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Abstract 
[Excerpt] The eighteenth edition of the Employment in Europe report is published at a moment when 
employment performance in the EU appears to be picking up. Nevertheless, progress over recent years 
towards the Lisbon and Stockholm employment rate targets for 2010, although encouraging with respect 
to women and older workers, remains insufficient overall and greater efforts are needed to provide the 
right impetus for further improvement. This is why, at the Spring 2006 European Council, Heads of State 
and Government reiterated the need for more effective and comprehensive implementation of the 
European Employment Strategy, particularly by emphasising a number of aspects, such as an adequate 
balance between security and flexibility in the labour market (i.e. “flexicurity”), mobility, education and 
skills, and a life-cycle approach to labour force participation. 
The need for increasingly adaptable European labour markets reflects a rapidly changing economic 
environment characterised by phenomena such as globalisation; the ageing of European societies; and 
the development of segmented labour markets. These key challenges require that Member States identify 
and carry through comprehensive reforms aimed at improving the balance between flexibility and security 
in their labour markets. In order to improve employment outcomes and facilitate broader social 
acceptance, the pathways to higher “flexicurity” must be comprehensive and include four key elements – 
flexible contractual arrangements; effective active labour market policies; credible lifelong learning 
systems; and modern social security systems combining the provision of adequate income support with 
the need to facilitate labour market mobility and transition. 
Against this background, the current edition of Employment in Europe addresses a number of politically 
prominent issues. The main conclusions are: 
• Significant synergies/complementarities exist between flexibility and security outcomes in the labour 
market, for instance between employment rates and income equality. 
• There is a need for furthering the culture of active labour market policy evaluation, using both the micro- 
and macro-economic approaches. 
• Economies close to the technology frontier need to focus more on creating new technologies by 
allocating a higher share of resources to tertiary education and fostering a highly adaptable work force. 
• Geographic mobility is a crucial element in the strategy to cope with the current labour market 
challenges, but it has to be combined with other relevant policies, such as education and immigration 
policies, in order to provide an efficient and consistent policy response. 
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5
The eighteenth edition of the Employment in Europe report is published at a moment when employment performance in the
EU appears to be picking up. Nevertheless, progress over recent years towards the Lisbon and Stockholm employment rate
targets for 2010, although encouraging with respect to women and older workers, remains insufficient overall and greater
efforts are needed to provide the right impetus for further improvement.  This is why, at the Spring 2006 European Council,
Heads of State and Government reiterated the need for more effective and comprehensive implementation of the European
Employment Strategy, particularly by emphasising a number of aspects, such as an adequate balance between security and
flexibility in the labour market (i.e. “flexicurity”), mobility, education and skills, and a life-cycle approach to labour force
participation. 
The need for increasingly adaptable European labour markets reflects a rapidly changing economic environment charac-
terised by phenomena such as globalisation; the ageing of European societies; and the development of segmented labour mar-
kets. These key challenges require that Member States identify and carry through comprehensive reforms aimed at improv-
ing the balance between flexibility and security in their labour markets. In order to improve employment outcomes and facil-
itate broader social acceptance, the pathways to higher “flexicurity” must be comprehensive and include four key elements –
flexible contractual arrangements; effective active labour market policies; credible lifelong learning systems; and modern
social security systems combining the provision of adequate income support with the need to facilitate labour market mobil-
ity and transition.
Against this background, the current edition of Employment in Europe addresses a number of politically prominent issues.
The main conclusions are:
• Significant synergies/complementarities exist between flexibility and security outcomes in the labour market, for instance
between employment rates and income equality.
• There is a need for furthering the culture of active labour market policy evaluation, using both the micro- and macro-eco-
nomic approaches.
• Economies close to the technology frontier need to focus more on creating new technologies by allocating a higher share
of resources to tertiary education and fostering a highly adaptable work force.
• Geographic mobility is a crucial element in the strategy to cope with the current labour market challenges, but it has to
be combined with other relevant policies, such as education and immigration policies, in order to provide an efficient and
consistent policy response.
The findings of this issue of Employment in Europe will, like in previous years, provide an important analytical input into
the Commission's policy considerations during the coming months. I strongly recommend this report to you, as I believe that
it provides an important insight into some of the key employment issues facing us in the EU today. We will have to contin-
ue to address these issues through joint efforts both at the level of Member States and at the level of the EU.
Vladimír Špidla
Foreword by the Commissioner
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Despite the deceleration in economic
growth in 2005 …
… there was a moderate improvement
in EU employment performance,
althrough labour productivity growth
slowed down.
Recent progress towards the overall
2010 Lisbon employment rate target
has continued to be slow, but general
progress towards the female and older
people's targets is encouraging.
Strong disparities in labour market out-
comes across Member States persist.
Across the EU, overall employment per-
formance in 2005 was generally posi-
tive at Member State level, …
…. reflecting continued strong employ-
ment expansion for women and older
workers, but also for prime-age men in
Compared to 2004, economic growth in the EU decelerated in 2005, mainly due
to the impact of the sharp rise in oil prices. GDP growth averaged 1.6% for the
year as a whole, down from 2.4% in 2004. However, this appears to be only a tem-
porary deceleration.
Despite the deceleration in economic growth, employment growth in the EU con-
tinued to recover gradually from the low in 2003, but remains well down on the
levels observed in the late 1990s and 2000. Employment growth averaged 0.9%
for the year as a whole, up on the previous year’s level of 0.5%. Reflecting the
moderate improvement in labour market conditions, the employment rate in the
EU increased to 63.8% in 2005 (from 63.3% in 2004), while the unemployment
rate declined to 8.7%, down from 9.1% the year before. However, although mod-
erate, there was a generalised decline in labour productivity growth in 2005, and
the EU continues to underperform relative to the US, both in terms of employment
and productivity growth. 
Progress towards the overall Lisbon employment rate target for 2010 has contin-
ued to be slow and reaching this target is becoming increasingly challenging. Nev-
ertheless, recent progress towards the female and older people's targets, especial-
ly during what has been a period of low economic growth in general, is rather
more encouraging. The average employment rate for the EU rose by 0.5 of a per-
centage point in 2005, while that for women rose by 0.6 percentage points to
56.3%. For older people (aged 55–64) the employment rate increased substantial-
ly by 1.5 percentage points to 42.5%, indicating a rebound from the relatively lim-
ited increase in 2004. Employment rates among the young (aged 15–24) remained
unchanged from 2004, at 36.8%.
Much of the weak employment performance of the EU over recent years has been
due to the relatively poor labour market performance in Germany and Poland,
although recent figures indicate that the situation may be finally turning around in
those two Member States. At the same time, many of the southern EU Member
States remain well below the common EU employment targets, and still tend to
exhibit marked gender differences in labour market outcomes, together with large
disparities in the performance of labour markets at regional level. Better labour
market integration of migrants remains a challenge for many EU countries.
At Member State level, employment performance for the year as a whole was gen-
erally positive, with negative annual employment growth only in Germany and the
Netherlands. For the vast majority of Member States employment expanded in
2005, with growth of over 1% in ten countries. Particularly strong growth was
experienced in Luxembourg (2.9%), Spain (3.6%) and Ireland (4.7%). 
With regard to the characteristics of the expansion in employment between 2004
and 2005, growth continued to be faster for women than for men, although a
notable development was the upturn in the employment rate of prime-age males
Executive summary 
Moderate improvement in employment performance in the EU in 2005, despite the
slow down in economic growth
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(those aged 25–54) after several years of decline. The continuation of the positive
trend in the employment of older workers, and the strong rise in the share of part-
time employment and of employment under fixed-term contracts, were also
notable developments.
The skill profile of the EU working age population continues to improve, with
strong improvements particularly in the skill composition of the female compo-
nent, contributing to a more employable and adaptable workforce and in turn to
increased employment and participation rates. 
The high-skilled non-manual occupations have been the main driver for overall
increases in employment in recent years, accounting for the major part of employ-
ment expansion since 2000. This suggests an underlying improvement in the skill
level of those in employment, as well as reflecting the ongoing shift towards a
more knowledge-based economy. However, there are indications of a certain
degree of polarisation in the changes in occupational structure towards high-
skilled occupations and very low-skilled occupations, with a decline in employ-
ment of the skilled manual occupations.
There is a wealth of working arrangements in European labour markets, both in
terms of contractual and working hour arrangements, and with atypical working
hours not uncommon in most Member States. Recent data indicate varying trends
across Member States in the incidence of atypical working hour arrangements
such as night work and Sunday work, but a general reduction in the incidence of
shift work. Average working hours per employed person remain relatively high in
the new Member States, partly due to the low incidence of part-time work in those
countries, although there appears to be a continued generalised decline in average
working hours across EU Member States with few exceptions.
The employment growth prospects for 2006 and 2007 are similar to 2005.
Employment growth is forecast to increase only marginally in 2006, remaining
below the 1% level, and to stabilise at around 0.8% in 2007. The unemployment
rate is foreseen to fall gradually to 8.5% in 2006 and to decline further to 8.2%
in 2007.
The 2006 Annual Progress Report has called on Member States to seek a conver-
gence of views on a set of common principles on the combinations of flexibility
and employment security in the labour market (i.e. “flexicurity”). Flexicurity is a
response to the need to improve the adaptability of both workers and firms to a
rapidly changing labour market and to labour market segmentation. A segmented
labour market implies risks of increasing the precariousness of jobs, damaging
sustainable integration in employment and limiting human capital accumulation.
The 2006 Joint Employment Report highlights that a good balance between flexi-
bility and security can be achieved by the interaction of four key elements: a) suf-
ficiently flexible contractual arrangements; b) effective active labour market poli-
cies; c) credible lifelong learning systems; d) modern social security systems.
The term “flexicurity” was initially used to describe the successful combinations
of flexibility and security realised by the Danish and Dutch labour markets. How-
ever, flexicurity has then moved away from the description of specific national
contexts to become a tool to classify different labour markets. EU Member States
2005, and in the incidence of part-time
and fixed-term employment. 
The ongoing improvement in the skill
structure of the working age population
in recent years …
…is reflected in the substantial rise in
employment in high-skilled non-manual
occupations.
There are mixed trends in the incidence
of atypical working time arrangements
but a generalised decline in shift work
and in working hours per employed
person.
Prospects of ongoing employment
growth, albeit at relatively modest lev-
els, and further decline in unemploy-
ment.
“Flexicurity” has gained importance in
the EU policy debate.
“Flexicurity” has moved away from the
description of specific national con-
texts to become a tool to classify differ-
ent labour markets.
Flexibility and security in the EU labour markets
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Stringent EPL tends to reduce the
dynamism of the labour market, wors-
ening the prospects of the groups “at
the margin”… 
…but deregulation “at the margin”
only tends to favour the creation of seg-
mented labour markets.
Well-designed unemployment benefit
systems seem to perform better as an
insurance against labour market risks. 
EU Member States can be grouped in
different “flexicurity” models…
… but political economy constraints
can make regime change problematic…
can be grouped into several flexicurity regimes based on the mix of one dimension
of flexibility (external flexibility) and one dimension of security (income/employ-
ability security). However, further work will be needed to include other dimen-
sions, in particular internal and functional flexibility.
External flexibility refers to the ease of hiring and firing workers, and the use of
flexible forms of labour contracts. This has been measured by the OECD's indica-
tor on the strictness of employment protection legislation (EPL). Both theoretical
and empirical findings suggest that stringent EPL, while having an ambiguous or
limited impact on total unemployment and employment, worsens the employment
prospects of women, youths and older workers. It can also slow down the flow of
labour between different jobs making the labour market less dynamic and increas-
ing the average duration of unemployment spells. 
In recent years, certain Member States have increased external flexibility “at the
margin”, chiefly by easing EPL for temporary contracts only, while keeping strin-
gent rules for regular contracts largely intact. This has favoured the development
of two-tier labour markets in which the brunt of adjustment to shocks falls on
employees under atypical contractual forms (e.g. fixed-term contracts). This has
led to precarious employment and a lack of adequate provision of training for
workers under atypical contracts, with negative impact on productivity. “Flexicu-
rity” would rather call for a simultaneous easing of rules on both regular and atyp-
ical contracts as a way to provide for improved flexibility in the labour market. 
EPL and unemployment benefit (UB) can be seen as two different ways of protect-
ing workers against labour market risks. Empirical studies suggest that workers
feel better protected by UB than by EPL. Relatively high UB tends to be associat-
ed with longer spells in unemployment, inter alia, because of the decline in the
intensity of job search. However, this can be largely offset by setting efficient acti-
vation strategies that coordinate UB administration with active labour market poli-
cies (ALMPs). A possible reform strategy could be to “trade” more flexible EPL
for higher transfers to the unemployed both in the form of income compensation
(i.e. passive labour market policies) and active measures (ALMPs). 
The “flexicurity” debate emphasises the importance of interactions between labour
market policies and institutions. In line with well-established theoretical results and
statistical procedures, EU Member States are clustered on the basis of a limited num-
ber of dimensions (or axes) to characterise national labour markets. This classifica-
tion suggests the presence of three major axes, which can be broadly interpreted as
representing: a) (external numerical) flexibility/employability; b) security; and c) tax
and social security contributions burden. A key finding of this analysis is that there
are significant synergies between the flexibility/employability and security axes in
terms of labour market outcomes. A high country score on both the flexibility and
security axes is positively correlated with favourable outcomes for socio-economic
variables, such as higher employment rates and a more equal distribution of income. 
The political feasibility of reform packages improving the combinations of flexi-
bility and security can be enhanced by negotiations in the framework of (tripartite)
social dialogue. However, the largely compensatory nature of “flexicurity”
reforms (i.e. loosening EPL in exchange for both higher and better spending on
LMPs) may make their implementation problematic, because of the implied
increase or shift in government expenditure, together with the necessary gains
required in the efficiency of public administrations. 
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A number of policies consistent with “flexicurity” have also been proposed or
implemented that may not involve significant increases in government expendi-
ture. Such policies included: a) setting up individual and portable unemployment
accounts; and b) replacing all types of labour contracts by a single one, lowering
firing costs and creating a layoff tax to fund UB and public employment services
(PES). These measures/proposals illustrate that there can be different pathways to
improving the combination of flexibility and security – as concrete solutions
depend on particular national circumstances and policy choices that can eventual-
ly yield equivalent socio-economic outcomes. 
In the context of the current “flexicurity” debate and according to the conclusions of
the Spring 2006 Council, effective active labour market policies (ALMPs) – sup-
porting transitions between jobs as well as from unemployment and inactivity to jobs
– is one of the ingredients essential to achieve a good balance between flexibility and
employment security while reducing the risk of labour market segmentation. 
Both the European employment strategy (EES) and the OECD Jobs Strategy have
recommended the following actions. Firstly, to shift resources from passive LMPs
(i.e. those concentrating in providing income support) to active LMPs (i.e. those
attempting to improve the labour market prospects of participants); and secondly,
to take better account of the interactions between ALMPs and tax and benefit sys-
tems, preferably in the framework of activation strategies, in order to increase the
effectiveness of ALMPs.  
Average spending on LMPs in EU Member States totalled just over 2% of GDP
during the period 1985–2004, with a small downward drift emerging after the mid-
1990s. There is a wide variation in spending across countries, ranging from a low
of under 0.5% in the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia and the
UK, to a high of 4.4% in Denmark in 2004. In the EU, the share of expenditures
on active measures accounts, on average, for approximately one-third of total LMP
spending. This indicates that EU Member States have not made any significant
progress on shifting resources from passive to active measures, despite the
declared intentions of many governments.
The effectiveness of ALMPs is usually evaluated using either micro- or macro-
econometric techniques. The large majority of programme evaluations use micro-
econometric techniques to measure the impact of participation in the programme
on subsequent employment and/or earning prospects. However, assuming ade-
quate data availability, use of a general equilibrium/macro framework is preferable
to a partial equilibrium/micro approach, as the former is capable also of measur-
ing indirect and long-run effects, which might lead to a reversal of the policy con-
clusions drawn from the micro-econometric evaluation.
Overviews of programme evaluations, including a recent meta-analysis of more
than 100 studies conducted in Europe, find the following: training has a modest
likelihood of making a positive impact on post-programme employment rates. In
contrast, spending on employment incentives and PES is associated with signifi-
cantly better outcomes. The evidence suggests that job search assistance pro-
grammes in general, and activation policies in particular, rank highly among the
more cost-effective ALMP measures in terms of helping the unemployed find a
job and keep it. Programmes involving direct job creation in the public sector are
…and different policy options seem to
be compatible with “flexicurity” princi-
ples.
Effective active labour market policies
are a key element for successful imple-
mentation of “flexicurity” principles.
The EES emphasises both the need to
strengthen spending on active policies
and make them more effective. 
Expenditure on active measures
accounts for about one-third of total
spending on LMPs.
The effectiveness of ALMPs is assessed
using either micro- or macro-econo-
metric techniques.
Micro-econometric evaluations suggest
that spending on training is relatively
ineffective, while employment incen-
tives and PES are associated with the
most favourable post-programme
employment outcomes.
Effective European Active Labour Market Policies
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In contrast, macro-econometric studies
usually find training as the most effec-
tive category of ALMP. This paradox
could be solved by extending the obser-
vation period to include the medium- to
long-term effects of training. 
Interactions between LMPs can have a
significant impact on the effectiveness
of active measures and affect labour
supply.
Despite recent progress, an evaluation
culture for labour market policies
needs to be further developed to make
active policies more effective.
Human capital is at the heart of the 
Lisbon Strategy but investment in a
high-skilled workforce has been rather
disappointing.
Some growth models treat human capi-
tal as an additional input in the produc-
tion function, alongside physical capi-
tal and labour …
… while other models link the stock of
human capital to the creation and
absorption of new technologies.
even less likely to show a positive impact on post-programme employment out-
comes than training programmes. 
The results of micro-econometric evaluations and of the few macro-econometric
studies available are somewhat contradictory. Macro-econometric studies usually
find that training is the only category of ALMP that seems to have a significant
positive impact on aggregate labour market outcomes. This paradox could be
solved by extending the observation period to include the post-participation effects
of training. In practice, evaluations of training programmes often find a negative,
or only a slight positive, effect on participants’ outcomes during the first year or two
after participation. However, after that initial period, a growing number of follow-
up studies have found evidence of a positive impact attributable to training. 
In order to explore synergies and make active policies more effective, it is impor-
tant to consider the interactions between active and passive LMPs. The disincen-
tive effects of relatively high and long-lasting unemployment benefits on labour
supply can be, at least partially, counteracted by adopting well-designed ALMPs.
In recent years EU Member States have preferred to counterbalance some of the
disincentive effects of UB/welfare systems by introducing comprehensive activa-
tion strategies that coordinate public UB administration with expenditure on
ALMPs. 
Although the situation in Europe is rapidly improving as the practice of conduct-
ing evaluations becomes more widespread, development of an evaluation culture
for labour market policies is still in its infancy in many EU Member States. Eval-
uating the effects and monitoring the implementation of ALMPs are important
steps in the process of improving policy design in order to secure better results. 
Human capital together with technology have been put at the heart of the Lisbon
Strategy with the aim to increase EU productivity in the context of the knowledge-
based economy. However, particularly investment in a high-skilled workforce has
been rather disappointing. Currently, the EU allocates approximately 1.2% of its
GDP in higher education compared with nearly 2.9% in the US. This underinvest-
ment in a high-skilled workforce has been seen as one of the main reasons behind
the relatively slow growth in Europe in the past years. The 2005 revised Lisbon
Strategy and the subsequent Integrated Guidelines for Growth and Jobs
(2005–2008) have thus placed an even stronger emphasis on the need to invest
more in human capital through better education and skills.
Several models in the existing economic literature link human capital to econom-
ic growth and they broadly follow two main approaches. A standard approach
treats human capital as an additional input in the production function, alongside
physical capital and labour. In this approach, growth is driven by the accumulation
of human capital. Consequently, differences in growth rates across countries can
be explained by differences in the rates at which these countries accumulate
human capital. This implicitly considers education as affecting the workers' pro-
ductivity in the same way, regardless of the type of job they perform.
In the second approach, growth is driven by the stock of human capital, which
determines the capacity of a country to create new technologies and to absorb new
technologies developed in other countries. This alternative approach sets out to
Human capital, technology and growth in the EU Member States
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explain the difference in growth rates between countries in terms of differences in
human capital stocks, thus in the ability of countries to create and absorb new
technologies. It sees education as especially important for jobs requiring innova-
tion and adaptation to change, which are growing fast in a knowledge-based econ-
omy. A skilled workforce is better at creating and absorbing new technologies and
therefore at generating technological progress. 
Since human capital and technology are seen as key determinants of EU's produc-
tivity, this alternative approach has been adopted to examine empirically the growth
effects of a high-skilled workforce through technological progress in the EU Mem-
ber States. However, especially in a knowledge-based economy where technologi-
cal progress can create an economic imbalance, it is not only the level of human
capital or its composition but also adaptability that matters for economic growth.
Adaptability of workers is crucial for effective reallocation of resources in response
to changes in economic conditions. Although the capacity to adapt to change is one
of the main features of a well-educated workforce, it is reasonable to assume that
the degree of adaptability of the workforce is sensitive to the forms of work organ-
isations workers face. Consequently, the growth effects of a skilled workforce may
have different magnitudes depending on whether the work environment is designed
to encourage the effective use of the adaptability of the skilled workers for techno-
logical progress.
To assess these assumptions, a model using panel data in 14 EU Member States
with observations for every five years between 1960 and 2000 is used. It estimates
the impact of high-skilled labour, measured here in terms of fraction of adult pop-
ulation with tertiary education in total adult population, on technological progress.
An important distinction is made between the impact of high-skilled labour on a
country's capacity to innovate and on its ability to catch up with the technology
leader. The speed of the latter is a function of both the proportion of high-skilled
workers in the workforce and its distance to the technology frontier. As a country
nears the technology frontier the impact of technology adoption weakens and the
ability to innovate domestically gains importance. The results suggest a positive
impact of skilled labour on the ability of EU Member States to create domestical-
ly new technologies and to absorb technologies developed abroad.
The empirical results also support the assumption that the effects on technological
progress will be more significant in countries that are closer to the technological
frontier and where the working environment supports the capacity of high-skilled
workers to adapt to changes in economic conditions.  Indeed, a combination of a
high-skilled workforce and a flexible working environment enhances the ability of
countries to create new technologies.
Geographic labour mobility of EU citizens remains a limited phenomenon both
relative to the total EU population and compared to migration from third countries
to the EU. Currently, less than 2% of EU working age citizens live in another EU
Member State, the biggest majority of them from the old 15 Member States. This
is less than 20% of the total foreign-born labour force of the EU. There are never-
theless, substantial differences across Member States.
Current labour mobility flows are low, with official statistics showing only 0.1%
of the EU-15 national labour force changing its place of residence from one Mem-
In a knowledge-based economy, a high-
skilled and adaptable workforce is
essential for growth.
An estimation of panel data from 14 EU
Member States suggests the importance
of a skilled workforce for technological
progress through technology creation
and absorption …
… but a working environment facilitat-
ing adaptability matters too in coun-
tries close to the technology frontier.
The overall share of EU workers living in
another Member State is relatively small,
but varies from country to country.
Annual cross-border mobility flows
between EU-15 countries are low and
Geographic mobility within the EU
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ber State to another every year. Mobility rates with respect to flows of workers
from the EU-10 to the EU-15 after enlargement have been limited according to the
evidence so far and the flow from EU-15 to EU-10 Member States has been large-
ly negligible.
Regional mobility within Member States is significantly higher than cross-border
mobility, although regional mobility rates between countries vary greatly and are
substantially lower in the new Member States compared with the old Member
States. Overall, geographic mobility rates in the EU are lower than in the US.
Although not as wide as sometimes claimed, the existing mobility gap with the US
suggests that there may be a potential for higher mobility in the EU.
Internationally mobile EU-15 citizens tend to work in high-skilled white-collar
positions and are significantly younger, better educated, mostly single and less
likely to have children than the total labour force and migrants from non-EU coun-
tries. Their skill level has increased since 2000, and there seems to be a trend to
higher mobility among older workers. 
Compared to their EU-15 counterparts, internationally mobile workers from the
EU-10 Member States are even younger, show a higher share of female workers
and are significantly less likely to be highly educated, but include a very high
share of medium-skilled persons. They are therefore less likely to be in high-
skilled positions, but have a substantially higher concentration in skilled blue col-
lar and elementary occupations, which would suggest their complementary role in
the host countries' economies.
The employment rates of mobile EU-15 citizens are very similar, if not higher than
those of the total working age population. Employment rates of EU-10 citizens
resident in the old Member States have increased considerably over recent years,
are close to those of the overall population and EU-15 movers, and substantially
higher than for non-EU nationals. 
Survey data on the intention of European citizens to move to another country in the
next five years indicate that cross-border mobility between the EU-15 Member
States is likely to increase somewhat but probably not greatly in the short and medi-
um term. Among the EU-8 countries, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and
Slovenia have expected mobility rates which are below that of most old Member
States. Expected mobility from the three Baltic countries and Poland is significant-
ly higher than that from the rest of the Member States, but this is unlikely to pose
major and lasting challenges for the labour markets of the receiving countries.
Looking at longer-term developments, demographics are likely to act as a brake on
mobility, particularly because of a decrease in the younger age group, which has
tended to be the most mobile.
Given the relatively low mobility levels in Europe, it is essential to further foster
the free movement of workers as one of the fundamental freedoms of European
citizens and for its contribution to a better functioning of labour markets. Efforts
to further reduce and remove existing legal and administrative barriers to mobility,
including the transitional arrangements for the free movement of workers from
new Member States, need to continue. However, even if all administrative barriers
and information hurdles to mobility were removed, the social, cultural, education-
al and infrastructure barriers to mobility would still remain as the main obstacles.
Tackling these obstacles will require policy actions aimed at fostering the integra-
tion and acceptance of newcomers, providing more attractive urban environments
mobility from the new to the old Mem-
ber States remains limited.
Regional mobility rates in the EU are
significantly higher, but comparisons
with the US still suggest a potential for
increase.
EU-15 movers are on average young,
highly educated, single, without chil-
dren and tend to work in high-skilled
white-collar positions. 
Mobile workers from the new Member
States tend to be even younger, with a
higher proportion of women, having
mostly medium skill levels and tending
to work in complementary sectors and
occupations.
Employment rates of EU-10 movers are
still lower than the average of EU-15,
but have been improving rapidly.
Data show some limited increase in
expected future mobility for most coun-
tries. Expected mobility levels from the
EU-8 countries to the old Member
States are unlikely to pose problems for
their labour markets. 
Efforts to increase geographic mobility
in the EU need to continue, both in
terms of further reducing legal and
administrative barriers and tackling the
social, cultural, educational and infra-
structure barriers. 
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and housing markets, improving language skills, raising educational levels, and
helping young people to gain first mobility experiences through studies or intern-
ships abroad.
Geographic mobility represents a crucial element in the strategy to cope with the
current and future labour market challenges in the enlarged EU. However, in order
to provide an efficient policy response to these challenges, policies on geographic
mobility need to be coupled with actions in the field of other employment poli-
cies, education and immigration.
The employment situation in the enlarged EU continued to improve in 2005
despite the slowdown in economic growth. Further progress was achieved in terms
of overall, female and particularly older worker employment rates; though reach-
ing the overall Lisbon employment target remains a major challenge. Increased
efforts will be needed in all three priority areas identified by the Employment
Guidelines; namely attracting and retaining more people in employment, increas-
ing labour supply and modernising social protection systems; improving the
adaptability of workers and enterprises; and increasing the investment in human
capital through better education and skills.
The conclusions of the last Joint Employment Report stressed the importance of a
comprehensive approach to reform in the face of rapid structural changes brought
about by ageing and globalisation. The findings of this year's Employment in
Europe corroborate this assertion. The Member States need to identify and imple-
ment appropriate combinations of policies enhancing both the flexibility and secu-
rity of their respective labour markets. While there is clearly no single flexicurity
solution for all, and adopted reforms will need to reflect the specific situation in
each Member State, a comprehensive reform approach encompassing all the key
elements – modern labour laws, active labour market policies, life-long learning
systems and modern social security systems – may not only deliver better employ-
ment outcomes, but also prove to be more politically feasible.
Looking in some more detail into the individual policy areas, this Employment in
Europe highlights the need to create a stronger culture of the evaluation of labour
market policies, to invest in a high-skilled and adaptable workforce, and to foster
the free movement of workers in the enlarged EU. These are some of the policy
actions that will be needed in order to progress toward fulfilling the objectives of
the European Employment Strategy within the broader framework of the re-
launched Lisbon Agenda.
Policies on geographic mobility need to
be put in context with other policies.
Despite further progress in the employ-
ment situation in the EU, reaching the
Lisbon target remains a challenge.
Member States need to identify and
implement comprehensive reform pack-
ages aimed at enhancing the flexibility
and security of their labour markets…
…in order to progress toward fulfilling
the EES objectives within the frame-
work of the renewed Lisbon Agenda.
Conclusions
1. Introduction
This chapter provides a detailed
overview of recent developments in the
European labour market up to 2005 and
compares them with developments in an
international context, in particular with
those in the US and Japan. The chapter
begins with an overview of recent
labour market performance, examining
the current situation and recent trends in
the EU set in a global perspective, and
reports on the short-term prospects for
the EU labour market in the year ahead.
It then focuses in more detail on the lat-
est developments in activity, employ-
ment and unemployment rates across
the individual Member States, with a
focus on progress with regard to the
Lisbon and Stockholm employment rate
targets. This is followed by an overview
of recent employment trends according
to type of employment and working
time arrangements, together with an
examination of the skill composition of
the workforce, of trends in the sectoral
and occupational structure of employ-
ment over recent years, of the continu-
ing disparities in labour market per-
formance at regional level, and of the
latest demographic trends, including
migration, and the labour market situa-
tion of non-EU nationals. The findings
reported in this chapter are based on
data available up to June 20061, while
many of the tables and charts include
data for the EU-15 aggregate to provide
a longer-term historical perspective.
2. Recent labour
market performance
2.1. EU labour market
performance in 2005 in a
global perspective
The expansion in the world economy
remained robust in 2005. Due to an
acceleration in economic activity in the
second half of the year, world GDP
growth for 2005 is estimated at 4.6%,
only slightly down on the recent high
of 5.1% observed in 2004. Particularly
strong growth was again observed in
certain emerging economies such as
China (9.9%) and India (8.0%). In the
US, economic activity remained
strong, reflecting continued buoyant
consumer spending and relatively
strong investment growth. GDP growth
was robust at 3.5%, although this was
down from 4.2% the previous year,
partly reflecting hurricane-related dis-
ruptions. In Japan, economic expan-
sion, at 2.7%, reached a five-year high
in 2005, up from 2.3% the year before,
with growth mainly driven by domestic
demand, although exports also made a
significant contribution.
As in the US, economic growth in the
EU slowed down in 2005 compared to
the year before, mainly due to the
impact of the sharp rise in oil prices2.
GDP growth averaged 1.6% for the
year as a whole, down from 2.4% in
2004, although this is expected to be
only a temporary deceleration
(Table 1). Indeed, over the course of
the year economic growth picked-up
from around 1.5% in the first half of
the year to around 1.8% in the second.
In 2005, employment growth in the EU
continued to recover gradually from
the low in 2003, despite the decelera-
tion in economic growth compared to
2004, but remains well down on the
levels observed in the late 1990s and
2000 (Chart 1). Employment growth
averaged 0.9% for the year as a whole,
up on the previous year’s level of 0.5%
(Chart 2). Reflecting the moderate
improvement in labour market condi-
tions the employment rate in the EU
rose to 63.8% (Chart 3), while the
unemployment rate declined to 8.7%,
down from 9.1% the year before.
In the US the labour market continued
to show strong signs of recovery.
Employment continued to expand at a
faster rate than in the EU, with growth
accelerating to 1.8%, up from 1.1% the
year before and approaching the rates
experienced at the end of the last cen-
tury. The unemployment rate fell to
just above the 5% level, down from
5.5% in 2004. In Japan, the turn-
around in the labour market observed
in 2004 continued in 2005. Employ-
ment growth was positive for the sec-
ond consecutive year, although, at
0.4%, much lower than in the EU and
the US, while the unemployment rate
fell from 4.7% to 4.4%.
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1 The figures in this chapter are based on the data available up to June 2006 and generally include data for the years up until 2005. Where “LFS”
is mentioned as the data source this refers to the spring results from the Labour Force Survey unless otherwise stated. Where “QLFD” is men-
tioned, this should be understood to mean either annual averages from national accounts or annual averages of quarterly data from the Labour
Force Survey, depending on the specific variable in question. Due to the transition to a quarterly survey, data for missing quarters for the LFS are
estimated by Eurostat until 2003. For further details on the data and the sources used, see the statistical annexes.
2 The average annual price (in US dollars per barrel) of Brent crude oil rose 43% compared to 2004.
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Table 1 – International Comparison of Key Indicators (2005)
EU-25 EU-15 USA Japan
Population (millions) 459 385 296 128
GDP (in 1000 million PPS, current prices) 10798 9822 10362 3274
GDP Growth, at constant prices (annual % change) 1.6 1.5 3.5 2.7
Employment Rate (as % of working age population) 63.8 65.2 71.5 69.3
Employment Growth (annual % change) 0.9 0.7 1.8 0.4
Unemployment Rate (as % of civilian labour force) 8.7 7.9 5.1 4.4
Source: GDP and employment growth from Commission's Spring 2006 Economic Forecasts and QLFD, Eurostat. GDP in PPS from
AMECO database, Commission Services. Employment rate from QLFD, Eurostat and OECD data for US and Japan. Unemployment
rate from the harmonised unemployment series, Eurostat. Population from demographic statistics, Eurostat.
Note: Employment rates for the EU and Japan refer to persons aged 15-64; US employment rate refers to persons aged 16 to 64.
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2.2. Recent general labour
market developments in
the EU
2.2.1. Employment growth across
Member States in 2005
Employment growth for the EU as a
whole continued to improve during
2005, a development reflected across
the vast majority of Member States
(Table 2). Only Finland, Germany and
Italy experienced a significant decline
in growth, with rates for the latter two
turning negative during the course of
the year. 
Among the larger Member States,
employment growth continued to be par-
ticularly strong in Spain where it acceler-
ated over the course of the year to reach
3.7% by the last quarter (Chart 4). In
contrast, growth in Italy fell from around
the 1% level in the first quarter to turn
negative from the third quarter onwards,
thus continuing the recent broad trend of
declining employment growth in that
Member State. Growth in Germany,
which had seemed to be back on a posi-
tive track following a resumption in
growth in 2004, fell back into negative
territory from the second quarter of 2005
onwards. In France, employment expan-
sion remained subdued, continuing the
lacklustre labour market performance of
recent years, but nevertheless showed a
moderate improvement over the course
of the year. Meanwhile growth in the UK
remained relatively robust at around the
1% mark for most of 2005, similar to
previous years, before dropping to 0.6%
in the last quarter.
Among the remaining Member States,
almost all experienced a clear improve-
ment in their employment situation
compared to the previous year. Several
Member States that had experienced
spells of employment contraction in
2004 saw a strong upturn in growth over
2005 (Austria, Denmark, Estonia,
Employment in Europe 2006
Source: Eurostat, QLFD quarterly results.
Note: No quarterly employment growth data from QLFD for EL, PL and PT.
Table 2 – Annual change in employment growth, by quarter, over 2002 to 2005 
(% change compared to same period of previous year)
2002q01 2002q02 2002q03 2002q04 2003q01 2003q02 2003q03 2003q04 2004q01 2004q02 2004q03 2004q04 2005q01 2005q02 2005q03 2005q04
BE 0.1 0.2 -0.4 -0.5 -0.1 -0.1 -0.3 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.7 0.9 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.8
CZ -0.1 0.8 1.2 1.1 3.7 3.4 2.7 2.8 0.1 0.0 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.9
DK -0.2 0.2 0.2 -0.4 -0.7 -1.5 -1.3 -1.4 -0.4 -0.2 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.8 0.8 1.0
DE -0.1 -0.4 -0.7 -1.1 -1.3 -1.2 -0.8 -0.5 0.0 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.0 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3
EE 1.9 0.9 1.3 1.0 0.1 1.3 2.0 2.3 2.3 0.5 -1.9 -0.9 0.5 2.7 2.3 2.5
EL : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :
ES 2.4 2.7 2.3 2.1 2.3 2.4 2.8 2.7 2.6 2.3 2.6 2.9 3.3 3.5 3.7 3.7
FR 0.9 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.2 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.4
IE 2.5 2.0 1.2 1.4 1.7 1.6 1.9 2.7 2.7 2.7 3.3 3.6 4.3 5.0 4.8 4.8
IT 2.1 2.0 1.1 1.1 0.5 1.8 1.6 2.1 1.3 1.1 -0.4 -0.6 1.0 0.3 -0.3 -0.1
CY 2.2 2.0 2.0 2.1 3.9 3.7 3.8 3.8 4.2 3.6 3.6 3.7 3.1 3.5 3.6 :
LV 0.6 1.3 4.5 2.7 1.6 1.5 0.6 0.5 0.9 1.8 0.3 1.5 1.3 0.6 1.3 2.9
LT 0.0 4.6 6.3 5.0 2.7 3.7 0.8 2.0 1.2 -2.4 -0.2 1.0 2.5 2.2 2.8 2.9
LU 4.1 3.1 2.3 2.2 1.7 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.7 2.3 2.5 2.5 3.0 2.8 2.9 2.9
HU -0.5 0.2 -0.1 0.6 0.5 1.4 1.6 1.6 0.7 -0.9 -1.2 -1.2 -0.6 -0.1 0.5 0.2
MT -1.2 0.5 1.4 1.6 3.3 1.1 0.2 -0.4 -1.3 -1.9 -0.5 0.5 1.6 2.0 1.7 0.8
NL 1.1 0.6 0.3 0.1 0.1 -0.4 -0.8 -1.3 -1.7 -1.6 -1.5 -1.0 -0.9 -0.5 -0.1 0.1
AT 0.2 -0.2 0.0 -0.5 -0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 -0.4 0.2 0.1 0.3 1.4 1.8
PL : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :
PT : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :
SI 1.6 1.5 1.3 1.7 -0.2 -0.1 -0.2 -0.4 0.0 0.2 0.7 0.8 0.6 0.8 0.8 0.8
SK -1.1 -0.6 -0.1 -0.3 2.0 1.7 1.5 2.0 -0.4 -1.0 -0.2 0.3 1.4 1.3 1.0 1.8
FI 1.2 0.8 1.0 0.9 0.5 0.4 0.0 -0.5 -0.6 -0.4 1.0 1.6 1.9 1.9 0.6 0.0
SE 0.4 0.3 0.1 -0.1 -0.5 0.0 -0.3 -0.6 -0.7 -0.8 -0.3 -0.3 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.9
UK 0.6 0.8 0.7 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.1 0.6 1.2 0.8 0.8 1.2 1.0 1.0 1.3 0.6
EU-25 0.7 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.9 0.8 0.9 0.8
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Lithuania, Malta, Slovakia and Swe-
den). In Ireland, already strong employ-
ment growth picked up even further,
while in the Netherlands the period of
employment contraction, which began
in the second quarter of 2003, had come
to an end by the close of 2005.
As a consequence of these develop-
ments, employment growth for the year
as a whole was positive for the majority
of Member States (Chart 5). Annual
growth was negative in only two coun-
tries (Germany and the Netherlands,
although due to the weight of the former
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this had a certain restraining effect on
overall growth for the EU), and then
only of the order of -0.2% to -0.4%, and
at a standstill in just two others (Hun-
gary and Portugal). For the other twen-
ty-one Member States employment
expanded in 2005, with growth of over
1% in ten countries. Particularly strong
growth was experienced in Cyprus
(3.3%), Spain (3.6%) and above all Ire-
land (4.7%). A further positive sign is
that annual employment growth turned
positive in Poland in 2005 following a
long period of employment contraction
in that country.
At EU level, employment creation
between 2004 and 2005 was again
characterised by greater employment
increases for women than for men,
while in terms of age, those of prime
working age (i.e. 25–54) accounted for
around two-thirds of the total increase
(Table 3). A significant development
was the strong contribution from prime
working age men in 2005, a marked
change from previous years and leading
to a more balanced composition of
growth by gender. Older workers aged
55–64 continued to account for a sub-
stantial share (just under one-third) of
the overall rise in employment, in con-
trast to the negligible change in
employment levels for younger people
aged 15–24. Focussing on types of
employment, part-time employment
was a major factor in employment
expansion, accounting for almost two-
thirds of the rise in overall employ-
ment, while fixed-term employment
was associated with almost half the
increase in employment among
employees.
2.2.2. Overall trends in
unemployment
Over the course of 2005 the overall
unemployment rate for the EU-25 con-
tinued the fall that had started from the
first quarter of 2004, when the rate
peaked at 9.2% (Chart 6). By the first
quarter of 2006 it had fallen to 8.4%,
the same level as the minimum
achieved in the first half of 2001, and
with the number of persons in unem-
ployment being just under 19 million.
At that time the (seasonally adjusted)
unemployment rate ranged from as low
as just over 4% in Denmark, Ireland
and the Netherlands to as high as
15.7% in Slovakia and 16.9% in
Poland.
Similarly, declines in the unemploy-
ment rate were observed in the US and
Japan. In the US the unemployment
rate continued to fall over the course
of 2005 and into 2006, having peaked
at 6.1% in the second quarter of 2003.
By the first quarter of 2006 it had fall-
en below the 5% level to 4.7%, but
nevertheless remained some 0.8 per-
centage points above the minimum of
3.9% attained in the fourth quarter of
2000. Unemployment rates in Japan
had fallen to 4.2% by the first quarter
of 2006, down from the peak of 5.4%
in early 2003. As a result of these
developments the gap between the
EU-25 unemployment rate and those
of the US and Japan remained around
4 percentage points – little changed
from 2004.
2.2.3. Developments in
productivity growth
Reflecting the temporary slowdown in
economic growth in 2005 and the
moderate recovery in employment,
average labour productivity growth (in
terms of GDP per person employed)
for the EU declined to 0.9%, down
from 2.0% the previous year and
returning to the low levels of the pre-
vious years 2001–2003 (Chart 7).
Although moderate, this generalised
decline in labour productivity growth
contrasts with the upturn observed in
2004, which was essentially a cyclical
rebound. Labour productivity also fell
sharply in 2005 in the US, down from
3.3% the year before to 1.7%, but
remained relatively stable in Japan at
2.3%. As a result of these develop-
ments, EU productivity growth
remained substantially below that in
the US and Japan, continuing the trend
observed since 2002.
Employment in Europe 2006
% contribution to employment 
creation 2004 – 2005
Sex and age
Women 15-24 negligible
25-54 32.6
55-64 20.6
All women 15+ 54.6
Men 15-24 negligible
25-54 30.6
55-64 11.0
All Men 15+ 45.4
Type of employment
Full-time versus Part-time Full-time 35.4
Part-time 64.6
% contribution to employment 
creation of employees 2004 – 2005
Permanent versus Permanent 54.2
fixed-term Fixed-term 45.8
Source: Eurostat, LFS spring results.
Table 3 – Contribution to employment creation between 
2004 and 2005 by sex, age and type of employment
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Considering productivity in terms of
GDP per hour worked, productivity
growth in the EU also declined sharply
in 2005, and also on this basis remains
below the growth rates observed in the
US and Japan (Chart 8). Even though
recent hourly productivity growth fig-
ures for the US peaked in 2003 and
have declined since, the rate remained
around twice that of the EU in 2005. 
At Member State level, strong produc-
tivity growth at rates well above the EU
average continued in the new Member
States other than Poland. Apart from
Germany, among the larger Member
States productivity growth was general-
ly subdued, and particularly weak in
Italy and Spain, continuing the trend of
recent years in these two Member
States (Table 4). In line with the overall
decline in productivity growth at EU
level, growth rates declined in the vast
majority of Member States compared
to the previous year. 
2.3. Short-term prospects
for the EU labour market
According to the European Commis-
sion’s 2006 Spring Economic Fore-
casts, the recovery in the EU economy
is expected to gather pace in 2006,
with GDP growth forecast to reach
2.3% for the year as a whole, some
three-quarters of a percentage point
higher than growth in 2005. Economic
growth is then expected to moderate
slightly and decline by 0.1 of a per-
centage point in 2007. 
The expectation is that the general
recovery in the EU will be supported by
a strengthening of domestic demand, in
particular increasing investment while
private consumption is forecast to grow
more moderately, reflecting the expect-
ed gradual improvement in the labour
market. Furthermore, external demand
is expected to be supported by the con-
tinued strong growth in the world econ-
omy, which is forecast to be sustained
for most of 2006, and to average 4.6%
for the year as a whole. However, there
is expected to be a moderation in
growth in the latter part of the year,
resulting from the strong increase in the
price of oil and other commodities cou-
pled with the effects of monetary tight-
ening across world regions. 
In the labour market, the moderate
response of employment to the upturn
in economic activity after the slow-
down of 2001–2003 continues, still
partly reflecting the effects of labour
hoarding during the slowdown but also
the relative weakness of the current
economic upswing and the effects of
the temporary deceleration in 2005.
Employment growth has now been rel-
atively low (under 1%) for four years
and has not picked up markedly since
the start of the general economic
upturn in mid-2003. Furthermore,
employment growth is forecast to
increase only marginally in 2006,
remaining below the 1% level, and to
stabilise at around 0.8% in 2007. The
unemployment rate is expected to fall
gradually to 8.5% in 2006 and to
decline further to 8.2% in 2007. 
Labour productivity growth in the EU
(in terms of real GDP per occupied per-
son) is expected to improve to 1.4% in
Employment in Europe 2006
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2006, up from the growth rate of 0.9 %
in 2005, and then to stabilise at 1.3% in
2007. Growth in productivity is expected
to be particularly low in Portugal and
Spain in 2006 (around 0.5%), but
strong in the Baltic States (over 5%)
and most of the other new Member
States.
Chapter 1. Panorama of the European labour markets
Source: Commission Services.
Table 4 – Annual productivity growth 2000 – 2005 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
BE 1.9 -0.4 1.7 1.0 2.0 0.3 1.9 -0.6 1.7 1.3 3.3 0.9
CZ 4.6 2.2 0.0 0.1 4.8 5.0 4.2 7.0 0.9 5.1 3.9 4.8
DK 3.1 -0.1 0.5 1.9 1.8 2.4 2.1 -0.6 0.9 2.2 2.6 1.5
DE 2.3 1.4 1.1 1.5 2.1 1.5 2.6 1.8 1.5 1.2 0.9 1.5
EE 11.0 5.6 5.6 5.8 7.7 7.9 n.a. 6.0 5.6 5.1 7.2 7.1
EL 4.6 5.4 3.7 3.4 1.7 2.2 4.0 5.2 3.7 3.4 3.0 2.0
ES 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.3 -1.2 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.8 0.5
FR 1.1 -0.3 0.1 1.1 2.3 0.9 3.8 1.0 3.1 1.5 2.4 1.0
IE 4.4 3.1 4.3 2.4 1.3 -0.1 4.6 3.7 5.5 3.7 1.7 0.6
IT 1.7 0.0 -0.9 -0.6 1.0 0.4 2.9 0.1 -0.2 -0.2 0.3 0.4
CY 2.7 1.9 1.0 0.9 2.3 2.2 n.a. -4.6 1.7 -0.2 1.4 2.2
LV 10.1 5.7 4.8 5.4 7.4 8.5 9.4 6.2 5.2 4.4 10.3 8.0
LT 8.3 10.1 2.6 8.0 7.1 4.7 n.a. 10.0 4.4 9.3 5.9 1.9
LU 2.7 -2.9 0.7 0.2 1.9 1.1 2.9 -2.0 1.2 1.5 4.0 1.1
HU 3.7 3.8 3.9 2.6 5.8 3.2 4.2 6.2 3.4 3.5 6.0 3.8
MT 4.0 -1.4 0.9 -3.5 -0.7 0.9 n.a. 1.6 1.4 -1.0 -4.7 4.0
NL 2.1 0.6 0.3 0.7 3.4 1.7 0.3 -0.1 0.7 0.5 3.3 1.3
AT 2.3 0.3 1.2 1.2 2.2 1.3 2.7 0.3 1.0 1.3 2.2 1.3
PL 5.8 3.4 4.5 5.1 3.9 0.9 n.a. 4.1 4.3 4.8 4.2 0.9
PT 2.1 0.3 0.4 -0.7 1.0 0.3 4.6 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.0 0.5
SI 3.3 2.2 1.9 2.9 3.7 3.1 2.6 1.8 5.1 2.5 6.5 2.1
SK 3.9 2.6 4.7 2.3 5.8 4.7 3.8 3.3 7.8 5.3 3.4 4.5
FI 2.7 1.1 0.7 1.7 3.1 1.6 3.6 2.1 1.0 2.1 2.8 2.1
SE 1.9 -0.8 1.8 2.0 4.3 2.4 3.3 0.6 3.3 3.2 2.9 2.2
UK 2.6 1.5 1.3 1.7 2.2 0.9 3.3 1.4 2.4 2.4 2.5 1.5
EU-25 2.4 1.0 0.9 1.0 2.0 0.9 n.a. 1.5 1.7 1.4 1.7 1.0
EU-15 1.9 0.6 0.6 0.9 1.9 1.0 2.6 0.9 1.5 1.2 1.6 1.1
US 1.6 0.5 2.7 2.8 3.3 1.7 2.4 2.0 3.0 3.2 3.1 2.1
JP 3.1 1.0 1.5 2.1 2.1 2.3 2.4 1.7 2.2 1.9 2.8 n.a.
Growth in GDP per person employed Growth in GDP per hour worked
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3. Labour market
situation in 2005 in
the enlarged EU
3.1. Employment rates and
the Lisbon and Stockholm
targets
3.1.1. Overall progress in relation
to the Lisbon and Stockholm
targets
In 2005 the EU continued to make
progress towards the Lisbon and Stock-
holm employment targets (Box 1), albeit
moderate other than for the older people's
target. Between 2004 and 2005 the aver-
age employment rate3 for the EU rose by
0.5 of a percentage point to 63.8%, simi-
lar to the increase recorded in 2004 and
despite the deceleration in economic
growth in 2005. The employment rate for
women rose by 0.6 percentage points to
56.3%, while that for men rose by a more
moderate 0.4 percentage points to
71.3%. As a result, the gender gap in
employment rates in the EU narrowed
further between 2004 and 2005, falling
by 0.2 of a percentage point to 15.0 per-
centage points. For older people (aged
55 to 64) the employment rate rose sub-
stantially, by 1.5 percentage points to
42.5%, indicating a rebound from the
relatively limited rise of 2004. Given the
above developments, in 2005 the overall,
female and older people’s employment
rates were around 6, 4 and 7.5 percentage
points below the respective Lisbon and
Stockholm employment targets for 2010
(Table 5). 
The relative weakness in employment
growth over the first half of this
decade, together with the rather limited
prospects for growth in 2006 and 2007,
means that achieving an EU employ-
ment rate of 70% by 2010 is becoming
increasingly challenging, although it
should also be recognised that in
absolute terms employment has
expanded significantly since 2000 and
that the overall employment rate has
risen despite the slowdown in econom-
ic growth which characterised much of
this period. According to recent labour
force projections prepared by the Com-
mission and the Ageing Working Group
attached to the Economic Policy Com-
mittee4 the overall employment rate of
the EU-25 is projected to rise to 67%
by 2010.
3 Defined as the share of employed persons aged 15–64 in the total population of the same age group.
4 A long-run labour force projection was recently prepared by the Commission and the Ageing Working Group attached to the Economic Policy
Committee as part of the project to produce common age-related expenditure projections. Using a baseline population projection supplied by
Eurostat, the labour force projections are based on an age-cohort methodology developed by the OECD and refined by DG ECFIN and the AWG. 
(http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/european_economy/2005/eespecialreport0405_en.htm)
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The Lisbon European Council of 2000
set a strategic goal, over the decade
2000–2010, for the EU “to become the
most competitive and dynamic knowl-
edge-based economy in the world,
capable of sustainable economic
growth with more and better jobs and
greater social cohesion”. It specifically
stated that the overall aim of employ-
ment and economic policies should be
to raise the employment rate to as close
as possible to 70% by 2010 and to
increase the employment rate for
women to more than 60% by the same
year, not least in order to reinforce the
sustainability of social protection sys-
tems. In addition to the 2010 Lisbon
targets, the Stockholm European
Council of 2001 set a new target of
raising the average EU employment
rate for older men and women (aged 55
to 64) to 50% by 2010. 
Recognising the limited progress
achieved so far towards these targets,
the European Council decided in 2005
to re-launch the Lisbon Strategy with-
out delay and refocus priorities on eco-
nomic growth and employment. As
part of this, a new set of employment
guidelines for the period 2005 to 2008
was adopted by the Council in July
2005 to reflect the renewed focus on
jobs, and they form part of the “Inte-
grated Guidelines” package also
adopted in 2005, which lays out a
comprehensive strategy of macroeco-
nomic, microeconomic and employ-
ment policies to redress Europe's weak
growth performance and insufficient
job creation. The employment guide-
lines continue to reflect the EU's over-
all goal of achieving full employment,
quality and productivity at work, and
social and territorial cohesion, and
advocate a lifecycle approach to work
that tackles the problems faced by all
age groups. The eight employment
guidelines fall under three broad areas
for action, namely to:
• Attract and retain more people in
employment, increase labour supply
and modernise social protection
systems;
• Improve adaptability of workers and
enterprises;
• Increase investment in human capi-
tal through better education and
skills.
Box 1 – Lisbon and Stockholm employment rate targets and the relaunched Lisbon Strategy
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It is estimated that between 2005 and
2010 employment of the working age
population would need to increase by
around 21 million in order to attain the
overall 2010 target, equivalent to an
employment growth of just over 2% per
year. This should be seen in the context
of employment creation for the work-
ing age population of around 8 million
over the first half of the decade as well
as the fact that forecast employment
growth5 is expected to lead to the cre-
ation of around 3.6 million new jobs in
the period 2006–2007. Similarly, to
meet the employment rate targets for
women and older workers, increases in
employment of around 6.5 million in
each of these population subgroups
would be necessary, although recent
trends in the employment rate increases
for these suggest that the chances to
5 Commission 2006 spring forecasts.
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Source: Eurostat, QLFD.
Note: The column “Gap below 2010 target” is for illustrative purposes only, since the 2010 target is a collective target for the EU
and not individual Member States. The symbol “>” indicates that the respective target has already been exceeded by the Member
States concerned.
Table 5 – Employment Rates in EU Member States in 2005 and progress towards the Lisbon and
Stockholm targets for 2010
BE 61.1 0.8 0.6 8.9 53.8 1.2 2.3 6.2 31.8 1.8 5.5 18.2
CZ 64.8 0.6 -0.2 5.2 56.3 0.3 -0.6 3.7 44.5 1.8 8.2 5.5
DK 75.9 0.2 -0.4 > 71.9 0.3 0.3 > 59.5 -0.8 3.8 >
DE 65.4 0.4 -0.2 4.6 59.6 0.4 1.5 0.4 45.4 3.6 7.8 4.6
EE 64.4 1.4 4.0 5.6 62.1 2.1 5.2 > 56.1 3.7 9.8 >
EL 60.1 0.7 3.6 9.9 46.1 0.9 4.4 13.9 41.6 2.2 2.6 8.4
ES 63.3 2.2 7.0 6.7 51.2 2.9 9.9 8.8 43.1 1.8 6.1 6.9
FR 63.1 0.0 1.0 6.9 57.6 0.2 2.4 2.4 37.9 0.6 8.0 12.1
IE 67.6 1.3 2.4 2.4 58.3 1.8 4.4 1.7 51.6 2.1 6.3 >
IT 57.6 0.0 3.9 12.4 45.3 0.1 5.7 14.7 31.4 0.9 3.7 18.6
CY 68.5 -0.4 2.8 1.5 58.4 -0.3 4.9 1.6 50.6 0.7 1.2 >
LV 63.3 1.0 5.8 6.7 59.3 0.8 5.5 0.7 49.5 1.6 13.5 0.5
LT 62.6 1.4 3.5 7.4 59.4 1.6 1.7 0.6 49.2 2.1 8.8 0.8
LU 63.6 1.1 0.9 6.4 53.7 1.8 3.6 6.3 31.7 1.3 5.0 18.3
HU 56.9 0.1 0.6 13.1 51.0 0.3 1.3 9.0 33.0 1.9 10.8 17.0
MT 53.9 -0.1 -0.3 16.1 33.7 1.0 0.6 26.3 30.8 -0.7 2.3 19.2
NL 73.2 0.1 0.3 > 66.4 0.6 2.9 > 46.1 0.9 7.9 3.9
AT 68.6 0.8 0.1 1.4 62.0 1.3 2.4 > 31.8 3.0 3.0 18.2
PL 52.8 1.1 -2.2 17.2 46.8 0.6 -2.1 13.2 27.2 1.0 -1.2 22.8
PT 67.5 -0.3 -0.9 2.5 61.7 0.0 1.2 > 50.5 0.2 -0.2 >
SI 66.0 0.7 3.2 4.0 61.3 0.8 2.9 > 30.7 1.7 8.0 19.3
SK 57.7 0.7 0.9 12.3 50.9 0.0 -0.6 9.1 30.3 3.5 9.0 19.7
FI 68.4 0.8 1.2 1.6 66.5 0.9 2.3 > 52.7 1.8 11.1 >
SE 72.5 0.4 -0.5 > 70.4 -0.1 -0.5 > 69.4 0.3 4.5 >
UK 71.7 0.1 0.5 > 65.9 0.3 1.2 > 56.9 0.7 6.2 >
EU-15 65.2 0.5 1.8 4.8 57.4 0.6 3.3 2.6 44.1 1.6 6.3 5.9
EU-25 63.8 0.5 1.4 6.2 56.3 0.6 2.7 3.7 42.5 1.5 5.9 7.5
2010 target
Total employment rate Female employment rate Older People's employment rate
70% More than 60% 50%
2005 Change Change Gap below 2005 Change Change Gap below 2005 Change Change Gap below 
2004 – 2005 2000 – 2005 2010 target 2004 – 2005 2000 – 2005 2010 target 2004 – 2005 2000 – 2005 2010 target
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reach the respective 2010 targets, or at
least make substantial progress towards
them, are more encouraging6. Indeed,
rates for women have risen by around 
3 percentage points since 2000 and for
older workers by around 6 percentage
points, despite this being a period of
low economic growth in general. How-
ever, continuing the long-term increas-
es in activity for women and older peo-
ple will be essential to achieving the
employment growth needed to meet the
targets, together with improving
employment opportunities for the low-
skilled. In this regard, removing
remaining disincentives to female par-
ticipation, continuing structural
reforms aimed at retaining older people
in the labour force longer and raising
skill levels, particularly for the less
skilled, are crucial. Efforts are also
required to improve the labour market
integration of young people, as high-
lighted in the European Youth Pact
adopted by the European Council in
March 2005.
3.1.2. Employment rate 
developments at Member State
level in 2005
Large variations remain in employ-
ment rates between EU Member
States. In 2005, these ranged from as
low as around 53% in Poland to close
to 76% in Denmark (Chart 9). In line
with the overall improvement in the
employment rate at EU level, rates
rose in the large majority of Member
States compared to 2004, most notably
in Estonia, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania,
Luxembourg and Poland where rates
all increased by more than one per-
centage point, and in particular Spain
where the rate increased by over 2 per-
centage points. Rates declined notice-
ably only in Cyprus and Portugal.
Among the large Member States, rates
remained essentially unchanged in
France, Italy and the UK, but rose 
0.4 percentage points in Germany. In
view of the apparent standstill in rate
increases in the former three, the turn-
around in the labour markets in Ger-
many and Poland in 2004 and 2005
following several years of decline are
particularly welcome.
Apart from Estonia, Finland and Swe-
den, employment rates for women
remain substantially below those for
men in EU Member States. Despite
the continuing reduction in the dispar-
ity between male and female employ-
ment rates at EU level, large gender
differences of more than 20 percent-
age points still remain in Cyprus,
Greece, Italy and Spain, while in
Malta the gap is around 40 percentage
points, reflecting the fact that in that
country only one in three women of
working age is in employment.
Notable disparities persist within the
EU between the employment rates of
different gender and age groups with-
in the working age population (Chart
10). Employment rates among the
young (those aged 15–24) averaged
6 The recent Commission and Ageing Working Group projections referred to above put the female employment rate at 60% in 2010, and that for
older workers substantially up at 47%.
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36.8% in 2005 at EU level, unchanged
from the year before and ranging from
25% or below in Greece, Hungary,
Lithuania, Luxembourg and Poland to
over 65% in the Netherlands. Similar
variation exists in the employment
rates for older people (aged 55–64),
which ranged from 27% in Poland to
almost 70% in Sweden. However,
while employment rates for older peo-
ple have risen strongly over recent
years in almost all Member States, in
contrast those for young people have
fallen substantially in a large majority,
although the latter partly reflects the
recent trend of higher participation in
education among youth.
3.1.3. Situation of individual
Member States in relation to
the Lisbon and Stockholm
targets
While the Lisbon and Stockholm
employment rate targets are collective
targets for the EU as a whole, it is
interesting to examine the position of
individual Member States with respect
to the collective EU targets for 2010.
Based on employment rates in 2005,
these can be summarised as follows:
• It is still the case that only four
Member States (Denmark, the
Netherlands, Sweden and the UK)
already meet the overall EU target
for 2010 of an employment rate of
70%, while five others (Austria,
Cyprus, Finland, Ireland and Portu-
gal) are presently within 3 percent-
age points (Chart 11). However, the
gap remains over 10 percentage
points in five countries, including
the large Member States of Italy and
Poland, which are currently around
12 and 17 percentage points respec-
tively below the EU target. Since the
launch of the Lisbon Strategy, the
greatest improvement in the overall
employment rate has taken place in
Spain where the rates has risen by 
7 percentage points. However, rates
have also declined in some Member
States, most notably in Poland.
• Nine Member States already meet
the 2010 employment rate target for
women, and six others are within
3 percentage points (Chart 12),
including France and Germany.
Among the remaining Member
States the gap remains above 10 per-
centage points in Greece, Italy and
Poland and as high as 26 percentage
points in Malta. Since 2000, large
increases in the female employment
rate have been achieved in Cyprus,
Estonia, Latvia and Italy, where
rates have all risen by around 5 per-
centage points or more, and above
all Spain (up 10 percentage points). 
• For the older people's 2010 employ-
ment rate target, eight Member
States already meet the target, but
only two others are within 3 percent-
age points of it (Chart 13). While
substantial gaps remain for many
Member States (being of the order
of 15 to 25 percentage points in
nine cases), since 2000 substantial
progress has been made towards the
target in many countries. In particu-
lar, sixteen Member States have
achieved increases of 5 percentage
points or more, with especially
strong rises (over 10 percentage
points) in Finland, Hungary and
Latvia. Only Poland and Portugal
have experienced declines in
employment rates for older people
since 2000, although for the latter
the rate is already high and above
the 2010 target.
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3.2. Activity rates
Despite the recent improvement in the
performance of the EU labour market,
the continued under-performance of the
EU economy relative to other similarly
advanced economies is due, in part, to
the fact that labour input remains rela-
tively low (Chart 14). In 2005, the
activity rate7 in the EU averaged 70.2%,
some 5 percentage points lower than in
the US and almost 11 percentage points
lower than its European neighbour
Switzerland.
This suggests that the EU has a substan-
tial reserve of unused labour, with con-
siderable scope for raising employment
further, especially among such groups
as women, older people and youth.
Raising employment rates to the targets
set by the Lisbon Council relies on
reducing unemployment and/or increas-
ing participation in the labour market.
In line with this, a core element of the
Integrated Guidelines for Growth and
Jobs, adopted by the Council in July
2005, concerns taking the necessary
steps to attract more people into the
labour market and to create more jobs.
The overall activity (or participation)
rate for the EU continued to rise in
2005, increasing by 0.5 percentage
points on the previous year and driven
by strong increases in Austria, Ger-
many, Ireland, Spain and Sweden. The
activity rates for the individual Member
States ranged from just over 58% in
Malta, with Hungary, Italy and Poland
also substantially (5 percentage points
or more) below the EU average, to as
high as just under 80% in Denmark
(Chart 15). Although rates for men and
women are rather close in certain
Member States such as Finland and
Sweden, large disparities remain in sev-
eral countries, in particular Greece,
Spain and Italy, and especially Malta,
implying there is still much scope for
increasing female participation in many
Member States.
Activity rates in the EU are extremely
age and gender specific. For young
(15–24) and older persons (55–64)
activity rates average 45%, well below
the rate for prime age workers (25–54)
at 84% (Chart 16). The main reason for
inactivity among young people is par-
ticipation in education, while retire-
ment is the main reason for inactivity of
older persons. Women are much more
likely to be inactive than men in all age
groups and in all Member States apart
from Finland and Sweden, with the EU
labour force survey indicating family
responsibilities as the main reason. In
2005, the difference between the activ-
ity rates for men (77.8%) and women
(62.5%) in the EU stood at 15.3 per-
centage points, slightly down on the
previous year and continuing the trend
towards closing the gap, largely driven
by rising female participation.
Continuing the rise in participation
rates observed over the late 1990s,
rates in the EU have increased by 
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7 The proportion of the total population aged 15–64 that is economically active (i.e. either in employment or unemployed).
1.5 percentage points since 2000
(Chart 17). This has been driven
almost entirely by the continued
underlying increase in female partici-
pation, which went up by 2.5 percent-
age points compared to only 0.4 per-
centage points for men. Strong contri-
butions to the activity rate increase
have come from females of prime-
working age and from older women
aged 55-64. For men the only contri-
bution has come from the older per-
sons group, since activity rates among
prime-age workers have not changed
compared to 2000 while those for
young men have declined. Youth activ-
ity rates have fallen by 1.3 percentage
points since 2000, with declines more-
or-less the same for men and women.
This reflects, at least in part, increased
participation in education8, which in
the context of building a competitive
knowledge-based economy, and given
that improved skill levels for youth
generally increases their chances to be
8 Within the EU the proportion of students in the 15–24 age group rose from 56.4% in 2000 to 60.5% in 2004 (Source: Eurostat, education statis-
tics), while the share of early school leavers (i.e. the percentage of the population aged 18 to 24 with at most lower secondary education and not
in further education or training) has declined from 17.7% in 2000 to 15.2% in 2005 (Source: Eurostat, structural indicators).
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in employment later on, could be seen
as a positive development. Further-
more, in contrast to the declining trend
of recent years, activity rates for youth
stabilised in 2005. Meanwhile activity
rates for older people aged 55–64 have
risen dramatically since 2000, up 6
percentage points on average, and
with a strong rise between 2004 and
2005 of 1.6 percentage points.
3.3. Unemployment
The unemployment rate for 2005 aver-
aged 8.7% for the EU as a whole,
down from 9.1% the year before.
Among the individual Member States,
rates went up in only six countries
compared to 2004, most notably Hun-
gary, Portugal and Sweden (all with
rates up of the order of 1.0 to 1.5 per-
centage points), and remained essen-
tially unchanged in a further six,
including the large Member States of
France, Germany and the UK. All the
other Member States recorded reduc-
tions in their unemployment rates,
with particularly strong falls (around
1.5 to 2.0 percentage points) in Esto-
nia, Latvia, Poland, Slovakia and
Spain, and most notably Lithuania
(down 3.1 percentage points).
Despite having achieved substantial
reductions in their unemployment rates
over recent years, those in Poland and
Slovakia remain comparatively high, at
17.7% and 16.3% respectively. Rates in
France and Germany (both at 9.5%)
were also above average in 2005,
although showing signs of stabilising
after the increases of recent years,
while the rate in Spain, traditionally a
country with relatively high unemploy-
ment, is approaching the EU average
following the substantial reduction in
unemployment compared to 2004.
Despite these developments, unem-
ployment remains high in the large con-
tinental European economies. In com-
parison, unemployment rates in 2005
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were as low as around 4–5% in Den-
mark, Ireland, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands and the UK (Chart 18).
At EU level the disparity in the average
unemployment rate between genders fell
noticeably between 2004 and 2005,
down from 2.2 to 1.9 percentage points,
with the actual unemployment rates at
7.9% for men and 9.8% for women in
2005. Nevertheless, large disparities
between unemployment rates for men
and women remain in several Member
States, especially Greece, Italy and Spain
where gaps in unemployment rates are
respectively 9, 4 and 5 percentage points.
However, in some Member States, name-
ly Estonia, Ireland, Latvia, Sweden and
the UK, unemployment rates for women
are actually lower than those for men.
For the first time in several years the
average youth unemployment rate in
the EU declined in 2005, down some
0.4 percentage points compared to
2004 and mainly driven by the reduc-
tions in most of the new Member
States (especially the Baltic States,
Poland and Slovakia) and Spain. How-
ever, at 18.5% the youth unemploy-
ment rate still remains around twice as
high as the overall unemployment rate,
pointing to an over-supply of relative-
ly low-skilled, inexperienced young
workers. Furthermore, large dispari-
ties are still evident across the Mem-
ber States (Chart 19), with rates above
20% in eight countries, and especially
high in Slovakia and Poland at around
30% and 37% respectively, but as low
as around 8.5% in Denmark, Ireland
and the Netherlands. 
Reversing the gradual rising trend
experienced since 2001, the long-term
unemployment rate9 in the EU fell
back to 3.9% in 2005, down from
4.1% the previous year. Several Mem-
ber States recorded strong falls in
long-term unemployment in 2005,
including the large Member States of
Germany and Spain, while rates con-
tinued to rise significantly only in
Hungary and Portugal.
Within the EU the long-term unemploy-
ment rate remains highest in Poland and
Slovakia, where around 10% and 12%
respectively of the labour force, or
around three times the EU average, are
affected (Chart 20). At around 5% it
also remains relatively high in Germany
and Greece. For the majority of Mem-
ber States, long-term unemployment
rates are higher for women than for
men, the EU averages being 4.5% and
3.5% respectively, with the largest gen-
der differences being found in Italy,
Spain, Poland and above all Greece.
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3.4. Features of EU
employment expansion
between 2000 and 2005
Despite the occurrence of the eco-
nomic slowdown in the early part of
the decade, compared to 2000
employment in the EU has expanded.
However, the increase in employment
between 2000 and 2005 has not been
uniform with respect to gender, age
and type of employment. In reality,
there are marked differences in the
trends in the labour market perform-
ance of the various elements of the
working age population (Chart 21)
and by type of employment arrange-
ment, as detailed below:
• Increasing female participation
In terms of gender, women have
accounted for the greatest growth in
employment, both in relative and
absolute terms. Indeed, the overall
increase in female employment has
been more than twice that for men.
This reflects the recent trend of ris-
ing labour market participation of
women, for whom activity rates
have increased from 60% to 62.5%
between 2000 and 2005 against an
increase in the male rate of only 
0.4 percentage points.
• Increasing participation of older
people aged 55–64
Relative to employment levels in
2000, growth has been greatest for
the 55–64 age group, where
employment has increased by
almost a quarter on 2000 levels. The
over 65s have also seen a substantial
relative increase. Even in absolute
terms the increase for the 55–64 age
group has been dramatic, account-
ing for almost half the overall
increase in employment and not far
below the total increase for the
whole prime working age group.
This reflects a 6 percentage point
increase in activity rates for those
aged 55–64 since 2000 and indi-
cates that developments such as
recent reforms in pension systems
that have postponed the statutory
retirement age and more generally
reduced incentives for early retire-
ment are taking effect and con-
tribute to the reversal of the
decrease in participation of older
workers in many Member States. 
• Declining youth employment
While the other age groups have all
experienced increases in employ-
ment, the 15–24 age group has wit-
nessed a contraction in employment
of around 4% since 2000, and with
activity rates falling from 46.5% to
45.2%. This development may be
partly explained by increased par-
ticipation in education since, as
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enrolment in education rises so
labour market participation falls,
while those young people who
remain in the labour market tend to
be the lowest skilled. Indeed, the
share of young people in education
has increased considerably in most
EU countries over recent years10,
impacting on labour force participa-
tion, although in the longer term the
implied improvement in human cap-
ital should have a positive effect on
overall employment performance
and the economy.
• Rising shares of part-time and
fixed-term employment
In terms of developments by type of
employment, the relative growth in
part-time and fixed-term employ-
ment since 2000 has been substan-
tial, with both increasing in the
order of 15–20%11. The extended
availability of part-time jobs has
facilitated the participation of
women in particular, by allowing
them to better combine work and
family responsibilities, although it
should also be recognised that part-
time work may have fewer fringe
benefits and career possibilities
than full-time jobs, and may to a
certain degree reflect the unavail-
ability of full-time work. Further-
more, although recourse to part-
time work may reflect personal
preferences and may help people to
(re)enter and stay in the labour mar-
ket, the high gender gap in the share
of part-time workers is also evi-
dence of differences of time use
patterns between women and men,
and of the role of carer predomi-
nantly assumed by women and the
greater difficulties they face in try-
ing to reconcile work and private
life.
• Improved skill structure of the
labour force
From 2000 to 2005 the share of low-
skilled people in the working age
population declined from 36.2% to
32.8% while that of the medium and
high skilled rose from 46.3% to
47.3% and from 17.6% to 19.9%
respectively12. This change in the
skill structure of the working age
population also contributed to the
increase in employment through
creating a more employable work-
force.
Other factors accounting for the
improvement in employment perform-
ance in Europe in recent years include
the reduction of disincentives to work
embedded in tax and benefit systems,
a stronger reliance on active labour
market policies, some reduction of the
tax burden on labour (especially for
the low skilled)13 and more generally,
a widespread wage moderation.
4. Recent
employment trends
according to type of
contractual
arrangement
4.1. Part-time employment
In 2005, 18.4% of workers in the EU
were in part-time employment. This
reflects a significant increase on the
previous year (when the share was
17.7%) and indicates a continuation in
the recent rise in the prevalence of this
more flexible form of employment.
The increase at EU level was mainly
driven by developments in Germany
and Spain, where the share of people
in part-time employment relative to
total employment rose 1.7 and 3.7 per-
centage points respectively. In con-
trast, the share of people in part-time
employment continued to fall or
remain unchanged in all the new
Member States other than Cyprus and
Malta.
Part-time employment has risen
noticeably in the EU in recent years
and has accounted for a larger contri-
bution (around 60%) to employment
creation post-2000 than full-time
employment (Chart 22). It also contin-
ues to be predominantly a feature of
female employment – even more so as
the increase in part-time employment
for women between 2000 and 2005
was more than twice the increase in
female full-time employment, as well
as in male part-time employment. In
2005, 32.3% of women in employment
in the EU had a part-time job com-
pared to only 7.4% for men, and for all
10 As reported on in section 6.2.2 (Trends in youth participation in the labour market) of Chapter 1 in Employment in Europe 2005
11 LFS spring data 2000 contain a relatively high share of no answers to the questions on part-time versus full-time employment and permanent ver-
sus fixed-term employment, hence only broad estimates of changes between 2000 and 2005 (with much fewer “no answer” responses) can be
given.
12 Low-skilled: those with education only at lower secondary level or below, medium skilled: those having completed upper secondary education,
high skilled: those having completed tertiary education.
13 An analysis of implicit tax rates relating taxes on labour to total compensation of employees in the EU shows a small reduction in the tax burden
on labour since the year 2000 (see European Commission (2006), Structures of the taxation systems in the European Union).
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Member States the share was higher
for women than for men (Chart 23). 
The share of part-time employment in
the Netherlands (46%) continues to be
much higher than for any other Mem-
ber State, with three-quarters of
female employment in that country
being part-time. Shares are also rela-
tively high (above 20%) in Austria,
Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Sweden
and the UK. However, within most of
the new Member States the overall
share of part-time employment
remains relatively low, and particular-
ly so in the Czech Republic, Hungary
and Slovakia where it is less than 5%. 
In the context of achieving the Lisbon
employment rate target for women, the
availability of part-time employment
is a key factor in raising female
employment rates, through facilitating
female labour force participation.
Indeed, figures from the EU labour
force survey indicate that family or
personal responsibilities are one of the
main reasons for working age women
choosing to work part-time, account-
ing for almost one third of women
employed part-time, while a further
28% indicate they do not want a full-
time job. At the same time around 19%
of females in part-time employment
indicate that they work part-time only
because they could not find a full-time
job. Nevertheless, a high share of part-
time work is not a necessary condition
for a high female employment rate, as
the cases of Finland and Portugal
show.
For the EU as a whole, the share of
part-time employment has risen by
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just over 2 percentage points between
2000 and 2005. This reflects underly-
ing strong increases in many Member
States, and especially Austria, Ger-
many, Italy, Luxembourg, the Nether-
lands, Spain and Sweden (Chart 24).
In general the new Member States
have not witnessed the same trend in
rising shares of part-time employment
as observed in most of the EU-15.
Rates in the former have generally
changed little, but the Baltic States
and the Czech Republic have even
declined. 
4.2. Fixed-term
employment
Employment contracts of a fixed-term
nature were held by 14.5% of EU-25
employees in 2005. While only 5% or
less of employees were employed
under such contracts in Estonia, Ire-
land, Malta and Slovakia in 2005, more
than a quarter of employees in Poland
and around a third in Spain worked
under fixed-term contract (Chart 25).
Unlike part-time work, f ixed-term
employment does not exhibit large
gender differences at EU level. In
2005 the average share of fixed-term
employment in the EU-25 was 15.0%
for women compared to 14.0% for
men. Furthermore, the gap is closing,
with the share for men increasing by
0.8 percentage points between 2004
and 2005 compared to a 0.7 percent-
age point rise for women. However,
there is still substantial variation at
individual Member State level. Gener-
ally the share of women in fixed-term
employment exceeds that for men,
most notably in Belgium, Cyprus and
Finland. Only in Austria, Estonia, Ger-
many, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania,
Poland and Slovakia were larger
shares of men employed on a fixed-
term basis than women in 2005. 
As in the preceding year, 2005 saw a
noticeable rise in the share of employ-
ees on fixed-term contracts (up 0.8
percentage points), confirming the
increase in the prevalence of this type
of employment from the period
2001–2003 when the share was static
at around 13.0%. However, since
fixed-term employment has a strong
business cycle component, the recent
increase in the share of fixed-term
employment may largely reflect a
cyclical rather than structural effect.
The increase in 2005 was mainly driv-
en by developments in Germany and
Poland, where the share of employees
in temporary employment rose around
2 and 3 percentage points respectively.
In Poland, the rise in such contracts
was a continuation of the marked trend
since 2000, where the share of
employees on fixed-term contracts has
risen sharply from around 6% to 26%
over this period, a much greater
change than in any other Member
State (Chart 26). However, the share
has also risen compared to 2000 in
most Member States, including the
other large continental Member States
with the exception of France, with the
result that at EU level, the share of
fixed-term employment has increased
by almost 2 percentage points since
2000, and accounted for almost half of
the employment creation among
employees between 2000 and 2005
(Chart 27).
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5. Working hours and
atypical working time
arrangements
Working hours and working time
arrangements are increasingly important
issues in today's labour markets, in par-
ticular with regard to their relation to
productivity, labour market flexibility
and quality in work. In principle they
potentially offer benefits both to employ-
ers and employees: on the one hand they
help firms to adapt labour input to their
production needs, while on the other
hand they allow employees to better
adjust the balance between work and pri-
vate commitments such as childcare and
care for other dependents (the so-called
“work-life balance”). At the same time
certain work practices such as very long
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working hours, night work and weekend
work may be at odds with the aim of
achieving greater productivity and quali-
ty in work through, for example, associ-
ation with less favourable working con-
ditions and increased work-related health
problems. Such considerations are of
topical importance in the current debate
on the need to improve the adaptability
of workers and enterprises, and in partic-
ular in the context of Employment
Guideline 21, which calls for promoting
flexibility through, among other meas-
ures, reviewing the different contractual
and working time arrangements in the
Member States and the promotion and
dissemination of innovative and adapt-
able forms of work organisation14.
5.1. Working hours
5.1.1. Long-term trends in
working hours
In general there is a long-term down-
wards trend in the EU in the average
annual number of hours worked per
employed person. Over the last two
decades the average hours worked per
person in employment have declined in
almost all EU Member States (with the
exception of Sweden) although the mag-
nitude varies across countries (Table 6).
Compared to 1983, large decreases in
hours worked have occurred in France,
Ireland and the Netherlands (and in Ger-
many compared to 1994), while all other
Member States (for which long time
series are available) have seen average
working hours per person in employ-
ment decline by the order of 5% or
more, except for Sweden and the UK. In
contrast, outside of Europe average
working hours have declined only much
more moderately in Australia, Canada
and the US, although in Japan a strong
fall similar to the most pronounced
cases in Europe has occurred. 
14 Chapter 4 shows indeed that the introduction of innovative and adaptable forms of work organisation can contribute to enhance productivity,
especially in the most advanced economies. 
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Source: OECD, Employment Outlook 2006.
Table 6 – Average annual hours worked per person in employment
1983 1994 2000 2005 % change % change
1983 – 2005 2000 – 2005
BE 1659 1551 1545 1534 -7.5 -0.7
CZ : 2043 2092 2002 : -4.3
DK 1669 1494 1554 1551 -7.1 -0.2
DE : 1543 1468 1435 : -2.2
EL 2152 2092 2080 2053 -4.6 -1.3
ES 1912 1816 1815 1775 -7.2 -2.2
FR 1759 1676 1592 1535 -12.7 -3.6
IE 1902 1824 1696 1638 -13.9 -3.4
IT 1946 1882 1855 1791 -8.0 -3.5
LU 1727 1663 1639 1557 -9.8 -5.0
HU 2112 2032 2061 1994 -5.6 -3.3
NL 1664 1362 1368 1367 -17.8 -0.1
AT : : 1632 1636 : 0.2
PL : : 1988 1994 : 0.3
PT : 1744 1691 1685 : -0.4
SK : 1854 1811 1791 : -1.1
FI 1823 1777 1750 1700 -6.7 -2.9
SE 1532 1621 1625 1587 3.6 -2.3
UK 1713 1737 1708 1672 -2.4 -2.1
US 1825 1842 1841 1804 -1.2 -2.0
JP 2095 1898 1821 1775 -15.3 -2.5
CAN 1780 1780 1766 1737 -2.4 -1.6
AU 1853 1875 1855 1811 -2.3 -2.4
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5.1.2. Working hours across EU
Member States in 2005
In 2005, average usual weekly working
hours15 (in the main job) among all
employees in the EU varied from 
29.6 hours in the Netherlands to 
41.2 hours in Latvia, and with the aver-
age for the EU as a whole being 
36.6 hours (Table 7 and Chart 28). The
low average in the Netherlands, which
is almost 5 hours below Germany, the
country with the next lowest average,
reflects the high share of part-time
employment in that Member State.
Average weekly working hours general-
ly remain higher in the new Member
States than among the EU-15 countries
(with the exceptions of Greece and Por-
tugal) and generally range from 2 to 
5 hours above the EU-15 average.
Much of the difference is due to the fact
that in the new Member States average
working hours for women are more
similar to those of men than is the case
in the EU-15 countries. In general, and
resulting from the fact that part-time
work remains predominantly a feature
of female employment, men work
longer hours on average than women,
the difference being 7 hours on average
for the EU as a whole but more than 
10 hours in the UK and the Nether-
lands. In contrast the gender difference
is much lower in the new Member
States.
Taking into account the full-time and
part-time contractual distinction,
weekly working hours in the main job
for full-time employees show consid-
erably less variation across Member
Employment in Europe 2006
All employees Full-time employees Part-time employees
Men Women Total Men Women Total Men Women Total
EU-25 39.8 32.8 36.6 41.3 39.1 40.4 19.0 20.1 19.9
EU-15 39.5 31.9 36.0 41.1 38.9 40.3 18.6 20.0 19.7
BE 38.6 31.3 35.3 39.8 37.6 39.1 24.0 23.2 23.3
CZ 41.7 39.2 40.6 42.1 40.5 41.4 23.0 24.1 23.8
DK 37.1 32.2 34.7 40.4 38.0 39.4 14.2 19.9 18.2
DE 38.7 29.6 34.4 40.5 39.2 40.1 15.3 17.8 17.4
EE 41.0 38.4 39.6 41.9 40.3 41.1 20.6 19.9 20.1
EL 41.4 38.3 40.1 41.8 39.8 41.0 22.7 20.5 21.1
ES 40.9 34.8 38.3 41.8 39.8 41.1 19.5 19.5 19.5
FR 38.9 33.3 36.2 39.8 37.8 39.0 22.6 23.3 23.2
IE 39.1 31.4 35.4 40.4 37.3 39.1 17.6 18.3 18.2
IT 39.9 33.1 37.0 40.6 36.9 39.2 21.2 21.7 21.6
CY 40.2 38.1 39.2 40.7 39.7 40.2 20.0 21.8 21.4
LV 43.1 39.2 41.2 43.7 41.1 42.5 23.9 21.3 21.9
LT 39.8 37.5 38.6 40.3 38.7 39.5 20.8 20.0 20.2
LU 39.9 32.6 36.8 40.3 39.9 40.2 23.6 21.1 21.3
HU 40.8 39.1 40.0 41.3 40.1 40.7 23.3 23.2 23.2
MT 40.6 35.3 38.8 41.6 38.9 40.8 18.2 19.4 19.0
NL 34.5 23.9 29.6 39.0 38.1 38.8 19.3 19.3 19.3
AT 41.8 33.1 37.7 43.1 41.0 42.4 18.6 21.1 20.8
PL 42.1 37.8 40.1 43.0 39.6 41.4 24.8 22.5 23.3
PT 40.6 37.3 39.1 41.0 39.1 40.2 20.5 19.7 19.8
SI 41.0 39.1 40.1 42.1 41.0 41.6 18.4 19.1 18.8
SK 40.9 39.4 40.2 41.2 40.1 40.7 21.1 21.3 21.2
FI 38.5 35.3 36.9 40.0 38.4 39.2 20.1 21.1 20.8
SE 37.4 33.8 35.6 39.9 39.8 39.9 21.5 26.3 25.3
UK 41.6 31.3 36.5 44.2 40.2 42.6 17.8 19.2 18.9
Source: Eurostat, LFS spring results.
Table 7 – Average usual weekly working hours in the main job in the EU Member States by gender
and full-time/part-time distinction, 2005
15 Usual working hours corresponds to the number of hours the person normally works. It covers all hours including extra hours, either paid or
unpaid, which the person normally works, but excludes the travel time between home and the place of work as well as the main meal breaks.
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States, ranging from 38.8 hours in the
Netherlands to 42.6 hours in the UK.
Gender differences in the working
hours of full-time employees are
smaller among full-time employees
(on average two hours for the EU),
although in Ireland, Italy, Poland and
the UK on average women employed
on a full-time basis work 7–10% fewer
hours (equivalent to 3–4 hours less)
per week. The small difference
between usual working hours for all
employees and full-time employees in
the new Member States is generally a
result of the low levels of part-time
employment in these countries.
Among part-time employees women
work longer hours on average than
men, this being particularly the case in
Denmark and Sweden but is also a
notable feature in Austria and Germany
(Chart 29). On average women in part-
time employment in the EU work 
20.1 hours per week compared to 
19.0 hours for men. Nevertheless in
some Member States men actually
work longer hours in part-time employ-
ment, notably in Greece, Latvia, Lux-
embourg and Poland. There remains
substantial variation across Member
States in the average hours worked in
part-time employment. The shortest
hours are in Germany (17.4 hours),
markedly lower than the 25.3 hours
worked on average in Sweden.
In 2005 some 12 million full-time
employees within the EU reported
usually working more than 48 hours a
week, the statutory maximum number
of working hours per week in most EU
Member States. This equates to a share
of around 9% of full-time employees,
with the share having risen compared
to 2000 (when it stood at 8.5%). This
increase reflects the fact that while the
share has declined in recent years in
almost all the new Member States, it
has generally risen compared to 2000
in the large continental Member
States, apart from Germany. Working
such comparatively long hours is a rel-
atively common experience among
full-time employees in Austria and
Latvia, and particularly so in the UK
where almost one in five full time
employees is affected (Chart 30). In
contrast, it is relatively rare in Lithua-
nia, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and
Sweden for full-time employees to
usually work more than 48 hours per
week. 
Examining the changes in weekly
working hours (in the main job, based
on data from the EU labour force sur-
vey) for all employees between 2000
and 2005 reveals that average hours in
work continue to decline for employ-
ees in the majority of EU Member
States and for the EU as a whole
(Chart 31). For some (mainly the new
Member States, Ireland and the UK)
this reflects reductions in working
hours in general, for example in the
Czech Republic and Slovakia weekly
working hours for full-time employ-
ees have decreased by around 2 hours
and 1.5 hours respectively, driving the
overall decline in average working
hours for all employees in those
Member States (Chart 32). In other
Member States (mainly the EU-15
countries) the fall in average weekly
working hours for employees is due
more to the increase in the share of
part-time employment, this being the
case for example in Germany and
Spain.
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The largest reductions in the average
weekly working hours of employees
have taken place in the Czech Republic,
Germany, Malta and Slovakia. Generally
the changes have been greater for women
than for men, although in the Czech
Republic, Denmark, Cyprus, Hungary,
the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK,
reductions in working hours were greater
for men. In contrast to the general trend,
Belgium and France actually experienced
increases in average hours worked for
employees, in both cases driven by rises
in hours worked by men. 
Employment in Europe 2006
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5.1.3. Working hours across
sectors of economic activity
Working hours vary considerably
across sectors. At EU level, the aver-
age usual weekly working hours for
full-time employees range from 
36.5 hours in the “education” sector to
43 hours in the “hotels and restau-
rants” sector (Chart 33). Other sectors
with above average working hours are
“transport, storage and communica-
tion”, “wholesale and retail trade,
repair of vehicles and domestic
goods” and “real estate, renting and
business activities” within services,
and “mining and quarrying” and “con-
struction” within industry. In general,
hours worked by full-time employees
in “agriculture” are also above the EU
average. Overall, average full-time
hours worked in the services sector are
slightly below the average for indus-
try, this being due to the relatively
lower hours worked in “public admin-
istration, defence and compulsory
social security”, “education” and
“health and social work” sectors. This
may also partly explain the ongoing
decline in working hours in Europe, as
the employment structure in the EU
continues to shift towards services
while employment in industry and
agriculture continues to contract.
For almost all Member States the short-
est average hours in full-time employ-
ment are worked in the education sec-
tor, the main exceptions being for those
countries where average hours are
slightly lower in the “health and social
work” sector (Denmark, Germany, the
Netherlands and the UK), and most
notably Sweden where in fact the hours
in the “education” sector are the high-
est of any sector (Table 8). Excluding
“agriculture”, the “hotels and restau-
rants” sector accounts for the highest
average full-time working hours in
most Member States (around half),
although the “mining and quarrying”
and “construction” sectors account for
the longest hours in several countries.
Within Member States, variations in
working time across sectors is greatest
in the southern European Member
States plus Ireland, Poland and the UK.
In contrast, there is much less variation
across sectors in Austria, Germany,
Hungary, Luxembourg and Sweden,
mainly due to the comparatively long
working hours in education in these
countries.
Employment in Europe 2006
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5.2. Atypical working
arrangements
With regard to working time arrange-
ments, a substantial proportion of
employed people in the EU work shifts or
work outside the usual working hours16,
for example at night or on weekends.
The use of shift work17 arrangements
seems to be more common in the cen-
tral European new Member States, with
the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia
and Slovenia all having more than 25%
of employees usually working under
such arrangements (Chart 34). This is
likely to be linked to the relatively high
share of employment in industry in
these countries. It is also quite common
in the Nordic Member States of Finland
and Sweden, where around a quarter of
employees usually do shift work, but in
contrast is the least common in the EU
in Denmark, where the incidence of
shift work has traditionally been low
compared to the rest of Europe. In gen-
eral shift work is more a feature of male
employment than female, although in
Finland and Sweden and the new Mem-
ber States of Estonia, Lithuania and
Slovenia relatively more women than
men are involved in shift work.
Work outside the standard daily work-
ing hours is not an uncommon feature
in the EU labour market18. For example,
across Member States generally
between 10–20% of people in employ-
ment report they work at least some-
times during the night (Chart 35). In
certain Member States (namely Austria,
the Czech Republic, Malta, Poland, Slo-
vakia and the UK) the share of workers
affected actually exceeds 20%. It is
most common in Slovakia, where 22%
of the employed do night work, and
with as much as 15% of workers doing
so on a regular basis. The share of work-
ers usually doing night work in Slovakia
is relatively high among EU Member
States, although Malta and the UK also
have shares over 10%. In contrast, regu-
larly working during night time hours is
relatively uncommon in Belgium,
Cyprus, Greece, Lithuania and Spain,
all with 5% or less of employed people
working regularly during the night. 
Working on Sundays is also a fairly
common feature of today's labour mar-
Employment in Europe 2006
16 Generally considered as normal day time working hours during the weekdays Monday to Friday
17 Shift work is a regular work schedule during which an enterprise is operational or provides services beyond the normal working hours, and
involves different groups or crews of workers succeeding each others at the same work site to perform the same operations. It usually involves
work at unsocial hours in the early morning, at night or at the weekend and the weekly rest days do not always coincide with normal rest days.
18 Definitions of evening and night vary considerably so it is not easy to establish a strictly common basis for all Member States. While cross-country
differences in standard (core) working hours and evening or night work may therefore partly reflect cultural and climatic differences across Mem-
ber States, the statistics presented are based on harmonised survey questions in the EU Labour Force Survey. In general “evening work” can be con-
sidered to be work done after the usual hours of working time in the respective country, but before usual sleeping hours, while “night work” is
work done during the usual sleeping hours. “Usually” means on at least half of the days worked (in the case of night and evening work) and on
two or more Sundays (in the case of work on Sundays) in a reference period of four weeks preceding the interview and refers to formal working
arrangements.
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ket. In several Member States (the
Czech Republic, Denmark, Lithuania,
Poland, Slovakia and the UK) more than
one in three employed people work at
least sometimes on Sundays (Chart 36).
Among Member States it is most com-
mon in the UK and Poland, with close to
36% of workers affected, although the
shares regularly working on Sundays in
these countries are relatively low. In
fact, when considering only those that
regularly work on a Sunday it is workers
in Austria, Denmark and Slovakia that
have the highest shares at around
18–19%. In contrast, regular Sunday
work is relatively uncommon in the
Czech Republic, Cyprus and Hungary,
all with shares below 10%.
Chapter 1. Panorama of the European labour markets
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Considering both regular night work
and regular Sunday work together, Slo-
vakia is clearly the Member State with
the greatest share of workers regularly
employed in such atypical working
time arrangements, having the greatest
share in both types. Other countries
with relatively high shares of regular
work in both are Austria, Finland and
Malta. On the other hand, countries
such as Belgium, Cyprus, and Hungary
have relatively low shares of the
employed regularly working in these
forms of atypical working hours
arrangements.
Recent trends in the incidence of
shift, night and Sunday work are
rather mixed across Member States
(Table 9 and Chart 37). In general
there has been a decline in the inci-
dence of shift work in recent years in
a majority of Member States, particu-
larly in most of the new Member
States and especially Lithuania,
Poland and Slovakia. This is likely to
be related to the reduction in employ-
ment in the industry sector, where
shift work is generally more common.
Only the Czech Republic and Sweden
have seen any significant rise in the
incidence of shift work. 
Developments in the incidence of regu-
lar Sunday work show no general pat-
tern across Member States. In Estonia,
Malta and Sweden (all countries with
relatively high shares of regular Sunday
work in 2000) there has been a sharp
Employment in Europe 2006
Source: Eurostat, LFS spring results. 
Note: For ES, IE, LU, PL and SK spring results for 2001 have been used for Sunday and night work instead of 2000 due to unavail-
ability of data for these countries in 2000, while there is no data on either available for DE and NL. For shift work, the first ref-
erence year is 2001 due to a change in response categories for this question in most Member States after 2000, and all data are
spring 2001 except FR for which spring 2000 is used.
Table 9 – Changes in the incidence (as % of employment) of regular Sunday work and 
regular night work in the EU Member States between 2000 and 2005, and of shift work 
(as % of employees) between 2001 and 2005
2000 2005 change 2000 2005 change 2001 2005 change
BE 9.3 10.8 1.5 5.0 4.6 -0.4 10.3 8.7 -1.6
CZ n.a. 8.4 n.a. n.a. 6.1 n.a. 26.7 28.9 2.2
DK 19.5 18.0 -1.5 7.1 7.4 0.3 6.1 5.0 -1.1
DE n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 15.0 15.5 0.5
EE 18.5 14.2 -4.3 9.4 6.1 -3.3 19.7 16.3 -3.4
EL 14.7 13.0 -1.7 4.2 4.4 0.2 19.2 18.8 -0.4
ES 13.7 13.7 0.0 3.7 5.0 1.3 17.4 15.1 -2.3
FR 9.2 14.0 4.8 4.6 7.1 2.5 9.7 8.4 -1.3
IE 14.3 13.9 -0.4 5.7 6.7 1.0 17.7 16.5 -1.2
IT 8.0 13.2 5.2 5.3 8.4 3.1 21.0 18.3 -2.7
CY 8.3 6.3 -2.0 1.6 0.9 -0.7 10.1 8.6 -1.5
LV n.a. 16.0 n.a. n.a. 5.4 n.a. n.a. 20.7 n.a.
LT 12.3 13.2 0.9 2.9 3.0 0.1 16.2 12.2 -4.0
LU 7.4 12.7 5.3 3.0 6.0 3.0 10.7 9.1 -1.6
HU 9.7 8.1 -1.6 7.3 5.8 -1.5 22.2 19.0 -3.2
MT 23.3 16.6 -6.7 13.9 11.2 -2.7 22.1 21.6 -0.5
AT 14.5 18.0 3.5 9.9 8.1 -1.8 19.3 18.0 -1.3
PL 12.3 13.1 0.8 3.6 5.5 1.9 38.8 35.3 -3.5
PT 11.7 11.1 -0.6 8.3 7.6 -0.7 17.0 17.6 0.6
SI 15.3 15.1 -0.2 8.4 8.0 -0.4 33.1 32.0 -1.1
SK 13.4 19.1 5.7 10.2 15.5 5.3 34.5 27.0 -7.5
FI 17.6 16.1 -1.5 8.4 9.1 0.7 23.9 24.1 0.2
SE 18.0 10.8 -7.2 7.6 5.6 -2.0 21.8 24.5 2.7
UK 13.3 12.0 -1.3 12.5 11.5 -1.0 19.0 19.0 0.0
Sunday work Night work Shift work
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decline in the share of workers regular-
ly working on Sundays, while in Aus-
tria, France, Italy, Luxembourg and
Slovakia (countries with low shares in
2000 apart from the latter) there has
been a marked increase. A similar situ-
ation exists with regard to trends in the
incidence of night work, with those
Member States registering strong
increases in Sunday work also general-
ly recording strong rises in night work,
and vice-versa. In several of the new
Member States (Cyprus, Estonia, Hun-
gary, Malta and Slovenia) there has
been a reduction in the incidence of all
three types of working hour arrange-
ment. Another pattern observed for
several Member States is a reduction in
the incidence of shift work combined
with increases in the prevalence of reg-
ular Sunday and night work, this being
the case in France, Italy, Luxembourg,
Poland and Slovakia. However, none of
the Member States has seen an increase
in the share of all three types of work-
ing arrangement.
6. Skills and
employment
Europe needs to invest more and more
effectively in human capital in order to
improve access to employment for all
age groups, to raise productivity levels
and quality at work, and to build a
workforce that can adapt to change19.
Too many people fail to enter or to
remain in the labour market because of
a lack of skills, or more generally due
to skill mismatches. At the same time,
knowledge-based and service-based
economies require different skills from
traditional industries – skills that also
need regular updating in the face of
technological change and innovation.
The importance of the need to improve
education and skills is fully reflected in
the Employment Guidelines adopted by
the Council in 2005. Two of the guide-
lines specifically cover this area:
Guideline 23 which calls for expanding
and improving investment in human
capital through specified measures
including lifelong learning strategies,
and Guideline 24 which calls on Mem-
ber States to adapt education and train-
ing systems in response to new compe-
tence requirements.
6.1. Skill structure of the
working age population
The skill content of the EU-25 working
age population continues to rise, con-
tributing to a more employable and
adaptable workforce and in turn to
increased employment and participation
rates. Since employment rates are gener-
ally higher the greater the educational
attainment level, this change in the skill
structure of the working age population
can be seen as a positive development for
employment as a whole. In 2005, the high
skilled (i.e. those having completed terti-
ary education) represented close to 20%
of the working age population, while the
low skilled (those with education only at
lower secondary level or below) repre-
Chapter 1. Panorama of the European labour markets
19 See Chapter 4 for further evidence on the positive relationship between a high-skilled and adaptable human capital and growth.
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sented just under 33% (Table 10 and
Chart 38). This compares with shares of
17.6% and 36.2% respectively in 2000
and reflects the ongoing improvements in
the level of human capital in the EU. This
has mainly been the result of improve-
ments in the skill composition of the
female working age population, where
the share of high skilled has increased 3
percentage points and the low skilled
declined 4.3 percentage points, compared
to changes of 1.7 and 2.5 percentage
points respectively for men.
There are significant variations across
Member States in the skill composi-
tion of the working age population
(Chart 39). Despite the general trend of
improving skill levels, the low skilled
still account for a comparatively large
share of the working age population in
several Member States. In Malta and
Portugal, the low skilled still represent
around three-quarters of the working
age population, and in Italy and Spain
account for more than half. The greatest
share of high-skilled people is found in
Finland (28.5%), with eight other Mem-
ber States having shares above 25%. In
contrast, the high-skilled account for
only between 10 and 15% of the work-
ing age population in the Czech Repub-
lic, Italy, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Por-
tugal and Slovakia, although all these
Member States have seen increases in
this share over recent years. The overall
upward shift in the skill composition of
the working age population since 2000
is a significant trend observed across all
Member States except Germany.
In 2005 the skills composition of the
working age population at EU level was
very similar for both men and women,
reflecting the relatively greater up-
skilling of the female population over
recent years. The increase in female lev-
els of education in recent decades
appears to be a major determinant of the
positive trend in female labour force
participation. In 2005 a woman with
Employment in Europe 2006
Source: Eurostat, LFS spring results.
Notes: Low (ISCED 0-2: lower secondary), Medium (ISCED 3-4: upper secondary), High (ISCED 5-6: tertiary); UK: GCSE levels included
under “medium”.
Table 10 – Share (as %) of the working age population (15-64) by educational attainment levels in 2005
Low Medium High Low Medium High Low Medium High
BE 37.4 35.9 26.7 37.7 36.7 25.6 37.0 35.0 28.0
CZ 17.2 71.8 11.0 14.3 73.6 12.1 20.1 69.9 10.0
DK 24.5 47.4 28.1 24.3 49.5 26.2 24.7 45.3 30.1
DE 24.8 54.8 20.5 22.2 53.9 23.9 27.4 55.6 16.9
EE 20.4 51.8 27.8 23.5 55.6 21.0 17.7 48.3 34.1
EL 40.8 41.6 17.6 40.5 41.4 18.1 41.1 41.8 17.1
ES 51.9 22.5 25.7 52.9 22.1 25.1 50.9 22.9 26.2
FR 36.1 41.0 22.9 35.0 43.4 21.6 37.1 38.6 24.3
IE 37.1 37.5 25.4 40.0 36.4 23.6 34.1 38.7 27.3
IT 50.7 38.9 10.4 51.5 38.6 9.8 50.0 39.2 10.9
CY 36.5 38.7 24.8 35.0 40.4 24.5 37.8 37.1 25.1
LV 24.7 57.5 17.9 27.8 57.7 14.5 21.8 57.2 21.0
LT 22.1 55.7 22.2 24.2 56.2 19.7 20.2 55.3 24.5
LU 30.5 46.5 23.0 28.5 46.8 24.7 32.5 46.2 21.3
HU 29.0 56.5 14.5 26.4 60.4 13.2 31.5 52.9 15.6
MT 73.0 16.7 10.3 68.8 19.6 11.7 77.3 13.7 9.0
NL 33.0 40.8 26.3 30.7 41.3 28.0 35.2 40.3 24.5
AT 24.3 60.5 15.2 20.7 61.8 17.5 28.0 59.1 12.9
PL 22.4 64.0 13.6 22.0 66.2 11.8 22.7 62.0 15.3
PT 72.8 16.3 10.9 75.6 15.7 8.7 70.1 16.8 13.1
SI 24.3 59.2 16.6 22.7 63.2 14.0 25.8 55.0 19.2
SK 20.7 68.1 11.2 18.5 70.2 11.4 22.8 66.1 11.1
FI 26.5 45.0 28.5 28.6 47.0 24.3 24.3 43.0 32.7
SE 21.3 52.9 25.8 23.1 55.1 21.8 19.4 50.6 30.0
UK 14.8 58.9 26.3 13.9 59.7 26.4 15.7 58.0 26.2
EU-25 32.8 47.3 19.9 32.1 48.0 19.9 33.5 46.6 19.9
Total Men Women
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tertiary-level education was more than
twice as likely (79%) to be in employ-
ment as a woman with lower-secondary
level education or below (36%). 
Nevertheless, there remain large skill
composition differences between the
genders at Member State level. In
Austria, the Czech Republic, Ger-
many, Hungary and Malta the share of
low-skilled women is much higher
(more than 5 percentage points) than
that for men, although in contrast the
Chapter 1. Panorama of the European labour markets
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opposite situation exists in several
Member States, notably Estonia, Ire-
land, Latvia and Portugal. Similarly,
large differences are observed at Mem-
ber State level in the shares of high-
skilled men and women. For example,
in Austria and Germany there is a
markedly lower share of high-skilled
women than men, while in Estonia,
Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Finland
and Sweden the reverse situation is
found.
6.2. Skills and employment
performance
Skill levels have an important relation
to employment rates, with the rate gen-
erally being higher the greater the edu-
cational attainment level (Table 11). In
2005 the average employment rate
among the high skilled in the EU was
82.5% and for the medium skilled20
68.7%, whereas for the low skilled it
was only 46.4%. The greatest within-
country differences in employment
rates for the low- and high-skilled are
found among the east European new
Member States, with differences above
50 percentage points for most and as
high as 70 percentage points in Slova-
kia. In these countries the importance
of skill levels to the employment status
of individuals is the most pronounced.
The variation in employment rates
across Member States is significantly
higher for the low skilled. Employment
rates for the high skilled range from
Employment in Europe 2006
Source: Eurostat, LFS spring results.
Table 11 – Employment, unemployment and activity rates by education levels in 2005, in % (age group 15-64)
ER UR AR ER UR AR ER UR AR ER UR AR
BE 61.0 8.1 66.4 83.6 3.8 86.9 66.0 8.2 71.9 40.0 13.7 46.3
CZ 64.7 7.8 70.2 85.0 2.1 86.8 72.0 7.1 77.4 21.3 27.3 29.3
DK 75.5 4.9 79.4 85.7 3.6 88.9 78.3 4.8 82.3 58.3 7.1 62.8
DE 65.3 11.4 73.7 82.7 5.8 87.8 69.2 11.5 78.2 42.1 19.0 52.0
EE 64.9 8.3 70.8 82.6 3.2 85.3 69.9 10.1 77.7 28.3 15.2 33.3
EL 60.3 9.8 66.8 81.4 7.7 88.2 61.0 11.5 68.9 50.5 9.0 55.4
ES 63.2 9.4 69.7 80.4 6.6 86.1 66.0 9.1 72.6 55.3 11.4 62.5
FR 62.8 9.3 69.3 76.9 6.6 82.3 68.7 8.2 74.9 47.2 13.6 54.6
IE 67.1 4.3 70.2 85.7 2.3 87.8 72.4 3.7 75.2 48.9 7.4 52.7
IT 57.8 7.6 62.5 79.5 6.0 84.6 67.6 6.6 72.4 45.8 9.2 50.4
CY 68.7 5.5 72.6 85.9 4.0 89.5 73.1 5.5 77.4 52.2 6.9 56.1
LV 63.0 9.2 69.4 85.6 3.9 89.1 68.9 8.9 75.6 33.1 18.6 40.7
LT 62.6 8.6 68.5 87.5 3.8 91.0 67.6 9.7 74.9 25.1 16.0 29.9
LU 63.6 4.5 66.6 82.5 3.5 85.5 63.0 4.2 65.8 50.5 6.2 53.8
HU 56.8 7.1 61.2 82.6 2.5 84.8 64.9 6.9 69.7 28.1 14.2 32.7
MT 53.6 7.9 58.2 82.7 2.7 84.9 76.0 3.7 78.9 44.5 10.6 49.8
NL 73.2 4.8 76.9 85.6 2.9 88.2 77.5 4.3 81.0 58.2 7.7 63.0
AT 67.6 5.3 71.3 83.6 3.1 86.4 72.5 4.5 76.0 45.1 10.4 50.3
PL 52.2 18.3 63.9 81.1 6.8 87.0 56.4 19.4 70.0 22.9 30.1 32.7
PT 67.6 7.7 73.2 87.5 4.4 91.5 63.5 7.5 68.7 65.5 8.3 71.5
SI 66.0 5.9 70.1 86.5 3.1 89.2 70.7 6.0 75.2 40.7 9.1 44.7
SK 57.4 16.3 68.6 83.4 5.2 88.0 66.6 14.4 77.8 13.1 53.1 28.0
FI 69.2 9.7 76.6 84.1 4.6 88.1 72.8 9.5 80.5 47.0 18.5 57.7
SE 72.6 8.8 79.6 86.0 4.7 90.2 78.7 7.8 85.3 52.0 17.1 62.8
UK 71.5 4.6 74.9 87.4 2.5 89.7 76.1 4.8 80.0 49.2 9.2 54.1
EU-25
Total 63.6 9.1 70.0 82.5 5.0 86.9 68.7 9.3 75.8 46.4 12.9 53.2
Men 71.1 8.5 77.7 85.9 4.6 90.1 75.1 8.7 82.3 56.8 11.7 64.4
Women 56.2 9.9 62.4 79.1 5.5 83.7 62.2 10.0 69.1 36.3 14.5 42.5
Total, irrespective of High Medium Low
education level
20 Those having completed upper secondary education.
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76.9% in France to around 87.5% in
Lithuania, Portugal and the UK, a dif-
ference of only around 10 percentage
points, while for the low skilled it
ranges from an extremely low 13% in
Slovakia to as high as around 66% in
Portugal. The countries where employ-
ment rates for the low skilled are very
low (below 30%) are all among the new
Member States from Eastern Europe,
reflecting the relatively low level of
labour market participation by the low
skilled in these countries, although it is
also the case that the shares of the low
skilled in the working age population in
these countries are well below the EU
average.
Focussing on unemployment rates, the
average unemployment rate for the
low skilled in the EU is more than
twice that for the high skilled. Differ-
ences in unemployment rates between
these two groups are particularly pro-
nounced in the Czech Republic and
Slovakia, as well as in Poland. In the
former two countries, the unemploy-
ment rate for the low skilled is more
than ten times that for the high skilled.
This contrasts markedly with the situ-
ation in Cyprus, Denmark, Greece,
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
Portugal and Spain where the unem-
ployment rates for low and high
skilled differ by less than 5 percentage
points.
7. Sectoral
employment structure
and trends
7.1. Sectoral employment
structure in the EU in 2005
In 2005, the overall sectoral employ-
ment structure of the EU-25 consisted
of 4.9% of total employment21 in agri-
culture, 27.5% in industry and 67.7%
in services. The increasing importance
of the share of employment in the serv-
ices sector, together with the declining
shares in agriculture and industry, con-
tinues to feature.
Noticeable differences remain at the
level of individual Member States in
terms of the relative importance of
employment shares within the main
sectors (Table 12 and Chart 40). For
example, in Poland and Lithuania the
agriculture sector still accounts for
17% and 15% respectively of total
main employment, while the share also
remains relatively high in Greece,
Latvia and Portugal. This compares
with shares as low as below 2% in
Luxembourg, Malta and the UK.
Industry’s share of employment varies
from 17% in Luxembourg to around
39% in the Czech Republic and Slova-
kia. In all Member States the services
sector accounts for by far the largest
employment share, ranging from just
under 55% of total main employment
in Poland and Slovenia, to as high as
over three-quarters in the Netherlands,
Sweden and the UK, and over 80% in
Luxembourg.
Chapter 1. Panorama of the European labour markets
21 By main employment and resident concept.
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7.2. Sectoral employment
trends in 2005
Between 2004 and 2005 the service
sector once again proved to be the most
dynamic sector for employment cre-
ation in the EU (Chart 41), with the rate
of annual growth22 in this sector show-
ing some signs of a moderate recovery
over 2005. For the EU as a whole,
employment growth in industry turned
positive in the first quarter of 2005,
spurred on by strong growth in con-
struction. However, growth returned to
negative territory in the remaining
quarters, although the rate of contrac-
tion was much lower than observed in
the preceding years. Meanwhile, in the
agriculture sector the contraction of
employment slowed over the first half
of the year before picking up again in
the second half.
A more detailed sectoral breakdown of
net employment creation (by main
employment) between 2004 and 2005
(Chart 42) shows that the “real estate,
renting and business activities” sector
experienced the greatest increase in
employment (up 0.6 million), followed
by “other community, social and per-
sonal service activities” and “health
and social work”. Within the services
sector, the “wholesale/retail trade,
repair of vehicles and domestic
goods” and “hotels and restaurants”
sectors also saw employment increases
of around 0.4 million, while, in con-
trast, the “education” and “transport
storage and communication” sectors
saw relatively little employment
expansion. Within industry, employ-
ment in “construction” rose by just
under 0.4 million, just below the level
of contraction in “manufacturing”,
with the result that employment for the
industry sector as a whole was little
changed.
Sectoral employment developments in
the four largest Member States
(Chart 43) show that all experienced
positive annual employment growth23
throughout 2005 in the services sector.
However, annual employment growth
in services slowed down over 2005 in
Germany and Italy and picked up only
slightly in France, although more sub-
stantially in the UK. In industry,
employment developments were again
rather mixed. In Germany, compared
to the same quarter of the preceding
year employment in industry contin-
ued to contract and at a rate higher
than in the previous year with negative
growth of -2.0% to -2.5% for all quar-
ters, while in Italy annual employment
growth returned to negative territory
from the second quarter of the year
onwards. In France the rate of job
losses in industry slowed over 2005
and remained at levels well down on
those over 2004, while in the UK the
rate of decline in industry was also
generally lower than in previous years
during the first half of the year but
accelerated sharply over the second
half. Employment developments in
Chapter 1. Panorama of the European labour markets
22 Comparing employment levels with those in the corresponding quarter of the previous year.
23 Comparing employment levels with those in the corresponding quarter of the previous year.
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
ServicesIndustryAgriculture, forestry and fishing
20
05
q
04
20
05
q
03
20
05
q
02
20
05
q
01
20
04
q
04
20
04
q
03
20
04
q
02
20
04
q
01
20
03
q
04
20
03
q
03
20
03
q
02
20
03
q
01
20
02
q
04
20
02
q
03
20
02
q
02
20
02
q
01
20
01
q
04
20
01
q
03
20
01
q
02
20
01
q
01
Employment growth in the EU by main sector, 2001-2005
Source: Eurostat, national accounts.
Chart 41
%
 c
h
an
g
e 
o
n
 s
am
e 
p
er
io
d
 o
f 
p
re
vi
o
u
s 
ye
ar
60
agriculture were generally negative,
with a return to strong employment
contraction in Germany and Italy, but
more subdued contraction in France.
In contrast, comparing to employment
levels in the same quarter of the previ-
ous year the UK saw strong employ-
ment expansion in agriculture in the
first part of 2005, but this also gave
way to substantial employment con-
traction from the third quarter
onwards.
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7.3. Sectoral employment
trends in the EU since 2000
The recent trend in the sectoral structure
of EU employment reflects the contin-
ued shift towards a service economy,
and the ongoing decline in employment
in agriculture and industry. Since 2000
total employment24 in the EU has
increased by over 8.5 million, mainly
driven by strong net employment cre-
ation of almost 11.5 million in the serv-
ices sector (Chart 44). The latter has
more than made up for the employment
contraction in industry (down 1.6 mil-
lion) and agriculture (down 1.2 million)
since 2000. 
Within industry, employment has con-
tracted particularly strongly in manu-
facturing, where it has fallen by 
2.2 million (or about 6% on 2000 lev-
els), although this has been offset to a
certain extent by the rise in employ-
ment of 0.8 million in the construction
sector. Within services, where employ-
ment has expanded in all sub-sectors
apart from “financial intermediation”,
the main drivers of employment cre-
ation have been the “real estate, renting
and business activities” (up 3.5 mil-
lion), “health and social work” (up 2.3
million) and “education” (up 1.3 mil-
lion) sectors.
7.3.1. Sectoral developments 
by gender
At EU level, the increased participation
of women in the labour market
accounts for the majority of the net
increase in employment in services
since 2000 (almost two-thirds). The
sectors that have witnessed the greatest
expansion in female employment are
the “health and social work”, “educa-
tion” and “real estate, renting and busi-
ness activities” sectors. In the former
two, the contribution of women to
employment expansion has far out-
weighed that of men, while it is also
interesting to note that women account
for essentially the whole increase in net
employment at EU level in the “public
administration and defence, compulso-
ry social security” sector between 2000
and 2005. Women also account for the
majority in the overall decline in
employment in industry, where their
employment in “manufacturing” has
declined almost as much as for men
while expansion in the “construction”
sector has essentially only concerned
their male counterparts. 
7.3.2. Sectoral developments 
by age group
In terms of age groups, the strong con-
tribution of older people aged 55–64 to
employment growth has been mostly
felt in the services sector, but to a cer-
Employment in Europe 2006
24 Based on spring 2000 and 2005 LFS results, by resident concept.
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tain extent also in industry (Chart 45).
In the former they account for around
one-third of net employment creation
in this sector between 2000 and 2005,
while in the latter sector they were the
only working age group to experience
a positive contribution to net employ-
ment. Within services the main sector
where employment of older people has
risen substantially was “health and
social work”, followed closely by “real
estate, renting and business activities”
and “education”. Furthermore, older
people aged 55–64 account for almost
all the net increase in employment in
the “public administration and
defence, compulsory social security”
and “transport, storage and communi-
cation” sectors during this period. In
contrast to the developments for older
workers, young persons (aged 15–24)
have seen a net decrease in employ-
ment, resulting mainly from a decline
in youth employment in the industry
sector (essentially “manufacturing”),
but also in “agriculture”, which has
only been offset to a limited extent by
increased employment in services. On
the other hand, for prime age workers,
reductions in employment in industry
and agriculture have been more than
offset by large increases in employ-
ment in services, especially in sectors
such as “real estate, renting and busi-
ness activities” and “health and social
work”.
8. Occupational
employment structure
and trends
8.1. Occupational
employment structure in
the EU in 2005 and overall
trends
In 2005 the occupational structure of
the employed population in the EU-2525
was broadly composed of approximate-
ly 40% of total employment in high-
skilled non-manual occupations,
around a quarter in both low skilled
non-manual and skilled manual occu-
pations, and just under one in ten in ele-
mentary occupations26 (Table 13).
Compared to 2000, there has been an
almost 3 percentage point increase in
the share of employment in high-skilled
non-manual occupations, and a similar
Chapter 1. Panorama of the European labour markets
25 According to occupation in the main job and excluding employment in the armed forces.
26 High-skilled non-manual consists of “legislators, senior officials and managers”, “professionals” and “technicians and associate professionals”, low-
skilled non-manual of “clerks” and “service workers and shop and market sales workers”, skilled manual of “skilled agricultural and fishery workers”,
“craft and related trades workers” and “plant and machine operators and assemblers”. Elementary occupations cover basic occupations such as street
vendors and related occupations, domestic helpers, cleaners and labourers.
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decline in the share of people employed
in skilled manual occupations.
Similar to the sectoral distribution of
employment, noticeable differences
remain at the level of individual Member
States in terms of the relative shares of
employment (by main job) within the
main occupational categories (Chart 46).
Within the EU, the Netherlands has the
highest share (close to 48%) of employ-
ment in high-skilled non-manual occupa-
tions, compared to only around 27% in
Portugal. In Poland, employment in
skilled manual occupations accounts for
42% of total employment, with a substan-
tial share of this due to employment in
skilled agricultural and fishery workers’
occupations. Similarly, in the Czech
Republic, Greece, Hungary, Lithuania,
Portugal, Slovakia and Slovenia, employ-
ment in skilled manual occupations
accounts for over a third of total employ-
ment, compared to below 20% in Luxem-
bourg, the Netherlands and the UK. Rela-
tively high shares of employment in the
low-skilled non-manual occupations are
found in Cyprus, Ireland and the UK,
while for the elementary occupations the
highest employment shares are in Cyprus
and Spain.
Within the high-skilled non-manual
occupation grouping, “legislators, sen-
ior officials and managers” accounted
for 8.6% of employment at EU level in
2005, “professionals” 13.7% and “tech-
nicians and associate professionals”
16.2%, with all three major ISCO27
groupings experiencing increases in the
share of total employment since 2000
(Chart 47). Within the low-skilled non-
manual group, the share of “service
workers and shop and market sales
workers” in employment, at 13.4%, has
not changed since 2000 and it is the
decline in the employment share of
“clerks” from 12.4% to 11.3%, which
drove the overall decline in the share of
low-skilled non-manual employment.
Within the skilled manual occupations,
“craft and related trades workers” have
seen their share of employment decline
from 15.6% to 14.1%, while the
“skilled agricultural and fishery work-
ers” and “plant and machine operators
and assemblers” occupational group-
ings also saw losses in employment
shares although to a lesser extent.
Employment in Europe 2006
27 International standard classification of occupations (ISCO- 88 (com))
Table 13 – Occupational structure in the EU by main occupational
grouping (as % shares of total employment (excl armed forces))
Main occupational grouping 2000 2005 Change 2000-2005
High-skilled non-manual 35.8 38.7 2.9
Low-skilled non-manual 25.9 24.9 -1.0
Skilled manual 29.3 26.8 -2.6
Elementary occupations 9.0 9.7 0.7
Source: Eurostat, LFS spring results. 
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Looking at the changes in occupation-
al employment in absolute terms, all
three occupational groups in the high-
skilled non-manual category have
seen substantial increases in employ-
ment in recent years, in particular the
“technicians and associate profession-
als” and “professionals” groups
(Chart 48). In effect, the high-skilled
non-manual occupations have been
the main driver for the overall
increase in employment, accounting
for the major part of employment
expansion since 2000. This suggests
an underlying improvement in the
skill level of employment, as well as
reflecting the ongoing shift towards a
more knowledge-based economy.
However, employment has also risen
substantially in the elementary occu-
pations and in “service workers and
shop and market sales workers” occu-
pations, while it has declined in all the
skilled-manual occupations and for
“clerks”. To a certain degree, this
points to a polarisation in the changes
in the occupational structure towards
high-skilled occupations and very
low-skilled occupations.
8.2. Recent developments
in occupational structure by
gender and age
From a gender perspective, increases in
employment since 2000 for both
women and men have been rather simi-
lar in most major occupational group-
ings, apart from “technicians and asso-
ciate professionals” and “service work-
ers and shop and market sales work-
ers”. In both of the latter groups,
increases in female employment were
substantially higher than those for men,
while in the low-skilled non-manual
and skilled manual occupations the
declines in employment have mainly
affected men. Overall, the main
increases in employment for both sexes
have been in the high-skilled non-man-
ual occupations.
Despite these changes, the distribution
of occupational employment remained
markedly different between men and
women in 2005 (Chart 49). Low-skilled
non-manual occupations account for a
substantially higher share of female
employment (close to 40%) than male
(around 14%), while for skilled manual
the opposite situation exists (10% of
female employment versus 40% for
men), essentially due to particularly
large differences in “craft and related
trades workers” and “plant and
machine operators and assemblers”
occupations. For the high-skilled non-
manual and elementary occupations
groups as a whole, the shares of the
working populations are broadly simi-
lar, at around 40% and 10% respective-
ly, although within the high-skilled
non-manual group, women are under-
represented relative to men in the “leg-
islators, senior officials and managers”
occupations, and over-represented in
the “professionals” and “technicians
and associate professionals” occupa-
tional groups.
Breakdowns of the changes in occupa-
tional employment since 2000 by age
(Chart 50) indicate that the majority of
employment creation in the high-skilled
non-manual occupations has been for
prime-age workers, but there have also
been substantial increases in employ-
ment for older persons aged 55–64 in
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these occupations. Similarly, the con-
traction in employment in the low-
skilled non-manual and skilled manual
occupations has mainly impacted on
prime-age workers, although young peo-
ple have also been negatively affected,
particularly in the “craft and related
trades workers” occupations. At EU
level young people have only witnessed
substantial employment creation in the
low-skilled “service workers and shop
and market sales workers” occupations,
and to a certain extent in “technicians
and associate professionals” and “ele-
mentary” occupations, which has been
more than offset by the reductions in
employment in the “clerks” and “craft
and related trades workers” occupations.
Interestingly, in addition to the high-
skilled non-manual occupations, older
workers have experienced employment
expansion in all main occupational
groupings apart from “skilled agricul-
tural and fishery workers”, indicating a
rather broad adjustment across occupa-
tions in the increasing involvement of
older workers in employment.
9. Regional labour
market disparities
Concerns over regional disparities have
long been a key element of European
policies, no less so for employment
policy since low performing regions
impact on the ability to achieve the
overall Lisbon employment targets. A
key objective of the Lisbon Strategy is
therefore strengthening territorial cohe-
sion, which calls for determined action
to reduce regional disparities in terms
of employment, unemployment and
labour productivity, especially in
regions lagging behind.
In 2004 (the latest year for which
regional labour market data are avail-
able) regional employment rates still
showed quite marked variation within
the EU, and also within certain Member
States (Chart 51). Despite some
improvements in reducing employment
disparities28 among regions since 2000,
Italy remains the Member State with the
largest variation, with the region of Sici-
ly having the lowest employment rate
(43.4%) of all regions in the EU-2529.
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28 The dispersion of regional (NUTS level 2) employment rates for the age group 15–64, as expressed by the coefficient of variation of regional
employment rates, gives a measure of the regional spread of the employment rates 15–64. The employment rates represent annual average fig-
ures (except for Germany in 2000 – 2004, France in 2000 – 2002 and Sweden in 2000, for which only spring LFS data are available) and are derived
from the quarterly European Union Labour Force Survey (LFS). (In this case the indicator is not applicable for Denmark, Ireland, Luxembourg,
Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Slovenia as these countries comprise only one or (in the case of Ireland) two NUTS level 2 regions). 
29 Excluding the French overseas departments.
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This compares with rates as high as
78.2% in the UK region of Bedford-
shire and Hertfordshire, a difference of
close to 35 percentage points (Chart
52). While most Member States have
witnessed a decline in regional employ-
ment rate disparities (at NUTS2 level)
since 2000 (this being especially the
case in Spain, Italy, Finland and the
UK) such disparities have nevertheless
increased in several countries, most
notably Austria, Belgium and Germany. 
The wide variation in employment per-
formance of the regions in Italy has a
significant impact on the overall
employment rate in the EU. Nine out of
the twenty-one NUTS2 regions in Italy
have employment rates below 60%, and
five of these (Campania, Puglia, Basil-
icata, Calabria and Sicilia) even have
rates below 50%, although these are
also among those regions to have regis-
tered the largest improvements since
2000. Disparities across regions also
remain relatively high in Belgium,
Hungary, Slovakia and Spain.
In contrast, Austria, the Netherlands
and Portugal have the lowest variation
in employment rates across regions,
with employment rates above 63% in
all regions. In Poland, which has the
lowest overall employment rate in the
EU, there is less variation across the
regions than in many other Member
States, suggesting that, in contrast to
Italy, the relatively weak employment
performance in Poland is a general
problem rather than limited to a sub-set
of regions.
Focussing on regional disparities from
the perspective of underperforming
regions (taken here to mean those
regions with an employment rate
below 90% of the average national
employment rate in the Member State
in question) gives a broadly similar
picture of developments between 2000
and 2004 (Table 14). While in most
Member States the number of under-
performing regions has remained the
same, in some cases (Spain and Italy)
the situation has nevertheless improved
slightly since the average rate for the
group of underperforming regions has
moved closer to the national average.
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Source: EU-LFS, annual averages.
Note: FR results exclude overseas departments (regions FR91, 92, 93 and 94).
Table 14 – Regional disparities with respect to underperforming
regions, 2000 and 2004
BE 9.1 (1 / 11) 12.3 88.6
CZ 12.5 (1 / 8) 12.6 89.8
DE 5.1 (2 / 39) 3.8 88.2
EL 0.0 (0 / 13) 0.0
ES 26.3 (5 / 19) 23.4 83.4
FR 13.6 (3 / 22) 11.2 84.8
IT 28.6 (6 / 21) 33.1 76.9
HU 28.6 (2 / 7) 27.4 87.4
NL 0.0 (0 / 12) 0.0
AT 0.0 (0 / 9) 0.0
PL 12.5 (2 / 16) 14.7 88.8
PT 14.3 (1 / 7) 2.2 88.0
SK 0.0 (0 / 4) 0.0
FI 20.0 (1 / 5) 12.9 88.5
SE 0.0 (0 / 8) 0.0
UK 10.8 (4 / 37) 10.6 88.6
Year 2000 % of regions with E.R. below 90 % % of total working age Extent of divergence of
of the national average E.R. population (aged 15–64) the regions concerned 
(number of regions affected / in regions concerned from the national
total number of regions) average (average E.R.
of regions concerned as 
a % of national average)
BE 18.2 (2 / 11) 21.9 87.5
CZ 12.5 (1 / 8) 12.4 89.9
DE 7.3 (3 / 41) 3.9 88.5
EL 7.7 (1 / 13) 2.6 89.7
ES 26.3 (5 / 19) 23.0 86.5
FR 9.1 (2 / 22) 4.0 89.3
IT 28.6 (6 / 21) 33.1 79.1
HU 28.6 (2 / 7) 27.6 88.9
NL 0.0 (0 / 12) 0.0
AT 0.0 (0 / 9) 0.0
PL 0.0 (0 / 16) 0.0
PT 0.0 (0 / 7) 0.0
SK 0.0 (0 / 4) 0.0
FI 20.0 (1 / 5) 12.5 89.4
SE 0.0 (0 / 8) 0.0
UK 2.7 (1 / 37) 5.2 87.8
Year 2004 % of regions with E.R. below 90 % % of total working age Extent of divergence of
of the national average E.R. population (aged 15–64) the regions concerned 
(number of regions affected / in regions concerned from the national
total number of regions) average (average E.R.
of regions concerned as 
a % of national average)
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Furthermore, in France and the UK the
situation has improved noticeably. In
the former there has been a reduction
in the number of underperforming
regions, and a strong fall in the associ-
ated share of the working age popula-
tion in such regions, while those
regions that remain as underperform-
ers have improved the average employ-
ment rate substantially. In the UK only
one region remained below the 90%
employment rate reference level in
2004, compared to four in 2000. Simi-
larly employment rates of underper-
forming regions have converged rela-
tive to the national average in Poland
and Portugal, while only Belgium has
experienced an increase in the number
of underperforming regions.
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Population Natural Net Total Population Natural Net Total
on 1.1.2005 increase migration (1) increase on 1.1.2006 increase migration (2) increase
(1000s) (per 1000)
EU-25 459 488.3 327.2 1 691.5 2 018.7 461 507.0 0.7 3.7 4.4
EU-15 385 383.4 409.4 1 628.7 2 038.0 387 421.4 1.1 4.2 5.3
BE 10 445.9 15.0 33.3 48.2 10 494.1 1.4 3.2 4.6
CZ 10 220.6 -5.6 35.6 30.0 10 250.5 -0.5 3.5 2.9
DK 5 411.4 8.5 7.8 16.2 5 427.6 1.6 1.4 3.0
DE 82 500.8 -143.7 98.5 -45.2 82 455.7 -1.7 1.2 -0.5
EE 1 347.0 -3.4 -0.4 -3.8 1 343.2 -2.5 -0.3 -2.8
EL 11 075.7 2.3 34.3 36.5 11 112.2 0.2 3.1 3.3
ES 43 038.0 90.6 652.3 742.9 43 781.0 2.1 15.0 17.1
FR2 60 561.2 227.7 102.9 330.5 60 891.7 3.7 1.7 5.4
IE 4 109.2 36.6 47.2 83.8 4 193.0 8.8 11.4 20.2
IT 58 462.4 -28.3 338.1 309.8 58 772.2 -0.5 5.8 5.3
CY 749.2 3.2 20.7 23.8 773.0 4.1 27.2 31.3
LV 2 306.4 -11.3 -1.1 -12.4 2 294.1 -4.9 -0.5 -5.4
LT 3 425.3 -13.7 -10.3 -24.0 3 401.3 -4.0 -3.0 -7.0
LU 455.0 1.8 1.6 3.3 458.3 3.9 3.4 7.3
HU 10 097.5 -39.7 18.1 -21.6 10 076.0 -3.9 1.8 -2.1
MT 402.7 1.1 2.0 3.1 405.8 2.7 5.0 7.8
NL 16 305.5 51.2 -19.1 32.1 16 337.6 3.1 -1.2 2.0
AT 8 206.5 3.0 61.0 63.9 8 270.4 0.4 7.4 7.8
PL 38 173.8 -12.9 -13.0 -25.8 38 148.0 -0.3 -0.3 -0.7
PT 10 529.3 8.3 41.1 49.4 10 578.7 0.8 3.9 4.7
SL 1 997.6 -0.9 7.2 6.3 2 003.9 -0.5 3.6 3.1
SK 5 384.8 1.0 4.1 5.1 5 389.9 0.2 0.8 0.9
FI 5 236.6 9.4 8.8 18.2 5 254.8 1.8 1.7 3.5
SE 9 011.4 4.2 24.7 28.9 9 040.3 0.5 2.7 3.2
UK 60 034.5 122.9 196.3 319.2 60 353.7 2.0 3.3 5.3
BG 7 761.0 -43.6 -13.7 -57.3 7 703.8 -5.6 -1.8 -7.4
HR 4 443.9 -7.4 11.5 4.1 4 448.0 -1.7 2.6 0.9
RO 21 658.5 -44.9 -9.8 -54.7 21 603.9 -2.1 -0.5 -2.5
TR 71 609.0 911.0 0.0 911.0 72 520.0 12.6 0.0 12.6
Source: Eurostat, demographic statistics (First Demographic Estimates, Statistics in Focus 1/2006).
Note: 
1) Including correction due to population censuses, register counts etc. which cannot be classified as births, deaths or migrations.
2) Data for France are for metropolitan France.
Table 15 – Population change in 2005 (first estimates)
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10. Demographic
trends and migration
10.1. Demographic trends
The total population of the EU is esti-
mated to have increased by around 
2 million in 2005, bringing the EU pop-
ulation on 1st January 2006 to 461.5 mil-
lion (Table 15). The increase in popula-
tion is mainly due to net migration, of
which around 1 million was accounted
for by Italy and Spain alone. However,
for both these Member States the fig-
ures are inflated by regularisation pro-
grammes, thus including persons who
may actually have arrived before 2005. 
Overall, the net inflow of international
migrants to the EU is expected to show
a decrease in 2005 to a level of around
1.69 million people compared to 1.85
million in 2004. The number of live
births is expected to have increased
slightly from 4.80 million in 2004 to
4.82 million in 2005, while the number
of deaths is also expected to have
increased, from 4.35 million to 4.49 mil-
lion. Natural population change (live
births minus deaths) is therefore forecast
to show a significant decrease from 0.45
million in 2004 to 0.33 million in 2005.
In 2005 the EU Member States experi-
enced very different rates of popula-
tion growth. The population of Cyprus
grew at over 3.1%, and that in Ireland
at around 2.0%, whereas the popula-
tion changes in Latvia and Lithuania
were the most negative. Within the EU,
the natural increase in the population
was the main component of total popu-
lation increase only in Denmark,
France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands
and Finland. For all other Member
States (except the three Baltic States
and Poland, where net migration was
negative), the main driver of popula-
tion increase was net migration. The
latest trends confirm the importance of
international migration to population
change. This is highlighted in particu-
lar by the cases of the Czech Republic,
Italy and Slovenia – countries that
would otherwise have experienced a
reduction in population. Nevertheless,
while most Member States experi-
enced overall increases in total popula-
tion, it declined in Germany, Hungary
and Poland, and particularly so in Esto-
nia, Latvia and Lithuania.
10.2. Migration
After a period of rather strong decline in
the 1990s, the net inflow of internation-
al migrants to the EU increased to 
1.98 million in 2003. For 2005, net
migration is expected to have decreased
to a level of around 1.69 million people,
but remains high by recent historical
standards (Chart 53). Spain, Italy, Ger-
many and the United Kingdom together
account for around three-quarters of this
net inflow, while Cyprus is expected to
be the Member State with the highest
crude net migration rate in 2005. Over-
all, the majority of Member States are
foreseen to have experienced a decline
in their net migration rates in 2005.
According to official national statistics
and Eurostat estimates, the total num-
ber of non-nationals living in the EU in
2004 was around 25 million, equivalent
to just below 5.5% of the total popula-
tion. In absolute terms the greatest
numbers of foreign citizens reside in
France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the
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UK. In all Member States other than
Belgium, Cyprus, Ireland and Luxem-
bourg the majority of foreigners are cit-
izens of non-EU countries. 
The citizenship structures of the foreign
populations in EU Member States vary
greatly (Table 16). As well as geograph-
ical proximity, the composition of the
non-national population in each country
strongly reflects their history, in partic-
ular historical labour migration trends,
recent political developments and his-
torical links. For example, the largest
non-national groups include Turkish cit-
izens in Germany, Denmark and the
Netherlands; citizens of former colonies
in Portugal and in Spain; migrants from
Albania in Greece; citizens from other
parts of the former Yugoslavia in Slove-
nia and citizens from other former Sovi-
et Union countries in Estonia, Latvia
and Lithuania. In general, the non-
national population accounts for
between 2–8% of the total population in
the majority of Member States, but for
over 8% in Austria, Belgium, Cyprus,
Estonia30, Germany, Greece, Latvia and
Luxembourg. In contrast, non-nationals
account for less than 2% of the popula-
tion in the Czech Republic, Hungary,
Lithuania, Poland and Slovakia. 
10.3. Labour market
situation of non-EU
nationals
At EU level31, the labour market out-
comes for non-EU nationals are substan-
tially worse than those for EU-nationals.
While their participation rate (67%) was
somewhat similar to that of EU nationals
(71%) in 2005, their employment rate
was substantially lower (55%, compared
to 65% for EU nationals) (Chart 54).
This was reflected in unemployment
rates that were almost twice as high for
non-EU nationals (17%) as for EU
nationals (9%) (Chart 55).
Employment in Europe 2006
30 The figures for Estonia and Latvia include citizens of the former Soviet Union permanently resident in these countries who have not taken the
citizenship of the host country since the break-up of the Soviet Union.
31 Results for the EU aggregate exclude Italy due to non-availability of data with breakdowns by nationality.
Year Nationals Non-nationals Non-nationals Largest group of non-nationals 
(1000) (1000) % (country of citizenship)
BE 2004 9 536 860 8.3 Italy
CZ 2004 10 016 195 1.9 Ukraine
DK 2004 5 126 271 5 Turkey
DE 2004 75 190 7 342 8.9 Turkey
EE 2000c 1 096 274 20 Russia
EL 2004e 10 149 891 8.1 Albania
ES 2004 39 426 2 772 6.6 Ecuador
FR 1999c 55 258 3 263 5.6 Portugal
IE 2002c 3 585 274 7.1 United Kingdom
IT 2004 55 898 1 990 3.4 Albania
CY 2002c 625 65 9.4 Greece
LV 2004 1 804 515 22.2 Russia
LT 2001c 3 450 34 1 Russia
LU 2004 277 174 38.6 Portugal
HU 2004 9 987 130 1.3 Romania
MT 2004 389 11 2.8 United Kingdom
NL 2004 15 556 702 4.3 Turkey
AT 2004 7 375 765 9.4 Serbia and Montenegro
PL 2002c 37 530 700 1.8 Germany
PT 2003p 10 169 239 2.3 Cape Verde
SL 2004 1 951 45 2.3 Bosnia and Herzegovina
SK 2004 5 350 30 0.6 Czech Republic
FI 2004 5 113 107 2 Russia
SE 2004 8 500 476 5.3 Finland
UK 2003 55 636 2 760 4.7 Ireland
c - Census data; e – Estimated figures; p – Provisional data.
Source: Eurostat, demographic statistics (official national statistics and Eurostat estimates).
Table 16 – National and non-national populations in the EU Member States around 2004
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However, it is not universally the case
among Member States that employ-
ment rates for non-EU nationals are
below those of EU nationals. In many
of the new Member States as well as
Greece, Spain and Portugal, the
employment rate of non-EU nationals
was above that of EU nationals in 2005.
Nevertheless, in most Member States
labour market integration of non-EU
nationals remains a significant prob-
lem, and especially so in Belgium,
Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands and
Sweden, where differences in employ-
ment rates compared to EU-nationals
exceed 20 percentage points and there
are generally strong disparities in
unemployment rates. Among the latter
group, the difference in employment
rates is as high as 33 percentage points
in the Netherlands, while Belgium has
the lowest actual employment rate for
non-EU nationals at only 35%.
At EU level, the difference in the
labour market situation of EU and non-
EU nationals is even more striking for
the high-skilled population, and sug-
gests a strong under-utilisation of
important human capital. The employ-
ment rate for high-skilled EU nationals
(i.e. those having completed tertiary
education) was around 83% on average
in 2005, while high-skilled non-EU
nationals had a much lower rate of only
67%. Differences in employment rates
for the medium skilled (69% versus
63%) and the low skilled (around 46%
for both groups) are much less pro-
nounced at EU level. 
In terms of gender, female non-EU
nationals face particular difficulties
compared to their EU-national counter-
parts. Employment rates are lower for
all skill levels, and the disparity is par-
ticularly pronounced for high-skilled
females where the difference between
employment rates for non-EU and EU
nationals exceeds 20 percentage points.
11. Conclusions
Labour market conditions in the EU
improved in 2005, although the overall
improvement in employment perform-
ance was moderate. Employment
growth picked up moderately even
though economic growth temporarily
slowed during 2005. At Member State
level, employment performance for the
year as a whole was generally positive,
with negative employment growth in
only a very few cases (but including the
large Member State of Germany). Nev-
ertheless, the pace of employment
growth remains well below that record-
ed in the latter part of the 1990s and has
now been below the 1% level for four
consecutive years. In addition, there
was a generalised (though moderate)
decline in labour productivity growth in
2005, in contrast to the increase in
2004, which was a cyclical rebound,
and the EU continues to under-perform
relative to the US both in terms of
employment growth and productivity
growth. 
As a result, progress towards the over-
all Lisbon employment rate target for
2010 has continued to be slow and
reaching this target is becoming
extremely challenging, although recent
progress towards the female and older
people's targets is rather more encour-
aging. Much of the weak employment
performance of recent years has been
due to the relatively poor labour market
performance in Germany and Poland,
although recent figures indicate that the
situation may finally be turning around
in those two Member States. At the
same time, many of the southern EU
Member States remain far from the
common EU employment targets, and
still exhibit large gender differences in
labour market outcomes, together with
large disparities in the performance of
labour markets at regional level.
With regard to the expansion in
employment in 2005, growth contin-
ued to be faster for women than for
men, although a notable development
was the upturn in the employment rate
of prime-age males after several years
of decline. The continuation of the pos-
itive trend in the employment of older
workers, and the noticeable rise in the
share of part-time employment and of
employment under fixed-term con-
tracts, were also notable developments.
At the same time there has been an
ongoing improvement in the skill
structure of the working age popula-
tion, which is reflected in the substan-
tial rise in employment in high-skilled
non-manual occupations compared to
2000. However, one area where further
strong efforts are necessary is in the
labour market integration of migrants,
as disparities in labour market out-
comes for EU nationals and non-EU
nationals remain substantial in many
Member States.
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Men Women Total
EU-25 Non-EU-25 EU-25 Non-EU-25 EU-25 Non-EU-25
nationals nationals nationals nationals nationals nationals
Low skilled 55.2 59.3 38.3 34.5 46.5 46.4
Medium skilled 75.0 70.6 62.9 54.4 69.1 63.1
High skilled 86.4 74.7 80.1 58.8 83.3 66.7
Source: Eurostat, LFS spring results.
Notes: Low (ISCED 0-2: lower secondary), Medium (ISCED 3-4: upper secondary),
High (ISCED 5-6: tertiary); UK: GCSE levels included under “medium”.
Table 17 – Employment rates of EU nationals and 
non-EU nationals by skill level and gender, 2005
1. Introduction 
In recent years, a number of develop-
ments have intensified competitive
pressures and increased the pace of
structural change in many economies.
In particular the following factors are
highlighted:
• The rapid pace of international eco-
nomic integration – a phenomenon
loosely described by the term “glob-
alisation”; 
• The emergence of new key economic
players on the world scene rich in
labour resources; 
• The rapid development and introduc-
tion of new technologies, particularly
in the information and communica-
tion areas; 
• The considerable ageing of European
societies, together with relatively low
employment rates on average, which
(assuming unchanged policies) are
projected to eventually put at risk the
financial sustainability of social pro-
tection systems;
• The development of segmented labour
markets, where both relatively “pro-
tected” and “unprotected” sectors
coexist, partly reflecting both the polit-
ical economy difficulties of conduct-
ing comprehensive (labour) market
reforms, and the consequent resort to
reform strategies that concentrate on
loosening the stringency of regulations
applying to the “unprotected” sectors
(i.e. reforms at the “margin”), as well
as the significant weight of undeclared
work in some Member States. 
While the processes of globalisation and
structural change are overall beneficial
to growth and employment, they can also
bring transformations that are disruptive
to workers and enterprises. On the one
hand, enterprises must become more
flexible to respond to unanticipated
changes in demand patterns, and must
adapt to new technologies and organisa-
tional methods to foster innovation and
remain competitive. On the other hand,
workers need to acquire skills to create
and use new technologies, and to adapt
to new working practices.
This all-pervading challenge to adapt
requires, among other things, a more
flexible labour market combined with
satisfactory levels of security to simul-
taneously respond to the needs of both
employers and employees. This should
also help to prevent the emergence of
segmented labour markets, with the risk
of making jobs more precarious, dam-
aging sustainable integration in the
labour market and limiting the accumu-
lation of skills. 
In recent decades, a number of atypical
forms of labour contracts have prolifer-
ated in some Member States1 (e.g. tem-
porary work, labour agencies), bringing
with them enhanced flexibility for the
adjustment of labour levels by firms,
but at the expense of reduced employ-
ment and income security, and poor
career prospects, for the large majority
of workers hired under such contractu-
al arrangements.
Based on these developments, large
segments of the public seem to have
come to the conclusion that there is an
irreconcilable dichotomy between, on
the one hand, firms’ quest for increased
flexibility in the labour market and, on
the other, workers’ interest in having
stable incomes and satisfactory career
prospects. Public perceptions are
“…often dominated by anxieties con-
cerning job losses and downward pres-
sures on wages and working condi-
tions”2 (i.e. a kind of “race to the bot-
tom”). 
This perceived dichotomy has generat-
ed a growing interest in the promotion
and implementation across Member
States of “flexicurity” principles,
which aim to combine, within an
appropriate social insurance model,
sufficiently flexible work contracts
with effective policies to support
labour market transitions, and lifelong
learning. Consequently, Member
States with particularly favourable
labour market outcomes and a proven
tradition of successfully balancing the
requirements of flexibility and securi-
ty, such as Denmark and the
Netherlands, have recently come under
close scrutiny by both academics and
policy-makers in the EU. 
The European Employment Strategy
(EES) calls for labour market institu-
tions to adopt “flexicurity” principles.
Specifically, Guideline No. 21 of the
Integrated Guidelines for Growth and
Employment for the period 2005-
2008 calls on Member States to
“…promote flexibility combined with
Flexibility and security in the
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1 These new forms of labour contracts have gained weight, particularly in countries with restrictive employment protection legislation for regular
contracts. 
2 EU Economy 2005 Review “Rising International Economic Integration, Opportunities and Challenges”, European Commission, November 2005.
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employment security and reduce
labour market segmentation […]”.
Equally, the Annual Progress Report
(APR), adopted by the Commission in
January 2006 within the framework of
the re-launched Lisbon strategy, also
calls on Member States to “...seek
convergence of views on the balance
between flexibility and employment
security (i.e. flexicurity)” and empha-
sises that the Commission is commit-
ted to present a report aimed at facili-
tating an agreement, by the end of
2007, on a set of common principles
on flexicurity. The 2005/06 Joint
Employment Report (JER) states that
those principles should comprise the
following four elements:
• The availability of contractual
arrangements, providing adequate
flexibility for both workers and
employers to shape the relationship
according to their needs.
• Effective active labour market poli-
cies supporting transitions between
jobs, as well as from unemployment
and inactivity to jobs.
• Credible lifelong learning systems
enabling workers to remain employ-
able throughout their careers, by
helping them to cope with rapid
change, unemployment spells and
transitions to new jobs.
• Modern social security systems com-
bining the need to facilitate labour
market mobility and transitions with
the provision of adequate income
support during all absences from the
labour market.
Moreover, in the first half of 2006, the
Council put flexicurity at the centre of
the EU political agenda3. 
The Chapter
The main aim of this chapter is to pres-
ent a preliminary characterisation of
the balance between flexibility and
security across Member States – to
reflect their current institutional setting
– and, on that basis, to propose a taxon-
omy of countries in a reduced number
of “flexicurity” systems. This should be
seen as preliminary work leading to the
Commission’s report on flexicurity
scheduled for the end of 2007, which,
in addition to describing the current sit-
uation, will also present a number of
“typical” pathways built around the
above-mentioned four principles, that
Member States could select in order to
improve their balance between flexibil-
ity and security. 
The analysis of this chapter builds on
a long tradition of work carried out
within past editions of Employment in
Europe (see EiE 2001, 2002, 2003 and
2004). This work focused on issues
such as job quality, labour market
flexibility, employment security and
labour market transitions and advance-
ment. In this context extensive empiri-
cal evidence as well as a number of
indicators (see below) have been pro-
vided. However, while those previous
chapters were focused on outcome
indicators4, this current one focuses on
institutional/policy differences across
countries. 
The chapter initially covers the concept
of flexicurity, as currently understood
in the context of the Danish and Dutch
models, presented together with other
policy proposals with a similar objec-
tive of improving the balance between
flexibility and security in the labour
market. The purpose is not to give a
thorough description of the Danish and
Dutch models of labour market policy,
but just to illustrate the definitions of
“flexicurity” which authors have put
forward drawing from the experience
of these two approaches. 
The two following sections focus,
respectively, on one dimension of flex-
ibility and one dimension of security.
Admittedly, such an approach signifi-
cantly limits the extent of the discus-
sion, but it allows for a more in-depth
analysis of these more narrowly select-
ed aspects of flexicurity within the
scope of this chapter.
The dimension of external numerical
flexibility is characterised using the
OECD’s indices of employment protec-
tion legislation (EPL) for regular and
temporary work, together with a num-
ber of measures of labour market flows,
such as labour turnover and average
tenure of employment. This section dis-
cusses the issue of labour market seg-
mentation, particularly in the context of
labour market reforms that increase
flexibility only at the margin, which
may have negative effects, not only on
the individual employees concerned,
but also on the macro-economic per-
formance of the labour market as a
whole. However, the related issue
regarding the effects of undeclared
work on individual employment paths
as well as overall labour market per-
formance is not considered in our
analysis.
Next, the dimension of (income) securi-
ty is discussed in a thorough review of
the various features of unemployment
benefit (UB) systems and their interac-
tion with Active Labour Market policies
(ALMPs), especially in the context of
activation strategies. This is followed by
a number of illustrative calculations of
3 The informal Employment, Social Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs (EPSCO) Council held in Villach (19–21 January 2006) under the Austrian
Presidency. 
4 Such as self-reported job satisfaction or probabilities of transitions between employment statuses or different contractual arrangements.  
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the budgetary costs that would be
incurred by adopting the expenditure
intensity (per unemployed) on labour
market policies of the high spending
countries, some of which are traditional-
ly considered as benchmarks for the
“flexicurity” model. This then leads into
a discussion on the trade-off between
EPL and UB for the provision of insur-
ance against labour market risks. 
The following section brings together the
range of quantified indicators on the var-
ious dimensions (though some important
ones are left out of the analysis for a
number of reasons, see Section 3) of
flexicurity in order to allocate Member
States into distinct labour market sys-
tems. This means identifying the main
dimensions/axes characterising flexicuri-
ty systems, and correlating those axes
with selected measures of labour market
performance and other socio-economic
indicators. Then, political economy con-
straints in the setting of labour market
institutions in general, and in the imple-
mentation of flexicurity reforms in par-
ticular, are briefly discussed. Finally, the
chapter concludes by summarising the
main findings of country mapping, high-
lighting the diversity of labour market
systems, the challenges in terms of both
fiscal costs and political feasibility of
improving on current flexicurity models,
and the main shortcomings of the taxon-
omy analysis of labour market systems
carried out in this chapter. The latter calls
for further work on a number of areas,
including explicit coverage of labour
market segmentation, consideration of
the important (and now missing) dimen-
sion of functional and internal (i.e. with-
in the firm) flexibility (see Section 2.1)
and, finally, an analysis along the “flexi-
curity” dimensions of the employment
features and prospects of more disadvan-
taged groups of workers (like women,
youth and older workers).
2. Definitions of
“flexicurity” 
The concept of “flexicurity” is primari-
ly based on the idea that the two dimen-
sions of flexibility and security are not
contradictory, but mutually supportive,
particularly in the context of the new
challenges – such as globalisation –
faced by developed economies. 
Flexicurity is a new term, which was
first coined in the Netherlands in the
aftermath of the labour law reform of
1999, the “Flexibility and Security
Act” (Wilthagen and Troos, 2004). For
this reason, the relevant literature is
still developing and there is no single
definition of the concept that is cur-
rently universally accepted. In fact, two
definitions, partly overlapping, are gen-
erally offered. The main elements char-
acterising these two definitions are
summarised below.
2.1. Wilthagen’s definition:
the flexibility-security 
nexus
The first definition mainly applies to
the Netherlands (Wilthagen and
Rogowski, 2002), and describes flexi-
curity as a policy strategy that attempts,
synchronically and deliberately, to
enhance the flexibility of labour mar-
kets, work organizations and labour
relations, on the one hand, and employ-
ment and income security, notably for
weaker groups in and outside the
labour market, on the other. In princi-
ple, this definition rules out (labour
market) reform strategies that consider
flexibility and security separately, or
(indirectly) promote labour market seg-
mentation through an increase in flexi-
bility only at the margin (e.g. tempo-
rary contracts). 
An alternative and more comprehensive
version of this definition maintains that
flexicurity is “…a degree of job, employ-
ment, income and combination security
that facilitates the labour market careers
and biographies of workers with a rela-
tively weak position and allows for
enduring and high quality labour market
participation and social inclusion, while
at the same time providing a degree of
numerical (both external and internal),
functional and wage flexibility that
allows for labour markets’ (and individ-
ual companies’) timely and adequate
adjustment to changing conditions in
order to maintain and enhance competi-
tiveness and productivity” (Wilthagen
and Tros, 2004).
This latter definition thus identifies
four elements for the flexibility dimen-
sion (Wilthagen et al., 2003; Wilthagen
and Tros, 2004):
• External numerical flexibility – the
difficulty/ease of hiring and firing
employees and the extent to which
fixed-term employment contracts can
be used;
• Internal (i.e. within the firm) numer-
ical flexibility – the difficulty/ease of
changing the quantity of labour used in
a firm without having recourse to
either hiring or separations (i.e.
through changes in working hours, use
of part-time or overtime work, etc.);
• Functional flexibility – the difficul-
ty/ease of changing the working
organisation or the ability/inability of
workers and enterprises to adapt to
new challenges (multi-tasking, job
rotations etc.);
• Wage flexibility – the degree of
responsiveness of wage costs to eco-
nomic conditions.
Chapter 2. Flexibility and security in the EU labour markets
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The following four elements are also
identified with the security dimension:
• Job security – the expectation regard-
ing the job tenure of a specific job;
• Employment security/employability
security – the expectation regarding
remaining in work (not necessarily
with the same employer);
• Income security – the degree of
income protection in the event that
paid work ceases;
• Combination security – the
ability/inability to combine paid
work with other private or social
activities.
These elements can be considered as
sub-dimensions of the flexibility and
security axes. Gaard (2005) proposed
using the resulting matrix as an analyti-
cal tool to classify national labour mar-
ket systems/models into distinct country
groups or clusters characterised by cer-
tain commonalities, in terms of the com-
bination between flexibility and security
that they realise (see Table 1). 
In this approach, flexicurity is seen as a
general analytical framework/tool to
compare national labour market sys-
tems (Bredgaard et al., 2005), rather
than as a concept describing the Dutch
or Danish labour markets5 (see Section
2.2). This approach also appears to be
more in line with EU policy, namely the
general recommendation to improve
the balance between flexibility and
security (EU Integrated Guideline
No. 21). The main thrust of the EU rec-
ommendation on flexicurity is to
encourage a shift from job security
towards employment security6. 
2.2. The Danish “Golden
Triangle”
The second definition to consider has
been initially developed for Denmark. In
fact, its comparatively favourable labour
market outcomes over recent years have
put Denmark at the centre of much inter-
national attention (Madsen, 2005).
Bredgaard et al. (2005) describe the
Danish flexicurity model as a “golden
triangle”. The sides of the triangle con-
sist of:
1.Relatively loose legislation for
employment protection;
2.Generous social safety net for the
unemployed;
3.High (intensity) spending (per unem-
ployed) on ALMPs.
Figure 1 gives a stylised presentation of
the Danish “golden triangle”. The arrows
signal the high degree of mobility in and
out of employment and between jobs,
which is a key feature of the Danish
model. On average, close to a quarter of
all workers pass through unemployment
every year at least once (Breedgard et al.,
2005). However, the transition rate to
employment is relatively high for the
vast majority of unemployed, reflecting
the overall dynamism of the Danish
labour market. After a certain period, the
unemployed who are unable to find a job
can benefit from Public Employment
Services (PES) referral to one of a com-
prehensive set of ALMPs7, which aim to
upgrade skills or to facilitate adaptation
to economic change, thereby supporting
individual transitions and career devel-
opment8. This is also supported by an
5 As an analytical framework, flexicurity is closely related to another well-known labour market concept, namely the idea of Transitional Labour
Markets (TLM) (Schmid, 1998; Schmid and Gazier, 2002). This theory emphasises that globalisation and increasing social differentiation of individ-
ual employment paths makes the model of continuous full employment during an average working life increasingly outdated. The new model
goes in the direction of discontinuous work biographies, whereby workers experience more frequent transitions between employment and non-
employment, and between different kinds of employment. These transitions can be either positive or negative for the individual, depending on
his/her adjustment capacity. Good transitional labour markets provide a supportive environment for successful management of these transitions.
6 Given the apparent political economy trade-off between (numerical) flexibility and income stability, this shift could be facilitated by enhancing
spending on income support to job losers, the provision of more efficient re-employment services, and offering programmes for vocational train-
ing and skills upgrading of the unemployed. In particular, investing in human capital is vital both to improve the long-term employment prospects
and the employment security of the individual, and also to enhance the competitiveness and adaptability of the labour force (OECD, 2004).
7 For instance job training and education. 
8 Chart 1 emphasises two effects of LMPs: a) a qualification effect, which raises the skills of employees that take part in those programmes; and b)
a motivational effect, reflecting the accrued intensity of job search when an unemployed person approaches the start of the activation
phase/expiry of benefits. 
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Source: Wilthagen, (2003). 
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efficient education and training system,
which includes well-developed schemes
for continuous training of the workforce
and life long learning. In particular,
Danish employees have the opportunity
to regularly improve their skills and com-
petences through participation in adult
vocational training programmes
(Andersen and Mailand, 2005). However,
it would be incorrect to portray Denmark
as a country with “free firing”. In fact,
Denmark has relatively strict rules on
advance notifications to workers in the
event of collective dismissals (ETUC,
2006). This represents an important ‘flex-
icurity’ element for two reasons. First, it
gives workers an adequate amount of
time to look for a new job and, if neces-
sary, to engage in retraining (thereby act-
ing as a kind of “early-warning” system).
Secondly, PES and the staff from the
social partners assist the worker in his/her
job search efforts from the moment
redundancies are announced.
Using Wilthagen’s categorisation, the
Danish flexicurity model combines
high external numerical flexibility, high
levels of income security, and high lev-
els of employment security. 
Empirical results suggest that generous
unemployment benefits have not been an
obstacle to labour supply in Denmark,
partly due to the offsetting effect of
ALMPs that are integrated in compre-
hensive activation strategies which con-
dition receipt of UB on participation in
ALMPs or compliance with job search
requirements. 
2.3. Beyond the Danish
system: other proposals
2.3.1. Layoff taxes to internalise
the social costs of dismissals
Based on the long established practice
in North American countries of expe-
rience-rating9, a number of leading
researchers in the field of labour eco-
nomics (e.g. Blanchard and Tirole,
2003, 2005; Cahuc and Zylberberg,
2005) have recommended setting up a
structured layoff tax system in order
to make employers internalise the
social costs of layoffs10 (see Section
5.3.1). The rationale for this proposal
resides in the fact that the social value
of a job exceeds its private value by
the cost of unemployment to society
9 In the US, the experience-rating system is state based. In a majority of states, each firm runs an imputed account balance with the social security
system, where social contributions appear as credits, and unemployment benefits paid to workers laid off by the firm as debits. Firms can accu-
mulate transitory debts on their imputed social security account, although they are required to keep a balanced account over the long-term.
Experience-rating is an original feature of North American countries being alien to the UB systems of other OECD countries, which are financed
by payroll taxes paid by employers and employees, and by government contributions (Holmlund, 1998). 
10 One example is provided by the “Delalande” contributions in France, which penalize firms for dismissals of older workers. If a worker over 50 is
fired the firm has to pay a contribution (variable according to the employee’s age) to the agency paying unemployment benefits. See Blanchard
and Tirole (2003).  
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(i.e. lower taxes and social security
contributions plus unemployment
and/or social assistance benefits)11. In
an efficiency wage model that explicit-
ly considers the budget constraint for
the unemployment benefit system,
Albrecht and Vroman (1999) compare
the workings of a UB system financed
by a payroll tax with another financed
by a layoff tax (i.e. a tax on dismissals).
They find that the latter is favourable to
employment, wage and production for
any level of unemployment benefits12. 
2.3.2. Individual unemployment
accounts 
Brown et al. (2006) propose a far-reach-
ing reform of the unemployment bene-
fit (UB) system in an effort to increase
the overall efficiency of the mecha-
nisms protecting against labour market
risk. The point of departure of their
analysis is the finding that current UB
systems fail to provide appropriate
incentives for the unemployed to take
full account of the social costs of unem-
ployment when searching for a job13.
They suggest replacing UB systems by
individual unemployment accounts,
thus sharing some features with the
2003 reform of the Austrian system of
severance payment, which is, though,
part of the EPL system rather than of
UB14. Workers would make obligatory
contributions to individual unemploy-
ment accounts when employed, while
being allowed to make withdrawals dur-
ing unemployment periods. The incen-
tive mechanisms built into individual
unemployment account systems tends
to foster job search intensity, reducing –
all else being equal – the equilibrium
level of unemployment. Furthermore,
an individual unemployment account
system can be made compatible with
any redistributive choice15. 
2.3.3. A single type of
employment contract to counter
labour market segmentation
In a report produced for the French gov-
ernment, Cahuc and Kramarz (2004)
proposed a set of reforms to improve
the functioning of the French labour
market, including measures to reconcile
the requirements of flexibility and
employment stability. If implemented,
the proposed set of reforms would bring
about significant changes in the current
institutional setting, although it remains
to be seen to what extent it can be
applied to national labour markets
which are different from the French
one. The main proposal of the report is
to replace the current regular and tem-
porary labour contracts by a single new
type of regular contract. 
Cahuc and Kramarz (2004) argue that
establishing a single regular labour
contract would end labour market seg-
mentation and the adverse treatment
of certain disadvantaged groups par-
ticularly affected by the excessive use
of temporary contracts, such as youths
and women. A coherent reform pack-
age should consequently include a
number of additional measures.
Firstly, loosening the EPL mainly to
avoid the unpredictable judicial and
administrative costs of a dismissal.
Secondly, discarding the reclassifica-
tion obligations imposed on firms in
the event of a dismissal16, preferring
recourse instead to a highly profes-
sional and efficient PES. PES can
operate better where the following
principles are applied: a) one-stop-
shop for the unemployed to attend for
all their needs; b) systematic profiling
to establish priorities and optimise
treatment; and c) setting incentives for
quasi-market private brokerage servic-
es. Thirdly, the introduction of pre-
dictable severance payments in order
to protect workers against excessive
job turnover. Finally, creating a layoff
tax to help finance the reintegration of
the unemployed. The interaction of all
these reforms is expected to work in
favour of labour mobility, career pro-
gression, labour market transitions
and actual and perceived employment
stability, ultimately yielding lower
structural unemployment. 
11 Other social costs associated with unemployment could also be taken into account, such as the depreciation of (social) human capital, and high-
er criminality.
12 In an efficiency wage model with layoff taxes, firms are induced to raise wages in order to reduce layoffs related to shirking. 
13 Under the current UB system, “…when unemployed people find jobs, their benefits generally are withdrawn (in whole or in part) and taxes are
imposed. Consequently, such a system ‘rewards’ people for being unemployed (through unemployment benefits) and penalises them for being
employed (through taxes). The UB system thereby creates an externality, distorting the incentives to work and save”, (see Brown et al, 2006).
14 OECD (2006c) reports on Austria’s 2003 reform of its system of severance payments. The reform consisted in replacing a conventional severance
payments system with a system of individual savings accounts. Under the old system (i.e. severance payments), in the event of contract termina-
tion, workers where entitled to a severance payment based on the length of the expired employment relationship, as long as they had worked
for the employer for at least three years. Under the new system (i.e. individual savings accounts), employers contribute a fixed percentage of the
payroll to the worker’s individual account. In the event of dismissal, the worker has the option of receiving a severance payment drawn from
his/her savings account or can take his/her accumulated balance to the next job. In a life-cycle perspective, individual savings accounts can be seen
as a form of (compulsory) retirement savings. From the perspective of employers, a savings accounts system has the advantage of converting the
unpredictable dismissal costs (at the time of hiring) into predictable costs (at the time of firing); while, from the standpoint of the worker, it
reduces job mobility costs because workers do not lose their entitlement to severance payment in the event of changing jobs. 
15 “To achieve its equity objectives in an unemployment account system, the government can make balanced-budget interpersonal redistributions
among the unemployment accounts, taxing the accounts of higher-income people and subsidising those of lower-income people” , (see Brown et
al, 2006).
16 I.e. in case of layoff the obligation to check alternative employment possibilities for the workers involved would no longer fall to the firm itself,
but on PES. 
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3. Flexibility:
Employment
Protection Legislation
and segmentation
The balance between flexibility and
security is largely determined by a wide
range of policies and institutions, includ-
ing labour market, social and education
policies, together with their interactions,
and by the macro-economic perform-
ance of the economy as a whole. 
However, this chapter does not cover all
the dimensions of flexibility and secu-
rity as identified in Wilthagen’s “flexi-
curity” matrix (see above), which
would allow for a richer characterisa-
tion of labour market systems. The data
requirements of Wilthagen’s matrix are
too demanding, going beyond the scope
of this chapter. For example, lack of: a)
appropriate (composite) indicators on
internal and functional flexibility, b)
indicators on various aspects of unem-
ployment and social assistance sys-
tems, such as on their eligibility and
enforceability rules; and c) lack of data
covering all EU Member States, such
as on the degree of real wage flexibili-
ty, prevented this chapter from carrying
out a more comprehensive analysis of
flexicurity systems. Progress will
undoubtedly require the preliminary
calculation of a number of composite
indicators, such as on internal and
functional flexibility, together with
indicators on workers’ perceived secu-
rity based on survey data.
The chapter will therefore focus on
external numerical flexibility (OECD’s
EPL), and income/employment securi-
ty and on those policies which have a
direct impact on these dimensions,
namely EPL, UB and ALMPs. So, in
Section 3.1 employment protection is
discussed using the OECD’s EPL indi-
cators and reviewing the evidence link-
ing employment protection to a number
of indicators based on the Labour Force
Survey (LFS), characterising labour
market dynamism and flexibility. It is
important to underline, though, that
rules for employment protection can be
provided by both labour legislation and
collective or individual bargaining
agreements. Moreover, the application
and enforcement of those rules in prac-
tice, may deviate from what foreseen in
written laws/contracts17 and the extent
of coverage of EPL may also be an
important issue (e.g. exclusion of
SME). The OECD’s EPL indicator
“…is mainly based on legislative provi-
sions, but it also incorporates some
aspects of contractual provisions and
judicial practices. Nevertheless, […]
their role is likely to be somewhat
understated […]”18, therefore our
analysis is subject to some caveats and
limitations. Using survey data, the cor-
relation between EPL and workers’ per-
ceived security is also evaluated.
Finally, Section 3.2 covers labour mar-
ket segmentation. 
3.1. Employment Protection
Legislation
3.1.1. Strictness of EPL differs
widely across the EU
EPL considers legal and administrative
constraints on worker dismissals, as
well as severance payments paid to dis-
missed employees. All other things
being equal, external numerical flexi-
bility tends to be higher in countries
with relatively loose EPL19 and/or a
labour law that facilitates recourse to
fixed-term contracts. 
The OECD (1999, 2004) calculated a
summary indicator of the overall stance
of employment protection legislation as
a weighted average of three sub-indica-
tors on dismissal regulations, covering:
a) regular employees20; b) temporary
employees21; and c) collective dis-
missals22. The summary indicator
ranges from 0 to 6 and increases with
the strictness of EPL.
Chart 1 suggests the existence of large
differences in EPL across EU Member
States. Anglo-Saxon countries have the
least stringent dismissal regulations
(UK and IE), while southern countries
tend to have the most stringent ones
(EL, ES and PT). Although EPL is just
one among a series of indicators that
can be used to characterise external
numerical flexibility, the wide range of
this indicator across EU Member States
(from 1.1 in the UK to 3.5 in PT)
strongly suggests that EU Member
States have adopted overall legal sys-
tems that provide for significantly dif-
ferent degrees of external numerical
flexibility. 
3.1.2. EPL does not seem to
significantly affect total
unemployment…
A considerable amount of research
has been carried out to evaluate the
impact of employment protection leg-
islation on aggregate labour market
17 In this respect, judicial practices and court interpretations of EPL should be taken into account. 
18 OECD (2004), Employment Outlook, Chapter 2, p. 64. See, also, pp. 65-70 for a detailed discussion of the inclusion of contractual provisions/judi-
cial practices in the EPL indicator.
19 The intended aim of EPL is to increase the volume and stability of employment at the cost of raising firing costs for firms. Theoretical analysis sug-
gests that “…firing costs do indeed reduce job destruction, but they also exert a negative effect on job creation, so the [net] effect on employ-
ment is ambiguous” (Cahuc and Zylberberg, 2004). Much empirical research has been carried out to measure the impact of EPL on labour market
outcomes. Their results suggest that firing costs may increase the stability of jobs directly shielded by EPL, but usually at the cost of raising the
instability of unprotected jobs, such as temporary work.  
20 This indicator sums up three main regulatory aspects concerning regular contracts: difficulty of dismissal, procedural inconveniences the employ-
er faces when starting the dismissal procedure and notice and severance pay provisions (OECD Employment Outlook 2004, Chapter 2).  
21 This indicator measures restrictions on the use of temporary employment by firms, with respect to the type of work for which these contracts are
allowed and their duration/renewal possibilities. 
22 The following weightings are used: 0.4 for regular contracts, 0.4 for temporary contracts, and 0.2 for collective dismissals. 
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variables23. However, econometric
results tend to be subject to the caveat
of being essentially based on statisti-
cal correlations between EPL and
those variables, so that in many cases
causal relationships cannot be robust-
ly inferred. This caveat, therefore,
applies to most of the results as well
as to the graphical analysis discussed
in this section. Nevertheless, calibra-
tion exercises on theoretical models24
and empirical studies25 consistently
arrive at one major finding, that the
impact of EPL on aggregate unem-
ployment rates is weak with an
ambiguous sign. The main explana-
tion of this result (see, among others,
OECD, 2004 and 2006c and 2006d;
Nickell and Layard, 1999) is that strict
EPL has two opposite effects. On the
one hand it tends to reduce the separa-
tion rate from employment into unem-
ployment and, on the other, it decreas-
es the exit rate from unemployment
into work, since firms, anticipating
future costs on labour force adjust-
ment, become more cautious about
hiring. These effects may, in principle,
offset each other. 
3.1.3. …and its impact on total
employment is modest
Another line of research has used
individual and f irm level data to
analyse differences in regulation
within countries, either over time or
across space. This provides for a large
degree of variation which, in turn,
allows for more accurate testing of the
causal effects of EPL relative to what
is normally possible with macroeco-
nomic data. 
Dertouzos and Karoly (1992) and
(1993), Miles (2000) and Autor et al.
(2005) evaluate the strengthening of
EPL strictness which has been intro-
duced in different US states at various
times26. Autor et al. (2005) find a neg-
ative but modest impact of those
changes on the total employment of
corresponding states; which becomes
stronger, in the short term, in the case
of female, youth and less educated
workers (see below 3.1.4). 
23 The impact of EPL on labour market outcomes also depends on the nature of other institutions in the labour market and their interaction.
24 Using either a general equilibrium matching model (e.g. Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999) or a partial equilibrium labour demand model with
adjustment costs (e.g. Bertola, 1999), calibration exercises suggest that the impact of dismissal costs on unemployment is weak with an ambigu-
ous sign, although they significantly reduce labour mobility. 
25 Panel estimates of the determinants of structural unemployment generally do not find EPL to have a significant effect on the level of unemployment
(e.g. Nickell et al., 2003), although EPL seems to make the effects of shocks on unemployment more persistent (e.g. Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000). 
26 In fact, during past decades in many US States, courts have adopted doctrines aimed at giving employees protection against “wrongful-dis-
charge”, weakening the very flexible, so-called “employment at will”, US model, in which “…workers can be fired at will – that is, for any time
and for any reason, good or bad”, (see Autor et al., 2005).
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Garibaldi et al. (2003) and Schivardi
and Torrini (2005) exploit the fact that
in Italy, dismissal regulations for regular
employees become more stringent as
the firm’s size goes above the threshold
of 15 employees27. These authors ana-
lyze the impact of this differential treat-
ment on the size distribution and on the
hiring behaviour of Italian firms. They
find a statistically significant, though
quantitatively modest, ‘threshold
effect’, i.e. firms close to the threshold
are more reluctant to hire further work-
ers. They conclude that size-contingent
EPL negatively affects (albeit to a very
limited extent) average employment28.
3.1.4. …but it may harm
employment prospects of weak
groups…
However, there is ample evidence that
stringent EPL tends to worsen the
employment prospects of those groups
that are most subject to problems of
entry in the labour market, such as
young people, women and the long-
term unemployed. In fact, Lazear
(1990) and Nickell and Layard (1999)
found a negative correlation between
EPL and employment rates, that is basi-
cally driven by low female participation
in those labour markets with higher dis-
missal costs. Similarly, OECD (2004)
and (2006d) find a negative impact of
EPL on youth employment rates. 
Algan and Cahuc (2004) argue that
employment protection favours insid-
ers, who are predominantly prime age
males, and is detrimental to the
employment opportunities of outsiders,
who are more frequently part of other
groups (women and youth). Hence,
across Europe, EPL tends to be stricter
in countries where there is stronger
support for the male breadwinner
model (Chart 1). 
3.1.5. …tends to increase
unemployment duration…
Moreover, stricter EPL, by reducing
both hiring and firing, tends to lead to:
• Lower re-allocation of labour
between jobs
• Lower unemployment in- and out-
flows
• Higher unemployment durations,
with high long-term and low short-
term unemployment respectively (see
Chart 2).
• High average job tenure. 
In countries with high EPL, unem-
ployed workers find themselves in a
particularly disadvantaged situation
given the low inflow rates into employ-
ment, which may increase the expected
average duration of unemployment
spells and, hence, increase the cost of
unemployment.
3.1.6. …and to slow down
labour re-allocation
In other words, stringent EPL con-
tributes to make labour markets more
stagnant and, conversely, to make
employment more stable and employ-
ment relationships more durable (see
Boeri et al., 1999; Blanchard and Tirole,
2003; OECD, 2006a and 2006c).
These stylised facts can be illustrated
calculating a number of indicators that
are frequently used as proxies for
employment stability (Auer and Cazes,
2003; Auer, 2005; Gazier, 2006; Boeri
et al., 1999). In previous editions of
Employment in Europe (see EiE 2001,
2002, and 2004) extensive evidence of
such indicators has been provided, with
a view to capture labour market
(numerical) flexibility in the EU and
the capacity of EU labour markets to
ensure access to employment as well as
career progress. In particular EiE has
an established tradition of computing
probabilities of transition of individual
workers, both across employment sta-
tuses (employment, unemployment and
inactivity) and between different kinds
of employment (e.g. part-time vs. full-
time, temporary vs. regular contracts,
low pay vs. high pay or low quality vs.
high quality) as well as analysing their
determinants (see EiE 2002, Chapter 3
and EiE 2004, Chapter 4). These have
been used to assess to what extent the
higher pressure for flexible working
arrangements over recent years have
gone hand in hand with successful and
durable integration of workers in the
labour markets. 
In this chapter the focus is on policy
variables, hence, evidence on employ-
ment stability and flows is far more lim-
ited and meant to give a basic illustra-
tion of the effects of EPL and (see
Section 5.3.1) to characterise different
“flexicurity regimes” in terms of labour
market dynamism. Therefore, no indi-
cator on transitions is provided here but
one is included among the outcome
indicators in the regime analysis below.
Evidence is limited to data on employ-
ment tenure29, building up on previous
evidence of this kind provided in EiE
2001 (Chapter 4), and on labour
turnover, which is a standard flow indi-
cator in the literature together with tran-
sitions. 
27 Article 18 of the “Statuto dei Lavoratori” only applies to firms with more than 15 employees and states that those firms are obliged to reinstate
workers whose dismissal has been judged unfair by a court and to compensate the worker with the foregone wages for the time elapsing between
the dismissal and the court’s ruling. Provisions for unfair dismissals applying to smaller firms are substantially looser.
28 Schivardi and Torrini (2005) underline that firms’ employment policies change discontinuously at the threshold. In fact, data lend some support
to the hypothesis that firms growing bigger than 15 employees use to a larger extent more flexible labour contracts (e.g. fixed-term) as a way to
avoid the more stringent rules on regular employees. This would partly explain why the threshold effect on the firms’ size seems to be modest.   
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Using data for 2003, Chart 3 draws the
OECD’s EPL indicator against the
average employment tenure calculated
using LFS data. The graph shows a pos-
itive correlation between these two
variables30, which suggests that coun-
tries with stringent EPL tend to have
more durable or stable jobs. 
Auer and Cazes (2003) and Auer (2005)
also reviewed evidence on the evolution
of job tenure over time, in the 1990s and
until 2002 across a number of countries.
They show that long-term employment
relationships are still the norm in
advanced economies. This also suggests
the relative importance of employment
protection legislation, which exhibits a
fair degree of inertia over time. Chart 4
plots the average employment tenure
across a number of EU countries for
both 1995 and 2005, suggesting that the
average job duration in Europe has been
relatively stable over the last ten years,
despite a widespread perception of a
marked reduction in employment stabil-
ity due, among other things, to global-
ization pressures31. In the EU-15, aver-
age job tenure has remained relatively
stable in the last ten years, even increas-
ing slightly from 10.2 years in 1995 to
10.5 in 200532. On the other hand, cross-
country comparisons reveal the exis-
tence of significant differences across
Member States, with jobs in the Baltic
and Anglo-Saxon countries and
Denmark being of shorter average dura-
tion, and jobs in Slovenia, Portugal and
Greece being of the highest duration.
Several studies (Auer, 2005; Auer and
Cazes, 2003; Bertola et al., 1999; and
Employment in Europe 2001, Chapter 4)
have also looked at the distribution of
employment across different job dura-
29 Employment tenure is defined as the length of time a worker has been continuously employed by the same employer.
30 Similar evidence is provided in Auer and Cazes (2003), Auer et al. (2005) and Boeri et al. (1999).
31 The main exceptions are Ireland and the Netherlands, which show a significant reduction/increase in average job tenure respectively.
32 However, other factors, besides EPL, may have an impact on employment tenure, such as the age distribution of the workforce (a relatively older
labour force should exhibit longer average tenure) and the business cycle (research tends to show a counter-cyclical behaviour of tenure, see Auer
and Cazes, 2003, for details). In fact, Auer and Cazes (2003) perform econometric analysis of the recent evolution of employment tenure across
OECD countries in order to control for the effects of those two factors. Hence, they find that some decline has taken place (affecting mainly young
workers) but this does not challenge their overall conclusion that employment relationships remained relatively stable in industrialized countries.
On the other hand, average figures may ‘mask’ different trends for specific categories of workers: Auer and Cazes (2003) point to an increasing
female tenure coupled with a slight decline in men’s tenure across OECD countries in the 1992 – 2000 period. 
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tions. Following on from this, Chart 5
plots the EPL indicator and the propor-
tion of workers having a job lasting for
more than ten years. The graph suggests
that EU Member States with stringent
EPL tend to have a relatively higher
share of long-term jobs.
Indicators of labour turnover and job
turnover are also commonly used to
capture the degree of labour market
dynamism (Davis and Haltiwanger,
1992; Davis et al., 1996; Cahuc and
Zylberberg, 2005; Albaek and
Sorensen, 1998). Labour turnover
measures gross flows of workers in and
out of employment and corresponds to
the sum of the number of separations
(quits or layoffs) and hires which take
place between two points in time. Job
turnover, on the other hand, is the sum
of jobs created and destroyed33 in a
labour market between two points in
time.
EPL has a different impact on these two
measures of turnover in the labour mar-
ket. On the one hand, the empirical lit-
erature suggests that EPL has a nega-
tive impact on labour turnover; where-
as, on the other hand, stringent EPL
does not seem to be systematically
associated with lower job re-allocation
(Blanchard and Tirole, 2003). This
lends support to the hypothesis that
EPL may reduce labour adjustments
considered to be only temporary by
firms, but does not seem to prevent per-
manent adjustments, which are condi-
tions for firms to adapt to demand and
technological change. This finding also
suggests that EPL is unlikely to repre-
sent a major (or an insurmountable)
obstacle to adapting an economy to
technology or demand shocks, and thus
be responsible for slowing down eco-
nomic growth (see Section 3.1.7).
Chart 6 suggests that a negative corre-
lation exists between stringent EPL and
labour turnover34 lending some support
to the assertion that the former slows
down the process of labour re-alloca-
tion. A similar plot for job turnover
cannot be provided in this chapter since
this would require firm level data,
which are not available in the LFS.
3.1.7. …although this has mixed
effects on productivity and
growth
The impact of the lower labour reallo-
cation, which seems to be associated
with stringent EPL, on productivity
and growth has been much debated by
researchers. On the one hand,
Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993)35
have argued that EPL slows down the
pace of labour re-allocation from old
and declining sectors to new and
dynamic ones, thereby lowering pro-
ductivity and economic growth.
However, the lack of a clear impact of
EPL on the size of job re-allocation
(see Section 3.1.6) brings this argu-
ment into question.
Moreover, it has also been argued that
stricter EPL can help redress a number of
market failures that hinder the provision
of optimal levels of training. By length-
ening average job tenure, employment
protection favours investment in (firm-
specific) human capital or skills that
would otherwise remain at sub-optimal
level, thereby having a positive effect on
productivity and growth. Longer
employment relationships, resulting
from stringent EPL, encourage firms to
provide and workers to undergo (firm-
specific) training. This, in turn, is the
precondition for building up firm-specif-
ic human capital and raising labour pro-
ductivity (Auer et al., 2004; Nickell and
Layard, 1999; Lazear, 1979)36.
Firing costs may also push firms to
upgrade the skills of their workforce as
a way to avoid as much as possible to
have to recourse to dismissals and, so,
to incur those costs. Therefore strict
EPL could be an incentive to respond to
external change by innovation and
internal and functional flexibility
instead of layoffs (Marinescu, 2006)37. 
Moreover, evidence also suggests that
more stable employment relationships
enhance the cooperation of employees
and their personal initiative at work,
thereby contributing to productivity
enhancements (Levine and Tyson,
1990; Ichniowski et al., 1996). 
Other contributions (Bélot et al., 2005)
point to an “optimal” level of EPL
33 Job creation is due to openings of both new firms and employment expansion of existing firms over a certain period. Job destruction is due to
closures of firms or employment contraction of existing firms. The net employment change is equal to job creation minus job destruction (see
Bertola et al., 1999; and Davis and Haltiwanger, 1992). 
34 Following Bertola et al. (1999, box 1), Madsen (2003), Bingley et al. (1999) we calculated the hiring rate as the percentage of workers who have
less than one year’s tenure at time t, over total employment at time t-1 (which corresponds to the share of positions where at least one hire has
been made during the year). The separation rate corresponds to the share of people unemployed, inactive or employed with less than one year’s
tenure at time t, who were employed at time t-1, over total employment in t-1 (which corresponds to the share of workers for whom at least one
separation took place). Total labour turnover is the sum of the two shares.
35 They calibrate a general equilibrium model and find that a layoff tax equivalent to one year’s wages would reduce consumption by 2%, mainly
due to the fall in average productivity following the inefficient allocation of resources.  
36 According to the theory of human capital, firm-specific capital requires a minimum job tenure period to recoup the investment. Auer et al. (2005)
refer to the theory of firm-specific capital according to which firms invest in on-the-job training specific to the firm. Returns to training in terms
of higher labour productivity can be reaped by the employer only if the worker remains with the firm for a sufficiently long time. Lazear (1979)
suggests that the optimal wage structure implies that the worker’s wage is lower than his/her marginal product at the career’s beginning, while
it increases with job tenure. The firm postpones wage rises in order to discourage employees from quitting the firm. Empirical studies (Osterman,
2003; and Appelbaum et al., 2000) have also suggested that job stability favours innovation and productivity enhancements.  
37 Marinescu (2006) looked at the UK 1999 reform which shortened probationary periods (at the end of which an employee acquires the right to
sue his employer for unfair dismissal) from two to one year. She shows that this seems to have triggered an increase in firms’ recruitment efforts
(thereby improving the quality of job matches) as well as a higher supply of training to workers with lower tenure. 
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resulting from the trade-off between the
increase in the investments of workers
in firm-specific skills with more stable
jobs, on the one hand, and the efficien-
cy costs due to lower labour adjust-
ment, on the other. 
3.1.8. The perceived insecurity
paradox
The discussion so far suggests that
employment protection tends to have a
negative impact on labour re-allocation
(i.e. it reduces labour market flexibili-
ty), although this does not necessarily
imply negative effects on growth and
productivity. 
However, another important question is
whether EPL actually provides workers
with a feeling of security, but a number
of recent contributions to the debate
show that this may not necessarily be
the case. OECD (2004) and Postel-
Vinay and Saint Martin (2004) provide
evidence, based on survey data, of a
negative correlation between the strict-
ness of EPL and workers’ perception of
employment security38. Furthermore,
the evidence suggests that this negative
correlation persists even after control-
ling both for a number of individual
characteristics of the job and for the
macro-economic performance of the
local labour market. 
The apparent paradox that emerges
from the analysis of survey data is that
workers seem to have a perception of
higher insecurity in countries with the
most stringent EPL. This finding need,
though, is to be taken with some cau-
tion given that EPL indicators underes-
timate the role of actual implementa-
tion and effective coverage of rules (see
above, beginning of Section 3). Chart 7
presents the scatter data for EPL and
perceived security39 drawing on the
empirical evidence. 
This broad finding is corroborated by
evidence from other sources, such as
Auer and Cazes (2003) and Auer
(2005). They show that stable employ-
ment, which, as discussed above, tends
to be associated with stricter EPL, does
not necessarily result in workers’ per-
ceived security40.
Auer and Cazes (2003), Auer (2005),
and Auer et al. (2005) put forward a
number of explanations for this para-
dox. For example, the perceptions
workers have of their job security may
be affected by the publicity surround-
ing the downsizing and restructuring
38 The International Social Survey Programme (ISSP, 1997), and the European Consumer and Household Panel (ECHP, 1999).
39 Data from Postel-Vinay and Saint-Martin (2004).
40 Across a number of OECD countries, these authors find a statistically insignificant correlation between average tenure and the ISSP perception of
security.
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activities of firms41. Labour market seg-
mentation (principally the excessive
recourse to temporary contracts, see
Section 3.2), combined with low transi-
tions into regular jobs, may also play a
major role in creating a feeling of inse-
curity. Postel-Vinay and Saint Martin
(2004) suggest that, given that EPL
simultaneously lowers the risk of job
loss and the chance of re-entering
employment once unemployed, then the
latter effect may take precedence over
the former.
3.2. Flexibility at 
the “margin”: labour
market segmentation
3.2.1. EPL loosening has mainly
affected temporary work…
Time-series data on the EPL indicator
(OECD, 2004) show an overall declining
trend for the stringency of dismissal reg-
ulations, with most of the changes
occurring in the 1990s. However, in
most cases easing regulations on tempo-
rary employment have predominantly
driven changes in the summary indica-
tor42. This has paved the way, together
with other factors, for the expansion of
temporary employment as a way to cir-
cumvent stringent rules on regular con-
tracts, given the political deadlock in
many countries regarding the possibility
of loosening EPL for regular jobs. This
situation has contributed to labour mar-
ket segmentation, high turnover rates for
temporary employment and precarious
attachment to the labour market, with
many workers holding various tempo-
rary jobs before eventually obtaining a
regular contract (OECD, 2004; and
Blanchard and Landier, 2002).
Chart 8 suggests that stringent rules on
regular contracts may indeed tend to
increase the incidence of temporary
work.
3.2.2. …leading to labour market
segmentation
Partial loosening of EPL (i.e. involv-
ing only temporary contracts) can
yield a dual labour market, where
41 Good news is no news.
42 Particularly in Italy, Belgium, Greece, Germany and Denmark (OECD, 2004). This has been basically done by facilitating the use of fixed-term con-
tracts and through recourse to workers hired through temporary work agencies. The main exception to this general trend was Spain, where, after
the accentuated segmentation that occurred in the 1980s and 1990s, national authorities took measures to reduce the EPL gap between regular
and temporary labour contracts (see Section 3.2.4).
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insecure temporary jobs coexist with
highly protected or inflexible regular
jobs. Such a situation runs counter to
the application of flexicurity, efficien-
cy and equity principles, and would
suggest the need for policy that puts
the emphasis on employment/career
protection rather than on job protec-
tion per se, coupled with a fairer
redistribution across all categories of
workers of the “costs” of securing a
sufficiently flexible labour market
overall. 
Past analyses of transition probabilities
across employment statuses and types,
and of indicators of job quality, all car-
ried out in past editions of Employment
in Europe (see EiE 2001, 2003, 2004)
have also highlighted the existence of a
two-tier labour market in Europe, with
“insiders” benefiting from a high level
of employment protection and good
career opportunities and “outsiders”
recruited under flexible forms of con-
tracts43. 
3.2.3. This has “perverse” 
macro-economic effects… 
A number of researchers (e.g.
Blanchard and Landier, 2001; and
Cahuc and Postel-Vinay, 2001) argue
that partial reforms of EPL may have
unintended, ultimately undesirable
macro-economic effects. Loosening
EPL for fixed-term contracts, while
maintaining stringent EPL for regular
jobs, creates two opposing effects. On
the one hand, firms become more will-
ing to hire new workers under tempo-
rary contracts, thereby increasing job
creation. On the other hand, maintain-
ing high firing costs for regular jobs
lowers the share of temporary jobs
transformed into regular jobs, thereby
leading to more job destruction (at the
end of temporary contracts). Hence, the
inability to let EPL systems (for tempo-
rary and regular contracts) converge
might actually increase unemployment
as well as lower productivity and out-
put44. 
Regarding the introduction of flexibili-
ty “at the margin”, Spain is a case of
particular interest. The Spanish govern-
ment liberalised the use of fixed-term
employment contracts in 1984, particu-
larly when compared with the condi-
tions applied to regular contracts. This
encouraged a rapid increase in employ-
ment in the late 1980s and a steady
improvement in the labour market
throughout the 1990s45. The Spanish
case triggered a number of theoretical
and empirical studies (e.g. Dolado et
al., 2001) on the consequences of using
fixed-term employment contracts on
such a large scale and the research sug-
gested the following major macro-eco-
nomic effects:
• a large increase in labour turnover
and a decrease in average unemploy-
ment duration;
• a drop in on-the-job training provid-
ed by firms, with negative effects on
labour productivity46;
• an increase in wage pressures if reg-
ular workers are the insiders in the
wage setting process47;
• a decline in regional labour mobility;
• a decline in the fertility rate.
• a more difficult access to housing
and financial markets for fixed-term
employees.
Developments in the Spanish economy
confirm that dual labour markets can
bring about mixed effects. On the one
hand, the lower firing costs associated
with fixed-term contracts have con-
tributed to employment growth but, on
the other hand, there have been less
desirable effects on employment and
growth such as inadequate investments
in human capital, higher wage pres-
sures, lower labour mobility and higher
wage dispersion. 
3.2.4. …but may trigger easing
of rules for regular work 
In response to these adverse outcomes,
a series of labour market reforms have
been implemented in Spain since the
mid-1990s. Their main aims were: a)
to loosen employment protection for
regular workers, while at the same
43 “Employees under fixed-term contracts have a higher risk than other employees not only of losing their jobs and of being excluded from the
labour market but also of receiving lower wages and of not benefiting of an equally good training as permanent employees with identical job
tasks and qualification levels” Employment in Europe 2003, p.152. 
44 Cahuc and Postel-Vinay (2001) perform model calibrations to assess the macroeconomic effects of the combined use of firing restrictions on reg-
ular jobs and flexible fixed-term contracts, showing that the effect on job destruction prevails for a typical European labour market. Blanchard
and Landier (2001) perform a similar exercise and come up with similar conclusions. Moreover, looking at the labour market participation among
young workers in France since the early 1980s, they conclude that reforms making the use of fixed-term contracts easier have increased labour
turnover without reducing unemployment duration for this group. 
45 The share of temporary employees in total employment almost doubled in a few years, going from 15.6% in 1985 to 30% in 1990, and has
remained at over 30% ever since.
46 Dolado et al. (2001) argue that the expansionary phase in Spain in 1986–1990 was marked by both high employment growth based on the mas-
sive use of fixed-term contracts and a very low productivity growth (about 1% per year). 
47 Bentolila and Dolado (1994) argue that the large incidence of temporary employment increases the bargaining power of regular employees, since
the latter can shift the burden of employment adjustment, following excessive wage claims, on temporary employees who act as a sort of
“buffer”. However this effect may be offset by the negative impact on wages of a higher share of workers with low job tenure (which is the result
of extensive use of temporary contracts). 
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time tightening the use of temporary
contracts; and b) to facilitate the trans-
formation of temporary contracts into
regular contracts through employment
subsidies48. Data analyses (e.g. Garcia-
Perez and Munoz-Bullon, 2003;
Dolado et al., 2001) suggest that these
reforms contributed to a reduction in
labour turnover rates during the
1990s49, and to a fall by 4 percentage
points in the share of temporary
employment in the private sector.
However, in the same period the share
of temporary employment in the pub-
lic sector increased by a similar
amount, meaning that the total propor-
tion has not declined significantly
since 1997. 
This two-step reform process50, involv-
ing, first; loosening of rules on tempo-
rary contracts and, then, the easing of
regular employment rules, could be
explained by political feasibility argu-
ments (OECD, 2006c). Increasing the
share of fixed-term employment in the
economy lowers the political clout of
“insiders”, thereby paving the way for
further reforms. 
4. Security:
Unemployment
benefits (UBs) and
activation strategies
Together with the description of EPL
regimes, an evaluation of UB systems is
equally important to characterise the
overall flexicurity nexus in a country.
This section highlights the main features
of unemployment insurance systems and
reviews their impact on labour market
outcomes51. Particular attention is given
to the known trade-off between the strict-
ness of EPL and the generosity of UB in
providing protection against the risk of
unemployment. Finally, reference is
made to the impact of UB on perceived
security of workers. 
4.1. The effects of UBs and
ALMPs
Unemployment insurance and welfare
assistance systems affect both the degree
of income security and labour market
flexibility. In the event of a job loss, eli-
gibility for and the generosity of welfare
systems determine benefit payments,
while job search rules, the quality of the
PES, and possible referrals to ALMPs
can have a potentially significant impact
on re-employment and future income
prospects. Also, the complex interactions
between welfare systems, job search
rules and job brokerage services, and
ALMPs, can all affect labour market
equilibrium, particularly through the
wage bargaining process. 
4.1.1. High and long-lasting
benefits increase unemployment…
The impact of UB and welfare assis-
tance systems on labour market out-
comes has been extensively investigat-
ed. The positive52 impact of a benefit
with a high replacement ratio53 on
unemployment is well documented,
both theoretically and empirically (see
Scarpetta, 1996; Nickell and Layard,
1999; OECD, 2006c and 2006d)54. 
An important feature of any UB system
is the duration of benefit entitlement. A
robust finding from the empirical liter-
ature is that long-lasting benefits are
associated with longer spells in unem-
ployment and, ceteris paribus, with a
higher rate of unemployment (e.g.
Nickell and Layard, 1999). 
Unemployment insurance basically acts
through two channels: firstly, by dis-
couraging job search intensity and sec-
ondly by affecting the wage setting
behaviour of the social partners
through an increase in workers’ reser-
vation wage. These combined effects
tend to put upward pressures on wages,
ultimately increasing the unemploy-
ment rate (Boone et al., 2001).
The OECD calculates indicators of
average replacement ratios of unem-
ployment benefits for a number of
Member States55. Chart 9 shows the
value of this indicator in 200356. 
Similar to EPL, large cross-country
variations exist in the size of transfers
to the unemployed, with the
Netherlands, Denmark and Belgium
being the most generous three countries
and Greece and the UK the least gener-
ous. However, on average, EU Member
States chose to provide far higher
income security to the unemployed
than the US and Japan. 
48 See Garcia-Perez and Munoz-Bullon (2003) for a description of the 1997 Spanish labour law reform which tightened regulations on the use of
temporary employment and created a new, more flexible, form of regular contract.
49 Using labour market data for youth in Spain, Garcia-Perez and Munoz-Bullon (2003) show that the exit rate from employment for temporary
workers has declined since 1997, while the exit rate from unemployment to employment has increased slightly since 1997.  
50 Portugal pursued a similar reform path, see OECD (2006c).
51 For more details, see Chapter 3, Section 5.
52 A rise in the replacement ratio tends to increase the unemployment rate.
53 I.e. the ratio of unemployment and related welfare benefits over previously earned labour income.
54 However, the evidence on the impact on labour inputs and employment is less robust and inconclusive. Nickell and Layard (1999) find little impact
on the employment rate and suggest that this may be due to the fact that high benefits may lead to both higher unemployment and higher par-
ticipation, since a generous unemployment benefit makes labour participation (which is often an eligibility condition) more attractive. 
55 For more details see Chapter 3, Section 5.1.
56 The last year for which data are available.
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4.1.2. …but are not necessarily
harmful for productivity and 
welfare
It is commonly argued that moral
hazards prevent the private sector
from providing unemployment insur-
ance (e.g. Chiu and Karni, 1998).
However, UB can potentially improve
the quality and duration of job match-
es58. The latter effect could, in princi-
ple, outweigh the moral hazard prob-
lems (i.e. the reduced incentive to job
search) in terms of raising total out-
put, despite the likely higher unem-
ployment rate. 
4.1.3. Monitoring and sanctions
can offset adverse incentives… 
In addition to the replacement rate and
the entitlement duration, UB systems
are characterised by other important
factors and all such relevant dimen-
sions have to be taken into account to
enable a thorough assessment of their
impact on labour market outcomes to
be made. 
The requirements set for the unem-
ployed to qualify for benefit receipt59
and the corresponding sanctions for
non-compliance play an important role.
Several recent papers have analysed the
issue of the optimal design of a benefit
system that aims to provide an adequate
level of insurance, while minimising
any adverse incentive effects. 
Governments can (partially) monitor
the job search efforts of an unemployed
person and so impose sanctions ranging
from partial to total withdrawal of ben-
efits. In fact, most unemployment
insurance systems in OECD countries
condition benefit payments on some
degree of performance criteria, such as
“availability for work” or evidence of
“active job search”, monitored by the
57 This indicator is calculated as the average of gross replacement rates over 2 earnings levels, 3 family types and 3 unemployment duration cate-
gories. Source: OECD, Tax-Benefit Models, www.oecd.org/els/social/workincentives. It should be taken with some caution. E.g. the figure for
Sweden is underestimated due to the way the rate is constructed, (see Houmann Frederiksen et al., 2004, Figure 8a). The reader is referred to the
same source for data on the net replacement rates both in the initial phase of unemployment and for long-term unemployed people, disaggre-
gated by different family types and earning levels. See, instead, OECD (2006), Economic Policy Reforms: Going for Growth for average measures
of the net replacement rates. For further details, see OECD (1994), The OECD Jobs Study (Chapter 8) and Martin (1996). 
58 Acemoglu and Shimer (2000) show that economies with moderate UBs can have higher output and welfare than those without unemployment
insurance, because unemployment insurance encourages workers to look for higher productivity, although riskier jobs. For more details, see
Chapter 3, Section 5.
59 This mainly concerns rules on job search, on the suitability of job offers an unemployed person should accept, and on participation in active pro-
grammes. Sanctions for lack of fulfilment of any of those requirements normally imply partial or total withdrawal of unemployment benefits. 
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PES (Grubb, 2001)60. However, such
monitoring can be costly and so raises
the question of whether a benefit sys-
tem with adequate monitoring and
sanctions represents a welfare improve-
ment for society. Theoretical analyses
of this issue have been carried out by,
for example, Fredriksson and
Holmlund (2001), and Boone et al.
(2001). Using models where job search
behaviour is not perfectly observable, a
monitoring and sanctions system
designed to encourage search effort
yields an overall welfare improvement
set against the costs of doing so61. 
The literature (e.g. Boone et al. 2004;
and Lalive et al., 2002) distinguishes
between the ex post and ex ante bene-
fits of setting up a monitoring and
sanctions system. Ex post benefits refer
to the stimulus of job search resulting
from the actual imposition of a sanc-
tion, while ex ante reflects changes in
behaviour brought on by a sanctions
system per se. Empirical work in the
Netherlands (Abbring et al., 1997; and
Van den Berg et al., 2002), Denmark
(Jensen et al., 1999), and the US
(Benus et al., 1997) finds that sanctions
regimes tend to significantly raise the
exit rate from unemployment into
work62. Lalive et al. (2002) and Boone
et al. (2004) find that the ex ante effect
of a sanctions system is also substantial
(i.e. for the non-sanctioned job seeker,
the exit rate from unemployment is
higher the stricter the monitoring and
sanctions regime)63. 
Overall, the literature strongly sug-
gests that having unemployment bene-
fits of limited duration, relatively
strict job search requirements, moni-
toring of job search intensity efforts
and quality job brokerage services
tend to speed up transitions out of
unemployment64. 
A successful flexicurity strategy there-
fore has to balance carefully the
income insurance function of the UB
and related welfare assistance systems,
with an appropriate “activation” strate-
gy designed to facilitate transitions into
employment and boost career develop-
ment. 
4.1.4. …and so can effective
Active Labour Market Policies
Unemployment benefits often interact
with ALMPs and the basis for this
relationship is discussed below in the
context of a brief examination65.
ALMPs aim to assist the unemployed
back into the labour market in various
ways (Boone and Van Ours, 2004). To
illustrate the scope of ALMPs,
Eurostat distinguishes between six
main categories as follows: a) train-
ing/retraining; b) job rotation and job
sharing; c) employment incentives; d)
integration of the disabled; e) direct
job creation; and f) start-up incen-
tives. 
OECD (2006c) suggests that existing
macro-econometric studies have found
that ALMP spending is associated with
lower aggregate unemployment66,
although this is subject to a number of
caveats. In particular, the evidence sug-
gests (Boone and Van Ours, 2004; and
OECD, 2006d) that training has the
largest positive impact on both unem-
ployment and employment, while
spending on PES seems to lower unem-
ployment but not to affect employment.
Micro-econometric evaluation studies
generally find considerable differences
in the impact across different pro-
grammes and across different groups of
workers, with many existing policies
having rather small or non-significant
effects on job finding rates (e.g. Martin
and Grubb, 2001)67. 
There is ample evidence of significant
interaction between ALMPs and UB
expenditures (Nickell and Layard, 1999;
OECD, 2006c and 2006d; Lalive et al.,
2000)68. A major finding is that the
known moral hazard problems linked to
UB systems can be largely offset by
adopting and implementing appropriate
ALMPs. 
The policy implication that can be derived
from this analysis – in line with the prin-
ciples of flexicurity – is that activation
strategies need to be fostered if synergies
are to be fully exploited between the
administration of UB (see Section 4.1.3)
and the adequate provision of ALMPs.
However, the emphasis should be put on
improving the design and effectiveness of
ALMPs, rather than on increasing spend-
60 Grubb (2001) argues that job search requirements show substantial variations across countries, as does the frequency with which sanctions are
applied. 
61 In Boone et al. (2001), monitoring costs have to be above 5% of GDP for this conclusion not to hold.
62 The two studies for the Netherlands find that the job finding rate doubles after a sanction is imposed. Moreover, it is the “shock” of getting a
sanction rather than the size of the benefit cut which raises the job search intensity.
63 Lalive et al. (2002) evaluate the ex ante effect of different sanction regimes across regional public employment services in Switzerland, a country
that relies more heavily on close monitoring and sanctions than most other OECD countries. 
64 For additional details, see Chapter 3, Section 5.
65 The reader is referred to Chapter 3 of the report for a more detailed description of ALMPs and their effects on labour market outcomes.
66 A rise in aggregate ALMP spending lowers the unemployment rate.
67 Boone and Van Ours (2004) highlight the different results between micro and macro studies. As regards training programmes, macro evaluations
tend to be more favourable than micro ones. They argue that this largely reflects the short time periods of the data used in micro evaluations. In
particular, the time span of data used to evaluate training programmes tends to be too short to capture the improvement in the quality of job
matches, which tends to reduce job separation probabilities and, ceteris paribus, to lower the aggregate unemployment rate. 
68 Lalive et al. (2000) assess the effect of a policy reform enacted in Switzerland in 1997, which made unemployment benefit payment conditional
on ALMPs programme attendance after 7 months of unemployment. 
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ing levels. The PES should provide better
job brokerage services69, including indi-
vidual counselling, together with the
requirement of both regular contacts with
the PES and compulsory participation in
programmes after a certain period of
unemployment has elapsed. A more pro-
fessional and efficient PES is essential to
raising the intensity and efficiency of the
job search efforts of the unemployed, and
thus leading to higher exit rates out of
unemployment. 
4.2. The trade-off between
UB and EPL in providing
insurance against the risk
of unemployment 
A number of authors (Boeri et al., 2003
and 2004) have drawn attention to a
negative correlation between the
size/coverage of the UB system and the
relative strictness of EPL. Chart 10 sug-
gests that this trade-off still holds when
plotting the most recent figures on EPL
(2003) and the gross replacement rate
of UB70, calculated by the OECD for a
number of EU Member States71.
The UB system and EPL are two (to
some extent) alternative ways of pro-
tecting individuals against labour mar-
ket risk and the cross-country evi-
dence points to some degree of substi-
tutability. 
4.2.1. Flexicurity calls for
loosening EPL and more
ALMPs…
The stronger competitive pressures
brought about by globalisation might
shift the balance in favour of UB pro-
tection, because it can facilitate labour
re-allocation and mobility, but only
provided that economies can bear the
higher costs for public budgets
involved in managing an overall protec-
tion system based predominantly on
higher UB. A flexicurity approach is
consistent with moving along this
trade-off by loosening EPL to some
extent in exchange for more generous
UB and higher spending on ALMP. 
However, this shift may prove very dif-
ficult to realise in practice due primari-
ly to major political economy con-
straints. In fact, political economy
explanations have been proposed for
the observed trade-off between EPL
and the UB across European countries.
These explanations highlight (Boeri et
al., 2003) that the combination of EPL
and UB prevailing in a country may
depend on the skill structure of the pop-
ulation, meaning that reforms focused
on “trading” more flexible EPL with
more generous UB should become
politically more feasible where educa-
tional attainments of the workforce are
relatively higher72. 
4.2.2. …but UB-ALMPs may
imply high fiscal costs…
A protection system based on UB also
implies higher budgetary and fiscal
costs, particularly so because it also
involves significant spending on
ALMPs. In this respect, research has
outlined some economic challenges that
flexicurity models similar to the Danish
one (see Section 2.2) will face in the
future (Madsen, 2006; Bredgaard et al.,
2005). 
Firstly, the demographic changes lead-
ing to fewer people of working age and,
hence, to a lower labour supply (from
traditional sources), challenge the
future ability to finance a system char-
acterised by generous UB, a broad
range of ALMPs and a comprehensive
welfare system in general73. Secondly,
the highly mobile Danish labour market
suggests that, at times of higher com-
petitive pressure and technological
progress, a large part of the potentially
active population will be continuously
tested for their productivity and work
potential and thus a large number of
workers may gradually be excluded
from the labour market, and become
recipients of long-term welfare trans-
fers. This trend is illustrated by the
sharp increase, between 1960 and 1999,
in the share of the Danish population
aged 15–66 receiving transfer incomes74. 
69 Which, according to micro studies, is a relatively low-cost policy and seems to deliver good results in terms of job finding rates (Martin and Grubb,
2001).
70 The UK has been taken out of Chart 10 because it is an outlier in terms of both EPL and the gross replacement ratio. However, this Chart is sup-
posed to give just a simple illustration of the trade-off, see Boeri et al. (2003) and (2004) for a thorough discussion and quantitative measurement
of the UB-EPL trade-off, where the UK is also included.  
71 Boeri et al. (2003) mention that this trade-off can also be detected for the new Member States, with, for instance, Hungary having more gener-
ous benefits and less stringent EPL than Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Estonia.
72 Boeri et al. (2003) suggest that different EPL-UB combinations may be the result of national political economy equilibriums, which correspond to
different skills and age compositions of insiders (employed) versus outsiders (unemployed). In this framework, low-skilled employed people are
less productive than high-skilled and thus at higher risk of job loss. Hence, they favour strict EPL, rather than generous UB, as a way to protect
their jobs. This means that, ceteris paribus, a country with a majority of low-skilled insiders would favour low benefits and high EPL.  
73 The Welfare Commission set up by the Danish government claims that over a lifetime an average Dane will receive more benefits and services
from the public sector than he/she contributes in taxes. As a result, the Commission’s conclusions point to more means testing in the granting of
welfare benefits as an unavoidable response.
74 See Madsen (2005), p. 32. 
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A stronger focus of public expenditure
towards both general education and
adult vocational training and lifelong
learning would be a possible answer to
upgrade the skills and qualifications of
the workforce, thereby limiting the risk
of labour market exclusion for disad-
vantaged groups (and with it the corre-
sponding financial burden).
Furthermore, Danish labour market
policy has shifted towards a more
active profile in a period of economic
upturn so that whenever an
unfavourable cyclical phase materialis-
es, the budgetary cost of an ambitious
activation policy would increase –
together with unemployment – at a time
of decreasing revenues. This may exert
political pressure to scale down labour
market programmes. 
4.2.3. …rendering adoption in
many Member States
problematic
A simple quantitative exercise illus-
trates the large financial implications
of adopting a comprehensive/generous
system of labour market policies, simi-
lar to that in the highest spending EU
countries. Charts 11 and 12, respective-
ly, show average spending on active and
passive labour market policies across
EU countries, for the period
1997–2004. 
Chart 13 evaluates the implied increase
in ALMP spending across EU countries
that would result from the adoption of
the spending intensity (per unemployed)
of the three higher spending countries
(DK, NL and SE, Chart 14)75. The
unweighted increase in ALMP expendi-
ture across the EU would amount to 1.6
percentage points of GDP. 
Chart 15 evaluates the implied increase
in PLMP spending that would result
from the adoption of the spending
intensity (per unemployed) of the three
higher spending countries (NL, DK and
BE, Chart 16). The unweighted
increase in PLMP expenditure across
the EU would amount to 2.7 percentage
points of GDP. 
The implied average increase in total
spending on labour market policies as
a percentage of GDP76 would 
therefore amount to over 4 percentage
points. Increases in government expen-
75 The following formula is used to calculate spending intensity per unemployed: . Where EXP is spending on ALMPs or on PLMPs, U is
the number of unemployed, GDP is output, and P is the population. 
76 In order to match the three EU countries with the highest spending intensity per unemployed.
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diture would be particularly large in
new and Southern European Member
States. The magnitude of the resources
involved clearly indicates that models
with high spending on UB/ALMP can-
not easily be transplanted to other
Member States without undergoing
significant adjustments. 
However, some important caveats must
be raised when drawing conclusions
from this illustrative exercise. Part of the
increase in spending shown in Charts 13
and 15 is due to the higher levels of
unemployment in some EU countries
compared to the low levels registered in
the benchmark countries. Adoption of
the Danish-style models, with their
focus on monitoring and activation,
could help to bring high unemployment
rates down77. However, even discounting
for the differences in unemployment,
adoption of high intensity spending
models would still involve substantial
increases in government expenditure.
Secondly, one should also take into
account the full range of macro-eco-
nomic costs/benefits of a certain poli-
cy model, and not just those concern-
ing the public budget. Hence, the ben-
efits from changing the flexicurity
mix, in terms of higher macro-eco-
nomic efficiency and adaptability to
change, with respect to an existing
model, may more than offset the high-
er fiscal burden that the new model
implies. 
4.3. Higher unemployment
benefits enhance workers’
feeling of security 
Evidence suggests that UB, besides
facilitating labour re-allocation, is also
positively correlated with perceptions
of job security of workers. OECD
(2004), Clark and Postel-Vinay
(2005), and Postel-Vinay and Saint
Martin (2004) find that, contrary to
EPL, the generosity of UB systems is
positively correlated (Chart 17) with
indicators of the perceived job securi-
ty of workers (see Section 3.1.8)
across a number of EU and OECD
countries. Similarly, Auer (2006) finds
a positive relationship between per-
ceived job security and expenditures
on Labour Market Policies. In particu-
lar, Postel-Vinay and Saint Martin
(2004) strongly suggest that the nega-
tive correlation between security indi-
cators and EPL strictness, on the one
hand, and the positive correlation
between security indicators and the
generosity of UB, on the other, are not
simply due to the trade-off between
EPL and UB; they also reflect the
higher efficiency of UB in providing
insurance against labour market risks. 
4.3.1. …but they may lead to
excessive layoffs
However, shortcomings in current unem-
ployment insurance systems have also
been highlighted. For example, Cahuc
and Zylberberg (2005), and Blanchard
and Tirole (2003; 2004) have stressed
that UB financed entirely through pay-
roll taxes result in too many lay-offs
from the economic efficiency perspec-
tive, since employers fail to internalise
the social costs of dismissals78. 
4.3.2. …leading to proposals for
setting layoff taxes in exchange
for loosening EPL
The main argument is that governments
should introduce a new policy instru-
ment in order to make firms internalise
the social costs of dismissals. Based on
the long-running system of rating experi-
ences in North America, a number of
authors have suggested the introduction
of layoff taxes (see Section 2.3.1). 
The proposal to introduce layoff taxes is
usually set in the context of loosening
EPL for regular contracts. Such a pro-
posal can be seen to reconcile efficient
labour turnover with employment securi-
ty, thereby being consistent with flexicu-
rity principles, particularly if accompa-
nied by efficient active and lifelong
learning policies (OECD, 2006a). 
77 Although this would be a long-term process.
78 Cahuc and Zylberberg (2005) identify these costs with the benefits provided to the unemployed plus his/her reduced contribution to the public
budget through lower tax payments and social contributions.  
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5. Mapping different
“flexicurity”
systems/models in
Europe
5.1. Interactions between
institutions play an
important role…
The analysis in this chapter has focused
so far on the impact of individual poli-
cies/institutions on labour market out-
comes. However, there is ample evi-
dence of the importance of interactions
between different labour market poli-
cies and institutions (Coe and Snower,
1997). The effects of certain combina-
tions of policies/institutions on labour
market outcomes may actually be re-
inforced or weakened relative to the
effect that each policy/institution would
have separately. Empirical studies find
two particularly significant interactions
(OECD, 2006c and 2006d):
• The negative effect on employment
of generous and longlasting UB is
statistically insignificant in countries
that invest greatly in ALMPs.
• The detrimental impact of the tax
wedge on unemployment is increased
when the minimum wage is high79.
There is also evidence that the impact
on employment of a reform concerning
a single policy/institution is lower when
all other institutions taken separately
have an adverse impact on employ-
ment. As a result, comprehensive
reform packages should yield greater
employment gains than reforms involv-
ing a single institution80. 
Furthermore, the interactions between
labour market policies and institu-
tions and product market regulation
(PMR) have also been emphasized. In
fact, empirical investigations
(Nicoletti and Scarpetta, 2005;
OECD, 2006c and 2006d) suggest that
regulations restraining competition in
product markets have a significant
negative impact on labour market per-
formance across OECD countries.
The existence of some degree of
cross-country correlation between the
strictness of PMR and rigid labour
market policies (in particular EPL)
has also been documented (Nicoletti
et al.; 200081). This triggered investi-
gation on possible complementarities
between PMR and labour market poli-
cies and between reforms in those two
areas. There is evidence that product
market deregulation tends to precede
labour market reforms (Brandt et al.,
2005; Høj et al., 200682). This may be
due to political economy reasons (see
also below Section 6). In fact, increas-
ing competition in product markets
stimulates entry of new firms,
decreases prices and, so, reduces
product market rents. This in turn may
decrease support for policies like EPL
which allow capturing those rents83
thereby paving the way for labour
market reforms (Høj et al., 2006;
Nicoletti and Scarpetta, 2005;
Blanchard and Giavazzi, 200384).
Moreover, the stimulus to economic
activity and employment opportuni-
ties as a result of higher product mar-
ket competition may lead to lower
pressure to protect jobs through strict
EPL/rigid labour market policies (Høj
et al., 2006; Ebell and Haefke, 2003). 
OECD (2006c) identifies the different
labour market policy packages pre-
vailing across western countries and
hints to the fact that different degrees
of policy ‘interventionism’ may be
compatible with equally good
employment outcomes, as long as
policies predominantly act on the sup-
ply side, rather than on the demand
side. So, the Danish/Dutch flexicurity
models, characterized by both rela-
tively lax product market regulations
and EPL deliver a labour market per-
formance equally satisfactory than
more “liberal” regimes like the UK or
the US.    
79 This is consistent with the fact that when the minimum wage is binding, the tax wedge cannot be shifted onto labour, thereby magnifying the
depressing effect the tax wedge has on labour demand.
80 OECD (2006c) suggests complementarity between taxes, union density, unemployment benefits and product market regulation. The Secretariat
simulates the additional gains that would be obtained by jointly undertaking reforms on two of the above-mentioned four areas that would each
reduce unemployment by 1 percentage point if implemented separately. All possible combinations of two such reforms (keeping an unchanged
policy stance as regards the remaining two areas) yield a total unemployment reduction of between 2.25 and 2.37 percentage points for the aver-
age OECD country, instead of 2 percentage points when interactions are not taken into account.  
81 Nicoletti et al. (2000), set up summary indicators of product market regulations and Employment Protection Legislation. The former include
aspects such as economic regulations concerning market access, the use of inputs, output choices, pricing and barriers to international trade and
investment as well as administrative regulation concerning the means for communicating regulatory requirements to the public and compliance
procedures. They show correlations between the two summary indicators and conclude that restrictive product market regulations tend to go
hand-in-hand with strict EPL across OECD countries.
82 Høj et al. (2006) perform regression analysis on the determinants of synthetic indicators of labour and product market policies and find that the
lagged indicator of product market regulation has a positive impact on the change in the overall indicator of labour market policies lending some
support to the idea that product market liberalization can trigger reforms increasing flexibility of the labour market. 
83 Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2005) label this as “political complementarity” between labour and product market regulations.
84 Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) argue that product and labour market regulations are complementary in driving employment outcomes. In their
framework product market regulations create rents while labour market regulations increase bargaining power of workers and, so, shift the alloca-
tion of those rents in favour of workers by creating a gap between wage and productivity. In this way product market deregulation triggers higher
employment gains when labour markets are more rigid than when they are more liberal, since in the former case there is not only the positive effect
due to lower rents but also the reduction of the wage-productivity gap.  Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2005) find empirical support to this conclusion.  
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5.2. …which triggered the
analysis of economic
systems
A growing body of the economic liter-
ature assesses the existence of different
economic/employment systems, which
can be identified according to prevail-
ing combinations of policies and/or
institutions, thereby defining common-
alities across countries. In this context,
Esping-Andersen (1990) presented a
particularly influential taxonomy of
capitalist systems/models, the so-called
“three worlds of welfare capitalism”,
identifying the liberal, the social-demo-
cratic, and the conservative welfare
systems. Amable (2003) classifies
OECD countries into different econom-
ic systems/models based on indicators
drawn from five institutional areas,
including the labour market. Hall and
Soskice (2001) analyse which differ-
ences in political economy configura-
tions are more relevant for macro-eco-
nomic performance, concluding that
different regimes are equally compati-
ble with economic success. Muffels et
al. (2002)85, Wilthagen (2004) and Auer
(2005) characterise different employ-
ment and economic systems/models
along two axes that can be broadly
interpreted as representing flexibility
and security in the labour market. 
Following this broad approach, present-
ed here is a preliminary taxonomy of
European flexicurity systems/models
based on the well-known tandem
approach (Nardo et al., 2005). With this
approach, firstly, a Principal Com-
ponent Analysis (PCA) is carried out
on a selected number of labour market
indicators to identify the main dimen-
sions/axes that characterise flexicurity
systems; secondly, the factor scores or
the coordinates of the PCA (correspon-
ding to the axes that explain most of the
overall variation in the data) are then
used as a basis for clustering countries
into different groups/systems. 
5.3. The Principal
Components Analysis (PCA)
followed by the Clustering
Analysis (CLA)
The objective of this tandem approach is
to classify EU Member States into
groups based on flexicurity
systems/models. Member States are
classified in a particular group/system
according to an overall measure of “dis-
tance” (between countries) reflecting the
scores obtained for the principal dimen-
sions (identified in the PCA analysis)
that characterise flexicurity systems (e.g.
security, flexibility, etc.). 
PCA is a multivariate analysis tech-
nique that aims to evaluate how differ-
ent variables are associated with each
other. This is achieved by transforming
correlated variables into a new set of
uncorrelated variables (the principal
components), using a covariance matrix
or its standardised form – the correla-
tion matrix (Nardo et al., 2005). The
(country) scores obtained along the
principal components that account for
most of the overall variation in the data
can then be used either as an input into
a classification method, such as K-clus-
tering or hierarchical clustering, or for a
graphical representation of the original
data (see Box 1 for technical details). 
However, before describing in details the
analysis and its results, a word of caution
is warranted on the validity and robust-
ness of this type of exercise. PCA and
CLA respectively identify the linear cor-
relations that better explain the variation
in the data, and then use the country
scores to propose a taxonomy based on
some measure of “distance”. Often the
results are sensitive to the methodology
and the particular parameters chosen for
the clustering method (e.g. the initial
cluster partition, see below and box 1).
Moreover, as far as the impact of different
flexicurity systems on labour market per-
formance (see below, 5.3.1) is concerned,
one has to bear in mind that this method-
ology is based on correlation coefficients
and so does not necessarily provide indi-
cation of any causal relationship. Finally,
the taxonomy obtained in this chapter is
preliminary since further work is neces-
sary to consider a number of crucial ele-
ments of flexicurity systems, such as
labour market segmentation and others
such as internal and functional flexibility
that, due to insufficient data, could not be
considered at this stage. 
The combined PCA/CLA analysis is
carried out for 18 countries86. Labour
market/flexicurity systems are described
using four (active) variables87 and all the
active variables characterise one
policy/institutional feature or another88,
chosen in order to take on board, as far
as possible, the four principles of flexi-
curity set out in the 2006 APR89. 
85 For example, Muffels et al. (2002) classify employment systems/models in Europe into four types: social-democratic, continental-corporatist, liber-
al and Southern-Mediterranean. The classification is basically determined by the indicators on the transitions between different employment sta-
tuses and different contractual arrangements.
86 EU minus Luxembourg, Cyprus, Malta, Slovenia, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. The analysis carried out in this chapter considers the new Member
States for which data are available, namely, CZ, HU, PO and SK. Other known analyses of labour market systems (e.g. Frederiksen et al., 2004;
Gaard et al., 2005) did not include the new Member States.
87 Annual averages for the 1997–2003/2004 period are used. Period averages are preferred to point-in-time observations (e.g. the most recent year
available), because of possible lagged effects of policies/institutions on labour market outcomes (see 5.3.1).
88 As opposed to labour market outcomes, such as employment, labour market turnover, etc. Outcome variables are included as supplementary vari-
ables, helping to interpret the principal components (alongside the active variables).
89 a) Modern labour laws allowing for sufficiently flexible work arrangements; b) Effective active labour market policies supporting transitions between
jobs, as well as from unemployment and inactivity to jobs; c) Credible lifelong learning systems enabling workers to remain employable throughout
their career, by helping them to cope with rapid change, unemployment spells and transitions to new jobs; and d) Modern social security systems
combining the need to facilitate labour market mobility with the provision of adequate income support during all absences from the labour market.
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The number of active variables consid-
ered in the analysis was limited by tech-
nical considerations to a maximum of
between 3 and 4 to 690. The variables
considered are:
• The strictness of EPL91 as a proxy for
numerical flexibility.
• Expenditure on labour market poli-
cies as a percentage of GDP (i.e. the
sum of passive/unemployment bene-
fits and ALMPs)92.
• Percentage of participants in lifelong
learning programmes93.
• Average tax-wedge94 as a proxy for the
distortions created by the tax system.
The three principal components account
for 92% of the overall variability in the
data. Using the correlation coefficients
between the active variables and the
three principal components (Table 2 and
Figures 2 and 3), it is possible to inter-
pret them as capturing the following
three dimensions of labour market/flex-
icurity systems: a) income/employment
security; b) numerical external flexibil-
ity/employability; and c) tax distortions. 
Table 2 allows for the following inter-
pretation of the principal components.
The first principal component (D1) can
be interpreted as representing “securi-
ty”, because of its positive correlation
with LLL and LMP. The second princi-
pal component (D2) can be interpreted
as representing “flexibility”/“employa-
bility” because of its negative correla-
tion with EPL and positive correlation
with LLL. The third principal compo-
nent (D3) can be interpreted as repre-
senting tax distortions given that it has
very high correlation with TWED. The
correlations between active variables
and the principal component axes are
also plotted using “unitary circles”
(Figures 2 and 3). 
Figures 4 and 5 plot the country
scores along the three principal com-
ponents (after varimax95 rotation of
the axes). After rotation, the security
and flexibility/employability axes
each account for about 1/3 of the
overall variability of the data, while
the tax distortion axis represents
about 26% (Table 2). 
The K-means clustering method is used
to classify countries using, as inputs,
the factor scores corresponding to the
three principal components. The result-
ing taxonomy identifies five flexicuri-
ty/labour market systems (Table 3). 
The five clusters can be characterised
as follows96:
• The Anglo-Saxon system comprising
the UK and Ireland – a high degree of
flexibility (i.e. looser employment
protection legislation), relatively low
security (i.e. intermediate-to-low
spending on Labour Market
Policies), and low taxation.
• The Continental system, including
Germany, Belgium, Austria and
France – intermediate-to-low flexibil-
ity, intermediate-to-high security,
and intermediate-to-high taxation.
• The Mediterranean system, includ-
ing Spain, Portugal and Greece – low
flexibility, relatively low security,
and no clear pattern on taxation.
90 The “Handbook on Constructing Composite Indicators: a Methodological and User Guide”, (Nardo et al., 2005), recommends that the countries-
to-variables ratio should be between 3 and 5 in order to avoid carrying out multivariate analysis if the sample is small compared to the number
of indicators since then results will not have known statistical properties. 
91 The overall OECD indicator, excluding its collective dismissals component, for which no data are available covering the period 1997-2003/2004.
92 Source: Eurostat’s Labour Market Policy Database. 
93 Percentage of population aged 25–64 participating in education or training programmes (source: Eurostat). 
94 The tax wedge is defined as the wedge between the labour cost to the employer and the corresponding net take-home pay of the employee.
Following the approach of the econometric analysis contained in OECD (2006c), we express the average tax wedge as the sum of income taxes
plus employee’s and employer’s social security contributions less cash benefits, as a percentage of total labour costs, for a one-earner family with
two children earning 100% of the Average Production Wage (APW). Source: OECD (2005), Taxing Wages: 2004/2005.  
95 Varimax rotation is a technique used to maximise the correlation of a number of original variables with principal components. 
96 The results obtained in this chapter are qualitatively similar to those obtained in the literature (e.g. Frederiksen et al., 2004; Gaard, 2005). They
report four regimes (new Member States are not included) with similar characteristics to the flexicurity systems identified in this chapter.
Chapter 2. Flexibility and security in the EU labour markets
D1 D2 D3
Variability (%) 33.3 32.6 26.1
Cumulative % 33.3 65.9 92.0
Correlations between variables and factors (after Varimax rotation)
EPL 0.03 -0.93 0.22
LLL 0.66 0.64 0.01
TWED 0.15 -0.16 0.98
LMP 0.93 -0.04 0.21
Sources: DG EMPL calculations from Eurostat and OECD figures.
In colour the correlations larger than 0.5 in absolute value; see Box 1 for further
details on the methodology. 
Notes: EPL = Employment Protection Legislation, LLL = LifeLong Learning, TWED =
Tax Wedge, LMP = Labour Market Policies (expenditures).
Table 2 – Main Results of the PCA (after Varimax rotation)
LMP
TWED
LLL
EPL
-1.00
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-0.25
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
-1 -0.75 -0.5 -0.25 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1
high flexibility/employability
low flexibility/employability
low security
high security
Interpretation of PCA axes: security and flexibility/employability
Sources: DG EMPL calculations from Eurostat and OECD figures.
Notes: A variable close to the unitary circle has a high correlation with a linear combination of the two principal components being
considered, hence it is well represented by one (or both) of them.
The chart plots the correlation coefficients between the four active variables and the principal components associated with respec-
tively the “security” and “flexibility”/“employability” axes. 
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The chart plots the correlation coefficients between the four active variables and the principal components associated with respec-
tively the “security” and “distortions” axes. 
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• The Eastern European (plus Italy)
system, including Italy97, Poland,
Hungary, the Czech Republic and
Slovakia – insecurity, intermediate-
to-high flexibility98, and intermediate-
to-high taxation.
• The Nordic system, including
Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden
and Finland – high security, interme-
diate-to-high flexibility, and interme-
diate-to-high taxation.
The basis for the clustering results can
be inferred by grouping the countries
according to the scores obtained on the
dimensions of security and flexibility
(Figure 6), giving a graphic illustration
of “flexicurity” systems in the EU. 
The “tandem-analysis” has also been
carried out on a larger set of policy
indicators (i.e. six instead of four) ren-
dering two main differences as follows:
• The single indicator on Labour
Market Policies is split between its
Passive and Active components.
• An indicator is included for the
change in the relative strictness of
EPL for regular employment versus
temporary employment99. This indi-
cator intends to measure the extent to
which EPL reforms have created a
dual labour market, stemming from
the loosening of temporary employ-
ment legislation, while keeping strin-
gent rules for regular employment.
Hence, it intends to assess to what
extent EPL reform strategies have
contributed to labour market segmen-
tation (Section 3.2).
The PCA results corresponding to six
policy indicators broadly coincide
with those obtained using only four
policy indicators. Moreover, the coun-
try scores along the security and flexi-
bility axes (Figure 7) do not change
significantly relative to the previous
case, while the clustering analysis
delivers the same country groups as
before. In the six policy indicators
case, the three main axes remain as
before, namely security is positively
correlated with active and passive
labour market policies, and lifelong
learning, while the flexibility/employ-
ability and taxation axes can be identi-
fied as before. The main difference
now is the emergence of a fourth axis,
capturing the evolution – since the mid
1980s – of the relative strictness of
EPL on regular versus temporary
employment. However, this axis does
not seem to have any meaningful asso-
ciation with measures of labour mar-
ket segmentation100.
5.3.1. Labour market outcomes
in different flexicurity systems
In the jargon of the PCA, the four poli-
cy indicators used to classify countries
are called “active variables”. It is also
common to consider supplementary
variables – usually outcome variables
representing several dimensions of
national labour markets and welfare
systems, used in order to characterise
the different labour market systems in
terms of overall socio-economic per-
formance101. The factor scores thus
obtained for supplementary variables
are then correlated with the principal
components in order to better charac-
terise the different labour market/flexi-
curity systems. 
The supplementary variables can be
broadly divided into three categories:
• Employment/unemployment rates,
both overall and for particular
groups at risk of marginalisation in
the labour market and/or social
exclusion102. 
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Continental Eastern Nordic Mediterranean Anglo-Saxon
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Sources: DG EMPL calculations from Eurostat and OECD data.
Table 3 – Results of the clustering analysis, using 
the K-means method
97 Italy is frequently considered as an inflexible country. However, it has significantly deregulated the use of temporary contracts over recent years
(late 1990s and early 2000s), yielding a reduction in its overall EPL indicator. This mainly drives the classification of Italy in a group with an inter-
mediate level of flexibility.
98 An intermediate level for Italy, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and a higher level for Poland and Hungary.
99 This indicator is based on the following ratio: , which is the relative strictness of EPL for regular employment versus EPL for
temporary employment, normalised by the overall strictness of EPL. The indicator is then calculated as the difference between the average of this
ratio for the period 1997–2003 and its value in the first year for which EPL figures are available (1985 for the EU-15 and the early 1990s for the new
Member States). OECD (2004) calculated a similar indicator as a way to evaluate the extent to which reforms of EPL have created dual labour mar-
kets and hence favoured labour market segmentation. 
100 No significant positive correlation is identified between this axis and the share of temporary employees over total employment (or its change over
the period considered).
101 Unlike active variables, supplementary variables do not play any role in the taxonomy of countries. This is an important distinction to avoid mix-
ing policies (causes) with labour market outcomes (effects). Supplementary variables are also calculated as annual averages over the
1997–2003/2004 period. 
102 The groups considered at risk are women, youth, older workers, long-term unemployed and temporary employees (source: Eurostat, LFS). 
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• Measures of external numerical flexi-
bility in the labour market, including
job tenure103, labour turnover; and the
transition from unemployment to
employment104. 
• Measures/indicators on education105
and poverty106.
Table 4 lists the supplementary vari-
ables with correlation coefficients
higher than or close to 0.5 in absolute
terms in relation to one of the three
main principal components.
Security and flexibility/employability
are complementary dimensions
A major fact emerging from the PCA
analysis is the following. There does not
seem to be any trade-offs between the
security and flexibility/employability
dimensions. For example, improvement on
both axes seems to be good for employ-
ment (total, women, youth and older work-
ers), lowers unemployment, reduces
income inequality, and increases labour
turnover. It is reassuring that the break-
down of “flexicurity” into its two main
dimensions of “flexibility” and “security”
(which are independent by construction in
a PCA) does not seem to result in the
emergence of trade-offs involving any
major socio-economic outcomes. 
Security and low tax distortions
reduce unemployment rates
A high score on the security axis is
negatively correlated with both total
and long-term unemployment, while a
high score on the tax distortion axis
seems to have a positive impact on
both variables. 
Flexibility/employability makes the
labour market more dynamic…
High flexibility is negatively correlated
with both average job tenure and the
share of long-term jobs, while being
(more weakly) positively correlated
with labour turnover and the share of
short-term jobs. 
…and so does lower tax distortions…
Tax distortions seem to have a detri-
mental effect on labour market flexibil-
ity by slowing down turnover and 
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security flexibility/employability tax distortions
Employment rate 0.79 0.25 -0.25
Unemployment rate -0.45 -0.15 0.39
Long-term unemployment rate -0.57 -0.23 0.34
PISA 0.44 0.56 0.03
Reduction in the poverty risk 0.48 0.44 0.05
GINI coefficient on income inequality -0.46 -0.41 -0.40
Women employment rate 0.75 0.38 -0.11
Youth employment rate 0.64 0.30 -0.48
Older workers employment rate 0.63 0.19 -0.24
Job tenure -0.08 -0.64 0.40
Labour turnover 0.36 0.27 -0.29
Transitions from unemployment to employment 0.00 0.03 -0.40
Share of employees with job tenure lower than 1 year 0.42 0.35 -0.12
Share of employees with job tenure higher than 10 years -0.11 -0.64 0.46
Sources: DG EMPL calculations from PCA on Eurostat and OECD data.
Table 4 – Correlation coefficients between (factor scores of) supplementary variables 
and the principal components
103 Three indicators on job tenure are considered: a) average job tenure; b) the share of workers with job tenure lower than one year; and c) the
share of workers with job tenure higher than ten years (source: DG EMPL calculations based on Eurostat’s LFS data).
104 There is extensive empirical literature on individual transitions between different employment statuses (employment, unemployment, and inac-
tivity), differentiating national labour markets with respect to how effective they are in enabling workers to enter, remain and improve their posi-
tion in the labour market (e.g. Auer and Cazes, 2003; Auer, 2005; Cahuc and Zilberberg, 2005; Muffels et al., 2002). Employment in Europe (EiE)
also addressed this issue in past editions (see above). In this chapter, transition rates from unemployment to employment are calculated, depend-
ing on data availability, between 2004 and 2005 or 2003 and 2004 (source: DG EMPL calculations based on Eurostat’s LFS data). 
105 These indicators cover only 2003. They include the average PISA (Programme for International Student Assessment) score in reading, mathemat-
ics and science; and the share of the population with at least secondary education in the 25–34 and 45–54 age brackets (source: OECD, 2006b,
Economic Policy Reforms: Going for Growth). 
106 The indicators considered are: a) the GINI coefficient as a proxy for the inequality of income distribution; and b) an indicator for the reduction in
the poverty risk due to the impact of public tax/transfer systems. It is equivalent to the percentage difference between the risk of poverty rate
(defined as the share of persons with an equivalised disposable income below 60% of the national median equivalised disposable income) before
and after social transfers, (source: DG EMPL calculations from Eurostat figures, see also Employment in Europe 2005, chapter 2, table 40).
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transitions to employment, while
increasing the share of long-tenure jobs
and decreasing that of short-tenure jobs.
…while security does not hinder
labour market flows
Security does not seem to hinder labour
market flows. On the contrary, a high
score on the security axis is positively
correlated with labour turnover and
with the share of short-term jobs, while
not having a significant correlation
with average job tenure and labour
market transitions. 
Security reduces income inequality
but may require higher taxation 
Security also seems to reduce both
income inequality – reflected in the GINI
coefficient – and the poverty risk, but
reduction of income inequality may come
at the price of increased tax distortions. 
Both security and flexibility/employa-
bility favour high PISA scores 
A high score on the security and flexi-
bility/employability axes is positively
correlated with better outcomes from
the education systems (i.e. higher
PISA scores). 
Chapter 2. Flexibility and security in the EU labour markets
The methodology used in this chapter
is based on Nardo et al. (2005),
“Handbook on Constructing
Composite Indicators: Methodology
and User Guide”, OECD Statistics
Working Papers N°3. This Handbook
is a collaborative effort between the
Joint Research Centre (JRC) of the
European Commission, and the
OECD Secretariat. It proposes a “tan-
dem analysis” for carrying out clus-
tering or classification analysis,
which involves two steps. Firstly, a
Principal Components Analysis is
carried out; secondly, a clustering
algorithm is applied on the scores of
individual objects or cases (countries
in our analysis) with respect to the
first few components. The Handbook
gives very specific advice on how to
implement this two-step approach
using a number of (largely arbitrary)
rules of thumb, such as that the cases-
to-variable ratio should be between 3
and 5. In the analysis carried out in
this chapter, the number of
cases/countries considered is 18, and
the number of variables is four or six,
i.e. broadly in line with the above
guidance rule.
PCA is a multivariate technique that
attempts to explain the variance of
the observed data through a few lin-
ear combinations of the original data
(i.e. the principal components),
based on the covariance or correla-
tion matrix of the original variables.
The objective is to select a few prin-
cipal components that preserve a
“high” amount of the cumulative
variance of the original data. The
value added of PCA is its ability to
“reduce” large datasets to a few vari-
ables; the linear combinations of
which should be able to account for a
high amount of the total variation in
the original data. A very useful prop-
erty of PCA is that the principal com-
ponents are uncorrelated and thus
they can be seen as representing dif-
ferent “statistical dimensions” of the
original dataset. However, it must be
stressed that PCA cannot always
reduce a large number of variables to
a small number of transformed vari-
ables. In fact, a significant saving in
reducing the dimensionality of the
data set can only be obtained when
the original variables are highly cor-
related (either positively or negative-
ly). PCA is of no value if the original
variables are uncorrelated. 
The criterion used to decide on the
number of principal components is
to consider the minimum necessary
to account for at least 90% of the
total variance in the original dataset.
To enhance the ability to interpret
the results, a standard procedure in
the literature is to “rotate” the prin-
cipal components in order to max-
imise their correlations with a num-
ber of the original variables. The
rotation method used in this chapter
is the common “varimax” method
(see Nardo et al., 2005 for details). 
Cluster analysis (CLA) is a collec-
tion of algorithms to classify objects
into classes. The classification aims
to reduce the dimensionality of the
dataset by exploiting a measure of
“distance” between classes. There
are many measures of distance avail-
able and hence different classifica-
tions can be obtained for the same
dataset. Therefore, CLA techniques
may not be robust and need to be
interpreted with caution. Moreover,
in the case of the “K-means method”
(see below), the final assignment of
objects can to some extent depend
on the initial partition chosen (or
randomly set). 
CLA techniques can be divided in two
main groups: a) hierarchical methods,
if the classification has an increasing
number of nested classes (e.g. tree
clustering), or b) non-hierarchical
methods, if the number of clusters is
decided ex-ante (e.g. K-means clus-
tering, where K stands for the number
of clusters set a priori). The K-clus-
tering method is useful when the
objective is to divide the sample into
K clusters of greatest possible distinc-
tion. In this chapter the K-means clus-
tering method is used, assuming five
user-defined clusters chosen in accor-
dance with principal component
analysis(i), and the determinant
method for the clustering algorithm.
The algorithm starts with K user-
defined clusters and then moves the
countries in and out of the clusters
with the aim of a) minimising the
variance of elements within the clus-
ters, and b) maximising the variance
of the elements outside the clusters. 
Box 1 – The Methodology of Principal Components (PCA) and Cluster (CLA) analyses
(i) PCA country scores across the two main axes of security and flexibility account for two-thirds of the total variance in the original data. 
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6. Building consensus
for reforms 
6.1. Social dialogue
The discussion has focused so far on the
impact of different policy/institutional
settings on labour market outcomes.
However, the recurrent political difficul-
ties (and associated social turmoil) faced
by many governments when attempting
to introduce labour market reforms has
prompted a growing body of literature on
the political constraints and the historical
and institutional barriers that condition
reform implementation, with particular
emphasis on the role of social dialogue
and, therefore, on the involvement of
social partners in policy changes. 
The prevalent model in a country that
regulates industrial relations seems to
play a central role in the political
economy of reforms. In this respect,
the Danish and Dutch flexicurity mod-
els seem to have emerged from a par-
ticular set of favourable historical cir-
cumstances, namely corporatist sys-
tems of collective bargaining, with a
long tradition of cooperation, coordi-
nation and mutual trust between the
social partners and the government107
(Madsen, 2006; Bredgaard et al.,
2005; Wilthagen and Tros, 2004).
Consequently, the historical circum-
stances underlying the development of
the Danish and Dutch models might
not be easily replicated in other coun-
tries, where a system of corporatist
industrial relations, and the resulting
high degree of mutual trust between
the social partners, is lacking.
However, in other Member States
social partners have contributed to
internal numerical flexibility, func-
tional flexibility and/or wage flexibili-
ty through, for example, so called
opening clauses in collective agree-
ments, company level agreements or
the promotion of training and innova-
tion in exchange for a job, employabil-
ity and/or combination security.
An important element that facilitates
the building of a social consensus is the
existence of a broad agenda for collec-
tive bargaining, going well beyond
wages and working hours. A broad
agenda facilitates the reaching of com-
promises, which are thought to be para-
mount in the building of sustainable
flexicurity models (Wilthagen and
Tros, 2004). Progress on flexibility and
security, together with the resources
needed to implement comprehensive
activation and lifelong learning poli-
cies, requires a well-developed tripar-
tite social dialogue108. 
Empirical analysis by the OECD (2006)
lends some support to the theoretical109
argument that corporatist bargaining
systems can moderate wage claims, by
taking greater account of (or internalis-
ing) economic-wide conditions, thereby
yielding better labour market outcomes. 
Algan and Cahuc (2006) stress the role
of culture and values in shaping labour
market institutions across countries.
They argue that the Danish flexicurity
model is unlikely to be transposable to
countries displaying weaker levels of
civic attitudes, because of the substan-
tial (even insurmountable) moral haz-
ard problems posed by extensive UB
systems in those countries110. 
6.2. Sources of political
resistance to reforms
The literature lists a series of factors
that can explain the political/social
resistance to economic reforms in gen-
eral, and to labour market reforms in
particular, which can largely explain
the so-called “status-quo” bias against
reforms. Labour market institutions
have large potential distributional
effects. For example, employed work-
ers (i.e. the so-called “insiders”,
according to the literature on political
economy), benefiting from EPL, have a
vested interest in resisting reforms
aimed at easing access to jobs for the
unemployed (i.e. the outsiders). Saint-
Paul (1998; 1999) argues that institu-
tions are basically rent-seeking mecha-
nisms, with a limited role in correcting
distortions or market failures.
Furthermore, labour market institutions
display a high degree of complementar-
ity (Coe and Snower, 1997), such that
reform packages tend to be more bene-
ficial/harmful than isolated reforms. 
The literature on political economy
assumes that “insider” groups define
the political agenda111 and/or are 
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107 The Danish corporatist system (or negotiated economy) has a very long tradition. It finds its roots in the 1899 September Compromise when the
foundations for a system of industrial relations were laid down. 
108 For a review of systems of social dialogue, coordination, collective bargaining, and concertation in EU Member States, see European Commission
(2004), Industrial Relations in Europe 2004, Employment and Social Affairs DG, Brussels, p. 29–54.
109 Calmfors and Driffil (1988) developed the so-called “hump-shaped” theory of the optimal degree of wage bargaining coordination/centralization.
According to this theory, both decentralised bargaining (at firm level) and highly centralised or coordinated systems (at national level) seem to
prevent excessive wage claims, thereby supporting high employment.
110 Algan and Cahuc (2006) set up a model where the government sets unemployment insurance and employment protection. Unemployment insur-
ance is more costly in countries where civic values/attitudes make it more acceptable to receive benefits without due entitlement. In equilibrium,
this leads the government to provide less generous unemployment benefits and more stringent employment protection. Furthermore, they use
individual surveys on civic values across countries, which show a correlation with the design of labour market institutions: countries with stronger
civic attitudes tend to have higher unemployment benefits, lower employment protection, and higher participation rates.
111 Meaning that the median voter is an insider.
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better organised than “outsiders”,
thereby being in a better position to
block reforms112. This may lead poli-
cy-makers to try and bypass this
obstacle by introducing reforms at the
margin, while keeping existing
arrangements for insiders largely
unchanged. A good example of this
strategy is the recurrent focus on EPL
reform of temporary contracts, while
keeping unchanged the stringent
employment protection legislation for
regular employees, so creating de-
facto “dual” labour markets (Saint-
Paul, 2000; Dolado et al., 2002;
Cahuc and Postel-Vinay, 2001). 
Another possible reform strategy is to
try and buy out resistance to reforms by
implementing compensatory schemes
for the “losers” (Bean, 1998). Denmark
implemented reforms that offset a
reduction in the generosity of unem-
ployment benefits by increasing the
scope and effectiveness of ALMPs.
The sequencing and timing of reforms
also plays an important role in deter-
mining their political feasibility. For
example, the potential benefits result-
ing from labour market reforms are
often concentrated in the medium to
long runs and are diffused across inter-
est groups, while the costs are usually
incurred in the short-term and can be
largely attributed to particular groups
(IMF, 2004). Therefore, in order to
weaken the political/social resistance to
reforms, a number of commentators
have proposed that they should be
accompanied by a loosening of the pol-
icy-mix stance. The lags between the
expected costs and benefits of reforms
tend to give them a contraction effect in
the short term (OECD, 2006; Bentolila
and Saint-Paul, 2000)113. 
A recent stream of literature
(Castanheira et al., 2006 and Høj et al.,
2006) investigates the factors that drove
cross-country differences in depth,
scope and timing of structural reforms
in product and labour markets as well
as in the welfare state. They also con-
clude that political economy factors
played a major role in that respect. In
particular, Castanheira et al. (2006)
apply a case study analysis to different
national reform experiences. Thus, they
highlight that policy-makers need to
build coalitions in order to reach the
required degree of consensus which
makes those reforms feasible. However
the extent of the consensus needed
depends on a series of country-specific
‘framework conditions’ (e.g. the system
of political representation) which iden-
tify the main social actors which can
affect the reform process and, so,
define the government’s room for
manoeuvre. Therefore, those political
requirements have an impact on the
kind and scope of successful reform
packages in different countries114.
7. Conclusions
EU labour markets are increasingly
faced with major challenges such as the
rapid pace of international economic
integration and technological progress,
the increased diversity of individual
working and life paths, as well as the
ageing of European societies. These
factors call for flexible working
arrangements in order to allow for swift
adaptation to change and to increase
labour force participation. On the other
hand, evidence of increasing labour
market segmentation between regular
jobs enjoying job security and good
training and career prospects, and pre-
carious forms of employment, charac-
terised by a high risk of exclusion from
the labour market, highlights the need
to ensure that more flexible labour mar-
kets do not contribute to a systematic
erosion of employment security and job
quality. 
A consensus is, therefore, emerging
among stakeholders, international
organisations, and the academic com-
munity that countries should adopt
institutional configurations in the
labour market that better combine the
requirements of flexibility and security
– in other words “flexicurity”. This
implies that, in an environment where
workers experience more frequent tran-
sitions between employment and non-
employment, and between different
kinds of employment, policies need to
put in place the right conditions for
individuals to successfully manage
these transitions, thereby ensuring sus-
tainable integration and progress of
individuals in the labour market. 
Both flexibility and security can take
different forms in different labour mar-
kets. Flexibility can, for instance, take
place either externally or within the
firm and it can concern either the size
112 The example of loosening EPL for regular employees is illustrative. Incumbent employees with regular jobs are expected to lose from such a
reform, because it involves a higher risk of job loss. In contrast, unemployed people would gain due to the higher probability of being hired, but
because they are less organised or are not represented by the “median voter”, they are not powerful enough to overcome the political resistance
of the incumbent group.   
113 OECD (2006c) and Bentolila and Saint-Paul (2000) highlight the fact that lower structural unemployment, as a result of reforms reducing labour
market rigidities, triggers wage and inflation reduction, which in turn lead to higher external competitiveness – but also to higher real interest
rates. The latter effect would delay output and labour market improvement (especially in large countries which may be less open to trade). A
reduction in interest rates (as inflation falls) would therefore speed improvement in the economy.
114 Castanheira et al. (2006) provide the example of countries with a majoritarian political system (UK), where governments can count on larger and
more homogeneous parliamentary majorities and, so, can afford a more confrontational strategy and realize more sudden and radical reforms.
On the other hand, in ‘consensus democracies’ like Denmark a wider base of consensus is needed and so reforms have to be targeted to ‘buy out’
opposition by unions and other social actors. 
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of labour, working time, tasks or
wages. This chapter did not tackle all
the different forms but instead focused
on those policy tools that impact on
external numerical flexibility (i.e. the
adjustment of the quantity of labour
used by firms) and on the
income/employability security of work-
ers: EPL and UB/activation strategies
for the unemployed, respectively. 
Evidence shows that EPL and UB are,
to a certain extent, alternative ways of
insuring workers against the risk of job
loss. However, their effects on labour
market performance are not equivalent.
Strict EPL, while having an ambiguous
impact on total unemployment, may be
detrimental for the employment
prospects of people at a higher risk of
labour market exclusion (youth,
women, older workers) and tends to
slow down workers’ movement
between different jobs, although it
apparently does not affect job creation
and destruction by firms. This, in turn,
implies (together with the positive
impact of stable employment relation-
ships on firm-specific human capital)
that EPL is not necessarily a major
obstacle to structural change of an
economy.
On the other hand, a generous UB tends
to increase unemployment, but this can
be offset by a limited duration of enti-
tlement and by an effective “activation”
strategy with monitoring of job search
efforts, participation to ALMPs and
provision of effective assistance to the
unemployed. Finally, UB/ALMPs
designed along those lines do not hin-
der labour market adjustment and seem
to perform better than EPL in enhanc-
ing workers’ perceived security. This
discussion suggests that reform pack-
ages adopting “flexicurity” principles
should assign a greater weight to care-
fully designed UB/ALMPs and less
importance to EPL. 
This chapter carries out a classification
of EU countries in a number of “flexi-
curity” models using the dimensions of
spending on (active and passive) labour
market policies to characterise the
security axes and EPL and LLL to char-
acterise the flexibility/employability
axis. The major fact emerging from this
analysis is that the dimensions of flexi-
bility and security in the labour market
are complementary, meaning that
progress on each or both does not nec-
essarily result in the emergence of
trade-offs between any major socio-
economic variables. 
However, the results need to be consid-
ered as tentative and preliminary. In
fact, further dimensions of flexibility
and security need to be included in
order to have a more solid characteriza-
tion of national models. In particular
the extent to which flexibility within
the firm (through changes of working
hours or tasks carried out by employ-
ees) can substitute for external flexibil-
ity remains an open issue and may
bring into question our national classi-
fication. The issue of ensuring a greater
work-life balance should also be
included.
Discussions should not just be limited to
the effects of different policies on labour
market outcomes. The recent experience
of several EU countries highlights the
fact that reforms often need to overcome
major problems of political feasibility.
The concept of “flexicurity”, by calling
for appropriate combinations of policies
rather than individual reforms, can be a
response to those problems. In fact,
comprehensive reform packages broad-
en the scope of negotiations, thereby
making agreements among stakeholders
easier. This would help to avoid the sys-
tematic postponement of less consensu-
al reforms (like softening EPL for regu-
lar workers) and, hence, to minimise the
risk of eventually introducing flexibility
only “at the margin” thereby worsening
labour market segmentation. However, a
policy shift that simultaneously trades-
off lower EPL for higher publicly-pro-
vided UB/ALMPs implies increased
budgetary costs which may make it
problematic – particularly in the context
of population ageing, a relatively low
labour supply or negative cyclical phas-
es with growing unemployment. 
Moreover, different combinations of
UB and EPL may be the result of dif-
ferent political economy equilibriums
resulting from different skill and age
compositions of the workforce. This
implies that improving the average
skills of workers may be a pre-condi-
tion to “flexicurity” policy shifts. 
The prevailing system of industrial
relations plays a crucial role in the
implementation of comprehensive
reform packages, with evidence point-
ing to the desirability of tripartite co-
operation and negotiations at national
level, together with a high level of trust
between negotiating parties. 
Notwithstanding the limitations of the
analysis, the message remains that the
policy focus should be shifted from
individual policy tools to reform pack-
ages that encompass several approaches
simultaneously in order to, on the one
hand, exploit well documented policy
interactions that enhance the benefits of
reforms on labour market performance,
and, on the other hand, to make policy
change politically and socially more
acceptable. This has to be weighed,
though, against increased complexity of
the policy-making process with respect
to single item reforms. Furthermore,
different institutional configurations
can deliver equally good labour market
outcomes, but certain national models
existing in the EU seem to lead to com-
paratively poorer results on all the rele-
vant dimensions.
Employment in Europe 2006
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1. Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to provide
an overview of the results of evalua-
tions of the effectiveness of active
labour market policies (ALMPs).
ALMPs are selective policies targeted
at certain sub-groups on the labour
market. In general, the main findings
of the analyses suggest that well-
designed programmes, particularly
focused on training, public employ-
ment services (PES) and employment
subsidies, are likely to be the most
effective. 
In the last 10–15 years there has been
an increasing focus on ALMPs as an
instrument of employment policy, with
international organisations generally
recommending shifting resources from
passive to active measures and taking
fuller account of how they interact
with tax and benefit systems. In more
recent years, under the pressure of
budgetary constraints, the ageing of
European populations and the chal-
lenges posed by phenomena such as
globalisation, innovation and new
organisational models, the emphasis
has shifted to making programmes
more effective in improving partici-
pants’ prospects in the regular labour
market. 
In the context of the European Employ-
ment Strategy (EES), ALMPs are poli-
cy instruments targeted on fostering,
inter alia: 
a) A lifelong approach to work (Inte-
grated Guideline No. 18); 
b) Identification of needs, job-search
assistance, guidance and training as
part of personalised action plans
(Integrated Guideline No. 19); 
c) The matching of labour market needs
(Integrated Guideline No. 20); 
d) Investment in human capital (Inte-
grated Guideline No. 23); and 
e) The adaptation of education and
training systems to new competence
requirements (Integrated Guideline
No. 24). 
ALMPs have an important role facilitat-
ing a rapid return to work by the majori-
ty of the unemployed and creating the
right conditions for some inactive work-
ers to join the labour force, as well as
tackling the problems faced in the labour
market by disadvantaged workers. The
final objectives of ALMPs should not
only be to improve employment out-
comes, lower inactivity rates and
decrease benefit dependency rates, but
also to contribute to increase the quality
and productivity of jobs and strengthen
social cohesion. Obviously, there are
policies in many other areas, such as the
management of aggregate demand, edu-
cation, labour market regulations and tax
and benefit systems, that could also play
an important role in promoting the socio-
economic objectives of the EES. 
This chapter is organised as follows.
Firstly, the two major (macro) databas-
es available on labour market policies
(LMPs), containing data comparable
across countries on both active and pas-
sive measures, are briefly presented. 
Secondly, the role of active measures is
discussed within a general equilibrium
matching model that includes transac-
tion costs and externalities. PES can
improve the efficiency of the process of
matching up unemployed persons and
vacant jobs. At the same time, public
intervention in training is justified in
order to stimulate private spending and
take it above the insufficient levels gen-
erated by a decentralised equilibrium. 
Thirdly, the two macro databases are
matched up to construct long-term
series for expenditure variables with the
aim of identifying long-term trends in
spending patterns. This allows assess-
ment of the extent of any significant
reallocation of resources from passive
to active policies and expenditure shifts
within the range of active measures. 
The fourth section of this chapter
reviews the extensive literature on pro-
gramme evaluations by main type of
measure, including recent research
drawing on the results of more than 100
programme evaluations conducted in
Europe. This enables the identification
of the types of programme and imple-
menting conditions most closely asso-
ciated with favourable outcomes. The
same section also covers a number of
macro-econometric evaluations of
ALMPs. It ends by attempting to recon-
cile the apparently conflicting results
from micro- and macro-econometric
evaluations. 
The fifth section covers both theoretical
and empirical results that highlight the
importance of considering the interac-
tions between active and passive LMPs.
These interactions mean that any disin-
centive effects associated with over-gen-
erous unemployment benefits (UB) can
be, at least partially, counteracted by
adopting well-designed ALMPs. Fol-
lowing the guidelines set in the EES, EU
Member States have developed “activa-
tion” strategies to coordinate public UB
administration with expenditure on
ALMPs. This section also addresses the
political economy of reforms and the
lessons that can be learned from this
type of analysis for the design of suc-
cessful reform strategies. 
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Finally, the chapter concludes by focus-
ing on the need for a culture of pro-
gramme evaluation in Europe as a basis
for improving the design and effective-
ness of future programmes, leading to
the reallocation of resources to those
most effective in terms of their labour
market outcomes.
2. What are labour
market policies? 
LMPs are essentially public interven-
tions in the labour market that are target-
ed towards particular groups in the
labour market. In this respect, they differ
from general employment policies
which, by definition, are not targeted at
any particular group1. Therefore, certain
important policies, such as measures
that lower labour costs, for example
through non-targeted reductions in taxes
and/or social security contributions, are
not considered LMPs but fall into the
category of “general” employment poli-
cies. LMPs are generally grouped into
either active or passive measures. 
Taking the former first, active labour
market policies (ALMPs) basically aim
to increase the likelihood of employ-
ment or improve income prospects for
the unemployed persons/groups who
find it difficult to enter the labour mar-
ket2. By contrast, the main aim of pas-
sive labour market policies (PLMPs) is
to provide income support to unem-
ployed people or early retirees, without,
a priori, attempting to directly improve
their labour market performance. 
2.1. The “old” OECD LMP
database
OECD’s “old” LMP database covers
the period 1985-2002. Its methodology
was not sufficiently developed to guar-
antee an adequate level of consistency
in the process of data collection and
validation across countries. 
The main types of programmes under
OECD’s “old” classification are listed
in Box 1.
1 According to the methodological definitions for Eurostat’s Labour Market Policy (LMP) database, they include measures taken by general govern-
ment which involve expenditure, either in the form of actual disbursements or of forgone revenue. The LMP database is also limited to labour
market measures which are explicitly targeted in some way at groups of people with difficulties on the labour market, referred to as “target
groups”, therefore excluding general employment policies. 
2 ALMPs work basically by changing the attractiveness of a job seeker to an employer (e.g. increasing the skill level through training; lowering wage
costs through employment subsidies). 
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In the “old” OECD LMP
database, data on programmes
are broken down into the
following categories:
Active measures
1. Public employment services
(PES) and administration. This
includes the following services:
placement; counselling and advice
on vocational training; job-search
courses; and support for geo-
graphic mobility and similar costs
in connection with job search 
and placement. All administrative
costs of labour market agencies,
including unemployment benefit
agencies, and administrative costs
of other labour market pro-
grammes are also included. 
2. Labour market training. This
covers training measures related to
labour market policies that are not
targeted at youth and the disabled.
It is broken down into two parts: (i)
training for unemployed adults and
those at risk; and (ii) training for
employed adults.
3. Youth measures. This includes
only special programmes for youth
in transition from school to work
and is broken down into two parts:
(i) measures for unemployed and
disadvantaged youth; and (ii) sup-
port for apprenticeship and related
forms of general youth training. 
4. Subsidised employment. This
includes targeted measures to pro-
mote employment for unemployed
individuals (other than youth or the
disabled) and is broken down into
three components: (i) subsidies for
regular employment in the private
sector; (ii) support for unemployed
persons starting enterprises; and
(iii) direct job creation (in public or
non-profit organisations).
5. Measures for the disabled. This
includes only special programmes
for the disabled, involving two
types of policies: (i) vocational
rehabilitation; and (ii) work for the
disabled.
Passive measures
7. Unemployment compensation. This
covers all forms of cash benefit to
compensate for unemployment,
Box 1 – Classification in the “old” LMP database
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2.2. The “new”
Eurostat/OECD Labour
Market Policy (LMP)
database
The “new” LMP database aims to provide
comparable data (across countries) on
labour market expenditure and participants
to allow certain aspects of the Employ-
ment Guidelines to be followed up. 
The “new” LMP database has been
developed as a module of the European
System of Integrated Social Protection
Statistics (ESSPROS) and also in close
cooperation with the LMP-OECD data-
base in order to build on previous work.
The “new” LMP database focuses on
collecting information from adminis-
trative sources on public expenditure
and on participants, both as stocks and
flows. It also includes much qualitative
information to describe the actions
taken and to facilitate analysis (Euro-
stat, 2005a). 
Policy measures are classified in two
ways: by type of action (e.g. placement
services, employment incentives, etc.)
and by type of expenditure (e.g. trans-
fers to individuals) (Eurostat, 2005b).
Chapter 3. Effective European Active Labour Market Policies
Classification by type of action
Labour market policy services 
1. Labour market services. These
include all services and activities
undertaken by public employment
services (PES) together with servic-
es provided by other public agencies
or any other bodies contracted under
public finance, which facilitate the
integration of unemployed and other
job seekers in the labour market or
assist employers in recruiting and
selecting staff. They can be broken
down into two main components:
1.1 Client services. Services provid-
ed by PES or other bodies which
facilitate the integration of the
unemployed and other job seek-
ers in the labour market or which
assist employers in recruiting
and selecting staff.
1.2 Other activities. These basical-
ly include the administrative
costs of active and passive
measures, plus all other servic-
es, activities and general over-
heads of the PES, which are not
covered in any other category of
the LMP  database.
Active measures
2. Training. This covers training
measures which aim to improve the
employability of the unemployed
and other target groups through
training and which are financed by
public bodies. This type of measure
should include some evidence of
classroom teaching or, if in the
workplace, supervision specifically
for the purpose of instruction.
3. Job rotation and job sharing. This
includes measures that facilitate
placement of an unemployed per-
son or a person from another target
group in work by substituting hours
worked by an existing employee.
4. Employment incentives. These
include measures that facilitate the
recruitment of unemployed per-
sons and other target groups or
help to ensure the continued
employment of persons at risk of
involuntary job loss. The employer
normally covers the majority of the
labour cost.
Box 2 – Classification in the “new” LMP database
except early retirement. In addition to
unemployment insurance and assis-
tance, it includes publicly funded
redundancy payments and other com-
pensation to workers made jobless due
to permanent or seasonal shutdown.
8. Early retirement for labour mar-
ket reasons. This involves special
schemes in which retirement pen-
sions are paid to individuals who
are out of work or for other labour
market policy reasons. It covers
only subsidised early pensions as
opposed to funded schemes within
regular pension plans (e.g. by actu-
arially calculated reductions of the
amounts paid).
Box 1 – Classification in the “old” LMP database (cont.)
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The main types of programmes under
this classification are listed in Box 2. 
2.3. Main differences
between the two LMP
classifications 
In order to have longer time series, it is
necessary to match up the two classifi-
cations. Annex 1 presents the results of
a simple exercise. There are basically
two major differences to consider.
Firstly, in the “old” classification,
expenditure on PES could not be sepa-
rated from administrative expenditure,
including the administration of UB3,
while in the “new” classification it is
possible to identify these two types of
expenditure. Secondly, youth measures
are now classified on the basis of the
type of measure involved, and Eurostat
strictly insists on excluding general
purpose measures for apprenticeships,
because they do not comply with the
general principle of selectivity (or tar-
geting) which is required before a
measure can be classified as a LMP4. 
At this stage, the matching up of the
two classifications is no more than
illustrative. In principle, it is not possi-
ble to split up total expenditure in cate-
gory 1 of the “old” classification
between PES and administrative expen-
ditures as in the “new” classification5.
In addition, at least for the moment, it
has not been possible, using detailed
programme data, to re-allocate spend-
ing on youth programmes across the
“new” classification categories. 
2.4. Analysis of selected
active labour market
policies 
This section covers some basic theoret-
ical aspects related to major ALMPs,
such as job-search assistance, labour
market training, employment subsidies
and job creation in the public sector.
The aim is to rationalise public inter-
ventions. The (general equilibrium)
matching model is a particularly useful
tool to assess how different ALMPs can
contribute to greater efficiency in the
process of filling vacancies (or job
reallocation). 
The matching process takes place in the
presence of externalities and involves
transaction costs6. To the extent that pub-
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5. Integration of the disabled. This
covers measures that aim to promote
integration of disabled persons into
the labour market. Disabled means
persons registered as disabled in line
with the national definitions.
6. Direct job creation. This includes
measures that create additional jobs,
usually of benefit to the community
or of a socially useful nature, in
order to find employment for the
long-term unemployed or persons
otherwise difficult to place. The
majority of the labour cost is nor-
mally covered by public finance.
7. Start-up incentives. These include
measures that promote entrepre-
neurship by encouraging the unem-
ployed and target groups to start
their own business or to become
self-employed.
Passive measures
8. Out-of-work income maintenance
and support. This includes meas-
ures that aim to compensate indi-
viduals for loss of wage or salary
by providing cash benefits.
9. Early retirement. This covers
measures that facilitate the full or
partial early retirement of older
workers who are assumed to have
little chance of finding a job or
whose retirement facilitates place-
ment of an unemployed person or a
person from another target group.
Classification by type of expenditure
1. Transfers to individuals: public
expenditure transferred directly to
individuals and paid in cash or
through a reduction in obligatory
levies.
2. Transfers to employers: public
expenditure transferred directly to
employers and paid in cash or
through a reduction in obligatory
levies. 
3. Transfers to service providers:
public expenditure transferred
directly to producers of goods and
services that are provided to indi-
viduals or to employers as benefits
in kind.
Box 2 – Classification in the “new” LMP database (cont.)
3 Sometimes benefit administration costs more than the entire placement service. 
4 Another potential area of difference is in measures for training employed people, which were sometimes included in the “old” OECD LMP data-
base, but which are only included in the “new” Eurostat/OECD LMP database for persons employed at risk – i.e. under immediate threat of job
loss due to restructuring or similar.
5 Obviously, this is only a drawback to the extent that one would like to build longer series for spending in PES. 
6 The former aspect is detailed below. Transaction costs result from the imperfect information (or asymmetric information) available to the two
sides in the market. 
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lic interventions can reduce those costs
and/or correct for those externalities, the
matching process could be made more
efficient, shifting the Beveridge curve
that links the unemployment and vacan-
cy rates inwards, which, in the long term,
would correspond to a fall in the struc-
tural unemployment rate. In the absence
of ALMPs, the unemployed would tend
to allocate insufficient resources to job-
search activities, while firms would face
higher costs to fill their vacancies, with
fewer jobs being offered as a result. 
The matching process is usually repre-
sented by a (matching) function, indicat-
ing the number of job hires as a function
of the number of unemployed persons
and vacancies. This function is marked
by positive inter-group externalities (e.g.
an unemployed person can benefit from
the opening of more vacancies) and neg-
ative intra-group externalities or conges-
tion effects (i.e. it is in the interest of a
job seeker or a firm posting a vacancy
that the number of job seekers or open
vacancies be as low as possible, see
Cahuc and Zylberberg, 2004, Chapter 9). 
2.4.1. Job-search assistance 
Job-search assistance includes a range of
different activities, such as job brokerage
and counselling. In many cases, such
services are combined with increased
monitoring and enforcement of the job-
search requirements that condition
receipt of UB (Martin and Grubb, 2001).
The matching model can be used to
analyse the role of job-brokerage agen-
cies, whether public or private. Yavas
(1994) showed that such agencies can
increase the efficiency of the process of
matching up unemployed persons and
job vacancies. However, this efficiency
gain comes at the (fixed) cost of having
to set up a large network(s) of placement
agencies, although the marginal cost of
filling a job might be low. 
Economic theory also suggests that due
to the fixed costs of setting up PES,
either the “market” for placement servic-
es should be regulated or public agencies
should hold the monopoly. Otherwise,
unregulated competition could lead to
inefficient provision of placement serv-
ices in the form of either under- or over-
provision, potentially leading to oligopo-
listic structures on the placement market. 
In all EU Member States, specialised
public agencies provide placement serv-
ices, but certain Member States have
authorised private organisations to oper-
ate alongside the public agencies. How-
ever, because of the fixed costs and
potential moral hazard7 problems, public
authorities have had to regulate the cre-
ation of a “quasi-market”8 for the provi-
sion of placement and brokerage servic-
es. In practice, there are various models
to organise “quasi-markets” for PES. It
has been advocated that a number of
conditions must be met for successful
organisation of a “quasi-market”, name-
ly: i) effective competition between serv-
ice providers, including performance
incentives and leeway for job seekers’
choice; ii) avoid the risk of moral hazard
or “creaming off ”; and iii) sufficient
government guarantees, for example,
about the continuity of the tender system
used so that market players are willing to
invest (Struyven, 2004)9. 
2.4.2. Labour market (re)training
Labour market (re)training is one of the
most costly measures and represents a
high proportion of total expenditure on
ALMPs in many countries. Its aim is to
alter the skills of the job seeker to
reflect the needs of the labour market
more closely, with the result that
employment rates and/or earnings
improve for programme participants.
By raising labour productivity, (re)train-
ing is also expected to improve the qual-
ity of job matches, securing more stable
relationships (i.e. lower separation
rates), thereby strengthening the incen-
tives for further investment in (re)train-
ing (i.e. the “Mathew effect”, see Heck-
man and Carneiro, 2003).
However, such public intervention is
only justified when individual choices
lead to sub-optimal levels of (re)training
which fall short of what is really needed
for society as a whole (i.e. the social opti-
mum). To effectively discuss the grounds
for public intervention in this area, revis-
iting the distinction introduced by Beck-
er (1964), between general training and
specific training10 is instructive. 
In the absence of public intervention,
general training – raising productivity in
any subsequent job held after receiving
training – would have to be financed
entirely by the worker, because she/he
could make no credible commitment to
share the proceeds of such an investment
with their current (or any future) employ-
er. According to a number of authors (see,
for example, Cahuc and Zylberberg,
2004, Chapter 11), both workers and
employers tend to underinvest in general
7 In the absence of public regulation, private placement agencies will tend to concentrate on the most easily placed unemployed persons (i.e.
“creaming off”). Although in some circumstances the intrinsic motivation of case workers may counterbalance “creaming off” effects. Heckman
et al. (1996) present empirical evidence from the Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA) that strongly suggests a preference (among case workers)
for disadvantaged applicants. 
8 In a “quasi-market”, the government contracts provision of the services to private or non-profit organisations, while usually leaving the unem-
ployed person some leeway over the choice of service provider. In a well managed (or regulated) quasi-market, the placement outcomes of dif-
ferent service providers are regularly evaluated and under-performing providers should be systematically driven out of the market.
9 “In general, it seems that quasi-competitive mechanisms can provide efficiency gains, as compared with rigid bureaucratic organisations which
lack clear measures of performance and effective mechanisms for replacing the management of inefficient employment offices” (OECD, 2005).
10 “General training” means investments that enhance the productivity of an individual for all jobs, while “specific training” means investments that
enhance an individual’s productivity for only one particular type of job.
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training compared with the socially
optimal level. This is because of the
existence of a number of market fail-
ures, such as lack of complete con-
tracts11, friction in the matching process
(i.e. the cost of filling vacancies), the
monopsony power of employers12 and
the imperfection of credit markets. The
last point, in addition to efficiency con-
siderations, also raises concerns over
social equity as the lack of adequate
funding tends to have a proportionately
greater effect on individuals from dis-
advantaged backgrounds. 
According to a number of authors (e.g.
Acemoglu, 1997), underspending on
general training could create a kind of
“vicious circle”. On the one hand, firms
prefer technologies making intensive
use of low-skilled labour when workers
have little (general) training, while on
the other hand workers have little
incentive to invest in training when the
demand for skilled labour is weak. 
The presumption that a decentralised
equilibrium results in under-investment
in training is stronger for general train-
ing than for specific training. In the lat-
ter case, a decentralised equilibrium
could yield the socially optimal amount
of investment if employers and workers
could sign long-term, non-renegotiable
contracts (“complete contracts”). How-
ever, it is unlikely that such conditions
will prevail in practice, amongst other
reasons, due to the limitations imposed
on contractual freedom by existing
laws and regulations.
The empirical evidence on (the sign of
the difference between) the social and
private returns to education is ambigu-
ous13. On the one hand, “if schooling has
signalling14 value in addition to raising
productivity, or if some other factor of
production is inelastically supplied”
(Acemoglu and Angrist, 1999), the social
return to education/schooling is lower
than the private return. “On the other
hand, the value of education to society
may exceed the private return because of
positive social returns due to changes in
relative wages, or human capital exter-
nalities from a more educated labour
force”. The limited empirical evidence
available seems to suggest that private
and social returns to education/schooling
are of the same order of magnitude. 
The  theoretical arguments set out above
suggest that public intervention in train-
ing is largely justified in order to nar-
row the gap between the private and
socially optimal levels of expenditure.
However, the available overviews of the
effectiveness of training programmes,
based on micro-econometric evalua-
tions, have revealed low rates of return
for participants in terms of their effects
on employment and/or earnings (Martin
and Grubb, 2001). Therefore, public
intervention has to be appropriately
designed if it is to enhance the labour
market prospects of participants and be
cost-effective. 
In the context of education and
(re)training activities, the EES empha-
sises the need to enhance participation
in continuous and workplace training
throughout the life-cycle. Box 3 briefly
addresses this subject. 
11 A contract is said to be complete when it is possible, at the time of signing, to foresee all eventualities that could arise while it is in effect and to
set out verifiable clauses covering each of them. 
12 If the worker’s investment in general training is to pay off, she/he must be able to apply to different employers so that they can bid up their wages
to reflect the higher level of productivity after training. 
13 As regards to the return on the resources invested in education, “the literature distinguishes two rates of return: the private rate of return and
the social rate of return. The private rate of return relates the resources invested by those obtaining the education (the opportunity cost as well
as direct costs) to the private benefits of education. The social return includes the public cost of education in these calculations. Notice that the
social return […] does not account for possible externalities” (Fuente and Ciccone, 2002). 
Moretti (2004) has found evidence of spillovers from college education. In particular, “a rise in the portion of better-educated workers has a large
positive effect on less-educated workers, but also generates a smaller rise in wages for the best-educated group”.
14 If the productivity characteristics of individuals are unobservable, education may be regarded as a signalling activity/device, leading to “over-edu-
cation”. However, “empirical studies suggest that signalling activity, although non negligible, does not play an overwhelming role in the educa-
tion process” (Cahuc and Zylberberg, 2004). 
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The European Employment Strategy
(EES) is built around three major priori-
ties for action: a) attract and retain more
people in employment, increase labour
supply and modernise social protection
systems; b) improve the adaptability of
workers and enterprises; and c) increase
investment in human capital through bet-
ter education and skills. Priority c) has
been especially addressed in Integrated
Guidelines/Employment Guidelines No
23 and No 24 for 2005-2008a). 
In 2006 the Commission presented the
first Annual Progress Report (APR) to
assess the progress made towards achiev-
ing the Lisbon growth and employment
objectives and to evaluate the macro-eco-
nomic policy strategies of Member States
as described in their National Reform Pro-
grammes (NRPs) (Commission, 2006). 
In the first year for which NRPs have
been set, Member States paid widespread
attention to increasing investment in
human capital through better education
and skills. However, the policy response
to the objective of investing more in edu-
cation and training has concentrated on
qualitative reforms in the education sys-
tem, while the efforts on setting up com-
prehensive lifelong learning strategies
have been less visible. Member States
are making a range of in-depth reforms
to support more effective lifelong learn-
ing. However, the development of truly
coherent and comprehensive lifelong
Box 3 – Lifelong learning
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learning strategies by 2006 remains a
challenge for many countries.
The employment guidelines set three
quantified targets in order to improve
human capital/skills: a)  an EU average of
no more than 10% early school-leavers;
b) by 2010 at least 85% of 22-year olds in
the EU should have completed upper sec-
ondary education; and c) average EU par-
ticipation in lifelong learning should be 
at least 12.5% of the adult working-age
population (25 to 64 age group). 
As regards human capital formation, the
APR notes that although some Member
States have adopted targets and bench-
marks linked to the objectives set for the
EU as a whole, more needs to be done to
raise participation in lifelong learning
and the skill and competence levels of
the population, especially among the
less-advantaged. The APR adds that par-
ticipation in lifelong learning varies con-
siderably across countries, largely
reflecting the lack of a comprehensive
approach in a number of Member States.
The culture of lifelong learning needs to
be further developed and delivery sys-
tems modernised in a majority of coun-
tries if the EU is to achieve the 12.5%
overall target. In fact, the average life-
long participation rate in the EU of
10.8% in 2005 is largely due to the good
performance of a few Member States
(DK, FI, NL, SE, SI, and the UK),
although an upward trend can be noted
in a majority of countries.
A simple analysis suggests that there is a
positive and significant correlation
between spending on training ALMPs and
the percentage of the population aged 25
to 64 participating in education and train-
ing (see Chart 1).
The European Centre for the Develop-
ment of Vocational Training (Cedefop)b)
recently presented a meta-study, based on
19 national reports on the reforms of
vocational education and training (VET)
systems that have taken place over the last
10 years (Cedefop, 2004). The main aim
is to evaluate how the reform of VET sys-
tems can influence the outcomes of edu-
cation and training at macro level. VET
systems cover multiple forms of activity,
ranging from vocational preparation in
schools to full-scale initial vocational
training (IVT) programmes, continuing
vocational training (CVT) at work,
retraining, etc. 
The lessons that can be learned from the
best practices for VET in general and
CVT in particular are especially relevant
in the context of lifelong learning. Howev-
er, research on/evaluation of VET reforms
across EU countries ranges from a mini-
malist approach to a fully fledged practice
combining an evaluation culture with the
process of reform of VET systems. 
Box 3 – Lifelong learning (cont.)
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Chart 1
a) Council Decision of 12 July 2005 on Guidelines for the employment policies of the Member States (2005/600/EC). 
Guideline No. 23: Expand and improve investment in human capital through …[inter alia] efficient lifelong learning strategies […] with a view
to enhancing participation in continuous and workplace training throughout the life-cycle, especially for the low-skilled and older workers.
Guideline No. 24: Adapt education and training systems in response to new competence requirements by …[inter alia] easing and diversifying
access for all to education and training and to knowledge by means of working time organisation, family support services, vocational guid-
ance and, if appropriate, new forms of cost sharing.
b) Cedefop was established in 1975 by Council Regulation (EEC) No. 337/75. Its aims are to provide information on and analyses of vocational
education and training systems, policies, research and practice.
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2.4.3. Employment subsidies
This section briefly covers a number of
theoretical aspects that are relevant to
programmes, classified by type of
action as either Employment Incentives
or Start-up Incentives. These ALMPs
basically consist of various types of
subsidies for private-sector jobs, where
the largest share of the labour costs is
still paid by the employer15. Besides
creating extra jobs, employment subsi-
dies may also help particular groups at
risk (e.g. the long-term unemployed) to
keep in contact with the labour market,
thereby maintaining their motivation
and skills (Martin and Grubb, 2001). 
The efficiency of employment subsidies
(in terms of net job creation) is limited
by the upward pressure they exert on
wages (Cahuc and Zylberberg, 2004,
Chapter 11)16. The (labour market)
matching model predicts that the
employer might only partly benefit
from the employment subsidy, despite
being the legal recipient. Under certain
circumstances, such as risk neutrality,
UB (perfectly) indexed to wages and a
negotiated wage above the minimum
wage, the wage bargaining process in a
matching model would result in the
employee receiving the entire subsidy
initially paid to the employer17. In this
borderline case, the employment sub-
sidy does not change the cost of labour
and, therefore, cannot create employ-
ment. Moreover, simple (but straight-
forward) calculations suggest that, if
applied to a large proportion of the
labour force, employment subsidies are
very costly and do not pass a cost-bene-
fit analysis18. 
Conversely, both economic theory and
evaluations of employment subsidy
programmes suggest that employment
subsidies targeted at particular groups
(e.g. low-skilled workers) can raise
net employment in the economy19. A
number of authors (Drèze and Malin-
vaud, 1994; Drèze and Sneessens,
1997) have suggested that it would be
possible to raise aggregate employ-
ment by attaching employment subsi-
dies to low wages (or reducing the
associated social security contribu-
tions) financed by higher taxes (or
higher social security contributions)
on high wages. Such a policy would
harness the higher labour demand
elasticity for low-skilled labour in
order to increase aggregate employ-
ment in the economy. 
2.4.4. Direct job creation
Direct job creation usually takes place in
the public or non-profit sectors and is
mainly publicly financed. In OECD
countries this type of active measure was
used especially during the 1970s and
early 1980s, but more recently there has
been a marked trend away from it,
reflecting the general conclusion reached
in many evaluations that this type of
intervention has not been very successful
in helping unemployed people to secure
permanent jobs on the (open) labour
market (Martin and Grubb, 2001). 
However, in countries with severe
unemployment problems, such as Ger-
many after reunification, these pro-
grammes actually make it possible to
create jobs within a short timeframe and
to partly compensate for the effects of
cyclical economic downturns when
aggregate demand is depressed and
there are few vacancies. Furthermore,
this type of intervention – when short in
duration – can be justified as a step-
ping-stone for those who have difficul-
ty entering the (open) labour market or
simply as a means of helping the most
disadvantaged groups of unemployed to
regain contact with the labour market.
One major issue linked to the direct
creation of jobs (in the public sector) is
the net impact on total employment, in
particular the evaluation of possible
crowding-out effects in the private sec-
tor. It turns out from the matching
model that, by increasing the exit rate
from unemployment20, direct jobs creat-
ed (in the public sector) tend to exert
upward pressure on the bargained wage
and, thereby, could end up crowding-
out private sector employment21. How-
ever, the increase in public sector
employment raises the average effi-
ciency of the matching process in the
economy22. The latter effect counters
the crowding-out effect on private sec-
tor jobs with the result that the actual
effect on the unemployment rate for the
whole economy is ambiguous. 
Overall, both back-of-the-envelope cal-
culations combined with the outcomes of
15 Although there are some cases (particularly in the new Member States) where public expenditure can cover the majority of costs (even 100%) for
a limited period.
16 In case of low elasticity of labour supply (particularly relevant for prime-age men), the shift in labour demand due to an employment subsidy
might basically lead to a wage rise and have little impact on employment. 
17 The argument linking the effectiveness of employment subsidies to the characteristics of the unemployment benefit system clearly illustrates the
general principle of complementarity between different employment policies (e.g. Coe and Snower, 1997; Pissarides, 1998).
18 See Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004), chapter 11, pp. 663–664.
19 Employment subsidies targeted at low-skilled jobs are more cost-effective in creating net jobs, basically for two reasons: firstly, the demand elas-
ticity for low-skilled labour is likely to be higher than that for medium or high-skilled labour and, secondly, for workers paid the minimum wage,
an employment subsidy always creates employment because it effectively reduces labour costs. Targeting employment subsidies also has some
drawbacks, namely it lowers the take-up rates for these programmes and might “stigmatise” participants as participation in such programmes
might convey a negative signal to potential employers.
20 Based on the assumption that the matching process is perfectly efficient in the public sector (i.e. the state recruits its employees from the unem-
ployed at random).
21 See Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004), chapter 11, pp. 664–668.
22 “An increase in public sector employment also leads to a downward shift of the Beveridge curve, so it is equivalent to greater efficiency in the
matching process”, Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004).
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many programme evaluations suggest
that the systematic use of generalised
employment subsidies or the direct cre-
ation of jobs in the public sector are not
cost-effective and could ultimately have a
very limited impact after consideration of
general equilibrium effects. As a result,
such measures should be used sparingly
and selectively to combat unemployment,
targeting low-skilled workers, individuals
at risk of exiting the labour force or indi-
viduals facing social exclusion. 
3. Expenditure on
ALMPs
This section combines data from the
OECD and Eurostat/OECD LMP data-
bases to build long-term series for expen-
diture variables. The aim is to identify
long-term trends in spending patterns, in
particular the extent of any significant
resource reallocation from passive to
active policies, and expenditure shifts
within the range of active measures. 
Two indicators on the intensity of spend-
ing on LMPs are calculated: a) total
spending on LMPs per unemployed per-
son expressed as a percentage of GDP
per capita23; and b) spending on LMPs
expressed in PPP24 divided by the num-
ber of persons wanting to work25.  
For a more detailed description of
LMPs, in terms of both expenditure
levels and number of participants, ref-
erence should be made to various Euro-
stat publications (for example, Euro-
stat, 2005b, 2005c, 2006a). 
3.1. Has the balance
between active and passive
measures shifted?
Average spending on LMPs, including
PES, in EU Member States totalled
just over 2% of GDP during the period
1985-2004 (see Table 1). There is wide
variation across countries in the share
of government expenditure on LMPs,
ranging from a low of under 0.5% in
the Baltic countries, the Czech Repub-
lic and the Slovakia to a high of 4.4%
in Denmark in 2004. In a typical EU
Member State expenditure on active
measures accounts for approximately
one-third of total spending on LMPs
(see Table 2). 
In 2004 spending on active measures,
excluding PES, averaged 0.5% of
GDP in the EU, down on the maxi-
mum average spending of close to 1%
registered in 1995 (see Table 3). Den-
23 It is common practice in empirical studies to express indicators of spending intensity as a percentage of GDP per capita in order to ensure cross-
country comparability (e.g. Scarpetta, 1996; Nickel, 1998; Nickell and Layard, 1999; Boone and Van Ours, 2004).
24 Purchasing power parity (PPP) is a theoretical exchange rate that equalises purchasing power levels between countries. The PPP exchange rate
between two currencies equals the ratio of their countries’ price levels calculated for a common basket of goods. PPP exchange rates are used to
make comparisons of living standards between countries.
25 The population wanting to work is a measure of the population not in work but who would like to work and who might need help through ALMP
interventions and which is comparable between countries (source LFS). The population wanting to work is the sum of the unemployed plus the
labour reserve. The labour reserve is a concept developed by the Employment Committee indicators group (Document IND/23/02/EN “Measuring
time-related unemployment and the labour reserve”) and covers inactive persons who would like to work but who do not qualify as unemployed
either because their method of job search is not active or because they are not immediately available for work. 
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1985 1990 1995 2000 2004
AT 1.2   1.2   1.7   1.7   2.0   
BE 4.5   3.7   4.0   3.4   3.6   
CZ - 0.4   0.3   0.5   0.5   
DE 1.8   1.9   3.6   2.9   3.5   
DK - 5.3   6.2   4.3   4.4   
EE - - - - 0.2   
ES 2.4   2.4   2.7   2.0   2.1   
FI 1.7   1.7   5.2   3.0   3.0   
FR 3.0   2.7   3.0   2.5   2.7   
EL 0.2   0.5   0.8   0.7   0.6   
HU - 2.8   1.3   0.8   0.7   
IE 4.3   3.8   4.4   1.6   1.6   
IT - - - 0.7   1.4   
LT - - - - 0.3   
LV (b) - - - - 0.5   
LU 1.2   0.7   0.8   0.5   0.9   
NL 5.1   3.7   3.9   2.7   3.7   
PT - 0.8   1.6   1.4   2.0   
SE 3.0   2.5   6.5   3.0   2.5   
SK - - - - 0.5   
UK 2.9   1.5   1.7   0.7   0.8   
EU average (a) 2.6   2.2   3.0   1.9   1.8   
Sources: OECD and Eurostat’s LMP.
a) Unweighed arithmetic average of countries for which data are available.
b) 2003.
Table 1 – Total spending on LMPs, including PES (as % of GDP)
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mark, the Netherlands and Sweden
recorded the highest expenditure-to-
GDP ratios in 2004 of over 1%, with
Germany, Belgium, Finland and
France between 0.75% and 1%. Active
spending was below 0.25% of GDP in
the Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece,
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia
and the UK. 
In 2004 spending on training stood at
about one-third of total expenditure on
active measures26, a figure that has
remained relatively stable since the
early 1990s (see Chart 2). In recent
years the main changes in the structure
of active spending have been as fol-
lows: employment subsidies increased
from close to 9% of total active spend-
ing in 1995 to above 16% in 2004,
while expenditure in connection with
direct job creation declined from 23%
in 1995 to about 13% in 2004. 
The EES27 calls for the strengthening
of spending on ALMPs and enhancing
their effectiveness (e.g. Integrated
Guidelines No. 19 and No. 20). How-
ever, over the last decade European
countries have not made any signifi-
cant progress on shifting resources
from passive to active measures, in
contrast to government’s declared
intentions. In fact, the share of active
spending has moved mainly in line
with the cycle, dropping to a trough in
the 1993–1995 recession and only
recently returning to its 1989 peak
level28. This relative failure may be
“…related to doubts about the effec-
tiveness of much of this spending”
(Martin and Grubb, 2001). 
3.2. Indicators of spending
effort on LMPs
There is a correlation between expen-
diture on both active and passive
measures and the unemployment rate
(see Chart 4)29. However, the slope of
the passive curve is steeper than the
active curve (Martin and Grubb,
2001), because entitlements to UB
tend to follow cyclical fluctuations
more closely than active policies,
which are more discretionary and take
longer to implement. 
3.2.1. Spending per unemployed
person expressed as a
percentage of GDP per capita
This indicator of spending effort on
LMPs suggests a downward shift in the
intensity of expenditure on both active
and passive measures in the EU (see
Chart 5), particularly since the mid-
1990s and mainly in high-spending
countries (see Chart 6). As regards pas-
sive measures, Martin and Grubb
(2001) argue that this may reflect “…a
shift in the policy stance towards
greater activation and a tightening of
the eligibility rules for benefit receipt”.
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1985 1990 1995 2000 2004
AT 15.3   17.4   14.1   24.7   23.6   
BE 25.4   28.4   29.6   31.5   27.7   
CZ - 28.5   26.1   31.7   33.8   
DE 24.1   42.5   32.1   34.3   26.9   
DK - 19.1   28.6   41.2   36.3   
EE - - - - 18.7   
ES 8.2   23.4   15.1   32.8   26.9   
FI 38.5   43.7   26.2   26.8   27.4   
FR 18.4   27.0   39.2   42.4   29.7   
EL 22.6   39.6   42.0   37.4   27.0   
HU - 17.2   24.8   37.7   35.3   
IE 27.7   32.9   34.2   50.3   35.4   
IT - - - 83.8   41.8   
LT - - - - 58.6   
LV b) - - - - 18.5   
LU 20.1   22.3   13.7   11.3   20.4   
NL 21.6   29.6   25.5   14.9   33.4   
PT - 59.1   43.0   30.0   29.5   
SE 68.1   62.6   48.1   53.0   43.2   
SK - - - - 18.4   
UK 21.7   31.3   17.2   30.6   36.0   
EU averagea) 26.0   32.8   28.7   36.1   30.9   
Sources: OECD and Eurostat’s LMP databases.
a) Unweighed arithmetic average of countries for which data are available.
b) 2003.
Table 2 – Active spending, excluding PES 
(as % of total spending on LMPs, excluding PES)
26 Including PES. 
27 As well as the OECD Jobs Strategy. 
28 The share of active spending is pro-cyclical, reflecting the stabilisation role of unemployment benefits that move counter-cyclically. After control-
ling for the cycle (e.g. as expressed by the unemployment rate), no general trend emerges, indicating that no shift from passive to active spend-
ing has occurred in the EU during the period 1985–2004 (see Table 2 and Chart 3).
29 Strong in the latter case, weak in the former. 
3.2.2. Spending on LMPs divided
by the number of persons
wanting to work
The country rankings resulting from
calculating indicators on the intensity
of spending based on the unemployed
(see Section 3.2.1) or on the number
of persons wanting to work (i.e. the
unemployed plus the labour reserve)
are broadly similar (see Tables 4 and 5
and Chart 7). This indicator (on the
intensity of spending) is based on the
work done by the Employment Com-
mittee indicators group.
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1985 1990 1995 2000 2004
AT 0.2   0.2 0.2 0.4 0.4  
BE 1.1   1.0 1.1 1.0 0.9
CZ - 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1
DE 0.4   0.7 1.1 1.0 0.9
DK - 1.0 1.8 1.7 1.5
EE - - - - 0.0
ES 0.2   0.5 0.4 0.7 0.6
FI 0.6   0.7 1.3 0.8 0.8
FR 0.5   0.7 1.1 1.0 0.7
EL 0.0   0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2
HU - 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.2
IE 1.2   1.2 1.4 0.8 0.5
IT - - - 0.6 0.5
LT - - - - 0.2
LV b) - - - - 0.1
LU 0.2   0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2
NL 1.0   1.0 0.9 0.4 1.1
PT - 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.6
SE 1.9   1.5 2.9 1.5 1.0
SK - - - - 0.1 
UK  0.6   0.4 0.3 0.2 0.2
EU average a) 0.7   0.6   0.9   0.7   0.5   
Sources: OECD and Eurostat’s LMP databases.
a) Unweighed arithmetic average of countries for which data are available.
b) 2003.
Table 3 – Active spending, excluding PES (as % of GDP)
Breakdown of active spending, including PES – EU average 1985 – 2004Chart 2
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1985 1990 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
AT - - 2.2 1.0 1.0 1.3 1.8 1.8 2.3 2.3 2.7 1.5
BE 2.8 5.3 4.0 4.5 3.6 3.7 4.9 6.3 5.7 4.8 4.9 5.1
CZ - - - - - - - - - 0.1 0.1 0.1
DE 1.9 5.3 5.1 4.9 3.2 3.8 4.4 4.4 4.2 4.4 3.6 3.2
DK - 4.9 7.8 8.0 8.9 9.7 13.2 12.8 13.9 15.6 12.6 12.5
ES - 0.8 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.8 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.2
FI - - 2.4 2.8 2.3 2.1 2.3 2.2 2.3 2.3 2.5 2.8
FR 1.5 2.8 4.2 4.3 3.4 3.5 3.9 4.5 4.8 4.8 4.2 3.6
EL 0.0 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.2 0.3
HU - - - 0.0 - - - - - - 0.2 0.2
IE 1.2 1.9 2.0 2.6 2.1 2.9 3.8 4.5 5.2 4.9 4.8 4.8
IT - - - 0.5 - 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.4 1.5 1.7 1.3
LU 2.7 5.5 2.0 3.2 3.7 3.0 3.5 3.8 4.8 4.7 5.8 6.5
NL 2.8 3.9 2.3 3.1 2.3 1.6 2.5 4.0 7.2 7.4 8.0 6.5
PT - 0.6 0.8 1.0 0.5 0.9 0.8 1.1 1.5 1.3 1.3 1.4
SE - - 13.3 - 9.7 10.8 11.7 12.0 11.5 12.0 13.0 10.8
UK 1.0 1.3 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.8 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.8
EE - - - - - - - - - - 0.0 0.0
LT - - - - - - - - - - 0.0 0.1
LV - - - - - - - - - - 0.0 -
SK - - - - - - - - - - - 0.0
Sources: DG EMPL calculations based on data from the OECD, Eurostat and Ameco (DG ECFIN).
a) The sum of the unemployed plus labour reserve. Labour reserve is made of inactive persons who would like to work but do not
qualify as unemployed.
Table 4 – Spending on ALMPs (expressed in PPP) divided by the number of persons 
wanting to work (a)
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4. Evaluation of
ALMPs
There is an extensive volume of litera-
ture on the evaluation of individual pro-
grammes. There are also studies on the
macro-economic (or general equilibri-
um) effects of total spending on ALMPs
and of its composition by main types of
intervention30. Evaluating the effects of
ALMPs, together with monitoring their
implementation, are important steps in
the process of improving policy design
in order to achieve better results. 
Evaluation of individual programmes
commonly uses micro-econometric
techniques to measure the impact of
participation in the programme on sub-
sequent employment and/or earning
prospects. Labour economists and
econometricians have developed highly
specialised tools for programme evalu-
ation (Heckman et al., 1999). The
objective of such evaluation is to iden-
tify the effects of participation in the
programme on participants (Kluve and
Schmidt, 2002). This involves the esti-
mation of the difference between the
outcome from programme participation
(an observable) and the outcome that
participants would have achieved had
they not participated in the programme
(a counterfactual). Given that it is not
possible to observe an individual
simultaneously in two different states,
estimating the counterfactual state is
the crux of the “evaluation problem”
(see Annex 2). 
However, assuming adequate data avail-
ability, use of a general equilibrium
framework is preferable to a micro-
econometric approach in order to assess
the effectiveness of ALMPs. Regret-
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1985 1990 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
AT - - 13.6 5.6 5.2 5.9 6.1 6.0 6.6 7.3 8.8 5.3
BE 8.2 13.2 9.5 9.7 10.4 8.4 11.4 13.6 12.9 12.7 12.3 13.3
CZ - - - - - - - - - 0.2 0.2 0.2
DE 5.9 7.2 10.8 10.3 9.3 9.0 9.1 8.8 9.0 9.4 9.1 8.8
DK - 20.5 19.4 19.9 15.9 17.4 18.5 18.3 19.2 21.9 22.1 21.9
ES - 2.6 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.9 2.1 2.5 2.8 2.9 3.2
FI - - 6.9 6.5 5.8 5.2 5.9 5.9 6.4 6.7 7.1 7.3
FR 6.9 7.6 6.6 6.5 5.6 5.8 6.0 6.3 7.4 8.4 8.9 8.6
EL 0.1 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7 1.0 1.0
HU - - - 0.1 - - - - - - 0.2 0.3
IE 3.1 3.9 3.9 4.4 - 4.5 4.8 4.5 5.0 6.1 7.2 8.7
IT - - - 1.5 - 0.9 1.1 1.0 1.4 1.5 1.7 1.8
LU 10.8 19.0 12.7 13.5 7.8 6.0 12.0 11.4 12.9 12.9 17.8 16.0
NL 10.0 9.2 6.8 8.5 7.6 7.8 8.1 13.3 15.4 14.4 14.3 13.8
PT - 0.4 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.8 2.1 2.6 3.2 3.5 3.1 3.4
SE - - 14.3 - 10.4 10.7 11.5 11.8 9.2 9.7 15.3 14.2
UK 3.7 2.9 2.0 1.8 2.1 2.0 2.1 2.1 2.0 1.8 1.6 1.6
EE - - - - - - - - - - 0.1 0.1
LT - - - - - - - - - - 0.0 0.0
LV - - - - - - - - - - 0.1 -
SK - - - - - - - - - - - 0.1
Sources: DG EMPL calculations based on data from the OECD, Eurostat and Ameco (DG ECFIN).
a) The sum of the unemployed plus labour reserve. Labour reserve is made of inactive persons who would like to work but do not
qualify as unemployed.
Table 5 – Spending on PLMPs (expressed in PPP) divided by the number of persons 
wanting to work (a)
30 The European Commission has done some work on the macro-economic effects of ALMPs. Chapter 2 of Employment in Europe 2004 (“Key Deter-
minants of Labour Market Performance”, http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/employment_analysis/employ_2004_en.htm) looked at the impact
of spending on ALMPs and its composition on the total unemployment and employment rates, and the interactions between various labour mar-
ket institutions and types of ALMPs. The EU Economic 2004 Review (Chapter 3, “Labour markets in the EU: an economic analysis of recent perform-
ance and prospects”, http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/european_economy/the_eu_economy_review2004_en.htm) provided an
extensive review of the literature on labour market institutions and labour market performance, which also makes reference to the role of ALMPs.
Arpaia and Mourre (2005) provided a more recent review of the empirical macro-economic literature on labour market institutions and employ-
ment performance, including the issues of flexibility, security and efficient redistribution (DG ECFIN Economic Paper n°238, http://ec.europa.eu/econ-
omy_finance/publications/economic_papers/economicpapers238_en.htm). 
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tably, the overwhelming majority of evi-
dence available on programme evalua-
tion still comes from micro-economet-
ric analyses, investigating the average
effects of participation in a programme
on participants and in the process,
neglecting general equilibrium effects.
In principle, a favourable micro-econo-
metric evaluation of a programme is a
necessary, though not a sufficient con-
dition to demonstrate its value. Instead,
many authors emphasise the importance
of also assessing the “indirect” effects
of programmes (in addition to the
“direct” effects) and possibly, the aggre-
gate impact on the variables of interest,
such as employment-to-population and
unemployment rates (Heckman et al.,
1999). Calmfors (1994) considers that
the following “indirect” effects should
be considered in a general equilibrium
analysis: i) displacement (subsidised
activities may displace other activities
in the economy); deadweight (the same
result would have been achieved with-
out the programme); creaming (only the
most employable of the unemployed
benefit from the intervention); substitu-
tion (subsidised individuals may dis-
place non-subsidised individuals); and
taxation (distortion linked to financing
of the measures). 
Macro-economic (or general equilibri-
um) analyses are principally relevant
for employment subsidy programmes,
which are especially affected by a num-
ber of such “indirect” effects.
4.1. Comments on the
programme evaluation
literature
This section presents some general
remarks regarding the reliability and
general applicability of the conclusions
that can be drawn from the extensive lit-
erature on labour market programme
evaluation, with the arguments made
closely following those in Martin and
Grubb (2001). This section is subdivid-
ed as follows: firstly, a review of indi-
vidual (micro-econometric) programme
evaluations by type of intervention; sec-
ondly, a review of macro-economic
studies; and, finally, an explanation of
the apparent contradiction between the
outcomes of micro- and macro-evalua-
tions, especially for training pro-
grammes (Boone and Van Ours, 2004).
4.1.1. Micro-econometric
programme evaluations 
There are a number of caveats that have
to be expressed about the results
obtained in the micro-econometric
evaluation literature, as follows: 
• The development of an “evaluation
culture” for labour market policies
does not currently exist in a large
majority of EU Member States. This
situation contrasts markedly with
practice in other countries, such as the
US and Canada, where despite lower
aggregate spending on LMPs, there is
nevertheless a long-standing tradition
of programme evaluation. In these
countries, programme evaluation is
often integral and the continuation of
the programme itself frequently
depends on the results. However, the
situation in Europe is rapidly improv-
ing as evaluation studies become more
common, and recent studies have been
using state-of-the-art techniques and
better data sets. There is a strong case
that whenever possible, independent
policy evaluation is desirable. Howev-
er, good quality micro-econometric
policy evaluation is closely connected
to the quality and availability of data. 
• Due to data availability problems31,
many programme evaluations tend to
monitor participants’ outcomes after
participation for only a brief period32,
which may be too short for a compre-
hensive assessment of the (social) rate
of return of many ALMPs. For exam-
ple, in labour market training pro-
grammes (widely regarded as having
considerable dynamic effects), the
short timeframe is liable to bias the
evaluation results downwards. In fact,
in terms of employment outcomes,
training programmes are usually
associated with large “locking-in
effects” in the short run (e.g. less
intensive job search due to participa-
tion in a programme) followed by
positive effects in the medium to long
run (e.g. higher quality job matches
as a result of participation in a pro-
gramme, yielding low separation
rates or longer spells in work). 
• In many countries there is a consider-
able degree of change in the mix of
ALMPs in place year-on-year. There
is a high incidence of new pro-
grammes being introduced and others
discontinued, together with frequent
changes affecting programme design,
rendering the task of programme
evaluation extremely challenging. 
• The set of “outcome” variables con-
sidered in programme evaluations is
usually too restrictive, tending to
focus on either the (re-)employment
or earning prospects of participants.
A limited number of studies also
weigh the evidence on the social ben-
efits resulting from participation in a
programme, such as lower crime, less
drug use or better health. 
• According to a number of surveys,
such as Martin and Grubb (2001),
Calmfors et al. (2001) and Kluve and
Schmidt (2001), evaluations have
rarely addressed the crucial empirical
problem of the relationship between
ALMPs and job duration. Programme
evaluation concentrates on the impact
31 For example, short longitudinal data sets. In a longitudinal data set (a high proportion of) individuals are (is) followed for a number of years.
Compared to the early European evaluation studies, which used predominantly cross-sectional data (Heckman et al., 1999), ALMP evaluation in
Europe is now based much more on longitudinal data, potentially improving the quality of the estimates of programme effects.
32 Covering at best two years after a person has participated in a programme. 
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of participation on job finding rates in
the period immediately after (or close
to) participation. This reflects the lack
of suitable data for analysing separa-
tion rates, which would require rela-
tively long data sets.
• Based on efficiency criteria alone, a
labour market programme ideally
should pass a cost-benefit analysis in
order to be considered worthwhile
implementing. Therefore, in addition
to the data and methodological needs
of programme evaluation, cost-bene-
fit analysis also requires weighing
data on both the direct (e.g. adminis-
trative) and indirect costs of the pro-
gramme (e.g. value of any fallback
activity for participants, such as
leisure or household production). The
data requirements of cost-benefit
analysis represent a huge (and often
insurmountable) hurdle. In the case
of the direct costs of programme
implementation, it is particularly dif-
ficult to breakdown by individual
programmes the overheads of run-
ning PES. 
• One aspect, often neglected in the lit-
erature, is the policy relevance of the
micro-econometric findings of pro-
gramme evaluations. Many pro-
grammes that have been subjected to
rigorous evaluation are small scale or
simple pilot projects. In these cir-
cumstances, it is uncertain how effec-
tive they could be if their scope was
extended, because general equilibri-
um effects could possibly kick in,
offsetting (or even reversing) the
gains observed for programme par-
ticipants. 
• Although micro-econometric evalua-
tions can give insight into the causal
impact of programmes, which is
much more difficult or even impossi-
ble to obtain using macrodata,
macro-economic evaluations are also
important especially for relatively
large programmes in terms of either
spending or participants. Assessment
of the general equilibrium (or macro-
economic) effects of ALMPs should
be given high priority on the research
agenda, because of the potential size
that “indirect” effects can have, pos-
sibly even leading to a reversal of the
initial findings on programme effec-
tiveness based solely on the micro-
econometric evaluation. However,
extending the use of general equilib-
rium methods poses a considerable
challenge for both theoretical and
data-gathering reasons. 
• Current knowledge about the effec-
tiveness of labour market policies is
held back not only by the lack of
comprehensive and high-quality
data, but also by the insufficient co-
operation between those designing
and implementing policies and those
better placed to assess them (Kluve
and Schmidt, 2002)33. Independent
evaluations of new policy initiatives
(and ongoing programmes) should be
integral, and the results should be
seen as highly relevant and used to
improve the design of future pro-
grammes, placing particular empha-
sis on the long-term effects34.
• Programme evaluation aside from
concentrating on “What works and
for Whom”, should also examine the
causal effects of outcomes to con-
tribute towards optimising pro-
gramme design.
Box 4 presents the “evaluation problem”
of identifying and measuring the effect
of participation in a programme on par-
ticipants, while Annex 2 briefly discuss-
es some commonly used estimators. 
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33 In Europe, there is a need for better communication between policy-makers, who formulate ALMPs, and academic researchers, who have the tools
to evaluate them.
34 Policy-makers are often accused (by academics) of resorting to ALMPs without giving due consideration to their long-run effects, instead prefer-
ring measures that maximise the short-run impact of reducing open unemployment (Boone and Van Ours, 2004).
The objective
The main objective of programme eval-
uation is to identify and measure the
effect of participation in a programme
on participants. This box and Annex 2
briefly review some of the methodolog-
ical issues and the techniques used in
the large majority of evaluations, which
have looked only at the “direct” effect
of labour market policies, neglecting
their “indirect” or general equilibrium
impact on the economy. 
The counterfactual
An individual can either participate in
a programme or not. To assess the
effect of participation, it is necessary
to measure two outcomes: a) the result
of participation in the programme
(observable); and b) the result that
would have occurred had the individ-
ual not participated (counterfactual).
The evaluation problem is actually a
question of missing data. It requires
making an appropriate identifying
assumption in order to estimate from
observable data the counterfactual
(missing) data. To solve this problem,
an appropriate group for comparison
(i.e. a control group) has to be found
among the non-participants in the
population to match them with the
participating group. Moreover, in gen-
eral the gains from participation in a
programme vary between workers,
with the distribution conditional on a
number of (both observable and unob-
servable) factors. Restricted data
Box 4 – The evaluation problem
 
35 A theoretical justification for activation programmes can be found in OECD (2005). “For some unemployed, given the costs of job search, it is not
worth searching for a job, even though it would be worth accepting a job offer that arrived without search effort. In this case, when an obliga-
tion to search is enforced, at the time a job offer arrives the search costs are sunk costs and the job will be accepted”. Also for the purpose of
motivating job search, an activation strategy might be preferable to a simple cut in unemployment benefits, because it achieves the same out-
come with a high level of social protection. Another justification for activation policies lies in their potentially large impact on labour market tran-
sitions when entitlement to unemployment benefits if of long or indefinite duration.
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4.1.2. Job-search assistance and
activation programmes
Public Employment Services (PES)
usually perform three roles: 
• Job-search assistance and career
guidance; 
• Management of unemployment bene-
fits (in a majority of Member States);
and
• Referral of job seekers to ALMPs. 
In recent years the development of infor-
mation technology has allowed PES to
provide a whole new range of (self-
)services, such as vacancy and curricu-
lum vitae databases. There is also a new
trend towards “activation”. Activation
polices encourage certain unemployed
individuals to step up their job search
after an initial spell of unemployment,
with a later obligation to participate in
various programmes. Eventually, the
activation principle makes receipt of
benefit conditional on participation in
programmes, in the process shifting the
balance between the rights and obliga-
tions of the unemployed35. To assess the
needs of the unemployed and map the
best course of action to take, profiling
techniques have also been recently
adopted, especially at the beginning of a
spell of unemployment, for individuals
in particularly vulnerable groups, such
as the unqualified young and the long-
term unemployed. In all OECD coun-
tries, PES are public agencies and in
some cases have authorised private
organisations to compete in “quasi-mar-
kets” for job search and placement activ-
ities.
A large number of studies are now
available on the effectiveness of job-
search assistance programmes and the
activity of placement agencies (Meyer,
1995). The general finding is that they
have a significantly (positive) impact
Employment in Europe 2006
availability and quality, generally
mean that only average measures of
programme participation can be cal-
culated and not the conditional distri-
bution of gains from the programme. 
Selection bias
In the case of observational or non-
experimental data, this is a major
problem for programme evaluation.
Even if the matched participant and
control groups are comparable for all
the observable factors, unobservable
variables might invalidate the compar-
ison (see Annex 2 for a definition of
selection bias).
Experimental and non-experimental
data 
Researchers prefer to use experimen-
tal data to solve the evaluation prob-
lem of finding an appropriate control
group to cope with the selection bias.
Experimental data are obtained from
randomised control trials or natural
experiments, which provide the easi-
est solution to retrieving the counter-
factual data desired. From those will-
ing to participate in an experiment,
individuals are randomly assigned to
either a participant or a control group.
In sufficiently large groups, randomi-
sation implies that, on average,
observed and unobserved characteris-
tics will be identical in the two
groups. This eliminates selection bias.
Differences between the average
results of the two groups can therefore
be attributed solely to the programme
being evaluated. Unfortunately (from
the perspective of the research com-
munity), experimental studies on
social sciences are the exception in
Europe, principally due to legal
restrictions and ethical considerations
on randomised trials. 
Although randomised control trials
are commonly seen as the gold stan-
dard of programme evaluation tech-
niques, Heckman et al. (1999) refer to
a number of conditions that still have
to be met in order to avoid the selec-
tion bias problem: a) the random draw
should not change the composition of
the population agreeing to participate
in the experiment; b) no significant
drops in the participant group should
occur during the experiment (attrition
bias); and c) no significant proportion
of the control group should benefit
from a substitute measure/treatment
(substitution bias). The last two prob-
lems are also present in non-experi-
mental evaluations. 
In the absence of experimental data,
programme evaluation has to be
based on observational/survey data.
These are subject to selection bias,
which econometricians attempt to
minimise by carefully selecting the
control group and the estimation
technique used to calculate the aver-
age effect of the programme on the
participants. 
Box 4 – The evaluation problem (cont.)
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on the transition of beneficiaries from
welfare to work. The evidence suggests
that job-search assistance programmes
in general and activation policies in
particular rank high among the more
cost-effective ALMPs to help the
unemployed to find a job and keep it.
Specifically, evaluations of social
experiments conducted in several coun-
tries (Canada, Sweden, the UK and the
US) suggest positive outcomes from
PES activities (Martin and Grubb,
2001). For example, compulsory inter-
views with PES tend to reduce the
unemployment rates of beneficiaries
significantly over the long term
(Dolton and O’Neill, 2002)36. 
However, in the design of activation
strategies it is particularly important to
pay attention to coordinating job search
activities with participation in other
programmes, such as training, in order
to avoid spending too little time search-
ing for a job and, thereby, inadvertently
prolonging the spell of unemployment. 
Given that PES provide job search
assistance, while at the same time mon-
itoring compliance with the job search
requirements for receipt of UB, it
should therefore not be surprising that
evaluations have not been able to disen-
tangle these two effects. Moreover, it is
commonly argued that effective PES
must carefully balance the carrot (i.e.
job search and counselling), and stick
components (i.e. monitoring and sanc-
tions to ensure compliance with job-
search requirements). Enforcement of
“availability-for-work” requirements
and provision of placement services
seem to be complementary activities.
On the one hand, without enforcement
of job search requirements, provision
of placement services produces dimin-
ishing returns, while on the other hand,
enforcement without properly devel-
oped placement services tends to yield
poor results (OECD, 2005). 
Dolton and O’Neill (1996) have
stressed the finding that activation
policies produce large pre-programme
“motivation”37 effects on job seekers.
A significant number of job seekers
seem to prefer to become inactive
rather than having to participate in
certain programmes to comply with
activation policy requirements. There-
fore, a secondary result (or by-prod-
uct) of activation policies could be to
check the availability of benefit
claimants to work. However, it has
also been pointed that imposing a too
stringent (or too harsh) set of condi-
tions on job seekers, either in terms of
the duration of UB or of programme
participation requirements, could
eventually reduce the quality of jobs.
In fact, putting excessive pressure on
job seekers to accept job offers has its
drawbacks if it results in them accept-
ing lower re-employment earnings or a
low quality job/match which can be
expected to be only of short duration. 
4.1.3. Labour market (re)training
Labour market (re)training measures
aim to improve the employability of the
unemployed and other target groups
(i.e. raise labour productivity and
improve the quality of job matches). As
an incentive to participate trainees usu-
ally receive an allowance that is slightly
higher than the UB they would be enti-
tled to. The training provided may be
either general or specific (to an industry
or firm). For a LMP to be classified as
training, it should include some evi-
dence of formal training (i.e. classroom
teaching). Otherwise, it should be con-
sidered “learning-by-doing” and classi-
fied as an employment incentives meas-
ure38. Apprenticeship schemes are con-
sidered part of the general education
and vocational training system and,
therefore, are excluded from the LMP
database. Significant parts of many
youth measures (in the “old” LMP clas-
sification) can be regarded as equivalent
to labour market training. 
Training programmes, many youth
measures and lifelong learning
schemes39 usually share common goals,
such as: a) to adapt the labour force to
changing patterns in labour demand; b)
to help fill the gaps in the general edu-
cation of some individuals who dropped
out of the education system premature-
ly; and c) to encourage changes in poor
attitudes to work, especially among dis-
advantaged youths, in order to enhance
their chances of successful integration
into a working environment. 
Training programmes are the most
widely used type of active measure.
They are also among the most expen-
sive. Findings on their impact in terms
of raising the future employment and
earning prospects of beneficiaries are
rather mixed. According to Martin and
Grubb (2001), training appears to be
effective for some target groups (adult
women) but not for others (prime-age
men and youth). Certain features seem
to make programmes more effective,
namely: a) small scale; b) targeted at
particularly disadvantaged groups; 
c) close partnership with local employ-
ers40 (i.e. build in as much on-the-job
content in the training as possible); 
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36 Dolton and O’Neill (2002) found that the compulsory interviews carried out under the Restart programme in the UK in 1989, which lasted for 20
minutes and took place after six months of unemployment, reduced the male unemployment rate five years later by 6 percentage points (which
was equivalent to a 15% to 20% reduction in the number of unemployed). 
37 Motivation effects arise when benefit recipients step up their job-search efforts (or drop their benefit claims) as the time approaches when ben-
efit levels fall or participation in a programme becomes compulsory.
38 Category 4 in the new LMPs nomenclature. 
39 Although lifelong learning schemes are not part of LMPs they are highly relevant for the EES.
40 Acemoglu and Pischke (1999a, 1999b) argue that training directly provided by public institutions is often less efficient than training within firms,
because it is not closely related to production. 
41 “Skill and ability beget future skill and ability” (Heckman and Carneiro, 2003). 
42 Evaluations based on observational (or non-experimental) data are also available. Even between studies using the same dataset, there tend to be
considerable divergences in the (qualitative) results, reflecting the difficulty of constructing control groups that account adequately for the het-
erogeneity in the population (Cahuc and Zylberberg, 2004). 
43 Section 2.4.2.
44 The impact of these programmes is generally less favourable for adult men.
45 Section 3.
46 Section 4.1.7.
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d) training should be certified, and cer-
tificates should be well recognised and
valued by the market; e) during partici-
pation in a programme availability for
work should still be checked to min-
imise lock-in effects; and f) participa-
tion in a programme should not re-
establish benefit entitlement (i.e. the
“carrousel effect”). A recurrent prob-
lem with further training in OECD
countries is its high (self-)selectivity,
especially by level of education. This
(self-)selectivity creates the paradox
that individuals who already have high-
er levels of education may be favoured
when it comes to further upgrading
their skills41.
For the US, there is a wealth of evi-
dence based on empirical studies –
mostly using experimental data42 – on
the effectiveness of training pro-
grammes. The overall results are unim-
pressive. Despite the theoretical argu-
ments that strongly suggest that market
mechanisms alone (i.e. without public
intervention) yield sub-optimal levels
of education/training43, the evaluations
of (public) training or education pro-
grammes produce only slight evidence
in favour of these policies. Moreover, it
should not be forgotten that, without a
general equilibrium analysis, establish-
ing a general presumption in favour of
public intervention is not sufficient to
guarantee the usefulness of any public
intervention in practice (e.g. due to
“indirect” effects, such as the tax dis-
tortions linked to financing it). 
Heckman et al. (1999) and Heckman
(2000) sum-up the evidence available
for the US by saying that the impact of
training and education programmes
varies considerably, depending on the
target population. Evaluations of train-
ing and education programmes suggest
that they should be targeted at econom-
ically disadvantaged adult women44 or
at young children from socially disad-
vantaged backgrounds and/or whose
capacities for social integration are low
respectively. Heckman (2000) argues
that in order to raise the earning
prospects of disadvantaged adult work-
ers it would be preferable (i.e. more
cost-efficient) to provide them with
employment subsidies rather than
training programmes. In fact, an alter-
native route to enhance human capital
can be through learning-by-doing or
learning on-the-job. Governments can
encourage this alternative route (to
training programmes) by granting
employment subsidies to specific tar-
geted groups. 
Training programmes are the most
widely used active measures in Europe,
although both expenditure outlays45 and
evaluation practice vary considerably
between countries. See Kluve et al.
(2005) for a recent survey of ALMPs,
the evaluation literature and a meta-
analysis46 of programme evaluations in
Europe. The overall assessment of the
effectiveness of training programmes
shows mixed results, strongly suggest-
ing that they are more likely to have
positive effects for specific target
groups. In particular, training pro-
grammes seem to raise beneficiaries’
re-employment rates for: a) those with
better labour market prospects; b)
women re-entering the labour market;
and c) educated migrants (Kluve and
Schmidt, 2002). 
Extensive research in Sweden – report-
ed in Calmfors et al. (2002) – con-
cludes that in general the effectiveness
of Swedish ALMPs is rather limited
and, in particular, training programmes
show no positive results in terms of
employment. In recent years, an evalu-
ation culture for ALMPs has been rap-
idly developing in Germany. Evalua-
tions in that country find that training
measures have considerable dynamics
in terms of their employment effects,
with negative locking-in effects in the
short run and positive ones in the long
run. In Denmark most analyses find
that training programmes have negative
effects by prolonging the duration of
unemployment due to substantial nega-
tive locking-in effects, but sometimes
also due to negative post-programme
effects. According to a number of eval-
uations in France, overall, training has
positive effects on re-employment
rates. Few evaluations of training pro-
grammes exist for new Member States
and those countries making a limited
use of ALMPs, such as Italy and Spain. 
Evaluations of training programmes
often find a negative or only small pos-
itive effect on participants’ outcomes
during the first year or two after the
programme. However, a growing num-
ber of follow-up studies have found
evidence of a positive impact after that
initial period of two or three years
(OECD, 2005). Unfortunately, most of
the datasets suitable for programme
evaluation have relatively short obser-
vation windows that fail to show the
long-run impact on employment out-
comes of ALMPs in general and of
training programmes in particular. Any
overall assessment of the effectiveness
of training programmes tends to be
negatively biased, because it usually
disregards the long run effects. 
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One significant drawback of the litera-
ture on programme evaluation is that
there are few studies on the relation-
ships between ALMPs and the duration
of job spells (Martin and Grubb, 2001;
Calmfors et al., 2002; and Kluve and
Schmidt, 2002). Even if training does
not significantly affect the job finding
rate of participants – hence helping to
explain the unimpressive results in the
literature on evaluation of training pro-
grammes – it may significantly increase
job tenure, because of the greater quali-
ty of job matches induced by training
programmes. Using a search model,
Boone and Van Ours (2004) argue
forcefully that training programmes
work principally by reducing separation
rates (i.e. inflows into unemployment),
because of their favourable effects on
the quality of job matches. 
4.1.4. Youth measures 
Evaluations of ALMPs targeted at
youth47 have shown disappointing
results. This overall negative assessment
holds, not only for training programmes,
but also for employment subsidies and
direct job creation measures as well.
Evaluations carried out both in Europe
and in the US48 – using either experimen-
tal or observational data – have general-
ly found that active measures for youths
have failed to improve their labour mar-
ket prospects (Stanley et al., 1998; Heck-
man et al., 1999; and Larsson, 2000)49. 
The evidence from North American eval-
uations suggests that the best results
from programmes targeted at youth can
be obtained from early and sustained
interventions, going as far back as the
pre-school period, that have also
involved their social background. Under
this scenario, it appears that ALMPs are
far from being the first-best option to
help disadvantaged youths in the labour
market, and that early public interven-
tions such as pre-school facilities, meas-
ures to reduce early school-leaving, and
interventions to improve the basic skills
and the relevance of competencies pro-
vided by the education system, all seem
to pay better dividends. Several authors
(e.g. Lerman, 1997) have highlighted the
importance of poor attitudes towards
work among disadvantaged youths as a
major cause behind the poor record of
youth measures. 
Based on the few successful education
and training programmes for disadvan-
taged youths implemented in the US,
Grubb (1999) identified five conditions
that seem to improve their effective-
ness: a) be market-oriented and target-
ed at jobs with relatively high earnings;
b) offer an appropriate combination of
education, occupational skills and on-
the-job training; c) provide youths with
pathways to further education; d) make
available a range of support services
adapted to the needs of the youths and
their families; and e) monitor outcomes
and use this information to improve the
quality of programmes. 
4.1.5. Employment subsides
Employment subsidies comprise both
wage subsidies to private employers
and start-up loans to individuals to
allow them to become self-employed.
Most European countries use a variety
of employment subsidies with different
features, depending not only on the tar-
geted group(s), but also on the relative
conditions of the welfare system. These
types of active measure, rather than
being used to create additional jobs, are
frequently targeted at certain disadvan-
taged groups, such as the long-term
unemployed, to help them retain some
attachment to the labour market, there-
by preserving work habits, skills and
information networks. Evaluations of
wage subsidy programmes tend to find
positive effects from these measures on
the future probability of entry into
unsubsidised employment. These
encouraging findings, however, have to
be qualified since most evaluations
tend to disregard “indirect” effects50,
which are generally important in
employment subsidy schemes. 
Martin and Grubb (2001) report that
when programme evaluations take into
consideration the reaction of firms to
employment subsidies, most schemes
yield small net employment gains, espe-
cially in the short term due to the relative
sluggishness in the adjustment of aggre-
gate demand and vacancies. Specifically,
“…evaluations of wage subsidies in Bel-
gium, Ireland and the Netherlands have
suggested combined deadweight and
substitution effects amounting to around
90%, implying that for every 100 jobs
subsidised by these schemes only 
10 were net gains in employment”. 
Moreover, relatively simple (but
robust) calculations suggest that the
systematic subsidisation of private-
sector employment (or the creation of
jobs in the public sector) would entail a
prohibitive cost (Cahuc and Zylber-
berg, 2004). However, model simula-
tions, evaluations of a number of pro-
grammes and theoretical analyses51
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47 Many programmes for youths are not precisely targeted, and there is little that distinguishes them from general training programmes.  
48 European assessments of youth programmes focus on employment outcomes, while in the US they concentrate instead on the future wages of
programme beneficiaries. 
49 Only a few programmes showed positive results, such as the US Job Corps for disadvantaged youths. This programme yielded a statistically signif-
icant gain in earnings for participants. However, given its high cost, it had to rely on savings from reduced criminal activity among the target
group to produce an overall net social benefit.
50 Section 4.
51 In a general equilibrium framework, the analyses by Drèze and Malinvaud (1994) and Drèze and Sneessens (1997) suggest that it is possible to
increase total employment by granting employment subsidies to low-skilled workers (for whom demand is relatively sensitive to labour costs)
financed by taxes on skilled workers (for whom demand is relatively insensitive to labour costs). 
52 Martin and Grubb (2001) mention the following problem with close targeting of employment subsidies: a programme with narrow eligibility con-
ditions might reduce take-up rates, because the unemployed may be aware of the “stigma” attached to participation in the programme (i.e. par-
ticipation may convey a negative “signal” to potential employers concerning the expected productivity and motivation of the individual job seek-
er in question). 
53 These authors estimate the number of jobs created or safeguarded between 1994 and 1997 because of tax reductions for low-wage workers at
about 470 000. 
54 For example, Laffargue (2000) estimates the number of jobs created in the long run at between 116,000 and 440,000, depending on the elastici-
ty of substitution between low-skilled labour and other factors. Audric et al. (2000) obtain very similar results, ranging from 120,000 to 410,000
additional jobs. 
55 While evaluations in OECD countries and in transition economies revealed that self-employment programmes cater only for the needs of specif-
ic sub-groups among the unemployed (e.g. the highly educated or young men), in developing countries micro- or small-enterprise creation pro-
grammes are increasingly seen as an important policy tool for a wide range of the unemployed (Auer et al., 2005).
56 Three-year business survival rates for firms created by former unemployed under a start-up incentive programme were 53% in France, 70% in
Germany and 60% in the UK.
57 This type of programme is relatively important in Europe, but is virtually non-existent in the US. In recent years, the unimpressive evaluation
results have led to a move away from direct job creation programmes towards other types of ALMPs.
58 In addition, direct jobs can also be used as a work test for unemployment benefit claimants.
59 Research project financed by the European Commission: Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities.
60 Meta-analysis is a technique for analysing and summarising the results of different studies, each of which answers the same question (in this case,
the sign of the impact of a particular ALMP on post-programme employment prospects). In the context of ALMP evaluations, this methodology
was first employed by Kluve and Schmidt (2002), who used the outcomes of 53 programme evaluations. 
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suggest that it is cost-effective (and
feasible) to target employment subsi-
dies at special groups52 among the
unemployed, provided the programme
ensures a close monitoring of firms’
behaviour in order to curb potential
misuse. As an example, in a partial
equilibrium model using linked
employer and employee data, Crépon
and Dezplatz (2002) find that payroll
tax subsidies contributed significantly
to job creation in France over the peri-
od 1994–199753. The order of magni-
tude of the number of jobs created is
similar to the estimates derived using
general equilibrium models54. 
Some ALMPs aim to help the unem-
ployed start up new enterprises. Specifi-
cally, employment subsidies (or start-up
loans), together with counselling servic-
es provided by PES, can play a crucial
role in promoting self-employment
and/or the creation of small enterprises
(e.g. by helping start-ups to define and
develop their business plans). 
However, evaluations strongly suggest
that this type of measure appears to help
only a minority of the unemployed,
namely relatively young men55 – with
comparatively high levels of education –
who already tend to have the necessary
entrepreneurial skills and motivation to
survive in a competitive environment. 
Auer et al. (2005) report the results of a
study on the impact of micro-finance in
industrialised countries. According to
this study, the small number of (micro-)
financing initiatives in favour of self-
employment among the unemployed
account for a considerable proportion
of all new entrepreneurs: 50% in
France, 19% in Germany and 40% in
the UK (ILO, 2002). According to the
same study, business survival rates of
new firms resulting from start-up
incentives compare well with those of
other recently created firms56. However,
start-up/self-employment programmes
involve considerable deadweight costs.
For example, 56% of participants in a
self-employment programme in Cana-
da would have created their own busi-
ness ultimately even without help from
any ALMP.
4.1.6. Direct job creation (in the
public sector)
Direct job creation is usually targeted
at the long-term unemployed or
youths that face problems of integra-
tion into the regular labour market. As
a rule, direct jobs are created in the
public or the non-profit sectors of the
economy and are mainly publicly
financed57. 
In general, evaluations on the effective-
ness of this type of public intervention
rarely reveal positive results, especially
when compared with other active meas-
ures, such as job-search assistance or
employment subsidies. Indeed, direct job
creation has not been very successful in
raising the post-programme probability
of beneficiaries finding (and holding on
to) permanent jobs on the (open) labour
market (Heckman et al. 1999; Martin
and Grubb, 2001; Kluve et al., 2005).
The rationale for direct job creation
should be based on equity considera-
tions. Consequently, direct job creation
measures, when used, should be of short
duration (both because of their limited
effectiveness and of their typical low
marginal product) and targeted at the
most disadvantaged (or socially exclud-
ed). Under these conditions, direct job
creation can have a positive social impact
by avoiding discouragement and social
exclusion effects among participants58. 
4.1.7. Lessons from a meta-
analysis of programme
evaluations
Kluve et al. (2005)59 carried out a meta-
analysis60 of the evaluations of Euro-
pean ALMPs to assess their effective-
ness in raising employment prospects.
The objective was to produce a synthe-
sis of more than 100 evaluations in
Europe and to add a new dimension to
a number of good surveys of the litera-
ture on programme evaluation (e.g.
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Martin and Grubb, 2001). A large
majority of the evaluations included in
the meta-analysis have been carried out
since the 1990s, which means that most
of them have employed relatively up-
to-date methodologies and better quali-
ty data. 
The meta-analysis assesses the likeli-
hood of obtaining favourable post-pro-
gramme effects on employment out-
comes, depending on a number of vari-
ables, such as the type of active pro-
gramme used, labour market institu-
tions and the economic environment
during implementation of the pro-
gramme. The results show remarkable
robustness across two models and vari-
ous model specifications. Moreover,
the findings of the meta-analysis are
broadly consistent with those reported
in a number of well-known surveys of
the literature. The principal results are
summarised below and the methodolo-
gy used presented in Box 5. 
Training was found to have a modest
likelihood of making a positive impact
on post-programme employment rates.
Compared with training programmes,
employment incentives and PES are
associated with significantly better out-
comes. In fact, results suggest that the
last two types of programmes are 40%
to 50% more likely to make a
favourable impact than training pro-
grammes. By contrast, programmes
involving direct job creation in the pub-
lic sector tend to be 30% to 60% less
likely to make a positive impact on
post-programme employment out-
comes than training programmes. Youth
programmes also seem to be particular-
ly ineffective. 
Beyond that, the results of the meta-
analysis also suggest that there is lit-
tle systematic correlation between a
programme’s effectiveness and a num-
ber of contextual factors, including
where (the country) or when (the time
period) it was implemented, the
macro-economic environment and the
labour market institutions in place.
The only institution that appears to
have a systematic effect on pro-
gramme effectiveness is the degree of
restrictiveness of employment protec-
tion legislation (EPL) which tends to
lower programme effectiveness. Con-
sequently, the type of programme
seems to be the critical factor deter-
mining its effectiveness.
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Objective
The basic idea of the meta-analysis is
to build a data set in which each
observation represents the qualitative
outcome of each programme evalua-
tion. For each observation in the data
set, the outcome of interest is an indi-
cator of whether programme evalua-
tion found a positive, zero or negative
effect. The goal of the meta-analysis is
to relate this qualitative information to
the quantitative information surround-
ing its implementation, including the
institutional framework, the economic
environment and the methodology
used in programme evaluation. 
Methodology
The database built for this meta-
analysis includes 137 observations
from 95 programme evaluations (i.e.
one study can yield more than one
observation if, for example, it evalu-
ates both a training and an employ-
ment subsidy programme). This is a
significant increase on Kluve and
Schmidt (2002), who considered the
results of only 52 studies.
The analysis uses either a probit
model (where outcomes of pro-
gramme evaluations are classified as
positive or not) or a multinomial pro-
bit (where evaluation outcomes are
classified as positive (a total of 75),
zero (33) or negative (29)). ALMPs
are classified into one of the follow-
ing types of programmes: a) training
(70); b) employment subsidies (23); c)
direct job creation (26); and d) public
employment services (21)(a). 
In the meta-analysis programme out-
comes are related to four broad cate-
gories of independent variables,
describing: a) the type of active
measure; b) the evaluation method-
ology employed; c) labour market
institutions; and d) the economic
background in the country at the
time of implementation of the pro-
gramme.
A dummy variable is included for
programmes specifically targeting
youths (about a quarter of all evalua-
tions)(b). A dummy variable is includ-
ed for the evaluation methodology
used (e.g. experimental or observa-
tional data). In total, only 9 studies
are based on experimental (or ran-
domised) data. Dummies are includ-
ed for the decade when the pro-
grammes were implemented: 4 in the
1970s, 36 in the 1980s, 81 in the
1990s, and 16 in the 2000s. In one
specification, dummies are included
to distinguish the total sample size
available for programme evaluation
(N): small (N<1000), medium
(1000<N<10000), or large (N>10000).
43% of the studies are based on
small, 40% on medium, and 17% on
large samples.
A number of variables are used to
describe the institutional setting on
the labour market, namely: a) the
OECD index of EPL; and b) indica-
tors on the proportions of fixed-term
and temporary employment in total
employment.  
Three variables were used to take
account of the economic background:
a) the unemployment rate; b) the GDP
growth rate; and c) ALMPs outlays as
a percentage of GDP.
Box 5 – The meta-analysis (Kluve et al., 2005)
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The probit model takes training as the
baseline category (i.e. the results of the
estimations are reported relative to this
baseline). In the first specification of
the probit model, which excludes coun-
try-fixed effects, estimates show that
both employment incentives and PES
(ie. Services and Sanctions) are associ-
ated with a higher probability of yield-
ing a positive post-programme effect.
At the same time, direct job creation in
the public sector is associated with a
significantly lower probability of show-
ing positive post-programme effects on
employment. A highly significant nega-
tive relationship also exists between
programmes targeted at youths and the
probability of displaying positive post-
programme effects on employment. As
regards the variables describing the
institutional setting on the labour mar-
ket, the results suggest a significant
negative statistical correlation between
strictness of employment (dismissal)
protection legislation and the probabili-
ty of obtaining a positive post-pro-
gramme effect on employment. Kluve
et al. (2005) interpret this finding as
follows: barriers to job dismissal (EPL)
are also an obstacle to job creation,
because firms plan ahead for the higher
adjustment costs that they will have to
incur during slowdown periods in the
case of a stringent EPL system. As
regards the variables describing the
economic background, the unemploy-
ment rate seems to be positively corre-
lated with positive post-programme
effects on employment, which might
reflect the fact that during periods of
high unemployment, a higher propor-
tion of unemployed are skilled individ-
uals, who, all other things being equal,
are associated with better labour market
outcomes. One interesting result of the
probit model estimation is that increas-
ing aggregate spending on ALMPs (as
a percentage of GDP) does not raise
beneficiaries’post-programme employ-
ment prospects. 
A second specification of the probit
model considers country-fixed effects,
thereby controlling for unobserved
country-specific factors. Sweden is
the country omitted and used as the
baseline (i.e. country effects are meas-
ured relative to Sweden). The results
obtained with the second specification
of the probit model are generally con-
sistent with the findings from the first.
Direct job creation in the public sector
is associated with a significantly lower
probability of positive post-pro-
gramme effects on employment than
training programmes, while employ-
ment incentives and PES display better
outcomes than training programmes.
As in the specification without coun-
try-fixed effects, programmes for
youth are particularly unlikely to yield
positive post-programme positive
effects on employment. In this model
specification, there is also some indi-
cation that evaluations based on exper-
imental data are less likely to produce
positive post-programme effects. 
A third model specification is estimat-
ed using the probit model, restricting
the sample to evaluations carried out
since the 1990s. This is because more
recent programme evaluations have
used more sophisticated methods and
the results are therefore likely to be
more reliable. The results from this
model specification are generally in
line with those from the two previous
model specifications, although more
pronounced in quantitative terms (i.e.
PES remain the most effective type of
programme but now by a larger mar-
gin over other types of programme). 
Finally, some multinomial probit
model specifications were also esti-
mated. To interpret the results
obtained using this type of model, it
is necessary to consider that there are
now two margins: a) a margin
between a negative versus a zero
effect; and b) a margin between a pos-
itive versus a zero effect. Results
obtained using this type of model
tend to confirm those obtained using
the simple probit models. Specifical-
ly, PES are significantly more likely
to yield a higher probability of posi-
tive post-programme effects and a
lower probability of negative post-
programme effects relative to a base-
line defined by training programmes.
On the other hand, direct job creation
in the public sector is associated with
a significantly higher probability of
negative post-programme effects and
a significantly lower probability of
positive post-programme effects. For
youths, the same pattern holds than
for that observed for direct job cre-
ation programmes, although the
effects are of a lower order of magni-
tude than in the simple probit model
specifications. There is also some
indication that experimental studies
have a lower probability of yielding
positive post-programme effects, that
strict EPL is associated with both a
higher probability of negative post-
programme effects and a lower prob-
ability of positive post-programme
effects and that higher unemployment
lowers the probability of a negative
programme effect, while slightly rais-
ing the likelihood of a positive
impact.  
Box 5 – The meta-analysis (Kluve et al., 2005) (cont.)
(a) Actually, Kluve et al. (2005) consider a broader scope for the latter category than the traditional PES. They call it Services and Sanctions. 
(b) No dummy variable could be included for programmes specifically targeting disabled individuals because there were only three observations.
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4.2. Macro-economic
evaluations
Since the second half of the 1990s
econometric models have been used
extensively to investigate the links
between aggregate labour market out-
comes (e.g. the unemployment and the
employment-to-population rates) and a
number of explanatory factors, such as
labour market institutions and cyclical
conditions. These studies were made
possible by the large amount of work
carried out – especially by the OECD
Secretariat – on constructing several
indicators of (labour market) policies
and institutions that are comparable both
across countries and over time.
The advantage of macro-economic stud-
ies over micro-econometric evaluations
is that they can give a composite, albeit
imprecise, measure of the general equi-
librium effects of labour market policies
and institutions. However, this analytical
framework suffers from a number of
drawbacks: a) there are few studies
using pooled cross-country/time series
data; b) the studies available are based
on few observations; c) heterogeneous
labour market programmes are lumped
together in broadly defined categories;
and d) this type of analysis usually
involves considerable technical difficul-
ties, such as multicolinearity (of
explanatory variables) and simultaneity
bias due to the endogeneity of some pol-
icy variables, such as spending on
ALMPs. 
The macro-economic evaluation litera-
ture attempts to explain changes in the
unemployment rate (or the employ-
ment-to-population rate) across coun-
tries and over time. Model specifica-
tions are estimated using pooled data
econometric techniques. The determi-
nants (or explanatory variables) are
usually a set of time-varying indicators
for (labour market) policies and institu-
tions, such as the degree of generosity
of UB61, the tax wedge, expenditure on
ALMPs and a variable controlling for
cyclical conditions62. Following devel-
opments in economic theory, many
model specifications also consider a
wide range of interactions between
policies and/or institutions. 
One major finding of the recent review
of the OECD Jobs Strategy (OECD,
2006) is that, on average, changes in
policies and institutions appear to
explain almost two-thirds of the non-
cyclical changes in the unemployment
rate over the period 1982–2003. In par-
ticular, generous UB, high tax wedges
and stringent anti-competitive market
regulation are found to be associated
with increases in the total unemploy-
ment rate. By contrast, highly cen-
tralised and/or coordinated wage bar-
gaining systems along with some cate-
gories of ALMPs (especially labour
market training) seem to be associated
with lower total unemployment rates.
In parallel, extensive sensitivity analy-
sis identified those findings that show a
high degree of robustness across a
number of dimensions, such as model
specifications, datasets and estimation
methods. 
However, given that policies and institu-
tions affect labour market outcomes not
only via their direct impact on aggregate
unemployment, but also through their
effects on labour market participation, it
is also crucial to assess their impact on
some disadvantaged groups in the
labour market, such as youth, women,
older workers and the long-term unem-
ployed. It is commonly argued that the
employment-to-population rate is a bet-
ter overall indicator of labour market
performance than the unemployment
rate, because open unemployment (i.e.
the variable used in pooled regressions
for the unemployment rate) excludes
unemployed individuals participating in
ALMPs63. Scarpetta (1996) argues that a
fall in the aggregate unemployment rate
can be misleading, reflecting net inflows
of unemployed people into active pro-
grammes and, therefore, not represent-
ing a genuine improvement in labour
market conditions.
In the remainder of this section, selected
macro-economic studies that evaluate
the effectiveness of ALMPs are briefly
summarised, starting with Scarpetta
(1996) who used annual data from 
17 OECD countries over the period
1983–1993. This study uses expenditure
on active measures per unemployed per-
son relative to output per capita as the
ALMP variable. In an unemployment
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61 This principally involves two dimensions: duration of eligibility and the replacement ratio (the ratio of unemployment plus related welfare ben-
efits to previous labour income).
62 Inclusion in pooled regressions of a variable for the stance of ALMPs raises the problem of endogeneity, which tends to bias parameter estimates.
The solutions to this problem adopted in the literature are not entirely satisfactory. For example, Scarpetta (1996) and Elmeskov et al. (1998) use
as a regressor, the average over the sample period of the ALMP variable used as a proxy for the stance of ALMP (public spending on ALMPs per
unemployed person relative to output per capita). Consequently, model specifications have to be estimated assuming random effects. In order to
investigate the impact of ALMPs by category, Boone and Van Ours (2004) use the shares of various ALMP expenditures in total expenditure, assum-
ing that expenditure shares are independent of cyclical conditions. The OECD (2006) seems to prefer the use of an instrumented ALMP variable,
using as instruments various lags of the output gap. 
63 An additional argument often heard in favour of using employment-to-population rather than unemployment-based indicators for assessing
labour market developments is the need to cope with the expected consequences of population ageing. Ageing-related concerns partly under-
pin a number of priorities for action defined in the 2006 Annual Progress Report on the renewed Lisbon Strategy (http://ec.europa.eu/growthand-
jobs/annual-report_en.htm), particularly the policy priority for action to “attract and retain more people in employment, increase labour supply
and modernise social protection systems”.
64 This occurs when governments react to changes in unemployment with changes in total spending on ALMPs, making it difficult to identify the
effect on aggregate unemployment due to spending on active policies. 
65 This study considers either the unemployment or the non-employment rates as the independent variable. The pooled data regressions use as
explanatory variables both time-varying measures (UB generosity, union density, coordination, centralisation, tax wedge, real interest rate, terms
of trade, trade restrictions as a proxy for product market competition, output gap) and time-invariant or period averages (employment protec-
tion legislation, ALMPs). This study also considers some policy interactions, namely between union density and coordination/centralisation.
66 A rise in the ALMP variable reduces the unemployment rate. 
67 This study considers the unemployment rate as the independent variable. The pooled data regressions use as explanatory variables both time-
varying measures (UB generosity, union density, coordination, centralisation, tax wedge, employment protection legislation and output gap) and
time-invariant or period averages (ALMPs). The study considers some policy interactions, namely between UB generosity and ALMPs.
68 Calmfors et al. (2001) argue that the rapid growth of expenditure on ALMPs in the 1990s has probably run into the region of diminishing mar-
ginal returns, particularly regarding its effectiveness in reducing open unemployment. 
69 This study considers the logarithm of either the unemployment or the population-to-employment rates as the independent variable. The cross-
country regressions use as explanatory variables period-average measures (UB replacement rate, benefit duration, union density and coverage,
coordination, tax wedge, employment protection legislation, instrumented ALMPs and changes in inflation as a proxy for cyclical conditions). The
ALMPs variable is instrumented given its highly endogenous nature. The instrument used is active labour market spending as a percentage of cur-
rent GDP over the period-average unemployment rate. The study does not consider any policy interactions. 
70 This study considers either the unemployment or the employment-to-population rates as the independent variable. The pooled data regressions
use as time-varying explanatory variables: the generosity of UB; expenditure shares of ALMP categories in total ALMP spending in the fixed effects
specification, or period averages of ALMPs spending by category in the random effects model; and changes in inflation as a proxy for cyclical con-
ditions. The study considers some policy interactions, namely between the generosity of UB and ALMPs expenditure shares by category.
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rate equation, introduction of this vari-
able as a proxy for the active policy
stance is likely to lead to simultaneity
bias in the estimated parameters64. It
found some evidence, albeit inconclu-
sive, suggesting that spending on
ALMPs has a positive impact on aggre-
gate labour market variables65.
Scarpetta’s (1996) main findings sug-
gest that although ALMPs appear to
have a negative impact on the unem-
ployment rate66, spending on ALMPs
gives rise to large substitution and dis-
placement effects on employment. The
results also suggest a significant nega-
tive correlation between ALMPs and
non-employment rates, which indicates
that active policies have a positive
effect on labour force participation,
keeping otherwise discouraged workers
in the labour force. 
Elmeskov et al. (1998) used annual
data from 19 OECD countries over the
period 1983–1995. The variable used to
proxy active policies is again public
spending on ALMPs per unemployed
person relative to output per capita67.
This study found that ALMP spending
has a negative impact on the unemploy-
ment rate, though only marginally sig-
nificant. However, Scarpetta (1996)
showed that the presence of Sweden in
the pool is crucial for this weak result.
Exclusion of Sweden from the pool, on
the grounds that it is an outlier in terms
of intensity of active spending68, signif-
icantly increases the magnitude and
statistical significance of the estimated
coefficient for the ALMPs variable. 
Nickell and Layard (1999) used two 
6-year averages from 20 OECD coun-
tries over the period 1983–1994. The
ALMP variable is spending per unem-
ployed person as a percentage of GDP
per member of the labour force. This
study found that spending on ALMPs
has a negative impact on the unemploy-
ment rate but no significant effect on
the employment-to-population rate69.
The negative impact of ALMPs on the
unemployment rate is stronger than that
found in Elmeskov et al. (1998). 
Using annual data from 19 OECD
countries over the period 1985–1999,
Boone and Van Ours (2004) evaluated
the impact of different types of active
measures on the unemployment and the
employment-to-population rates. This
study found that expenditure on labour
market training has the largest (posi-
tive) impact on labour market out-
comes. Expenditure on PES appears to
be able to reduce the unemployment
rate but does not affect the employ-
ment-to-population rate. Expenditure
on employment incentives seems to be
largely ineffective for improving either
the unemployment or the employment-
to-population rates. The generosity of
UB and labour market training were
found to be complementary70. 
As regards the latter result, it is com-
monly argued that spending on ALMPs
provides an incentive mechanism, par-
ticularly when part of an activation
strategy, mitigating the moral hazard
problems caused by high UB replace-
ment ratios. In practice, it is usually
found that the threat of referral to
ALMPs by the PES tends to deter
would-be UB claimants. This incentive/
disciplinary role of ALMPs could part-
ly explain the high correlation between
spending on active and passive meas-
ures in Nordic countries. 
Boone and Van Ours (2004) put for-
ward a different reason for countries to
run simultaneously high-expenditure
training programmes and have a UB
system with a high replacement ratio. If
training programmes improve workers’
qualifications, an increase in both the
quality and duration of job matches
should be expected, and consequently a
reduction in the frequency and length
of future spells of unemployment.
Under these circumstances, a high UB
replacement ratio might be desirable
(i.e. complementary to training pro-
grammes), given that it could reduce
the incentive of participants to accept
job offers prematurely – before com-
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pleting their training. This effectively
means that “locking-in” trainees into
training, until completion of the pro-
gramme, could pay off in terms of bet-
ter quality and more stable jobs in the
future. 
According to the comprehensive
analysis carried out during the recent
review of the OECD Jobs Strategy
(OECD, 2006), including extensive
sensitivity analysis of the robustness
of the results, the Secretariat’s main
findings on the effectiveness of
ALMPs are: a) no significant effect of
aggregate spending on ALMPs could
be identified on the total unemploy-
ment or the total employment-to-pop-
ulation rates; b) labour market training
is the only ALMP category for which a
negative (positive) coefficient in the
unemployment (employment-to-popu-
lation) rate equations appears to be
statistically significant and robust
across a number of model specifica-
tions71; c) the positive impact of gener-
ous UB on the unemployment rate72
seems to be counterbalanced by high
public spending in ALMPs; and d)
youth measures are found to exert a
positive impact on the youth employ-
ment rate, above the effect estimated
for training measures73. 
4.3. Reconciling the results
from the micro and macro
analyses
The results of micro-econometric pro-
gramme evaluations and of macro-
econometric studies are somewhat con-
flicting. On the one hand, micro-econo-
metric programme evaluations usually
find that training programmes have
rather mixed effects, but nearly always a
statistically insignificant impact on the
future employment prospects of partici-
pants. On the other hand, macro-econo-
metric studies usually find that training
is the only category of ALMP that seems
to have a significant positive impact on
aggregate labour market outcomes74. 
From this it would appear that extend-
ing the observation window of training
programmes to post-programme effects
could potentially solve this paradox. In
fact, even if training programmes were
to have an insignificant or even slightly
negative impact on the job-finding rate,
which would go some way in explaining
the relatively poor or mixed results
reported in the literature evaluating
training programmes, a significant
reduction in the separation rate follow-
ing participation in training could still
cause an overall drop in the equilibrium
unemployment rate, thus accounting for
the favourable macro-economic effects. 
Boone and Van Ours (2004) devel-
oped a general equilibrium matching
model that is capable of solving this
paradox. They model separately the
effects of different categories of
ALMPs, namely training, employ-
ment subsidies and PES, constructing
a rich model which, after calibration,
can make predictions about (the sign
and magnitude of) many policy inter-
actions. For example, the model does
in fact support the empirical finding
that expenditure on training and the
generosity of UB are complementary
in terms of their effects on the unem-
ployment rate75.
Boone and Van Ours (2004) found that
training has small and ambiguous
effects on the job-finding rate, which
could explain the mixed results in the
micro-econometric evaluation litera-
ture, which, in their opinion seem
largely to reflect the usually short
observation windows for post-pro-
gramme outcomes. At the same time, in
their theoretical model training raises
the quality and average duration of job
matches, reducing inflows into unem-
ployment (i.e. the job-separation rate),
thus yielding a lower equilibrium
unemployment rate. The latter effect
could explain the significantly positive
impact of training found in macro-
econometric evaluations. 
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71 However, the OECD (2006) warns against drawing hasty conclusions about the relative effectiveness of active policies by main category. For exam-
ple, “…a decline in the ratio of PES expenditures to GDP could well reflect an increase in efficiency through cuts in administrative costs rather
than a decline in the “quality” of services provided to the unemployed. As a result, the lack of significance of ALMP categories other than train-
ing programmes does not necessarily imply that these are ineffective”. 
72 A rise in the generosity of the UB variable increases the unemployment rate. 
73 The apparent effectiveness of youth measures in raising youth employment rates, compared with their insignificant impact on aggregate unem-
ployment, suggests significant substitution effects favouring young people. 
74 By design, micro-econometric evaluations do not consider “indirect” effects and generally do not take into consideration long run effects, because
of the short observation windows available for the post-programme outcomes for participants. For these reasons, OECD (2006) argues that micro-
econometric evaluations “…might tend to be overly optimistic as regards programmes involving large potential substitution effects (e.g. employ-
ment subsidies) as well as overly pessimistic on programmes that are likely to pay off only in the long run (e.g. training)”. 
75 For a given generosity of UB, raising expenditure on training tends to lower the unemployment rate.
76 The presence of private (or asymmetric) information in a market can result in significant market inefficiencies. The classical example of private or
asymmetric information is the market for used cars where the seller knows more about the quality of the car being sold than potential buyers. 
77 The literature on insurance economics suggests that the presence of private information or aggregate risk may hinder the provision of insurance
by the private sector. Unemployment risk is particularly susceptible to market failures, because employees eligible for unemployment insurance
are responsible for two types of (hidden) action that give rise to moral hazard: a) the efforts (or the intensity) of search for a new job while unem-
ployed; and b) employees’ efforts on the job which affect their job performance and thus the probability of them being laid off.
78 “There is no such thing as the replacement ratio in any (OECD) country, rather there are a myriad of replacement ratios corresponding to the spe-
cific personal and family characteristics of the unemployed, their previous history of work and unemployment, and the different structures and
entitlements of unemployment insurance and social assistance systems in (OECD) countries and the ways in which these systems interact with tax
systems”, Martin (1996). 
79 Two different levels of previous earnings in work: a) average earnings and b) two-thirds of average earnings. 
80 Single person, married person with a dependent spouse, and married person with a spouse in work. 
81 Three different durations of unemployment for a person with a long record of previous employment: the first year, second and third years, and
fourth and fifth years of unemployment. 
82 In all cases, the replacement ratios refer to a 40-year-old worker since this is considered to be a good approximation to the average situation for
an unemployed person.
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5. Interactions
between active and
passive policies
Both theoretical models (e.g. Coe and
Snower, 1997; Boone and Van Ours,
2004) and empirical results (e.g.
OECD, 2006) suggest that it is very
important to consider the interactions
between active and passive LMPs in
order to increase the effectiveness of
active policies (Grubb and Martin,
2001). On the one hand, providing ade-
quate insurance income through UB
can have significant disincentive
effects on job search, and a negative
impact on the wage setting behaviour
of employees and employers. On the
other hand, ALMPs, particularly when
well designed and integrated into acti-
vation strategies, can raise future
employment and income prospects for
participants in programmes. It is there-
fore important to pay attention to the
interactions (or synergies) between
ALMPs and UB systems. 
The presence of private76 information
may explain why the private sector fails
to provide unemployment insurance
(Chiu and Karni, 1998)77. Since the
beginning of the twentieth century,
many European countries have created
public unemployment insurance sys-
tems. Governments also intervene to
provide social assistance based on
means-tested income. Besides provid-
ing income insurance against unem-
ployment, UB is also a subsidy for job-
search, potentially yielding an improve-
ment in the quality and duration of job
matches. High UB paid over a suffi-
ciently long period can allow unem-
ployed individuals to be more selective
about the quality of the jobs they
accept. 
UB have multiple dimensions (e.g. the
level of payments, the duration over
which they are paid, the eligibility con-
ditions and the strictness of administra-
tion) besides interacting with other
labour market policies/institutions,
such as ALMPs or wage bargaining
(centralisation/coordination). All these
interactions call for careful considera-
tion of the potential impact of UB on
labour market outcomes. Moreover, UB
are usually associated with a number of
well-publicised drawbacks, such as
lowering job-search intensity and
increasing the reservation wage. All
other things being equal, these two
effects tend to reinforce each other, put-
ting upward pressure on wages, pro-
longing the duration of unemployment
and, thereby, increasing the equilibrium
level of unemployment.
5.1. The replacement ratio
A first step towards analysing interac-
tions between active and passive LMPs
would be to compare UB with compen-
sation paid to participants in ALMPs.
Unfortunately, data are only available
for the former, and not for the latter.
However, Grubb and Martin (2001)
argue that there is a strong correlation
between spending per beneficiary on
active and passive measures and that in
many countries “…participants in
some active measures are paid unem-
ployment benefits, sometimes with a
small top-up”. 
The standard indicator of the generosi-
ty of the UB system is the replacement
ratio (i.e. the ratio of unemployment
plus related welfare benefits to previ-
ous labour income). The OECD has
constructed both gross and net indica-
tors for the replacement ratio78. The
gross indicator of UB is defined as the
unweighted arithmetic average of sepa-
rate gross replacement ratios covering
two earnings levels79, three family situ-
ations80 and three durations of unem-
ployment81 (i.e. the unweighted average
of eighteen indicators)82. 
Table 6 presents time-series estimates
of the summary gross replacement ratio
for every odd-numbered year since
1961. The average for the EU Member
States for which there are data suggests
that the gross replacement ratio has
approximately doubled since 1961.
However, Table 6 shows that the sum-
mary ratio remained fairly stable or
even fell over the same period in Bel-
gium, Germany and the United King-
dom. Gross replacement ratios across
EU Member States have not only been
rising, but also converging significant-
ly, as indicated by the coefficient of
variation. 
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A joint Eurostat/OECD
project has put a consider-
able amount of resources into
calculating net (i.e. after-tax)
replacement ratios83. For the
OECD as a whole, net
replacement ratios are
around two-thirds higher
than the average gross
replacement ratio. This is
essentially due to the pro-
gressiveness of the tax sys-
tem and income redistribu-
tion policies. Although there
are no internationally com-
parable time-series for net
replacement ratios going
back to the early 1960s,
given the strong positive
correlation between gross
and net ratios, it seems like-
ly that net replacement
ratios have also been follow-
ing a significant upward
trend over the past three
decades. 
Although the United States
has a considerably lower
summary gross replacement
ratio than the EU average
(see Table 6), after correcting
for the influence of taxation
and of income redistribution
policies (see Tables 7 and 8),
net replacement ratios, which
are a preferable indicator for
the impact of UB on incen-
tives, unexpectedly turn out
to have similar values, partic-
ularly in the case of two-
earner married couples. 
The criticism directed at UB
is well-known. It is fre-
quently argued that if the
UB system results in an over
generous replacement ratio
and long entitlement periods
then, all other things being
equal, UB tend to reduce the
incentive to look for a job
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(i.e. job-search intensity), to increase
the reservation wage and put upward
pressure on wage bargaining. All things
considered, over generous and long-
lasting UB are likely to raise unem-
ployment but, above all, to lengthen
spells of unemployment, weakening the
attachment of the unemployed to the
labour market. 
5.2. The coverage rate of
unemployment benefits
However, a number of qualifications
are necessary, regarding the potential
disincentive effects of UB. Firstly, the
impact of a given UB system depends
largely on coverage rates. A large pro-
portion of unemployed people are not
eligible for UB in EU Member States
for one of several reasons, such as
being new entrants to the labour market
or reaching the end of the eligibility
period after a long spell out of work84.
The coverage rates of UB tend to be
rather low in southern European coun-
tries (see Table 9) compared to other
EU Member States. From a theoretical
perspective, the ineligibility of unem-
ployed persons for UB tends to reduce
their bargaining wage, because of the
prospects of becoming eligible for UB
in future if they take a job. Therefore,
an increase in the replacement ratio
should reduce unemployment among
ineligible persons but, since it increas-
es unemployment among those eligible,
its effect on the total unemployment
rate is ambiguous (Cahuc and Zylber-
berg, 2004). 
5.3. Unemployment
benefits, productivity and
job quality
Besides providing unemployment
insurance against the risk of job loss,
thereby smoothing consumption fluc-
tuations, UB are a subsidy for job
search. Using a general equilibrium
model, Acemoglu and Shimer (2000)85
showed that economies with moderate
UB can have higher output and welfare
than those with lower levels of unem-
ployment insurance, because unem-
ployment insurance encourages work-
ers to look for more productive,
although more vulnerable jobs. Even if
UB increases unemployment, moder-
ate UB could increase the quality of
job matches and so their productivity,
outweighing the effect of the rise in
unemployment on output and welfare.
This result contrasts sharply with the
conclusions drawn from partial equi-
librium job search models that empha-
sise the moral hazard effects of unem-
ployment insurance. 
5.4. A review of empirical
studies
This section gives an overview of the
empirical literature (both micro- and
macro-econometric) evaluating the
impact of UB on labour market out-
comes. As regards the macro-econo-
metric literature, particular emphasis is
placed on the interactions (or syner-
gies) between UB systems and LMPs
or institutions. 
5.4.1. Micro-econometric
evaluation
Using micro-data, and in particular
longitudinal data86, many empirical
studies have investigated the determi-
nants of exit rates from unemploy-
ment. This follows the seminal work
on job-search models by Mortensen
AT 66
BE 81
DK 66
FI 73
FR 45
DE 70
EL 9
IE 67
IT 7
NL 50
PT 27
ES 24
SE 70
Source: Manning (1988, table 1, p. 144; op. cit. Cahuc and Zylberberg, 2004).
Table 9 – Percentages of unemployed persons qualifying for
unemployment benefits in 1995
84 A low coverage rate by UB is often associated with high youth unemployment rates, as first-time job seekers typically do not qualify for UB. Unem-
ployed people not covered by UB may, however, receive social assistance. 
85 Acemoglu and Shimer (2000) developed a dynamic general equilibrium labour market search model in which workers take decisions on search
effort, job applications and savings. The model is calibrated using plausible assumptions about preferences, the unemployment rate and the
unemployment insurance system for US workers with a high-school degree. The model performs well in a number of dimensions, including the
decline in consumption following job loss and the responsiveness of duration of unemployment and wages to the magnitude and duration of UB.
The result that economies with moderate UB have higher output and welfare than those without social insurance is very robust to different
parameter values. 
86 Longitudinal data refer to the same group of individuals measured repeatedly over time. Longitudinal data contrast with cross-sectional data,
which make a single-time observation for each individual. 
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(1990) and Van Den Berg (1990) that
provided the first rigorous study of the
impact of UB87. In general, empirical
studies find that more generous UB
systems extend the duration of unem-
ployment. Krueger and Meyer (2002)
provide an overview of many studies,
particularly for the US, finding that the
average estimate for the elasticity of the
duration of unemployment to the indi-
cator used to reflect benefit generosity
is close to 188. According to the OECD
(2006), a number of recent micro-data
studies for European countries have
obtained similar estimates. 
Using experimental data for the US,
Moffitt (1985) and Katz and Meyer
(1990) suggest that extension of the
entitlement period results in a signifi-
cant increase in the average duration of
unemployment. Using US survey data,
Meyer (1990) highlights the finding
that the exit rate out of unemployment
shows considerable discontinuity in the
period immediately before UB expires.
Dormont et al. (2001) and Van Ours
and Vodopivec (2004), using data for
France and Slovenia respectively, arrive
at similar results, namely a significant
spike in the exit rate out of unemploy-
ment around the period when benefit
expires.
These empirical results suggest that the
impact of UB on the average duration
of unemployment does indeed follow
the theoretical predictions of the job-
search model. However, the disincen-
tive effects of UB systems on labour
supply tend to be relatively moderate
and have to be weighed against the cost
of poor quality job matches that might
result from over stringent UB systems,
together with possible redistribution
objectives. 
Many OECD countries have adopted
policy measures aimed at increasing the
intensity and efficiency of job search,
and mitigating the disincentive effects of
UB on labour supply. These have gener-
ally combined a number of moves, such
as: a) strengthening counselling and job
brokerage assistance; b) measures to
check compliance with eligibility condi-
tions and job search requirements; c)
financial sanctions to enforce job search
obligations and/or acceptance of suitable
job offers; and d) payment of in-work
benefits upon return to work. 
Following the guidelines set in the
EES, EU Member States have devel-
oped activation strategies to coordinate
benefit administration for public unem-
ployment insurance with expenditure
on ALMPs. Within this, the “mutual
obligations” principle plays a central
role in activation strategies. On the one
hand, PES should provide quality coun-
selling and job brokerage services,
while on the other hand the unem-
ployed should comply with the obliga-
tions to actively search for a job and to
accept suitable job offers. Both eco-
nomic theory and empirical results
strongly suggest significant interac-
tions between UB and activation poli-
cies, meaning that disincentive effects
associated with over-generous (i.e. high
and long-lasting) UB can be, at least
partially, counteracted by the adoption
of well-designed ALMPs. 
5.4.2. Policy interactions and the
political economy of reforms
An overview of macro-econometric
evaluations of the impact of LMPs 
and institutions on labour market out-
comes was presented earlier (see in Sec-
tion 4.2.). In this section attention turns
to the interactions between policies and
institutions and to the lessons that can
be learned from this type of analysis for
designing successful reform strategies. 
A number of authors have suggested
that LMPs and institutions show a large
number of interactions (e.g. Coe and
Snower, 1997; Orszag and Snower,
1999; Belot and Van Ours, 2004). The-
oretical analysis suggests that virtually
all interactions across policies and
institutions can potentially affect
labour market outcomes, therefore
requiring empirical assessment in order
to identify which ones are actually sig-
nificant. 
Orszag and Snower (1999) argue that
major LMPs and institutions “…are
characterised by economic comple-
mentarities (in the sense that the effec-
tiveness of one policy depends on the
implementation of other policies) and
policy complementarities (in that the
ability to gain political consent for one
policy depends on the acceptance of
other policies)”.
As regards policy complementarities,
one strand of the economic literature
emphasises political economy arguments
(e.g. Saint-Paul, 1996; Saint-Paul, 2000).
Labour market inefficiencies, and the
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87 According to Holmlund (1998), rational job search behaviour (by an unemployed individual receiving UB) implies the following. Firstly, that the
unemployed individual’s reservation wage (i.e. the minimum wage for accepting a job offer) declines as the date when UB expires approaches.
Secondly, an increase in UB lowers the reservation wage for those currently ineligible for benefit, because of the prospect of becoming eligible
in future if they take a job (i.e. the “entitlement effect”). Thirdly, a rise in the benefit level will cause recently unemployed individuals to increase
their reservation wage, while insured individuals approaching the end of the benefit period will reduce their reservation wage. 
88 Early estimates of the impact of benefit generosity on unemployment duration pointed to a slightly lower elasticity in the range of 0.2 to 0.9
(Layard et al., 1991). However, Krueger and Meyer (2002) argued that more recent literature provides much more reliable estimates of the causal
impact of UB on labour supply than earlier studies due to methodological advances. 
89 On the one hand, high (low) UB cause low (high) labour market turnover, and low (high) turnover causes high (low) political support for UB. The
latter because low (high) turnover means that income shocks associated with unemployment are more persistent than when turnover is high
(low), requiring a higher (lower) degree of social protection, because resorting to private saving and borrowing becomes less (more) efficient in
smoothing income fluctuations.
90 A vast amount of literature exists on the diversity or “varieties” of capitalism (e.g. Hall and Soskice, 2001; Amable, 2003). This theory provides a
taxonomy of national economic systems, identifying different “models” characterised by specific complementary institutional features. Amable
(2003) argues that “…continental European economies will most likely stay very different from the market-based economies, and that political
strategies promoting institutional change aimed at convergence with the Anglo-Saxon model are bound to meet considerable opposition”. 
91 Belot (2004) points out that although empirical studies fail to identify any significant and robust negative impact of EPL on either employment
or unemployment rates, they find that EPL reduces the pace of reallocation on the labour market by lowering both the job-finding and firing
rates. Consequently, “…countries with low migration costs and high economic heterogeneity may prefer no employment protection so that work-
ers can move quickly to better horizons than being maintained in low productive activities”.
92 Interaction a) because the disincentive impact of high and long-lasting UB can be mitigated through “activation” policies. Interaction b) because
high taxes on labour income appear to have a particularly negative effect on employment when contractual wages cannot fall due to binding
wage floors. 
The OECD (2006) found that adding to a baseline cross-country unemployment regression a term for the interaction between the average bene-
fit gross replacement ratio and a summary measure of ALMPs spending, yielded significant and robust estimates across a number of specifications
and estimation methods. The estimates obtained suggest that the disincentive effects on labour supply of generous UB become statistically
insignificant in high ALMP-spending countries, such as Denmark and the Netherlands. 
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difficulty or even inability to carry
through reforms, might result from a sta-
tus-quo bias that protects the entrenched
interests of “insider” employees as
opposed to those of “outsider” groups,
such as the unemployed or temporary
workers, leading to a segmented labour
market epitomised by two-tier policies,
institutions and outcomes. Although pro-
viding potentially valuable insights
explaining labour market policy and
institutional landscapes, coupled with
the usual difficulty in implementing suc-
cessful reform strategies, the political
economy approach could be considered
complementary to the mainstream view
that institutions (and their rigidities) may
actually enhance economic efficiency,
because they have been set-up (presum-
ably) as a second-best policy instrument
to correct market failures (Alogoskoufis
et al., 1995), or as an income redistribu-
tion tool. 
A number of researchers have empha-
sised the importance of not treating dif-
ferences in policies and institutions
across countries as exogenous, but
instead viewing them as the outcome of
a political process (Hassler et al.,
2005). Making political decisions
endogenous can produce self-reinforc-
ing mechanisms, leading to multiple
equilibria that display a high degree of
persistence. Hassler and Rodríguez-
Mora (1999) developed a model in
which stakeholders vote to determine
the UB system. If labour turnover rates
are made endogenous, there can be
multiple steady-state equilibria, which
can be seen as stylised representations
of the US and European labour market
and social models respectively89. 
Making policy decisions endogenous
can create self-reinforcing mechanisms
between, on the one hand, policies and
institutions and, on the other hand,
labour market outcomes, potentially
yielding multiple and stable equilibria.
Policies and institutions create their own
constituencies, influencing socio-eco-
nomic behaviour, which in turn feeds
back into the political process. The main
beneficiaries of a particular measure can
often muster strong support for it, even
when in the minority, carrying the day
against the majority who do not feel par-
ticularly strongly about it, because they
incur diffuse losses. 
Two more studies illustrate the existence
of multiple equilibria and their signifi-
cance in explaining major differences
between Anglo-Saxon and continental
European countries in terms of labour
market institutions and outcomes90. 
Belot (2004) presents a labour match-
ing model where labour migration and
EPL are both determined endogenous-
ly. The author argues that migration
opportunities determine preferences for
EPL. If there are no migration opportu-
nities workers will vote for EPL, but if
there are migration opportunities work-
ers will prefer their jobs not to be pro-
tected so as to facilitate reallocation
from low- to high-productivity jobs91.
Therefore, EPL and migration between
heterogeneous regions can be seen as
two alternative strategies at the dispos-
al of workers to protect their income. 
Hassler et al. (2005) built a dynamic
general equilibrium model to explain
cross-country differences on labour
mobility, unemployment and labour
market institutions, where UB are deter-
mined endogenously through the politi-
cal process. Attachment of individuals
to their place of residence is assumed to
increase with duration of stay. UB will
tend to reduce incentives to migrate and
so increase the proportion of individu-
als attached to their place of residence
and hence the political support for (a
generous) UB system. In this model,
making UB endogenous can generate
self-reinforcing mechanisms between
labour market attachment and political
preferences, giving rise to multiple and
stable equilibria, which can be taken as
approximating the European and US
situations of high (low) UB and low
(high) migration flows respectively. 
According to the OECD (2006), there
is robust evidence for two types of
interactions between institutions and
policies on the labour market, namely:
a) UB and activation policies; and b)
taxes on labour income and minimum
wages92. In particular, the negative
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impact of generous UB on labour mar-
ket variables appears to be counteracted
by high government expenditure on
ALMPs, particularly when they form
part of an activation strategy. A number
of recent empirical studies (e.g. Boone
and Van Ours, 2004; Kluve et al., 2005)
conclude that disincentives for labour
supply due to generous UB can be part-
ly offset through benefit administration
practices that use (the threat of) finan-
cial sanctions to impose and enforce an
obligation on the unemployed actively
to search for work on the one hand and,
on the other, to accept reasonable job
offers. 
According to the OECD (2006), there
is also evidence that expenditure on
ALMPs lessens the impact of econom-
ic shocks on unemployment and
reduces their persistence.
In the OECD (2006) Jobs Strategy
review, empirical analyses found that
complementary reforms can add up to
one-fifth to the unemployment effects
of separate reforms. Consequently,
well-designed reform packages can
yield larger employment gains than
piecemeal reforms. In fact, a labour
market reform that tends to lower
unemployment is likely to complement
all those reforms that head in the same
direction. 
A variety of circumstances, such as
political economy arguments, the pre-
ferred (or perceived) balance between
efficiency and equity considerations,
and the nature (or quality) of the social
dialogue, can favour the adoption of
different reform strategies or policy
packages. Usually, insider employees
are the main force opposing reforms
designed to lower unemployment
(Saint-Paul, 2004). In order to cope
with the potential opposition and make
reform more politically feasible, gov-
ernments adopt different strategies,
depending largely on the quality of
industrial relations93. 
In line with the literature on economic
systems (e.g. Amable, 2003), the
OECD (2006) concludes that “…the
experience over the past two decades
shows that there is no single combina-
tion of policies and institutions to
achieve and maintain good labour mar-
ket performance”. Moreover, “…coun-
tries can adopt different reform strate-
gies and yet they have achieved similar
outcomes suggesting that there exist
different policy packages”, which are
functionally equivalent, although “…in
practice there are few feasible policy
combinations to achieve employment
outcomes. A successful package needs
to be coherent and embody a good
overall incentive structure.”
According to the OECD (2006), two
policy packages have been successful.
The first consists of: a) a limited role
for collective agreements; b) strong
product market competition; c) low lev-
els of welfare benefits and active poli-
cies, as well as limited taxation to fund
labour market policies; and d) a light
labour market regulatory environment
(e.g. the UK). The second policy pack-
age comprises: a) strong emphasis on
collective bargaining and social dia-
logue; b) significant product market
competition; c) generous welfare bene-
fits and active policies, while imposing
and enforcing strict job search condi-
tions for receipt of benefit in order to
activate job seekers; and d) more
restrictive labour market regulations
than in the first successful policy pack-
age (e.g. Denmark). 
Both policy packages achieve similar
outcomes in terms of high employment
and low unemployment rates. The
major differences between the two suc-
cessful policy packages or models in
terms of socio-economic indicators are
that the first package is associated with
relatively high in-work poverty and low
budgetary costs for LMPs and, the sec-
ond with relatively low in-work pover-
ty, albeit achieved at a relatively high
budgetary cost. 
5.5. The trade-off between
EPL and UB
Stringent EPL is often blamed for the
unfavourable labour market perform-
ance in Europe. A considerable amount
of research has been carried out to eval-
uate the impact of EPL on aggregate
labour market variables and labour
mobility94. Calibration exercises95 and
empirical studies96 consistently come
up with two major findings. Firstly, the
impact of EPL on aggregate labour
market variables (i.e. employment and
unemployment rates) is weak with an
ambiguous sign. Secondly, labour mar-
ket transitions97, especially between
employment and unemployment, are
slowed down considerably. 
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93 For example, the extent to which trade unions and employers’ organisations share common views on how the labour market functions, are able
to agree on common objectives and have high mutual trust. Blanchard and Philippon (2004) suggest that the quality of labour relations partly
explains cross-country variations in unemployment trends in Europe over the past thirty years. 
94 The impact of EPL on labour market outcomes also depends on the nature of and interactions between other institutions on the labour market.
95 Using either a general equilibrium matching model (e.g. Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999) or a partial equilibrium labour demand model with
adjustment costs (e.g. Bertola, 1999), calibration exercises suggest that the impact of dismissal costs on unemployment is weak with an ambigu-
ous sign, although they significantly reduce labour mobility. 
96 Panel estimates of the determinants of structural unemployment generally find that EPL has no significant effect on the level of unemployment
(e.g. Nickell et al., 2003), although there seems to be a positive correlation between EPL and the persistence of unemployment to economic shocks
(e.g. Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000). 
97 In order to analyse the ease of labour reallocation, labour and job turnover measures are usually calculated (Bertola et al., 1999; Blanchard and
Tirole, 2003). 
98 Some authors argue that employment protection across Europe is largely determined by “…the male breadwinner conception, which is itself
largely shaped by religious “values”(Algan and Cahuc, 2004). 
99 Using a calibrated general equilibrium model, Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) found that high dismissal costs might potentially induce substan-
tial negative welfare losses, by hindering labour reallocation. They show that a firing tax equivalent to one year’s wages would reduce consump-
tion by about 2%. The mechanism which gives rise to consumption losses is the fall in average productivity due to inefficient allocation of
resources within the economy.
100 Based on enterprise data, as opposed to labour survey data that are used to calculate labour turnover rates, which basically describe transitions
between labour market statuses (e.g. from unemployment to employment) and job-to-job transitions. 
101 On the one hand, stringent (lax) EPL in European/North American countries tends to reduce job flows, while on the other, high (low) wage com-
pression/minimum wages in European/North American countries would imply more (less) intense labour shedding (and hiring) in response to
labour demand shocks. For example, this interaction can explain similar job destruction rates in France and the US, as the impact of different EPL
is roughly offset by different degrees of wage compression/minimum wages (Cahuc and Zylberberg, 2004).
102 Stringent EPL reduces “…the role of unemployment turnover in gross job creation and destruction and creates a large intermediate labour mar-
ket status of workers on short-term jobs.[…] Thus, large shifts of workers across short-term jobs or from short-term jobs to posts offering more
security are in Europe associated with low unemployment inflows and outflows” (i.e. a stagnant unemployment pool).
103 EPL benefits insiders on two counts: a) job protection; and b) a stronger wage bargaining position. Usually, outsiders suffer longer spells of unem-
ployment and/or find it difficult to leave the second tier of a two-tier labour market, often typified by a succession of low-quality short-term
labour contracts with low transition rates into permanent and better jobs. 
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Countries with comparatively stringent
EPL usually display: a) lower unem-
ployment in- and outflows; b) long
duration of unemployment, with high
long-term and low short-term unem-
ployment; and c) high average job
tenure. In such countries, unemployed
workers find themselves at a particular
disadvantage given the low inflow into
employment, which, all other things
being equal, prolongs the expected
average spell of unemployment. 
Although the overall effects are weak,
there is ample evidence to suggest that
stringent EPL favours the development
of two-tier labour markets, worsening
the prospects of certain groups at the
“margins of the labour market”, such as
young people, some women and older
people. Political economy arguments
can explain the persistent difficulties
faced by governments in reducing over-
all EPL, often leading to the adoption
of partial reform strategies that involve
lowering EPL for temporary employ-
ment only. Employment protection
favours insiders, who are predominant-
ly prime-age males, but is detrimental
to the employment opportunities of
outsiders, who come more frequently
from other groups (see Chart 8)98. 
Many studies find that although job dis-
missals tend to be much more regulated
in Europe than in the US, the rates of job
creation and destruction (i.e. job
turnover) are remarkably similar. The
main explanation seems to be that there
are other differences between countries
that offset job creation and destruction
(such as wage compression effects). The
evidence is consistent with standard dis-
cussions of labour market institutions,
which typically identify firing costs and
wage compression as amongst the most
distinctive characteristics of European
and North American economies. 
A number of authors (e.g. Hopenhayn
and Rogerson, 1993; Bertola, 1994)
have suggested that low labour
turnover rates (i.e. a symptom of scle-
rotic labour markets) might have a
negative impact on economic growth
by slowing down labour reallocation99.
However, job turnover rates100 turn out
to be remarkably similar across coun-
tries despite significant differences in
their EPL systems (Nickell and
Layard, 1999). Whereas labour transi-
tion rates are important as determi-
nants, for example, of the expected
duration of a spell of unemployment,
economy wide job turnover indicators
are relevant to assess the ease of
labour reallocation from low-produc-
tivity (or declining) to high-productiv-
ity (or expanding) sectors. 
A number of ideas have been put for-
ward to explain the paradox of different
labour turnover rates but similar job
turnover rates across countries, and that
a stringent EPL does not seem to be
systematically associated with weaker
labour reallocation, necessarily yield-
ing low-productivity growth. For exam-
ple, firms can reduce employment by at
least 10% per year just by relying on
the normal attrition of labour levels
(Nickell and Layard, 1999); Bertola
and Rogerson (1997) suggest that the
interaction of EPL with wage compres-
sion may explain the relative similarity
of job turnover rates between European
and North American countries101; Boeri
(1998) presents evidence suggesting
that low labour turnover can coexist
with large job turnover rates if most job
reallocation takes the form of job-to-
job shifts, not involving an intervening
spell of unemployment102. 
Notwithstanding the rent-seeking role
of EPL for inside workers103, the eco-
nomic literature provides several argu-
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ments that support employment protec-
tion on efficiency grounds. In the
absence of perfect insurance markets104,
Pissarides (2001) argues that there is a
role for both severance payments and
advance notice of termination of labour
contracts. Booth and Zoega (2003)
argue that in a world where human cap-
ital comprises both firm-specific and
general components, firms tend to
destroy too many job matches during
cyclical downturns compared with the
social optimum. In these circum-
stances, the social optimum can be
achieved with positive redundancy pay-
ments. Teulings and Hartog (1998)
argue that EPL can stimulate invest-
ment in firm-specific human
capital/skills that would otherwise be
sub-optimal because, in the absence of
employment protection, workers might
instead invest too much in general
portable skills105. Belot and Van Ours
(2005) carried-out an empirical analy-
sis using cross-country panel data that
suggested that there is an optimal level
of employment protection106, which can
vary across firms and workers. 
To provide insurance against labour mar-
ket risk, a trade-off between EPL and UB
is well documented (e.g. Boeri et al.,
2003). Table 10 reproduces Table 1 from
104 This occurs when moral hazard or other problems prevent sufficient cover from private unemployment insurance providers. Another market fail-
ure stems from the incomplete nature of contracts, possibly justifying employment protection as a commitment that fosters investment in firm-
specific human capital. However, this positive effect has to be set against the expected reduction in the average productivity of jobs resulting from
maintaining some inefficient ones. 
105 Wasmer (2002) argues that American workers invest more in general portable skills, while European workers invest more in firm-specific skills. 
106 Using a general equilibrium matching model, with incomplete contracts, employment protection is found to stimulate workers’ investment in
firm-specific skills, which offsets the social cost of employment protection at the social optimum. The empirical analysis suggests that employment
protection has a non-linear effect on economic growth.
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EPL
EPL correlated with Working-age population Male prime-age (25 to 45)
a. UB coverage -0.63 ** -0.71 **
b. Net replacement ratio -0.34 * ----
a*b -0.55 ** -0.66 **
Source: Boeri et al. (2003).
Number of observations 14. 
** significant at 99%; * significant at 95%.
Table 10 – Alternative indicators of the trade-off (late 1990s) 
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Boeri et al. (2003). It shows the correla-
tions of EPL with UB coverage, the net
replacement ratio in the first 12 months
of unemployment, and their product107. 
Chart 9 depicts the relationship between
EPL and total spending (as a percentage
of GDP) on unemployment benefits
(i.e. passive labour market policies). 
The existence of the trade-off depicted
in Table 10 and Chart 9 is implicitly
acknowledged in the EU Integrated
Guidelines108 (Guideline No. 21), which
calls for adequate balancing between
flexibility and employment security
requirements on the labour market. In
the 2006 Annual Progress Report109 the
Commission stressed that greater atten-
tion should be given to creating the
conditions for “flexicurity”110. 
Some authors suggest that the actual
policy-mix largely depends on the ini-
tial choices made regarding EPL and
UB, which have crystallised into a sta-
ble politico-economic equilibrium111.
Although countries can choose differ-
ent points on the EPL/UB curve when
setting their labour protection systems
from scratch, as in the case of the for-
mer centrally planned European
economies (Boeri et al., 2003), moving
along this curve has proved to be very
difficult because of entrenched atti-
tudes and interests.
The alleged growing vulnerability of
developed economies to shocks
and/or competitive pressure due to a
plethora of phenomena, such as glob-
alisation, technological changes and
new organisational paradigms, has led
several authors to consider that the
predominant employment protection
model in much of Europe, the “male
breadwinners” model, is ill-suited to
accommodate the rising demand for
labour market flexibility/mobility and
macro-economic adjustment (Boeri
and Bertola, 2003). 
Empirical studies based on surveys
suggest that individuals feel better
protected by UB than by EPL (Postel-
Vinay and Saint-Martin, 2004; Clark
and Postel-Vinay, 2005). Econometric
analyses of the determinants of per-
ceived or subjective employment
security suggest that there is a signif-
icant negative correlation with the
strictness of EPL, even after control-
ling for a number of variables112.
Obviously, this relationship does not
necessarily mean that there is a causal
link between EPL and employment
security. Postel-Vinay and Saint-Mar-
tin (2004) suggest that the correlation
between employment security and
EPL is largely spurious, reflecting
certain economy-wide variables, such
as the generosity of UB or the intensi-
ty of use of temporary contracts (see
Chart 10). Given that countries with
stringent EPL also tend to spend less
on UB, have longer average unem-
ployment spells and a high proportion
of temporary jobs, the observed nega-
tive correlation (between job security
and EPL) might just be reflecting the
increased perceived individual risk
associated with job loss in countries
with high EPL.
A number of empirical studies (OECD,
2006) find that over-stringent EPL has
an adverse impact on the employment
of certain demographic groups, such as
youth, some women and older workers.
Therefore, many studies have devel-
oped innovative reform proposals to
strike a better balance between efficient
labour turnover and employment secu-
rity. One idea frequently advocated is to
introduce comprehensive reform pack-
ages that combine some loosening of
EPL with changes in incentive mecha-
nisms, in exchange for strengthening
(both passive and active) LMPs (i.e. a
move along the EPL/UB curve, Boeri
et al., 2003) 
In countries where employment protec-
tion rules are over-stringent, there may
be efficiency gains in implementing
reform packages that exchange reduc-
tions in EPL for increases in UB and
ALMPs for the unemployed. Flexicurity
is a general approach that attempts to
combine labour market flexibility with
social security for workers (see Chapter
2 of EiE 2006). Flexicurity can also be
seen as a general analytical framework
to compare national labour market sys-
tems (Bredgaard et al., 2005), mapping
countries into distinct clusters in terms
of the options chosen to balance flexibil-
ity and security on the labour market
(e.g. Gaard, 2005). Therefore, flexicuri-
ty should not be seen as a concept
107 OECD indicators are used for EPL and the net replacement ratio. Coverage rates of UB are estimated based on the European Community House-
hold Panel (ECHP).
108 http://ec.europa.eu/growthandjobs/pdf/integrated_guidelines_en.pdf
109 http://ec.europa.eu/growthandjobs/annual-report_en.htm
110 “This consists of a combination of sufficiently flexible work contracts coupled with effective and active labour market policies to support switch-
es from one job to another, a reliable and responsive lifelong learning system, and adequate social protection.”
111 Boeri et al. (2003) develop a model in which voters decide on both the strictness of EPL and the generosity of UB. Heterogeneity in the labour
market is measured in two dimensions: a) insiders versus outsiders; and b) low- versus high-skilled workers. The outcome of the voting model sug-
gests that if there is a majority of low-skilled insiders then the equilibrium is characterised by low UB and stringent EPL; otherwise, voters choose
generous UB and lax EPL. The authors also find that, all other things being equal, a larger share of elderly workers tends to increase the demand
for EPL. 
112 Such as age, gender, occupation, education level, characteristics of the job (i.e. temporary/permanent or part-time/full-time), history of individual
unemployment, local market variables, etc. 
describing predominantly the Dutch or
Danish labour markets, but more as a
general EU recommendation issued
under the open method of coordination113
for improving the balance between flex-
ibility and security (EU Integrated
Guideline No. 21), especially by encour-
aging a shift from job security towards
employment security114. Given the
apparent politico-economic trade-off
between flexibility and income stability,
this shift could be facilitated by develop-
ing an efficient system of unemploy-
ment insurance, providing more effi-
cient re-employment services, and offer-
ing programmes for vocational training
and upgrading the skills of the unem-
ployed. All stakeholders should partici-
pate and take responsibility for this
shift.115. In particular, investing in human
capital is vital both to improve the long-
term employment prospects and the
employment security of the individual,
and also to enhance the competitiveness
and adaptability of the labour force
(OECD, 2004).
Chapter 2 of this report presents in
some detail the main policy measures
that have been introduced in certain
Member States or proposed by
researchers in order to improve the bal-
ance between flexibility and security. 
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113 “The Open Method of Coordination (OMC) is a new approach to EU governance based on “soft law” mechanisms and mutual learning. It has
been devised as an instrument to share best practices and increase policy convergence in areas which remain a primary responsibility of national
governments but are of concern to the EU as a whole, such as employment, and social security protection systems. In contrast with the tradition-
al “Community method”, it aims at coordination rather than harmonisation of national “policies”” (Jassem, 2004). 
114 The concept of flexicurity is difficult to define in precise terms. Together with the significant distributional impact of labour market policies, it
tends to accommodate quite different preferences on the part of the social partners regarding labour market institutions. 
In the literature, at least three different (only partly overlapping) perceptions of the concept coexist: a) as a policy strategy; b) as a state of the
labour market; and c) as an analytical concept. 
As a policy strategy, Wilthagen (1998) defines flexicurity as: “a policy strategy that attempts, synchronically and in a deliberate way, to enhance
the flexibility of labour markets, work organisation and labour relations on the one hand, and to enhance security – employment security and
social security – notably for weaker groups in and outside the labour market, on the other hand”.  
As a state of the labour market concept, flexicurity is a stylised description of some fundamental characteristics, such as external numerical flexi-
bility, social security and employment security. 
As an analytical frame, flexicurity is closely related to another well-known labour market concept, namely the idea of transitional labour markets
(TLMs) (Schmid, 1998; Schmid and Gazier, 2002). The basic assumption of TLMs is that the boundaries between labour markets and various social
systems, such as the education system, the unemployment system, the pension system and household activities have become more permeable
towards transitional states between paid employment and (productive) activities outside the labour market. 
115 As mentioned earlier, moves along the trade-off curve between employment protection and (income) security are difficult to materialise. In this
context, Bredgaard et al. (2005) argue that the Danish flexicurity model can be seen largely as a one-off historical outcome: “…it is not the prod-
uct of a carefully designed strategy, but a by-product of a long historical and institutional evolution and social compromises in a number of dif-
ferent policy areas. It is therefore difficult to copy or to export the Danish flexicurity model”. 
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5.6. The importance of an
integrated management of
benefit systems and active
policies – activation
strategies
The interaction between tax and benefit
systems is considered one of the most
important determinants of labour sup-
ply, especially for low-skilled/low-paid
individuals116. A joint EU-OECD proj-
ect117 calculated a number of indicators
“…to measure the financial gain when
a jobless person living on benefits –
either unemployment benefits or other
income support – takes up a job, or
when a worker decides to work longer”
(Carone and Salomäki, 2005). The indi-
cators calculated are marginal effective
tax rates (METRs) on earned income
for the transitions from UB to employ-
ment income (unemployment trap indi-
cators), from social assistance to
employment income (inactive trap indi-
cators) and from low to higher work
effort resulting from either working
longer or moving to better jobs (low-
wage or poverty trap indicators). 
Carone and Salomäki (2005) reported
the following main findings, based on
calculation of various METRs indica-
tors (see Table 11). “The risk of an
unemployment trap for persons entitled
to unemployment benefit is particularly
high for low-skilled workers when
potential re-entry wages are lower than
those before unemployment”. This
reflects the fact that low-skilled work-
ers face longer and more frequent
spells of unemployment than high-
skilled workers and are therefore more
at risk of losing their attachment to the
labour market. 
For individuals/households living on
social assistance, the risk of being
trapped in inactivity is particularly high
when the expected wage level is low.
“To some extent, the risk of an inactivi-
ty trap may be more worrying than the
risk of an unemployment trap, because
means-tested social assistance, being a
last resort scheme, is usually without
any final limit in its duration”. 
“The analysis shows that the interac-
tion of tax and benefit provisions
results in a risk of a low-wage trap for
employed persons in some Member
States, especially in those where
means-testing of benefits plays an
important role”. 
Using survey data, econometric studies
tend to find that generous UB signifi-
cantly increases the average duration of
spells of unemployment (Krueger and
Meyer, 2002; Grubb, 2005). Addison et
al. (2004) estimated the elasticities of
unemployment duration to UB and
found a positive cross-country correla-
tion between these and METRs for the
unemployed (see Chart 11). They inter-
preted this as evidence that the higher
the tax burden on low-skilled/low-paid
workers, the more sensitive workers are
to the generosity of the UB system. 
Although the interplay of tax and bene-
fit systems is not the only determinant
of labour supply, the risk of falling into
a number of traps has potentially wide-
reaching implications, requiring con-
tinuous re-assessment of the disincen-
tive effects related to tax and benefit
systems and ALMPs. Reform policies
that raise the financial incentives to
work are a key part of any overall strat-
egy to increase labour supply118.
Despite the strong evidence that gener-
ous and long-lasting UB tends to
increase the average duration of spells of
unemployment, they have only marginal-
ly been cut, whether in terms of replace-
ment ratios or of the length of entitle-
ment periods. This attitude on the part of
national authorities reflects both equity
goals and politico-economic considera-
tions. European countries have preferred
to counterbalance some of the disincen-
tive effects of UB systems by introduc-
ing comprehensive activation strategies
that coordinate administration of UB
with ALMPs. 
An effective activation strategy
involves reforms in a number of inter-
related areas, such as: a) greater
emphasis on work availability condi-
tions and more effective enforcement
of job search obligations for the unem-
ployed through benefit sanctions; b)
more efficient administration of PES
activities (i.e. enhanced counselling
and placement efforts); c) increased
referrals to ALMPs (e.g. training); and
d) setting up of quasi-markets for
employment services. 
After a period of rising expenditure on
ALMPs (see Section 3), in recent years
many countries have favoured policies
that enhance the effectiveness of
ALMPs, while keeping expenditure-to-
GDP ratios broadly stable. Integration of
ALMPs into a comprehensive activation
strategy implies that job seekers have to
choose from a menu of activities and
programmes after a certain period of
unemployment. In line with the targets
of the EES, Member States have agreed
to offer individual action plans to young
people and adults after at least 6 and 12
months of unemployment respectively.
116 Labour taxes drive a “wedge” between the cost of labour to a firm and the amount received by the worker. An increase in labour taxes has two
opposite effects. First, by lowering the opportunity cost of leisure it reduces labour supply (the substitution effect). Second, a tax on wages reduces
net income, which encourages people to work more in order to maintain their net income level (the income effect). Given these two opposite
effects on labour supply, economic theory cannot predict either the sign or the size of the supply response to tax changes, which becomes an
empirical question. 
117 Carone et al. (2003).
118 Integrated Guideline No 19: “Ensure inclusive labour markets, enhance work attractiveness, and make work pay for job seekers, including disad-
vantaged people and the inactive, through [inter alia]: continual review of the incentives and disincentives resulting from the tax and benefit sys-
tems, including the management and conditionality of benefits and a significant reduction of high marginal effective tax rates, notably for those
with low incomes, whilst ensuring adequate levels of social protection”. 
These individual action plans should
offer a mix of counselling, referrals to
job offers, job search monitoring, train-
ing or other employability measures. 
A number of studies indicate that well
designed activation strategies have
improved labour market performance
by enhancing the efficiency of the job
matching process and raising the skills
of participants in programmes. More-
over, requirements to participate in
activation measures can elicit the moral
hazard behaviour of some individuals
who respond by dropping their benefit
claims rather than complying with the
requirements to participate in a pro-
gramme.
In recent years in order to obtain effi-
ciency gains, a number of European
countries have set up quasi-markets for
the provision of PES119. In their com-
prehensive review of ALMPs in OECD
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Tax wedge 2004 Unemployment trap 2004 Low wage trap 2004 Inactivity trap 2003
AT 38.6 73 70 25
BE 46.4 88 51 46
CY 18.6 57 31
CZ 41.9 65 45 29
DE 45.4 87 72 50
DK 39.4 89 85 69
EE 38.9 50 54
ES 33.6 80 20 16
FI 38.6 80 81 34
FR 32.6 82 56 27
EL 34.4 76 16 16
HU 41.5 66 26 18
IE 15.7 73 61 23
IT 41.7 59 9 34
LT 40.0 49 52
LU 27.5 85 92 34
LV 41.1 87 73
MT 18.0 67 16
NL 38.1 87 78 61
PL 41.9 83 78 40
PT 29.6 87 49 30
SE 46.2 87 83 31
SL 39.8 81 31
SK 38.8 43 31 26
UK 26.4 71 69 38
EU-25 36.4 78 57
EU-15 36.3 78 57
US 27.3 71 39
JP 61 65
Sources: Eurostat: Key indicators on EU policy, and European Economy Special Report No 2/2005.
Notes: Tax wedge: Tax rate on low wage earners. Unemployment trap: difference between the net income in work and the net
income in unemployment divided by gross earnings in work. The low wage trap measures what percentage of the gross earnings
is “taxed away” by the combined effects of higher taxes and reduced or lost benefits, when an employed single person moves
from 33% to 67% of the average earnings of a production worker (average of two family types). The inactivity trap measures the
percentage of gross earnings of a social assistance recipient which is “taxed away” when she/he decides to take up a job  (ave-
rage of two family types).
Table 11 – Indicators of unemployment traps, low wage traps, and inactivity traps measured by 
marginal effective tax rates (METRs) on earned income
119 OECD (2005b): “…to implement a quasi-market, the PES has to be split between a public authority (the “principal”, here called the purchaser),
which determines individual eligibility for benefits and services, assigns clients to a specific provider, and measures outcomes, and multiple ser-
vice providers or local employment offices (the “agents”), which deliver employment services. The service providers are given near-complete free-
dom to choose their procedures and programmes, but the purchaser measures the employment outcomes achieved by their clients and in some
way ensures that providers are replaced if their outcomes fall systematically below benchmark levels”. 
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countries, Martin and Grubb (2001)
argue that quasi-markets have in gener-
al yielded efficiency gains in the provi-
sion of PES, mainly as a result of the
introduction of clear indicators of per-
formance and mechanisms for replac-
ing the management of inefficient
employment offices. However, the
same authors also recognise that well
managed public employment services
can also reap many of the potential ben-
efits associated with quasi-markets. 
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6. Conclusions – the
need for an
evaluation culture
There is no doubt that the conduct and
use of evaluation studies is becoming
more widespread in Europe, thought it
could still be argued that the develop-
ment of an “evaluation culture” for
LMPs is still in its infancy in many EU
Member States. Evaluating the effects
and monitoring implementation of
ALMPs are important steps in the
process of improving policy design as a
way of securing better outcomes. 
Only a relatively limited number of
evaluations have been carried out in
Europe for several reasons, including a)
lack of comprehensive and good quali-
ty data; b) insufficient cooperation
between those responsible for design-
ing and implementing policies and
researchers; and c) programme design
and continuation are largely independ-
ent of evaluations. 
Researchers have highlighted the
importance of regular independent
evaluations of ongoing and new pro-
grammes, putting particular emphasis
on their long run effects. There is some
criticism from the research community
that policymakers adopt certain
ALMPs without paying full attention to
their long run effects, choosing instead
those measures that maximise the short
run impact of reducing (open) unem-
ployment. 
Good overviews of programme evalua-
tions, including the meta-analysis by
Kluve et al. (2005) of more than 100
evaluations conducted in Europe, point
to the following conclusions.
Training/retraining measures are found
to have a modest likelihood of making
a positive impact on post-programme
employment rates. Compared to train-
ing programmes, spending on employ-
ment incentives and PES is associated
with significantly better outcomes. 
The evidence suggests that job-search
assistance programmes in general, and
activation policies in particular, feature
highly among the more cost-effective
ALMP measures in terms of helping
the unemployed to find a job and keep
it. Programmes involving direct job
creation in the public sector are less
likely than training programmes to
show a positive impact on post-pro-
gramme employment outcomes.
Evaluations of training programmes
strongly suggest that they are more like-
ly to have positive effects for specific
target groups. In particular, training
programmes appear to raise the re-
employment rates of: a) beneficiaries
with better labour market prospects to
begin with; b) women re-entering the
labour market; and c) educated
migrants. One recurrent problem with
(re)training in many countries is its high
incidence of self-selectivity, particularly
as regards the level of education. This
means that individuals who already
have higher levels of education are
more likely to undergo further training. 
Despite the policy relevance of con-
ducting micro-econometric programme
evaluations, public policy should not be
based exclusively (or even primarily)
on them, especially when large pro-
grammes in terms of expenditure or
number of participants are involved. In
these circumstances, general equilibri-
um or macro-econometric analyses of
ALMPs should be a research priority,
because of the possible magnitude of
any indirect effects that might conflict
with the policy conclusions drawn from
the micro-econometric evaluation. Due
both to data limitations and the natural
challenges of building general equilib-
rium models, the overwhelming evi-
dence available on the evaluation of
ALMPs still comes from micro-econo-
metric analyses.
The results of micro-econometric eval-
uations and of the few macro-econo-
metric studies available are somewhat
contradictory. On the one hand, the
microeconometric evaluations tend to
find that training programmes have
rather mixed effects, but nearly always
a statistically insignificant impact on
the participants’ employment prospects.
On the other hand, macroeconomic
studies tend to find that training is the
only category of ALMP that has a sig-
nificant positive impact on aggregate
labour market outcomes. 
It appears that this paradox could be
solved by extending the observation
window to include the post-participa-
tion effects of training. In practice,
evaluations of training programmes
often find a negative or only small pos-
itive effect on participants’ outcomes
during the first year or two after partic-
ipation. However, after that initial peri-
od, a growing number of follow-up
studies have found evidence of a posi-
tive impact attributable to training.
Unfortunately, most of the datasets
suitable for programme evaluation have
relatively short observation windows
that fail to show the long-run impact on
employment outcomes attributable to
ALMPs in general and to training pro-
grammes in particular. 
Both economic theory and empirical
estimates strongly suggest that it is very
important to consider the interactions
between active and passive LMPs in
order to explore synergies/complemen-
tary features and make active policies
more effective. Specifically, this means
that the well-documented disincentive
effects on labour supply associated with
over-generous UB can be, at least par-
tially, counteracted by adopting well-
designed ALMPs. In recent years EU
Member States have usually preferred
to counterbalance some of the disincen-
tive effects of UB/welfare systems by
introducing comprehensive activation
strategies. This attitude on the part of
governments reflects both equity goals
and political economy considerations. 
In accordance with the EES guidelines,
EU Member States have developed
activation strategies to coordinate
Employment in Europe 2006
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expenditure on ALMPs with UB
administration. The “mutual obliga-
tions” principle plays a central role in
activation strategies. On the one hand,
PES should provide quality counselling
and job brokerage services, while on
the other the unemployed should com-
ply with their obligations to search
actively for a job, to accept any suitable
job offers or to participate in ALMPs. 
A number of studies indicate that well-
designed activation strategies have
improved labour market performance
by making the job matching process
more efficient and improving the skills
of participants in programmes. More-
over, the requirements for participation
in activation measures can elicit the
moral hazard behaviour of some indi-
viduals who respond by dropping their
benefit claims rather than complying
with the programme participation
requirements.
The principle of policy complementar-
ity is also illustrated by the interaction
between tax and benefit/welfare sys-
tems in determining labour supply,
especially for the low skilled.
Although this interaction is not the
only determinant of labour supply, the
risk of falling into a number of traps
has potentially wide-reaching implica-
tions, requiring continuous assessment
of the disincentive effects related to
tax and benefit systems and ALMPs.
In accordance with the EES guide-
lines, reform policies that raise the
financial incentives to work are a key
part of any overall strategy to increase
labour supply.
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Annex 1
Crude matching-up of the “old” (OECD) (1985–2002) and the “new” (Eurostat/OECD) (1998 onwards) classifications of
LMPs.
Annex 2
Average effect of participation on participants and identifying assumptions
Let 1 denote the state associated with participation in a particular public intervention, and 0 the state associated with non-
participation. Let t represent the time index. Let Y indicate the labour market outcome resulting from public intervention (e.g.
probability of re-employment or earnings). The population is divided into participants (D=1) and non-participants (D=0) in
the programme. X denotes a vector of observable characteristics of the population. 
The average effect of participation on participants (or the impact of public intervention) is given by: 
αt (x; D) = E(Y1t | D = 1, X = x) - E(Y0t | D = 1, X = x) (1) 
where, for example, E(Y1t | D = 1, X = x) is the (conditional) expected value of Y1t for the individuals participating in the
programme (D = 1) with characteristics X = x. 
As discussed earlier, the impact of the public intervention cannot be estimated using (1) due to the missing (counterfactual)
data. What can be estimated is the difference between the average result for individuals benefiting from the programme and
the average result for non-participants (or a control group drawn from non-participants): 
θt(x) = E(Y1t | D = 1, X = x) - E(Y0t | D = 0, X = x) (2) 
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“Old” classification (OECD) “New” classification (Eurostat/OECD)
Code Title Code Title
100 Public employment services and administration 1 LMP services
(PESA)
200 Labour market training 2 Training
300 Youth measures
410 Subsidies for regular employment 3 Job rotation and job sharing
in the private sector 4 Employment incentives
500 Measures for the disabled 5 Integration of the disabled
430 Direct job creation (public or non-profit) 6 Direct job creation
420 Support of unemployed persons starting 7 Start-up incentives
enterprises
600 Unemployment compensation 8 Out-of-work income maintenance 
and support
700 Early retirement for labour market reasons 9 Early retirement
910-100 Active measures (1–5; for inflows, 2–5)-PESA 2–7 Total categories 2–7
920 Passive measures (6 and 7) 8–9 Total categories 8–9
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The impact of the public measure given by αt(x;D) has in practice to be measured by θt(x). The difference between these two
quantities is the selection bias βt(x), given by: 
αt (x; D) = θt(x) - βt(x) where βt(x) = E(Y0t | D = 1, X = x) - E(Y0t | D = 0, X = x) (3) 
It is in the interest of researchers to choose the estimation method (and control group) in order to minimise (in absolute
terms) the selection bias. Ideally, the average outcome of the control group should be as close as possible to the average out-
come that participants would have achieved had they not actually participated in the programme. 
The selection bias can be a significant value (either positive or negative). If the observed measure of the causal impact of
the programme θt(x) were to be taken as its actual impact αt(x;D) (i.e. ignore the selection bias, βt(x)), the
effectiveness/value of the programme being evaluated could easily be misjudged. For example, Aucouturier and Gélot (1994)
found that a number of studies on the effectiveness of a particular type of active measure (“stages de qualification”) in France
tended to overestimate the true impact on participants’ employment prospects. The positive difference in the measured impact
of the public instrument (i.e. θt(x)>0), did not reflect its true effect (αt(x;D)), because of the high proportion of highly able
individuals participating in this programme (βt(x)>0). 
Main estimators and conditions of validity
In order to assess the effectiveness of a programme (i.e. its average impact on participants), it is necessary to choose an esti-
mator. The choice of estimator depends on the identifying assumption made, which should reflect the availability and quali-
ty of the data (Cahuc and Zylberberg, 2004). Three commonly used estimators are briefly described below. 
The “before-after” estimator
Let A stand for a period after participation, and B for a period before participation. This estimator is frequently used for lon-
gitudinal data or for repeated cross-sectional data on the same population. The identifying assumption for this estimator is: 
E(Y0A | D = 1, X = x) - E(Y0B | D = 1, X = x) = 0 (4) 
This assumption means that the average response of participants in a programme – had they not participated in it – would
have been the same before and after the programme. 
Substituting (4) for (1) produces the “before-after” estimator for the average gain from participation (∆αAB(x)): 
∆αAB(x;1) ––– αA(x;1) - αB(x;1) = E(Y1A | D = 1, X = x) - E(Y1B | D = 1, X = x) (5) 
This estimator can be calculated for longitudinal data or repeated cross-sectional data on the same population. Another
advantage of this estimator is that it can be computed even if no data are available for non-participants. However, the iden-
tifying assumption for this estimator (4) should be rejected if either: a) there is unobserved heterogeneity; or b) the cyclical
position of the economy varied considerably between the periods before and after participation in the programme. 
The “difference-in-differences” estimator
The identifying assumption for this estimator is: 
E(Y0A - Y0B | D = 1, X = x) = E(Y0A - Y0B | D = 0, X = x) (6) 
Condition (6) signifies that the average gain from non-participation would be the same for both participants and non-partic-
ipants. It basically assumes that there is an underlying common trend affecting the results of both participants and non-par-
ticipants. Substituting (6) for (1) and using definition (5), the “difference-in-differences” estimator ∆DD can be expressed as: 
∆DD = ∆αAB(x,1) - ∆αAB(x,0) (7) 
166
The “difference-in-differences” estimator is therefore equal to the difference between the “before-after” estimator for the par-
ticipating group and the “before-after” estimator for the control group. 
The “difference-in-differences” estimator has the advantage of being insensitive to cyclical fluctuations and, in principle, can
reduce the biases due to both observed and unobserved heterogeneity. However, the importance of the selection bias will ulti-
mately continue to depend on how well the control group represents the population analysed. 
The “cross-section” estimator
The identifying assumption for this estimator is: 
E(Y0A | D = 1, X = x) = E(Y0A | D = 0, X = x) (8) 
Condition (8) postulates that the average effect of non-participation is the same for participants and non-participants. Sub-
stituting (8) for (1), the “cross-section” estimator ∆CS can be expressed as: 
∆CS = ∆αA(x,1) - ∆αA(x,0) = E(Y1A | D = 1, X = x) - E(Y1A | D = 1, X = x) (9) 
The “cross-section” estimator is commonly used with experimental data. However, its identifying assumption is unlikely to
be satisfied with non-randomised (or observational) data. 
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1. Introduction
At the Lisbon European Council held
in March 2000, the Heads of State or
Government set the European Union
(EU) the following goal – “to become
the most competitive and dynamic
knowledge-based economy in the
world, capable of sustainable economic
growth with more and better jobs and
greater social cohesion”, to be achieved
by the year 2010. Subsequent Council
meetings and the mid-term review of
the Lisbon Strategy have reinforced
these aspirations, leading to the 2005
revised Lisbon Strategy1 and the subse-
quent Integrated Guidelines for Growth
and Jobs (2005–2008) adopted by the
Council of the European Union2, which
have placed an even stronger emphasis
on the need to invest more in research
and development and human capital
through better education and skills.
The revised Lisbon Strategy follows
recent reports (Sapir et al., 2004; Kok,
2004)3 that emphasise that the knowl-
edge, skills and other attributes embod-
ied in individuals – what constitutes
human capital4 – are key determinants
of economic growth in a knowledge-
based economy. In this context, Sapir et
al. (2004) pointed out, for instance, that
one major cause for the relatively slow
economic growth in Europe in relation
to the United States (US) is low invest-
ment in research and development and
in human capital, particularly in higher
education. Currently the EU allocates
approximately 1.9% of its annual Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) to Research
and Development (R&D) compared
with 2.6% in the US, and it invests
around 1.2% of its GDP in tertiary edu-
cation compared with nearly 2.9% in
the US.
However, despite this perspective, sev-
eral recent empirical studies have ques-
tioned the positive relationship between
human capital (in the form of educa-
tion) and economic growth. For
instance, in recent surveys on educa-
tion and economic growth, de la Fuente
and Ciccone (2003) stated that “…the
picture that emerges from [their]
review of the empirical evidence is
somewhat mixed”, while Krueger and
Lindhal (2001) found that “…educa-
tion [is] statistically significantly and
positively associated with subsequent
growth only for countries with the low-
est level of education”.
This chapter argues that the somewhat
mixed results of the empirical evidence
on the growth effects of human capital
may be, at least in part, due to an insuf-
ficient specification of the role of
human capital in economic growth5 in
the standard (i.e. the neoclassical)
approach (Mankiw, Romer and Weil,
1992) principally because it treats
human capital as an ordinary input,
alongside physical capital and labour. In
this neoclassical modelling approach,
growth over a given period is propor-
tional to the growth in the stock of
human capital over the same period, the
factor of proportionality being the
returns to education at the macro-eco-
nomic level. In other words, growth is
primarily driven by human capital accu-
mulation. In the long run, it is however
necessary to continue accumulating
more human capital in order to sustain
growth. Moreover, as noticed by Aghion
and Howitt (1998), drawing on Nelson
and Phelps (1966), the neoclassical
approach implicitly considers that
“…education affects [an] individuals’
productivity equally on all jobs, no mat-
ter whether these jobs are already rou-
tinised or innovative”. Consequently, the
marginal product of education (i.e. the
increase in output generated by each
additional unit of human capital) can
remain positive even if the rate of tech-
nological change is zero because the
exact specification of the production
function does not concern the workers
(Nelson and Phelps, 1966). A major
drawback with the neoclassical
approach is that it does not explain how
changes in government policies 
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1 Communication from the Commission (2005), “Working together for growth and jobs. A new start for the Lisbon Strategy”, (COM(2005) 24 final).
2 Council Decision of 12 July 2005 on Guidelines for the employment policies if the Member States. Official Journal of the European Union. L 205/21.
3 See also Communication from the Commission (2005), “Mobilising the brainpower of Europe: enabling universities to make their full contribu-
tion to the Lisbon Strategy”, (COM(2005) 152 final); Communication from the Commission, “More Research and Innovation – Investing for Growth
and Employment: A Common Approach“, (COM(2005) 488 final).
4 As stressed by de la Fuente and Ciccone (2003), “human capital is a broad and multifaceted concept encompassing many different types of invest-
ment in people. Health and nutrition are certainly an important aspect of such investment, particularly in developing countries where deficien-
cies in these respects may severely limit the population’s ability to engage in productive activities. However, in modern economies], the key aspect
of human capital has to do with knowledge and skills embodied in people and accumulated through schooling, training and experience that are
useful in the production of goods, services and further knowledge“. See also OECD (2001).
5 As mentioned by Hanushek and Kimko (2000), “…two issues arise in considering the effect of human capital on economic growth: how should
any relationship be specified and how should human capital be measured“. This chapter mainly focuses on the first issue, leaving aside the ques-
tion of the measurement of human capital per se.
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(e.g. increases in subsidies to education)
could influence growth permanently. In
the neoclassical approach, technological
progress is the only determinant of per-
manent growth in living standards but it
remains exogenous.
This chapter adopts an alternative
approach to the role of human capital in
economic growth that reverts back to
Nelson and Phelps (1966) and is associ-
ated with the theory of “endogenous
growth”. This approach models techno-
logical progress or the growth of Total
Factor Productivity (TFP)6 as a function
of the stock of human capital (and not its
accumulation as in the standard
approach). The starting point for the
analysis is that an educated workforce is
better at creating, adopting and imple-
menting new technologies (Benhabib
and Spiegel, 1994, 2005; Aghion and
Cohen, 2004; Vandenbussche, Aghion
and Meghir, 2006) so human capital has
an impact on technological progress by
creating new technologies (Romer,
1990) and adopting them (Nelson and
Phelps, 1966). 
The interest of this alternative approach
is twofold. Firstly, from a theoretical
point of view, such analysis contributes
to a better understanding of the sources
of technological progress, as it does not
assume it to be exogenous as is the case
in the neoclassical framework. Secondly,
this approach sets out to explain the dif-
ference in growth rates between
economies not in terms of differences in
the rates of accumulation of human cap-
ital but instead, of differences in human
capital stocks. The implications of dif-
ferentiating between the standard
approach and the alternative approach to
human capital formation are noteworthy.
In the former, the benefit of an increase
in human capital is its marginal product.
Human capital accumulation certainly
has level effects because it raises the
growth rate of an economy temporarily,
until a higher level of steady-state output
is reached. In the latter approach,
because the stock of human capital
affects TFP growth through technology
creation and absorption, its benefit
could be measured in terms of its impact
on all output levels in the future
(Benhabib and Spiegel, 2005). However,
the distinction between level and rate
effects can be difficult to make if the
impact of the stock of human capital on
a country’s ability to generate new tech-
nologies is low.
From a policy perspective, this
approach is particularly relevant for
explaining the key role of education
and, more generally human capital, in
knowledge-based economies. It does
not claim that jobs of a highly routine
nature do not necessarily require a sub-
stantial level of education, it says more
that education is particularly important
for jobs requiring adaptation to change
and innovation. In this respect, this
alternative approach forms a natural
framework in which to analyse the view
expressed by the European Commission
in the Communication Working together
for growth and jobs. A new start for the
Lisbon Strategy that economies
endowed with a high-skilled and adapt-
able workforce are better able to create
and make effective use of new technolo-
gies and to embrace change7. The need
for the EU Member States to promote
such a high-skilled and adaptable work-
force is expressed in the Title VIII of the
Amsterdam Treaty, article 125. 
Drawing on the Nelson-Phelps approach,
this chapter shows that across countries
the effect which a high-skilled and adapt-
able workforce can have on the mecha-
nisms driving growth depends on how far
a country is from the technology frontier.
The technology frontier characterises the
best-practice level of technology avail-
able at the world level and is measured by
the level of TFP of the leader country,
namely the US. In countries close to the
technology frontier – specifically, in
countries with levels of current TFP close
to US level – a high-skilled and adaptable
workforce contributes to technological
progress by creating new technologies
suited to domestic production. In these
countries, a high-skilled workforce influ-
ences TFP growth or technological
progress by determining their national
capacity to create new technologies. Such
an effect on TFP growth is even greater if
the workforce is adaptable. By contrast,
in less technologically countries such a
high-skilled workforce affects technolog-
ical progress by adopting new technolo-
gies first created abroad. The speed at
which these countries “catch up” with
those close to the technology frontier is
an increasing function of their skilled
human capital stocks and is proportional
to the distances to the technology frontier.
The remainder of this chapter is organ-
ised as follows. Section 2 reviews the
literature on the relationship between
human capital and growth with a spe-
cial focus on the various empirical
specifications used. The goal of this
section is not to make an exhaustive
review of the literature, but rather to
indicate the key ideas developed by the
macro growth literature over recent
years. Section 3 extends the Benhabib-
Spiegel model (2005) with a basic
premise that technological progress or
the growth of TFP depends on the
high-skilled human capital stock as
measured by the fraction of adult pop-
ulation with tertiary education in total
adult population. Furthermore, this
section introduces in the model the
notion of “adaptability” with the
assumption that a high-skilled work-
force could have a more significant
impact on technological progress if it
can be adapted in practice. The empir-
ical results are estimates based on a
panel data set covering a sample of EU
Member States between 1960 and
2000. Finally, section 4 draws conclu-
sions and some lessons for human cap-
ital policy in the EU.
6 Technological progress represents an improvement in the state of technology. In this chapter, technology is synonymous with total factor produc-
tivity. It refers to the way inputs (e.g. labour and physical capital) to the production process are transformed into output.
7 Communication from the Commission (2005), “Working together for growth and jobs. A new start for the Lisbon Strategy”, (COM(2005) 24 final).
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2. Measuring 
the returns to 
education: from
micro-economics to
macro-economics
The hypothesis that human capital is a
key determinant of productivity
growth has received considerable
attention in the micro-economic liter-
ature since the 1960s. For instance,
labour economists have intensively
investigated the impact of schooling
and labour market experience on indi-
vidual wages (Mincer, 1974;
Psacharopoulos and Layard, 1979;
Card, 2001). However, as pointed by
Krueger and Lindhal (2001), a draw-
back of the micro-economic literature
on human capital is that it focuses
principally on the “private pecuniary
return to education” despite the fact
that theoretical literature assumes the
possibility of positive externalities
from education. The possible presence
of such externalities motivates much
of the macro-economic literature 
on the relationship between growth
and human capital (Aghion and
Cohen, 1994). A first attempt to
address these concerns was made in
the context of the resurgence of the
convergence debate stemming from
the standard Solow (or neoclassical)
model (Solow 1956)8.
Starting from a few basic assump-
tions, in particular the assumption
that capital is subject to diminishing
returns and that technology a public
good, this model predicts that
economies will eventually converge in
terms of income level or growth rate
in the long run. Although these con-
vergence predictions have not been
fully validated by the data, Mankiw,
Romer and Weil (1992) nevertheless
showed that the Solow model still
remains suitable for analysing conver-
gence in living standards, but only if
human capital is included as an ordi-
nary factor of production alongside
the two traditional inputs, namely
physical capital and (raw) labour9.
Although this reformulation of the
Solow model opened the way for sev-
eral interesting empirical studies on
the growth effects of human capital
(Knight, Loayza and Villanueva,
1993; Vasudeva Murthy and Chien,
1997; Hamilton and Monteagudo,
1998), it has not been without criti-
cism. A number of subsequent studies
based on the standard approach to the
role of human capital in economic
growth found rather disappointing
results. However, the most recent
works suggested that these disap-
pointing results could be attributed to
low data quality and to the measure-
ment error bias. Using improved data
sets, these works resulted in a signifi-
cant contribution of human capital
accumulation to economic growth.
Nevertheless, the most fundamental
critique of the augmented Solow
model is from an economic perspective
and comes from the work of Benhabib
and Spiegel (1994). Based on the
Nelson-Phelps approach (1966), these
authors suggested that the treatment of
human capital in the augmented Solow
model may be mistaken. Instead of
assuming that human capital is an ordi-
nary factor of production, they pro-
posed an alternative assumption –
associated with endogenous theory –
which sees technological progress as a
function of the stock of human capital.
The contribution of human capital to
growth is thus indirect since it impacts
on technological progress or TFP
growth by creating new technologies
(Romer, 1990) and adopting them
(Nelson and Phelps, 1966).
2.1. The micro-economic
returns to education
2.1.1. The Mincerian wage 
equation and returns to 
schooling
In his classic book Mincer (1974)
showed that, making certain assump-
tions, the natural logarithm of the real
wage could be written as a linear func-
tion of the years of schooling, the
years of labour market experience and
a quadratic in terms of the years of
labour market experience. The most
important assumptions underpinning
the Mincerian wage equation are that
the only costs of schooling are the for-
gone earnings and every year of
schooling generates an equal return to
the student. In the Mincerian equation,
the parameter associated with the
years of education is of particular
interest as it can be interpreted as the
private return to schooling, also
known as the “Mincerian return to
schooling”10.
The Mincerian wage equation has been
estimated extensively for many coun-
tries, especially the US and EU
Member States. Several studies (for
instance, Harmon, Walker and
Westergaad-Nielsen, 2001; Denny,
Harmon and Lydon, 2002; Trostel,
Walker and Woolley, 2002; de la Fuente
and Ciccone, 2003) have pointed out
substantial changes occurring in the
Mincerian return to schooling in the US
and Europe since the 1960s and also
that notable differences exist across EU
Member States. The Mincerian return
to schooling in Europe follows a 
U-shaped time pattern similar to that in
the US. In the 1960s, the Mincerian
return to schooling was higher than in
the 1970s. In the 1980s, it slumped fur-
ther before starting to increase again
during the 1990s. Such trends in the
8 See also Swan (1956).
9 The term “raw labour” is used to underline the fact that human capital plays no role in the standard Solow model. The model considers only the
total quantity of labour units used in the production process.
10 The “Mincerian return to schooling” is generally different from the “proper” return to education, i.e. the return on the resources invested in edu-
cation, because it does not notably consider the direct costs of education (de la Fuente, 2003).
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return to schooling are well document-
ed in the literature on wage distribution
and skill-biased technological change.
In the 1970s, the supply of high-skilled
workers was higher than the demand.
This led to a decrease in the rate of
return of schooling. In the 1980s, how-
ever, the increase in the demand of
skilled workers, which is often attribut-
able to an acceleration in the pace of
technical change, outpaced supply
growth. As a result, the rate of return to
schooling rose (EC, 2005). In addition
to this time variation in the return to
schooling, there is significant variation
across EU Member States, with the
parameter value ranging from 0.02 to
0.17. In other words the pay-off for an
additional year of schooling varies
between 2% and 17% in the EU. The
United Kingdom and Ireland show rel-
atively large returns, while Austria,
Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden
have relatively low returns.
2.1.2. Social versus private
returns to education
As noted by Krueger and Kindhal
(2001), much research on the Mincerian
equation has concentrated on how to
interpret the parameter associated with
the years of formal schooling. In the
Mincerian wage equation, this parameter
can be interpreted as a measure of the
private return to schooling only if the
marginal product of labour and the real
wage are proportional and if the correla-
tion between education and wages is due
to the education enhancing productivity
(Becker, 1964). While the first condition
is generally satisfied even in the case of
imperfect competition (Aghion and
Cohen, 2004), the second is more con-
troversial as it has proved problematical
in econometric work to isolate the effect
of education from other factors (Card,
2001; Krueger and Lindhal, 2001;
Temple, 2001; de la Fuente and Ciccone,
2003). To understand these conditions11,
it must be remembered that education
may play not only a productivity-enhanc-
ing role but also a role in the selection
and allocation of resources in the labour
market as well as in transmission of
knowledge, so that the private returns to
education could differ from the social
returns12.
Education as a signalling device
A human capital-enhancing function of
education is not incompatible with theo-
ries that consider education primarily as
a device to help select individuals for
employment, without actually influenc-
ing their productive efficiency that they
will display at work. Indeed, the produc-
tive efficiency of a person may stem
from a wide range of factors on which
education, however, has little impact,
such as innate ability, determination, and
family background. Because such fac-
tors are not observable by potential
employers, education can be used by
employees to signal these “productive
factors” to them (Spence, 1973). A work-
er’s level of education is therefore corre-
lated with, but not the cause of, high pro-
ductivity. Put differently, schooling can
raise earnings (i.e. there is a private
return to schooling) without raising pro-
ductivity (i.e. there is no social return).
Nevertheless, although this hypothesis is
attractive, recent empirical research has
failed to reject the human capital expla-
nation against the screening hypothesis
(Groot and Oosterbeek, 1994; Chevalier
et al., 2003).
Educational externalities
A large theoretical literature underscores
the possibility that the social returns to
education could be higher than the pri-
vate returns because education may be a
source of positive externalities (for a sur-
vey, see Venniker, 2000). According to
Venniker (2000), three different types of
human capital externalities can be identi-
fied: static, dynamic and non-pecuniary
externalities. The idea behind static
externalities is that one employee may
benefit – in terms of higher productivity
and earnings – from another’s education
without any compensation. Lucas (1988)
and others have argued that one person’s
gain from the better education of another
person may also be caused by interac-
tions that take place outside firms.
Dynamic externalities cover the effect of
human capital on technological change
and learning-by-doing. A higher human
capital may indeed affect economic
growth since growth is, to a large extent,
determined by technological progress
and better-educated people could
increase a country’s capacity to produce
(Romer, 1990) and adopt ideas (Nelson
and Phelps, 1966). In addition, learning
is more effective with better-educated
people. Finally, education can generate
non-economic (i.e. non-pecuniary) bene-
fits such as better health, crime reduc-
tion, higher civic participation (OECD,
2001; London Economics, 2005).
The possible existence of positive exter-
nalities from education is the focus of a
large amount of the empirical literature
on the relationship between growth and
human capital. The empirical micro-
economic literature seems less appropri-
ate in addressing the issue of education’s
return on investment for society.
(Krueger and Lindhal, 2001; Harmon,
Oosterbeek and Walker, 2003; Sianesi
and van Reenen, 2003)13.
Empirical macro-economic studies on
human capital and growth have followed
two different approaches (de la Fuente
and Ciccone, 2003; Canton et al., 2005):
a non-structural approach and a structur-
al approach. The non-structural approach
involves the specification and estimation
of an ad hoc equation that relates growth
to a set of economic variables (including
non-conventional ones such as political
instability) that may affect growth
11 A detailed discussion on the methodological issues raised by the interpretation of the slope of the Mincerian wage regression is beyond the scope
of this chapter. For an overview, see in particular Card (2001), Kruger and Lindhal (2001), Temple (2001) and de la Fuente and Ciccone (2003).
12 The term “social return” is used in the literature on the return to education in various ways. Here, we refer to the overall return on an individ-
ual’s education from society’s point of view rather than the private return simply adjusted for taxation and direct costs of education. A large
amount of theoretical literature covers the possibility of positive externalities from education.
13 A few recent empirical micro-economic studies nevertheless attempted to identify educational externalities, especially static ones (Acemoglu and
Angrist, 2001; Moretti, 2004a; Moretti, 2004b).
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(Barro, 1991). The structural approach
involves specification and estimation of
a theoretical model built around a pro-
duction function and, occasionally, an
equation describing the determinants of
technological progress such as the stock
of human capital or R&D expenditure.
This chapter will focus on the structural
approach, whereby a distinction is made
between two assumptions: the standard
assumption, associated with the neoclas-
sical framework, which treats human
capital as an ordinary input in the pro-
duction function (Mankiw, Romer and
Weil, 1992), and an alternative assump-
tion, associated with the theory of
endogenous growth, that sees technolog-
ical progress as a function of the stock of
human capital (Romer, 1990; Nelson and
Phelps, 1966; Benhabib and Spiegel,
1994, 2005; Vandenbussche, Aghion and
Meghir, 2006).
2.2. The standard 
assumption: human capital
as an ordinary input
2.2.1. From the standard to 
the augmented Solow model
The framework developed by Mankiw,
Romer and Weil (1992) builds on the
standard Solow model and is a useful
tool for understanding differences in
economic growth across countries.
However, the model has chiefly been
used to estimate the growth effects of
human capital.
The standard Solow model: basics and
predictions
The standard Solow model envisages
the growth of worker output as depen-
dant on physical capital accumulation.
It assumes that output is produced
using two factors of production – phys-
ical capital and labour – and a neoclas-
sical production function with constant
returns to scale and diminishing returns
to each input14. How much output is
produced, given these inputs, depends
on the current level of technology (or
TFP). This aggregate production block
is then combined with a physical capi-
tal accumulation equation, assuming a
constant and exogenous saving rate, to
produce a general equilibrium model of
the economy.
The standard Solow model predicts that,
in the long run, the economy reaches
equilibrium (known as steady state)
when the output per worker grows at the
given exogenous rate of technological
progress. Indeed, the assumption of
diminishing return to physical accumula-
tion ensures that the economy converges
to a steady state where output per work-
er does not grow without technological
progress. In the steady state without
technological progress, the level of
investment in physical capital equals the
amount of investment necessary to keep
the per-worker capital stock constant. In
the long run, output per worker can grow
only if the economy’s productive
processes are augmented with new tech-
nology that produces additional output
without additional inputs. The steady-
state level of output per worker depends
positively on the saving rate and the tech-
nology level, and negatively on the rate
of population growth, while the steady-
state per worker growth rate depends
only on the rate of technological
progress. This first result answers, from a
theoretical perspective, the question why
countries with high saving rates tend to
be richer, ceteris paribus, or why coun-
tries with high population growth rates
tend to be poorer.
This first result from the standard
Solow model does not explain differ-
ences in growth rates between coun-
tries. More specifically, it does not
address the question of why poor coun-
tries tend to grow faster than rich coun-
tries? However, the Solow model does
allow the derivation of another impor-
tant result in the context of transition
dynamics. Although in the standard
Solow model permanent growth in out-
put per worker can only be explained
by technological progress, temporary
or transitional growth can be due to
several factors, including shocks affect-
ing the saving rate, the rate of popula-
tion growth, the depreciation rate and
the level of technology.
According to the principle of transition
dynamics, the growth rate of an econo-
my is proportional to the gap between
the country’s current position in terms of
output per worker and its (new) steady-
state position (Jones, 1997). During the
transition to the new steady-state growth
path, capital per worker grows more rap-
idly than normal and hence output per
worker also grows more rapidly than
normal. However, the growth slows
down and stops when the economy
reaches its new steady-state because of
the diminishing return to physical capi-
tal. Shocks affecting the saving rate, the
rate of population growth, the deprecia-
tion rate and the level of technology
therefore have level effects only. Applied
to cross-country growth, the principle of
transition dynamics imply, from a theo-
retical point of view, that poorer coun-
tries will tend to have higher growth
rates when catching up or converging
with those with higher standards of liv-
ing. This notion of convergence can also
be understood in terms of either levels or
rates of growth (Islam, 1995). The latter
is due to the fact that in the Solow
model, the steady-state growth rate is
determined by the exogenous rate of
technological progress. Assuming that
technology is a public good, freely avail-
able to all economies, the latter can
reach the same growth rate in the long
run.
Testing the prediction of convergence
The issue of convergence has received
considerable attention in empirical work
in the past decades (for a survey, see
14 “Constant returns to scale” means that a proportionate increase in all factors of production leads to an increase in output of the same propor-
tion. A production function shows “diminishing marginal product” if the marginal product of a factor falls as the amount of the factor increases
while all other factors are held constant.
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Islam, 2003). Baumol (1986), for exam-
ple, examined convergence among a
small sample of industrialised countries
by regressing output growth over the
period 1870–1979 on a constant and ini-
tial income. The results of his regression
suggested almost perfect convergence.
However, further empirical studies have
challenged this finding, at least in its
absolute form – namely, the hypothesis
that poor economies tend to grow faster
per capita than rich ones without condi-
tioning on any other characteristics of
economies (for instance, Bradford De
Long, 1988; Baumol, Batey and Wolf,
1989; Barro, 1991; Barro and Sala-i-
Martin, 1992) – especially when larger
samples (including both developing and
industrialised countries) are considered. 
For this reason, the hypothesis of condi-
tional convergence – where a country’s
growth is conditioned by its specific char-
acteristics – was gradually developed in
the empirical literature (Barro and Sala-i-
Martin, 1992; Mankiw, Romer and Weil,
1992)15. In any event, the relatively disap-
pointing empirical results have tended to
add to the interest in models that go
beyond the neoclassical framework with
its exogenous technological change. In
these “endogenous growth” models,
changes in government policy can influ-
ence the growth rate permanently and not
only transitionally. The latest generation
of these models has endogenised techno-
logical change (Romer, 1990; Grossman
and Helpman, 1991; Aghion and Howitt,
1992, 1998), admitting that the rate of
technological progress depends on eco-
nomic forces and can be influenced by
government policy16.
Augmenting the Solow model with
human capital
In their influential paper, Mankiw,
Romer and Weil (1992) showed that the
neoclassical framework remains appro-
priate for explaining cross-country dif-
ferences in income and growth rates,
when it is augmented to include human
capital accumulation. One key feature of
this model is that in the augmented pro-
duction function, human capital is a dis-
tinct input along with physical capital
and labour, rather than just augmenting
labour itself (Jones, 1996; Hall and
Jones, 1999; Bils and Klenow, 2000).
At the same time, the augmented Solow
model assumes that human capital is
accumulated in the same way as physi-
cal capital, i.e. by foregoing consump-
tion. More fundamentally, the introduc-
tion of human capital as an ordinary
input in the neoclassical production
function leads to “…the implicit
assumption that education affects indi-
vidual’s productivity equally on all
jobs” (Aghion and Howitt, 1998). This
particular way of treating of human
capital in the production function of the
augmented Solow model is fundamen-
tal and has been criticised by a number
of authors as discussed below17.
2.2.2. Estimating the augmented
Solow model: mixed results
In order to gauge empirically the
growth effects of human capital, a large
body of the relevant literature has tried
to estimate the value of the parameter
reflecting the output elasticity of
human capital. This elasticity measures
the percentage change in the level of
output that results from a 1% change in
the stock of human capital. Several
techniques can be used to estimate the
parameter. During the 1990s, studies on
the growth effects of human capital
started by estimating the so-called
“convergence equation” derived from
the augmented Solow model. This
equation shows that, around the steady
state, the level of output per worker is a
function of the determinants of the
steady-state level of output per worker
and the initial level of output per work-
er. In subsequent years, researchers
have directly estimated the augmented
production function using new data sets
on educational attainment. 
Mankiw, Romer and Weil estimated the
above mentioned convergence equation
of the augmented Solow model18. The
former equation, based on the assump-
tion that the economies are at their
steady state, expresses the level of out-
put per worker in terms of exogenous
variables, including the saving rates,
the rate of depreciation and the rate of
population growth. Applying standard
econometric techniques (i.e. Ordinary
Least Squares), the authors made use of
cross-sectional data for the period
1960–1985 for three samples of coun-
tries as follows: 
• The non-oil sample which includes
98 countries, except countries where
the oil industry is dominant; 
• The intermediate sample which cov-
ers 75 countries, i.e. the non-oil pro-
ducing sample without the poor
countries; and 
• The OECD sample which consists of
22 OECD member countries.
In this exercise, the rate of investment
in human capital is proxied by the frac-
tion of the working-age population
enrolled in secondary schooling; the
investment and population growth rates
which are averages for the period
1960–1985; and the rate of technologi-
cal progress which is assumed to be
common to all countries, while the ini-
tial level of technology at the beginning
of the period is a constant that varies
randomly across them. In practice, the
authors included the unobservable ini-
tial level of technology in the distur-
bance term of the equation and pre-
sume it to be independent of all other
variables. The authors found that an
15 Abramowitz already addressed this issue in his article published in 1986.
16 See Section 2.3.
17 See Annex 1 for further technical details regarding the augmented Solow model and the different options to estimate it.
18 See equation (A1.11) in Annex 1.
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increase in the human capital stock has
a significant impact on the level of out-
put for the three groups of countries. In
fact, the implied human capital coeffi-
cient is 0.2319. This result is in line with
the positive findings obtained by Barro
(1991) on the basis of the ad hoc equa-
tions. Moreover, the same authors also
showed that human capital accumula-
tion slows down the convergence to the
steady-state by counteracting the
effects of diminishing returns to physi-
cal capital accumulation.
Several cross-country growth studies
(e.g. Lichtenberg, 1993; Vasudeva
Murthy and Chien, 1997; de la Fuente,
1998) have built on Mankiw, Romer
and Weil’s paper to replicate or extend
the augmented Solow model in various
directions. These studies have more or
less corroborated the results obtained
by these authors (for a survey, see de la
Fuente and Ciccone, 2003; Sianesi and
Van Reenen, 2003).
Nevertheless, a number of studies have
also criticised the framework devel-
oped by Mankiw, Romer and Weil.
Only some of the economic problems
are discussed below. A discussion of
the econometric problems can be found
elsewhere20.
Firstly, Mankiw, Romer and Weil
assumed that an economy accumulates
human capital in the same way that it
accumulates physical capital, that is by
foregoing consumption, despite the fact
that the mechanisms of human capital
accumulation are more complex
(Lucas, 1988; Cohen, 1996; Jones
1996; Hall and Jones, 1999; Bils and
Klenow, 2000). One example of this
approach is Jones (1996) who, in his
extension of the Solow model, followed
Lucas (1988) in assuming that individ-
uals spend time accumulating skills21,22.
In the Lucas model the effort devoted
to the accumulation of human capital
depends negatively on the rate of time
preference (i.e. the marginal rate of
substitution between current and future
consumption) and on the degree of risk
aversion and positively on the produc-
tivity of schooling. Secondly, the
hypothesis that economies have a com-
mon rate of technological progress is
questionable. Given differences in tech-
nology levels, it is natural to assume
that rates of technological progress
must also vary. Thirdly, the assumption
that all economies are close to their
steady states and converge on them at
the same speed is doubtful from an eco-
nomic point of view. Moreover, such
assumption contradicts the specifica-
tion of the model. Indeed, in the model,
the speed of convergence depends, in
particular, on the population growth
rate, which varies from country to
country23. 
A second generation of empirical stud-
ies has addressed these criticisms.
These studies benefited from the fact
that they were able to use recently creat-
ed data sets on human capital stocks and
educational attainment in a large num-
ber of countries over an extended period
(for instance, Kyriacou, 1991; Barro
and Lee, 1993, 2001; Nehru, Swanson
and Dubey, 1995). Using the Barro and
Lee data set (1993), Islam (1995) esti-
mated a variant of the convergence
equation of the Solow augmented
model24 using a simple cross-section
framework on three similar samples of
countries (non-oil, intermediate and
OECD) in order to allow comparison of
his results with Mankiw, Romer and
Weil’s. In so doing, he approximated the
steady-state level of human capital by
applying a value to the stock of human
capital at a given time. His results are
non-significant for the intermediate
sample but they are positive and signif-
icant for the non-oil sample. Islam then
used panel data methods which allowed
him25 to introduce country-specific
level (fixed) effects in order to correct
for the variable bias associated with the
initial level of technology omitted in the
Mankiw, Romer and Weil regression. In
particular, these authors assumed that
the initial level of technology included
in the disturbance term of the regression
is uncorrelated with the regressors.
However, as this is unlikely to be the
case, the estimated coefficients
obtained from standard econometric
methods (i.e. Ordinary Least Squares)
tend to be biased. Once country-specif-
ic fixed effects are considered, Islam
found that human capital has no posi-
tive effects on growth. Later, Lee,
Pesaran and Smith (1997) extended
Islam’s exercise to show that time series
indicate that the rates of technological
progress vary across countries.
As more data sets became available the
initial research programme initiated by
Mankiw, Romer and Weil attracted
even stronger criticism from authors
who estimated variants of the structural
form of the augmented Solow model,
instead of the reduced forms. These
new regressions allow these authors to
abandon the assumption that
economies converge to their steady
states and are close to them. For
19 This means that a 1% increase in human capital stock is associated with a 0.23% increase in GDP.
20 A detailed discussion of the econometric problems associated with Mankiw, Romer and Weil’s paper is beyond the scope of this paper. For a
detailed discussion on this issue see, for instance, Gurgaud (2000) and de la Fuente and Ciccone (2003).
21 In his specification, where S is the time spent on skill accumulation by a representative member of the labour force or years of school-
ing and θ is the Mincerian rate of return to a year of schooling. One additional year of schooling increases the “effective” labour input by 100θ%
and increases the wage by the same amount. This specification was first suggested by Bils and Klenow in an earlier version of their paper.
22 In order to avoid this type of problems, it may be more appropriate to estimate equation (A1.12) in the annex since it does not express the stock
of human capital in relation to its exogenous determinants.
23 In order to avoid this type of problem, it may be more appropriate to estimate equations (A1.8) or (A1.9) in Annex 1.
24 Equation (A1.12) in Annex 1.
25 See also Caselli, Esquivel and Lefort (1996).
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instance, Benhabib and Spiegel (1994)
estimated a variant of the structural
form of the augmented Solow model
expressed in growth rates26 over the
period 1965-1985, using the large data
set on schooling from Kyriacou (1991).
Pritchett (2001) undertook a similar
exercise using data on education from
Barro and Lee (1993) and Nehru,
Swanson and Dubey (1995). The
results obtained from these studies
showed that increases in human capital
resulting from improvements in educa-
tional attainment had no positive effect
on the growth in output per worker.
Examination of the results obtained
from some of the most influential
empirical studies on the growth effects
of human capital in the framework of
the augmented Solow model over the
1990s appears to show opposite results.
While those studies that estimated mod-
els based on the convergence equation
tended to show positive and significant
effects of human capital on growth,
those that estimated models based
directly on the augmented production
function revealed no positive effects.
2.2.3. Measurement error in
human capital: another 
perspective on the augmented
Solow model
The disappointing results obtained
from the empirical studies described
above have themselves been widely
criticised (for a review, see Temple,
2001; de la Fuente and Ciccone, 2003).
Low data quality on schooling
In particular, several scholars – includ-
ing, among others, de la Fuente and
Doménech (2001) and Krueger and
Kindhal (2001) – stressed the existence
of measurement error bias as result of
the low quality data on schooling in
these studies. In the earlier standard
growth regressions, the main conse-
quence of the “noise” introduced by the
low quality data on schooling had the
main effect of reducing the human cap-
ital coefficient. In practice the measure-
ment error implies changes in the meas-
ured stock of human capital independ-
ent of the level of output per worker.
Using improved data sets on human
capital, several studies (de la Fuente and
Doménech, 2002, 2006; Cohen and
Soto, 2001; Bassanini and Scarpetta,
2001) found a positive relationship
between human capital and growth in
several standard growth specifications.
For instance, de la Fuente and
Doménech (2006) wrote that “…the
true value of the elasticity of output
with respect to years of schooling is
almost certainly above 0.60, that is, at
least twice as large as the largest esti-
mate of reference in the previous stud-
ies”. These results are remarkable given
that, in the studies by de la Fuente and
Doménech and by Bassanini and
Scarpetta, they are applicable to the
OECD countries. Indeed, as noticed by
Temple (2001), the bulk of studies on
the growth effects of education have
focused on large samples of countries
dominated by developing countries,
whilst their conclusions have often been
generalised to developed countries.
The quality of schooling matters too
Although measurement error due to the
poor data quality on enrolment rates or
years of schooling as a proxy of human
capital has reduced the human capital
coefficient in many standard growth
regressions, the measurement error
caused by disregarding differences in
the quality of schooling is far greater
(Wößmann, 2003). However, an alterna-
tive data set that has the potential to
overcome these problems to some extent
was created by Hanushek and Kimko
(2000). They used direct measures of
labour force quality obtained from inter-
national tests of cognitive skills in math-
ematics and science. Their results sup-
port the idea that education has a sub-
stantial effect on rates of growth.
Following up the ideas of Hanushek and
Kimko (2000), Coulombe, Tremblay
and Marchand (2004) used direct meas-
urements of human capital derived from
literacy scores from the International
Adult Literacy Survey. Based on a sam-
ple of OECD countries, their results
indicate that, overall, human capital
based on such measurements has a pos-
itive and significant effect on transition-
al growth and in the long run on levels
of per capita output.
2.3. An alternative 
assumption: technological
progress as a function of
human capital
2.3.1. Human capital, technology
creation and endogenous growth
From transitional growth to sustained
growth
The limits of the standard Solow model
have also given rise to new theoretical
growth models grouped under the label
“endogenous growth theory”. One key
feature of this theory is that permanent
changes in variables that are potentially
affected by government policies, lead
to permanent changes in growth rates
and not to transitional growth, as is the
case in the neoclassical framework27.
Endogenous growth models cover, inter
alia, the early “AK” growth models28 of
Romer (1986), Lucas (1988) and
Rebelo (1991) as well as the subse-
quent models of Romer (1990),
26 See equation (A1.9) in Annex 1. 
27 It can also be argued that the distinction between transitional growth and sustained (or permanent) growth is to some extent semantic if the
speed of convergence to the steady-state is very slow.
28 The “AK” growth models are endogenous models within which capital accumulation (covering here all the factors of accumulation) is not sub-
ject to diminishing returns like in the Solow model. Indeed, there are constant returns to the accumulation of capital. Therefore, the capital stock
is always growing and growth in these models never stops. The growth rate of the economy is thus an increasing function of the investment rate.
Government policies that increase the investment rate of this economy permanently will increase the growth rate of the economy permanently.
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Grossman and Helpman (1991) and
Aghion and Howitt (1992, 1998) focus-
ing more explicitly on endogenous
technological change. In the endoge-
nous growth theory, human capital
plays a predominant role. Aghion and
Howitt (1998) indicated that the role of
human capital in endogenous growth
models can be divided into two classes.
The first broadens the concept of capi-
tal to include human capital. In these
models, permanent growth is due to the
accumulation of human capital over
time (Uzawa, 1965; Lucas, 1988). The
second class of models links growth to
the existing stock of human capital,
which acts as a factor of technology
creation (Romer, 1990). These are
often referred to as “R&D-based mod-
els of economic growth” (Jones, 1995).
Sustained growth with human capital
as a factor of production
Lucas (1988) includes human capital as
an additional input in the production
function while maintaining the other
features of the neoclassical growth
model. In the Lucas model, output per
worker is a function of the physical
capital stock per worker, the proportion
of time devoted to production (as
opposed to accumulation of human
capital), the stock of human capital per
worker and the average human capital
stock in the economy. The average
human capital stock is introduced in the
function to allow for the presence of
externalities. While physical capital is
accumulated in the same way as in the
standard Solow model (i.e. by forego-
ing consumption), Lucas (1988)
assumed that human capital is acquired
by spending time in an educational
process. This creates, for the workers, a
trade-off between time spent on the
production of output and time spent on
accumulation of human capital, which
will increase their marginal productivi-
ty in the future.
Moreover, Lucas also considered that
human capital production technology
has constant returns, implying that the
growth rate of human capital is inde-
pendent from the level of human capi-
tal stock because it depends only on the
time spent by individuals on accumu-
lating skills. The constant returns imply
that the model exhibits a positive
growth rate of output per worker in the
steady state, even though physical cap-
ital has diminishing returns and there
are positive externalities. From this
scenario, differences in growth rates
across countries are due solely to dif-
ferences in the rates of human capital
accumulation and not to differences in
the levels of their human capital stocks.
Compared with the augmented Solow
model, the Lucas model gives human
capital a much more significant role in
economic growth. In the former,
human capital can have an impact on
growth only during the transition to the
steady state, while it can be a source of
permanent growth in the latter. In
effect, this means that higher human
capital accumulation has only a level
effect in the augmented Solow model
since it can lead to an increase in the
level of output per worker, while in the
Lucas model it has a rate effect because
it can lead to a permanent increase in
the rate of growth. 
Nonetheless, both the augmented
Solow and the Lucas models have sim-
ilar drawbacks (Aghion and Howitt,
2006). In particular, human capital is
treated as an additional input in the
production function. Human capital is
therefore assumed to have an impact
on the productivity of workers whatev-
er their jobs – either routine or innova-
tive. Certainly, education is crucial for
routine jobs. However, it is also rea-
sonable to assume that education is
particularly central to jobs requiring
adaptation to change and innovation,
which are increasing in a knowledge-
based economy.
Moreover, neither the augmented
Solow nor the Lucas models attribute
growth to the level of human capital
stock, neither to the steady state nor in
the steady state itself. As a conse-
quence, it is necessary to keep on
increasing the investment rate in
human capital to ensure permanent
growth or to increase the rate of
growth.
Finally, neither the augmented Solow
nor the Lucas models explain the
mechanism by which growth is actual-
ly sustained in the real world. While in
the Lucas model permanent growth is
attributable only to human capital accu-
mulation, several authors (for example,
see Grossman and Helpman, 1994)
have pointed out an alternative view
that technological progress has been
the real force behind the sustained rise
in living standards over the past
decades. While in the augmented
Solow model, technological progress is
the only source of sustained rising liv-
ing standards, it remains exogenous,
whereas in the real world the rate
depends on economic forces and can be
influenced by economic policy.
Sustained growth with human capital
as factor of technology creation
The subsequent generation of endoge-
nous growth models typified by the
R&D-based models of Romer (1990),
Grossman and Helpman (1991) and
Aghion and Howitt (1992) adds a new
dimension to endogenise technological
progress by modelling it as a linear
function of the stock of human capital.
Romer (1990) considers an economy
where endogenous technological
progress is the engine of sustained
growth. The Romer economy consists of
three sectors as follows: a research sec-
tor, an intermediate-goods sector and a
final-goods sector. In brief, the research
sector uses the existing stock of knowl-
edge and skilled workers employed in
that sector to produce new knowledge in
the form of new designs for new vari-
eties of capital goods. It then sells the
new designs to intermediate-goods
firms to produce specific capital goods.
The intermediate-goods firms subse-
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quently manufacture the capital goods
and sell them to the final-goods sector,
which in turn produces the output.
In the Romer model (1990), output in
the final-goods sector is produced
using skilled workers employed in that
sector and a number of different capital
goods from the intermediate-goods
sector. This number of different capital
goods is measured by the level of tech-
nology or knowledge stock. In that sec-
tor, firms are perfectly competitive, as
in the Solow model. Romer sets out a
crucial assumption about the attributes
of knowledge. Knowledge embodied in
new designs is assumed to be a nonri-
valrous good because it involves a
fixed cost of production and zero mar-
ginal cost. In other words, once know-
ledge is produced by a firm in the
research sector, it can be used simulta-
neously by the others without any
financial compensation. This implies
the presence of positive externalities in
the research sector and so new know-
ledge can therefore be accumulated
over time even if the stock of human
capital is constant – because the pro-
ductivity of the high-skilled workers is
proportional to the existing stock of
knowledge. More precisely, Romer pre-
supposes that the technology for gener-
ating knowledge has constant returns
and as a consequence, the pace at
which new knowledge is produced is
proportional to the level of human cap-
ital and the existing knowledge stock.
However, under this scenario what
would encourage the research sector to
produce new knowledge? Since
knowledge is nonrival, it cannot be
paid at its marginal product under per-
fect competition without engendering
negative profits and therefore there is
no incentive for the creation of new
knowledge in the research sector. In
order to overcome this difficulty,
Romer introduces imperfect competi-
tion in the intermediate-goods sector
and the research sector sells to an
intermediate goods firm the exclusive
right to use a design for manufacturing
new capital goods. In that respect,
knowledge is partially excludable
from its free use by intermediate
goods firms as the research sector can,
to some extent, compensate for its
activity.
Sustained growth in the Romer model
is driven by the accumulation of
knowledge through an expansion in
product varieties. The precondition for
sustained growth in this model is that
the knowledge production technology
has constant returns. Since knowledge
accumulation drives growth, the size of
the skilled labour force in the research
sector and its productivity determine
the growth rate of output in the steady-
state. Moreover, since the model
assumes that the human capital
employed in the research sector is the
same as that for the production of out-
put in the final-goods sector, the rate of
output growth is ultimately determined
by the stock of human capital
employed in the whole economy. This
finding is remarkable with regards to
the previous specification of the role of
human capital in economic growth. In
particular, when human capital is con-
sidered solely as an input for produc-
tion (such as in the Lucas model
(1988)) output growth can be affected
only by different rates of human capi-
tal accumulation, but when human
capital is considered a factor of tech-
nology creation, growth depends on
the stock of human capital.
2.3.2. Human capital, technology
diffusion and growth
Although the Romer model (1990)
shows that growth is sensitive to the
stock of human capital when it is con-
sidered as a factor of technology cre-
ation, several authors have suggested
growth could also depend on the stock
of human capital when the latter is seen
as a factor of technology diffusion. 
The idea that education can speed the
process of technology diffusion was
first put forward by Nelson and Phelps
in their seminal article published in
1966. Nelson and Phelps noticed that
US farmers with relatively high levels
of education, have tended to adopt
profitable innovations disseminated by
the US Department of agriculture earli-
er than the farmers with little educa-
tion. In order to explain this observable
fact, the authors rank jobs or functions
according to the degree to which adap-
tation to change or leaning is required.
At the bottom of the scale, there are the
highly routinised jobs for which adap-
tation and learning are not crucial.
These jobs and functions are often
repetitive and characterised by low
uncertainty. At the top of the scale,
there are innovative jobs for which
capacities of adaptation to change and
learning are essential in order to keep
abreast of technological progress and to
assimilate it. 
Nelson and Phelps assume that a well-
educated workforce is necessary on
both sides of the scale. Even the high-
ly routinised jobs demand a high-
skilled workforce to master the neces-
sary discrimination among the tasks to
be done. However these authors argue
that a well-educated workforce is par-
ticularly important for the innovative
jobs because “…education enhances
one’s ability to receive, decode and
understand information”29. Moreover,
these authors insist on the fact that the
function of keeping abreast of techno-
logical improvements is not limited to
scientists and engineers but extends to
other occupations, in particular man-
agers, within enterprises: “…their
education is obviously important; but
so too is the education and sophistica-
tion of top management which must
make the final decision” (Nelson and
Phelps, 1966).
Other economists have supported this
important feature of education. For
29 Quoted by Bartel and Lichtenberg (1987).
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Welch (1970), “the productive value of
education has its roots in two distinct
phenomena. Increased education may
simply permit a worker to accomplish
more with the resources at hand … [or
it may] enhance a worker’s ability to
acquire and decode information about
costs and productive characteristics of
other inputs, such as a change in educa-
tion results in a change in other inputs
including perhaps the use of some
“new” factors that otherwise would not
be used”30. Welch names the first phe-
nomenon the “worker effect” and the
second one the “allocative effect” of
schooling. Schultz (1975) argues that
education influences “the efficiency of
human beings to perceive, to interpret
correctly, and to undertake action that
will appropriately reallocate their
resources” in response to changes in
economic conditions which are in gen-
eral not of their own making. Put differ-
ently, education increases the ability of
workers to deal with disequilibria and
to capture what may be termed “dise-
quilibrium rents”. In a Schumpeterian
economy, where disequilibria are inces-
sant31, these rents are typically generat-
ed by technical change (Schultz, 1975;
Bowles, Gintis and Obsorne, 2001).
Based on the hypothesis that education
speeds the process of technology diffu-
sion, Nelson and Phelps (1966) built a
simple model to explain technological
progress32. The model postulates that
while the growth of the technology
frontier – which is treated as exogenous
in the model – reveals the rate at which
new technologies are created, the
growth of TFP depends on the absorp-
tion of these new technologies, and
varies positively with the gap between
the level of frontier technology and the
level of current technology. In addition,
the model assumes that the speed at
which this gap is closed depends posi-
tively on educational attainment. In
other words, the growth of TFP or tech-
nological progress is an increasing
function of the level of human capital
and is proportional to the distance to
the technology frontier. It is important
to note that, in this model, human capi-
tal affects the growth of TFP only in the
transition towards the technological
frontier. As a consequence, the rate
effect becomes a level effect in the long
run. 
Given this particular treatment of the role
of human capital in economic growth,
Nelson and Phelps conclude: “…the
usual, straightforward insertion of some
index of education attainment in the pro-
duction function [like in the neoclassical
framework] may constitute a gross mis-
specification of the relation between edu-
cation and the dynamics of production”.
2.3.3. Distance to frontier, 
technological progress and
human capital
The two sources of technological
progress
The two previous sections have pre-
sented models of technological
progress within which the human capi-
tal stock is considered, on one hand, as
factor of technology creation and, on
the other hand, as factor of technology
diffusion. Such assumptions are of par-
ticular interest because they make
growth sensitive to the stock of human
capital and not to its accumulation and
at the same time, imply that human
capital cannot simply be considered as
an additional factor of production.
However, taken separately, these two
assumptions have a major drawback –
they neglect the fact that the source of
technological progress is dual. As
emphasised by Benhabib and Spiegel
(1994) and Acemoglu, Aghion and
Zilibotti (2006), among others, techno-
logical progress is the outcome not only
of technology creation but also of tech-
nology diffusion and absorption.
Distance to frontier, technological
progress and level of human capital
It is reasonable to assume that the
respective contribution of technology
creation and diffusion to technological
progress depends on the level of techno-
logical development of economies. 
In less advanced economies, technology
diffusion and absorption can certainly
promote growth because economies at
the forefront of technology act as the
“locomotive” of growth by expanding
the set of attainable knowledge, pulling
all others through the “catch-up” effect.
However, the strength of this effect with
the technology frontier decreases with
the level of technological development,
to the benefit of technology creation.
Indeed, the creation of more advanced
technology becomes progressively
more important as a country moves
closer to the technology frontier
because “… catching up with the fron-
tier translates into smaller and smaller
technological improvements as a coun-
try starts from an initial productivity
level that is closer to the frontier tech-
nology” (Vandenbussche, Aghion and
Meghir, 2006).
Based on these considerations,
Benhabib and Spiegel (1994, 2005)
built alternative model(s) that allow the
level of human capital stock to directly
affect the growth of TFP through tech-
nology creation and technology diffu-
sion33. Following Romer (1990), they
assume that the level of human capital
30 Quoted by Bowles, Gintis and Osborne (2001).
31 According to Schumpeter, capitalism is by nature a form or method of economic change that can never be stationary. Capitalism has an evolu-
tionary character because it is subjected to a process of creative destruction where new innovations destroy old ones.
32 This model is described in more technical detail in Annex 2.
33 Although the basic idea behind these models is the same, the technology diffusion and catch-up processes are slightly different. For instance, in
Benhabib and Spiegel (1994), the technology diffusion and catch-up process is a confined exponential diffusion process. In their paper published
in 2005, Benhabib and Spiegel introduce an alternative formulation for the technology diffusion and catch-up process in line with the logistic
model of technology diffusion. For more technical details regarding these two processes of technology diffusion, see Annex 2.
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stock may directly impact on TFP
growth or technological progress by
determining the capacity of countries
to create domestically new technolo-
gies. The term “domestically” indicates
that the level of human capital stock
increases technological progress inde-
pendently. They also adapt the Nelson-
Phelps framework in order to allow the
level of human capital stock to speed
up the adoption of technologies from
abroad, thus fostering technological
progress. This is realised by adding to
their model a multiplicative term
involving the level of human capital
stock and “backwardness”, measured
as a country’s distance from the world
technology leader, to capture the
“catch-up” effect.
In Benhabib and Spiegel (1994), the
authors tested their specification on a
sample of economies, covering both
developing and developed economies
over the period 1965–1985. In this arti-
cle, the technological gap of a country
(i.e. its backwardness) is proxied by the
gap in terms of GDP. For the full sam-
ple of 78 economies, they found that
the “catch-up” measure of their model
emerges positively and significantly,
while the “innovation” measure is neg-
ative and insignificant. 
They also tested the same empirical spec-
ification on two smaller samples of
economies. In the reduced sample cover-
ing the richest countries, they showed that
education has a positive impact on the
growth of TFP through technological cre-
ation. Reciprocally, Benhabib and
Spiegel (1994) demonstrated that educa-
tion has a positive effect on the growth of
TFP through technological diffusion in
the poorest countries. The conclusions
from this alternative model are particular-
ly significant in terms of policy implica-
tions. The authors showed that it is the
level of human capital stocks rather than
their growth rates that affect overall
growth. Moreover, because the level of
education has positive effects on the
growth of TFP through the creation of
new technologies and their absorption, its
affects growth permanently – not just
transitionally, as is the case in the neo-
classical framework. However, it should
be stressed that the distinction between
level and rate effects can be difficult to
make if the impact of the stock of human
capital on a country’s ability to generate
new technologies is low. Indeed, the
effect of human capital on TFP growth
through technology diffusion will contin-
ue to decrease as the country moves
towards the technology frontier.
Distance to the frontier, technological
progress and high-skilled human capital
Despite the important policy implica-
tions suggested by Benhabib and
Spiegel, their approach does not make a
distinction between the different types
of human capital – only the level of
human capital stock, as proxied by the
average years of schooling, is consid-
ered. As a result, this approach implic-
itly treats primary, secondary and terti-
ary education as perfect substitutes
since countries with similar levels of
human capital stock can have different
distributions in terms of the types of
human capital. This can be shown with
a simple example. Consider two
economies A and B. Suppose that the
cumulative years of schooling for pri-
mary, secondary and tertiary education
are respectively 6, 12 and 18 in both
economies. Suppose also that, in econ-
omy A, 30% of the workers have a pri-
mary level of schooling, 20% have a
secondary level of schooling and final-
ly 50% have a tertiary level of school-
ing. The average years of schooling in
this economy is 13.2. If in economy B,
the distribution of the workers between
the different levels of schooling is 10%,
60% and 30%, this economy will have
the same average years of schooling.
Following Benhabib and Spiegel, the
impact of education on the growth of
TFP will have the same magnitude in
economies A and B if they are at the
same distance to the technology fron-
tier, despite the fact that the fraction of
high-skilled workers is much higher in
economy A.
This drawback of the Benhabib-Spiegel
analysis has been emphasised by
Vandenbussche, Aghion and Meghir
(2006) and Aghion and Cohen (2004).
While these authors agree with
Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) seeing
technological progress as dual, they
argue that the creation of new technolo-
gies and their absorption require differ-
ent types of human capital. They
assume that a high-skilled workforce is
better suited to the creation of new
technologies while a low-skilled work-
force is more appropriate to their
absorption. These authors conclude
that economies close to the technology
frontier need to focus on the creation of
new technologies by concentrating
their efforts on tertiary education.
Conversely, economies far from the
technology frontier should concentrate
more on absorption by giving particular
importance to primary and secondary
education. These conclusions support
the view already expressed by
Acemoglu, Aghion and Zilibotti (2006)
that economies have to be equipped
with “appropriate institutions” in rela-
tion to their level of development, in
order to sustain growth34.
Distance to frontier, technological
progress and adaptable human capital
The idea defended by Vandenbussche,
Aghion and Meghir (2006) is particu-
larly interesting because it allows
understanding of the role of education
in economic growth in industrialised
countries such as the EU Member
States. In these countries, it is not so
much the levels of the human capital
stocks that matter since they are charac-
terised by similar average years of
schooling. Conversely, what makes the
difference is the skill composition of
human capital and more precisely, the
34 This idea of “appropriate institutions” was first expressed by Gerschenkron (1962). According to this author, backward economies have to be
equipped with “appropriate institutions” in order to “catch up” faster.
Employment in Europe 2006
185
fraction of high-skilled workers in the
labour force. Such an idea is in accor-
dance with the European Commission’s
view, expressed in the Communication
Working together for growth and jobs. A
new start for the Lisbon Strategy and by
the EU Member States in the Title VIII
of the Amsterdam Treaty, article 125.
However both these policy documents
refer to the importance of an adaptable
workforce as well. The European
Commission states that economies
endowed with a high-skilled and adapt-
able workforce are better able to create
and make effective use of new tech-
nologies and to embrace change in its
Communication Working together for
growth and jobs. A new start for the
Lisbon Strategy35. The Integrated
Guidelines for Growth and Jobs
(2005–2008) adopted by the Council of
the European Union36 also underline the
importance of enhancing the adaptabil-
ity of workers and enterprises in order
for “Europe to improve its capacity to
anticipate, trigger and absorb economic
and social change”. According to these
Guidelines, this requires “…employ-
ment-friendly labour costs, modern
forms of work organisation and well-
functioning labour markets allowing
more flexibility combined with
employment security to meet the needs
of companies and workers”.
The notion of “adaptability” expressed in
these policy documents can be under-
stood here in relation to the ideas devel-
oped by Nelson and Phelps (1966) and
more generally by Schultz (1975). The
adaptability of workers is crucial in order
to reallocate resources in response to
changes in economic conditions or to
economic disequilibria. These authors
assume that the capacity to adapt to
change or the ability to deal with dis-
equilibria is one of the main features of a
well-educated workforce. However, it is
also reasonable to assume that the degree
of adaptability of the labour force is sen-
sitive to the forms of work organisation
that workers face. In particular there may
be forms of work organisation that pro-
mote more than others the capacity of
high-skilled workers to adapt to changes
in economic conditions and their ability
to capture “disequilibrium rents” gener-
ated in particular by technological
progress. Such consideration is signifi-
cant because it implies that the growth
effects of a skilled human capital stock
may have different magnitudes depend-
ing on whether the work environment is
designed to encourage the effective use
of the adaptability of the high-skilled
workers for technological progress.
Based on the literature on the “high
performance work system” which deals
with the diffusion of Japanese-style
work practices in the US and Europe,
and the literature on organisational
design and innovation (for a survey of
these literatures see Lam, 2004),
Arundel et al. (2006) – following
Lorenz and Valeyre (2005), there devel-
oped a set of EU-wide aggregate meas-
ures of forms of organisation to explore
the relationship between innovation
and the organisation of work. In order
to map the forms of organisation adopt-
ed by firms across the EU, they used
the results of the Third survey on
European working conditions carried
out by the European Foundation for the
Improvement of Living and Working
Conditions. The authors identified four
main forms of work organisation as fol-
lows: 
• “Discretionary learning organisa-
tion”;
• “Lean production”; 
• “Taylorism”; and 
• “Simple organisation”. 
According to these authors, “discre-
tionary learning organisation” is distin-
guished by high levels of autonomy in
work combined with high levels of learn-
ing, problem-solving and task complexi-
ty. Like “discretionary learning”, “lean
production” involves problem solving
and learning, but is nevertheless charac-
terised by low levels of employee discre-
tion in setting work practices and meth-
ods and the work tends to be highly
monotonous. However, the use of job
rotation and teamwork are much higher
and work effort is more constrained by
quality norms of production.
“Taylorism” is essentially the opposite of
“discretionary leaning”, with low discre-
tion and low levels of learning and prob-
lem solving activities. The work is
extremely monotonous. Finally, “simple
organisation” involves less complex
tasks, being more individualistic than all
the other forms of organisation and less
monotonous than “lean production” and
“Taylorism”.
Because “discretionary learning” sup-
ports high levels of autonomy in work,
combined with high levels of learning,
problem-solving and task complexity,
this form of organisation may be better
suited to reallocate resources in
response to changes in economic con-
ditions or to economic disequilibria
and to allow high-skilled workers to
capture “disequilibrium rents”.
Discretionary learning may thus speed
up technology diffusion because it
allows high-skilled workers to deal
with new and better production possi-
bilities not of their own making. Such
forms of organisation may also accel-
erate technology creation since it pro-
vides the opportunity for high-skilled
workers to reallocate resources
towards new profitable economic
prospects in order to create new dise-
quilibria and in consequence to capture
new “disequilibrium rents”. As
economies move closer to the technol-
ogy frontier, the creation of new dise-
quilibria, driven by technical change,
constitutes the main source of profits,
and the payoff to encourage the effec-
tive use of the adaptability of the high-
skilled workers becomes higher.
35 See footnote 1.
36 See footnote 2.
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Arundel et al. (2006) shows that two
institutional factors, in particular, pro-
mote the use of “discretionary learning”,
beyond formal education. The first factor
is vocational training, which helps
employees adapt their skills and knowl-
edge to changes in economic conditions.
There is indeed a strong positive correla-
tion between the use of discretionary
learning across the EU and the percent-
age of enterprises providing training for
their employees. The second factor is less
obvious. The use of “discretionary learn-
ing” seems to be more prevalent in those
EU countries where unemployment bene-
fits are high. The authors explain such
correlation by the fact that, in “discre-
tionary learning organisations”, the skills
and competencies of employees are con-
tinuously subject to change and career
paths tend to be less structured than other
types of organisations. In that respect,
high unemployment benefits increase the
feeling of security, which in turn can
encourage individuals to engage in dis-
cretionary learning organisations despite
the increased risk of unemployment37. 
3. Econometric 
evidence of the
growth-effects of
human capital
through technological
progress in the EU
Member States
In order to assess the impact of human
capital on technological progress
through technology creation and diffu-
sion as discussed above, this section
presents regressions for a panel data set
of 14 old EU Member States for the
period from 1960 until 2000. The first
empirical specification is derived from
the Benhabib-Spiegel model (2005)
within which the level of human capital
affects the growth of TFP or technolog-
ical progress38. In the subsequent empir-
ical specification, the Benhabib-Spiegel
model is modified by letting technolog-
ical progress or growth of TFP depend
on the fraction of high-skilled and
adaptable human capital. However,
before examining these specifications,
the data are discussed.
3.1. Data
Several sources of data are used to con-
struct the panel data set covering 14 EU
Member States observed every five years
from 1960 to 2000. These 14 countries
consist of the EU-15 except Luxembourg
(due to the lack of data on educational
attainment for the whole period under
consideration). The data set is restricted
to the EU before the 2004 enlargement
due to data availability.
3.1.1. Measurement of total 
factor productivity
Total factor productivity (TFP) is
derived from a constant return to scale
Cobb-Douglas production function,
and is that part of the output that can
not be explained by the measurable
quantities of physical capital and
labour (decomposed into both the num-
ber of employees and the average hours
worked per employee)39. 
Estimates of the annualised five-year
average growth rate in TFP for the 14
EU Member States and the US between
1960 and 2000 are shown in Table 1.
Most of these countries experienced
decreases in the growth of TFP in the
1960s and 1970s but during the 1980s,
they exhibited contrasted trends. While
the growth of TFP continued to decline
in countries such as Belgium, Finland
and Spain it increased in other coun-
tries, including, for example, Denmark,
Ireland and Sweden. In the 1990s, these
latter countries maintained their strong
growth in TFP in contrast to Belgium,
France, Italy and Spain, where TFP
stagnated.
TFP estimates for the 14 EU Member
States relative to the US level in 1960
and 2000 are displayed in Chart 1. Not
surprisingly, all the EU Member States
were closer to the technology frontier
in 2000 than in 1960 due to the “catch-
up” effect. In 2000, those Member
States with the smallest distances to the
technology frontier were Belgium,
Denmark, France and Germany, while
the southern European countries were
the farthest from the US level.
3.1.2. Measurement of 
educational attainment
Data on educational attainment are those
of de la Fuente and Doménech (2002).
The data set40 gives series on the distribu-
tion of the adult population by educa-
tional level (i.e. primary schooling; lower
and upper secondary schooling; higher
education, first cycle or shorter courses
and second cycle or full-length courses)
in 21 OECD countries covering the peri-
od between 1960 and either 1990 or
1995. The data set provides no estimates
for France, Portugal, Spain and the
United Kingdom for 1995. In order to
complete the data set, we apply trend
extrapolation of the distribution of the
adult population by educational level to
1995. In our empirical specifications, the
fraction of high-skilled human capital is
the share of adults with higher education
in total adult population.
37 For further discussion on the relationship between flexibility and security, see Chapter 2.
38 See Annex 2 for a brief technical description of this model.
39 ln A=logY-0.35ln K-0.65ln L, where A is the level of TFP or the Solow residual, Y is real GDP in 2000 prices, K is the net (physical) capital stock in 2000
prices, and L is labour input which is decomposed into both the number of employees and the average hours worked per employee. Observations
for average working hours are retrieved from the AMECO database and the database of the Groningen Growth & Development Centre. Data for the
other variables are from the AMECO database. In this exercise, the growth of total factor productivity is defined as the annualised 5 years growth
rate. The capital and labour elasticities are calibrated on the basis of the income share of capital and labour. The HP (Hodrick-Prescott) Filter is applied
to the productivity series in order to reduce the influence of short-run variations in the form of business cycle effects and other processes.
40 The complete data set is available at http://iei.uv.es/~rdomenec/human/human.html.
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60-65 65-70 70-75 75-80 80-85 85-90 90-95 95-00
AT 0.0379 0.0341 0.0226 0.0122 0.0104 0.0127 0.0123 0.0104
BE 0.0347 0.0303 0.0231 0.0148 0.0121 0.0110 0.0088 0.0084
DE 0.0248 0.0229 0.0171 0.0100 0.0076 0.0133 0.0154 0.0125
DK 0.0243 0.0177 0.0083 0.0054 0.0080 0.0109 0.0157 0.0146
EL 0.0688 0.0504 0.0269 0.0043 -0.0083 -0.0030 0.0058 0.0179
ES 0.0545 0.0376 0.0247 0.0143 0.0119 0.0090 0.0050 0.0024
FI 0.0234 0.0253 0.0224 0.0171 0.0159 0.0153 0.0193 0.0225
FR 0.0377 0.0290 0.0196 0.0148 0.0142 0.0132 0.0104 0.0089
IE 0.0214 0.0235 0.0217 0.0162 0.0168 0.0260 0.0329 0.0324
IT 0.0431 0.0336 0.0212 0.0128 0.0100 0.0119 0.0102 0.0059
NL 0.0245 0.0237 0.0178 0.0094 0.0078 0.0103 0.0108 0.0096
PT 0.0629 0.0496 0.0329 0.0185 0.0150 0.0193 0.0141 0.0078
SE 0.0253 0.0173 0.0077 0.0028 0.0066 0.0094 0.0142 0.0182
UK 0.0202 0.0181 0.0136 0.0114 0.0147 0.0143 0.0147 0.0146
US 0.0229 0.0151 0.0092 0.0068 0.0089 0.0104 0.0111 0.0123
Source: DG EMPL calculations based on AMECO and Groningen Growth & Development Centre databases.
Table 1 – Estimates of annualised five-year growth rates of total factor productivity, 1960 – 2000
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Source: DG-EMPL calculations based on AMECO and Groningen Growth & Development Centre databases.
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41 See Section 2.3.3. for a justification of the choice of this form of work organisation. As discussed earlier, “discretionary learning organisation” is
characterised by high levels of autonomy in work in conjunction with high levels of learning, problem-solving and task complexity.
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The shares of the adult population with
tertiary level of education in relation to
total adult population for the same
countries in 1960 and 1995 are shown
in Chart 2. This share rose in all these
countries between 1960 and 1995,
although the US showed the most dra-
matic increase in the share. Among the
EU Member States, Belgium, France
and Sweden exhibited the highest pro-
portion of the adult population with ter-
tiary education in 1995 – albeit well
behind that of the US.
3.1.3. Measurement of 
adaptability
Data on adaptability is derived from the
Arundel et al. (2006) study and corre-
sponds to the fraction of employees
involved in “discretionary learning
organisations” in the 14 EU Member
States41.
In order to obtain the figures for the
EU Member States, Arundel et al.
(2006) used the Third survey on
European working conditions of the
European Foundation for the
Improvement of Living and Working
Conditions to construct 15 binary vari-
ables associated with the different
work practices identified in the litera-
ture. They then undertook a factor
analysis combined with a cluster
analysis, to identify the relationships
that exist among these variables and to
assign employees to four clusters cor-
responding to distinct groups of work
systems: “discretionary learning
organisation”, “lean production”,
“Taylorism” and “simple organisa-
tion”. These results were then used by
Arundel et al. to examine the national
differences in forms of work organisa-
tion, (i.e. the distribution of employees
by country and work organisation
cluster).
Six EU Member States covered by the
data set have a percentage of employees
involved in discretionary learning
organisations higher than the EU-15
average – Austria, Denmark, Finland,
Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden
(Chart 3). These countries constitute
the group with high adaptability from
the empirical analysis, while the others
are included in the group of countries
with low adaptability.
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3.2. Model specifications
3.2.1. First empirical specification:
fraction of high-skilled human
capital
The first empirical specification
derives from the logistic form of tech-
nology diffusion42 of the Benhabib-
Spiegel model (2005). Following
Vandenbussche, Aghion and Meghir
(2006) the stock of high-skilled human
capital, as measured by the fraction of
adult population with tertiary education
in total adult population, is introduced
into the specification instead of the
level of human capital stock as it is the
case in Benhabib and Spiegel (2005)43.
The specification corresponds to the
following equation:
(1) ∆log Ait = b + g * FHit-1 + 
c * FHit-1 (1 - (Ait-1 / AUSt-1)) + εit
where ∆log Ait represents the average
annual growth rate in TFP of an EU
Member State i between t and t-1, 
FHit-1 the fraction of adult population
with tertiary level of education in total
adult population in country i at period
t-1, Ait-1 represents the TFP in country
i at period t-1, AUSt-1 is the level of TFP
in the US at period t-1, which is the
world technology frontier, and εit is an
i.i.d. disturbance term.
From this equation, the growth of TFP
in country i can be decomposed in the
following three terms: i) a constant
term g(.), that captures some exoge-
nous technological progress, b; ii) a
second term, g(.), that captures the
ability of country i to domestically cre-
ate new technologies (the stock of
high-skilled human capital independ-
ently increases technological
progress); and iii) a third term, c(.),
that measures its ability to absorb tech-
nologies developed abroad. This abili-
ty is an increasing function of the stock
of high-skilled human capital and pro-
portional to the distance to the technol-
ogy frontier, (1 - (Ait-1 / AUSt-1)). 
The expectation is that a high-skilled
human capital stock has a positive
impact on the ability of an EU Member
State i to absorb technologies developed
by the US. This implies that the coeffi-
cient c should be greater than zero. It is
also expected that this stock enhances
the ability of an EU Member State i to
create domestically new technologies.
This means that the coefficient g should
be positive44.
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Source: Arundel et al. (2006) based on the Third survey on European working conditions, European Foundation for 
the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions.
42 See Annex 2 for a justification of the logistic form of technology diffusion of the model over the confined exponential one.
43 See Section 2.2.3.
44 For further interpretation on these coefficients, see Annex 2.
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3.2.2. Second empirical 
specification: fraction of 
high-skilled and adaptable
human capital
The second empirical specification
introduces the notion of adaptability.
As a result, the growth of TFP (or tech-
nological progress) is a function of the
stock of high-skilled and adaptable
human capital. As discussed in Section
2.3.3, the idea is that an adaptable
workforce is better placed to take
advantage of the opportunities created
by changing economic conditions. As a
consequence, the effect of a high-
skilled and adaptable workforce on
technological progress is expected to be
greater than that of a high-skilled but
non-adaptable workforce. This predic-
tion can be tested using the following
specification:
(2) ∆log Ait = b + g * FHit-1 (1 + d1adapt)
+ c * FHit-1 (1 - (Ait-1 / AUSt-1))
(1 + d2adapt) + εit
where ∆log Ait represents the average
annual growth rate in TFP of an EU
Member State i between t and t-1,
FHit-1 is the fraction of adult population
with tertiary education in country i at
period t-1, Ait-1 represents the TFP in
country i at period t-1, AUSt-1 is the
level of TFP in the US at period t-1,
which is the world technology frontier,
and εit is an i.i.d. disturbance term. The
variable adapt is a dummy: equal to 1
for a country with a high degree of
adaptability and zero otherwise.
The theory predicts a positive g, mean-
ing that high-skilled human capital
matters for technology creation in gen-
eral. The parameter c is also expected to
be greater than zero so that high-skilled
human capital matters for technology
diffusion. In order to measure the effect
of a high-skilled and adaptable work-
force on technological progress, two
new parameters, d1 and d2 have been
introduced in the model specification.
In this case their estimates are signifi-
cantly positive, which would support
the theory that a high-skilled and adapt-
able human capital stock has a positive
effect on technological progress by cre-
ating and diffusing technology. 
3.3. Results and 
interpretation
3.3.1. Fraction of high-skilled
human capital
Column (1) in Table 2 reports the esti-
mated coefficients for the model with
the stock of high-skilled human capital
as a driving force of technological
progress through technology creation
and absorption, as specified in equation
(1). The estimated coefficients are pos-
itive and significant.
The results from equation (1) are consis-
tent with the notion of skilled human
capital as a factor of technology creation
and diffusion in the EU Member States. 
3.3.2. Fraction of high-skilled and
adaptable human capital
In order to test the theory that adapt-
ability has a positive impact on the
growth of TFP in addition to the effect
due to a high-skilled human capital
stock, equation (2) is estimated. The
effect of adaptability is captured by a
dummy variable as explained above.
Column (2) in Table 2 reports the esti-
mated coefficients for equation (2).
The estimated coefficients for tech-
nology creation (g) and diffusion (c)
remain unchanged compared to those
estimated in equation (1). More inter-
esting is the positive and significant
estimate (d1) for the effect of adapt-
ability on technology creation. This
result suggests that an adaptable
workforce substantially increases
technological progress generated by a
high-skilled human capital stock.
However, the effect of an adaptable
workforce on technological progress
through the absorption of technolo-
gies developed abroad (d2) is not sta-
tistically significant.
4. Conclusions and
policy implications
There is a consensus that education,
and more generally human capital, are
key determinants of productivity and
other economic and social outcomes,
both at the micro-economic and macro-
economic levels, and that its role is cru-
cial in a knowledge-based economy.
Furthermore, this consensus was re-
affirmed recently by the Heads of State
or Government at Hampton Court, as
well as the recent Brussels European
Council (23/24 March 2006). 
At the micro-economic level, human
capital is an important determinant of
individual income and employability.
At the macro-economic level, evidence
shows that the contribution of human
capital to labour productivity is sub-
stantial. For these reasons, the Heads of
State or Government put education and
human capital at the heart of the Lisbon
Strategy with a view to delivering more
growth and creating more and better
jobs. The 2005 revised Lisbon Strategy
and the subsequent Integrated
Guidelines for Growth and Jobs
(2005–2008) adopted by the Council of
the European Union, have placed an
even stronger emphasis on the need to
invest in human capital through better
education and skills. Unfortunately,
progress towards these goals has been
slower than was expected.
This chapter has explored the issue of
the role of human capital in economic
growth. While there is broad consensus
that human capital is a key engine for
growth in today’s knowledge-driven
economy, the bulk of studies have nev-
ertheless considered human capital as
an ordinary input in the production
process, alongside physical capital and
labour. Human capital uniformly
enhances the productivity of workers in
all jobs – either routine or innovative.
However, elaborating on the conclu-
sions of several influential studies, this
chapter argues that such treatment of
Employment in Europe 2006
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the role of human capital in economic
growth may be insufficient to fully cap-
ture its importance in knowledge-driv-
en economies.
An alternative treatment of the role of
human capital knowledge-driven
economies has been considered here.
The starting point being that an educat-
ed workforce is better at creating,
adopting and implementing new tech-
nologies so that human capital influ-
ences technological progress by creat-
ing and adopting new technologies.
This approach is particularly relevant
for explaining the key role of education
and, more generally, human capital in
knowledge-based economies. It does
not imply that certain routine jobs do
not require substantial education; it
says that education is especially impor-
tant for jobs requiring adaptation to
change and innovation, both of which
are increasing in knowledge-based
economies. Therefore, this alternative
approach forms a natural framework in
which to analyse the view expressed by
the European Commission in the
Communication Working together for
growth and jobs. A new start for the
Lisbon Strategy that “…economies
endowed with a high-skilled and adapt-
able workforce are better able to create
and make effective use of new tech-
nologies and to embrace change”. 
The first assumption has been made in
this chapter that, across countries, the
effect of a high-skilled workforce on
the mechanisms driving growth
depends on how far a country is from
the world technology frontier. In less
developed countries, a high-skilled
workforce affects technological
progress by adopting new technologies
developed abroad. The speed at which
these countries “catch up” with those
close to the technology frontier is a
function of the stock of high-skilled
human capital and the distance to the
technology frontier. As these countries
move closer to the technology frontier,
the strength of the “catch-up” effect
decreases, and the endogenous creation
of new technologies gains increasing
significance to sustain growth. This is
connected with the fact that in coun-
tries near the world technology frontier,
a highly skilled workforce has an
impact on technological progress pre-
dominantly through creation of new
technologies.
The second assumption developed in
this chapter is that adaptability matters
too for growth in a knowledge-driven
economy. The adaptability of workers
is indeed essential in order to reallocate
resources in response changes in eco-
nomic conditions and to capture “dis-
equilibrium rents” generated principal-
ly by technological progress. While the
ability to deal with disequilibria is one
of the main features of a well-educated
workforce, its degree of adaptability is
also sensitive to the forms of work
organisation that workers face. In par-
ticular, this chapter argues that there
are ways of working that are more
appropriate than others in encouraging
the effective use of the adaptability of a
well-educated workforce for technolog-
ical progress.
The empirical analysis carried out in
this chapter has confirmed the role of
skilled human capital as a factor that
Empirical specification Variable Coefficient Dependant variable: annual TFP growth
(1) (2)
(1): Fraction of high- FHit-1 g 0.2246 (0.0401) ***
skilled human capital FHit-1*(1-Ait-1/AUSt-1) c 0.2279 (0.1192) *
(2): Fraction of high-skilled FHit-1 g 0.2317 (0.0446) ***
and adaptable human capital FHit-1*(1-Ait-1/AUSt-1) c 0.2726 (0.1571) *
g*FHit-1*adapt d1 0.6483 (0.3680) *
c*FHit-1*(1-Ait-1/AUSt-1)*adapt d2 -3.1963 (2.0728)
Cross-section dummy yes yes
Period dummy yes yes
Number of observations 98 98
R-squared 0.67 0.68
Note: Estimation by IV 2SLS with standard errors in parentheses. One, two and three stars indicate statistical significance at 10, 5
and 1% levels respectively. Time and country dummies are not reported. (1): fraction of high-skilled human capital. (2): fraction of
high-skilled human capital in countries with high/low adaptability. “Adaptable” countries are Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany,
the Netherlands and Sweden. We apply panel data estimation techniques, allowing for the use of time and country dummies in all
models. In addition, instrumental variables are used to deal with the possible endogeneity of educational attainment. The instru-
mental variables include the lagged values of the fraction of high-skilled workers, as well as the lagged interaction between
human capital and the distance to the technology frontier.
Table 2 – Summary of econometric results
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encourages the creation and diffusion
of technology in the EU Member
States. Based on an original panel data
set covering a sample of EU Member
States between 1960 and 2000, it has
been demonstrated that a high-skilled
workforce contributes to productivity
improvement by the endogenous cre-
ation of new technologies and by the
absorption of technologies developed
abroad. Moreover, the empirical results
suggest that the impact of a high-
skilled workforce on technological
progress through technology creation is
greater in countries where the working
environment encourages adaptability –
the capacity of high-skilled workers to
adapt to changes in economic condi-
tions. However, further research is
needed to refine the measurement of
adaptability and to better understand its
relationship to technological progress.
Both theoretical and empirical results
are significant. Firstly, they suggest
that the relative underinvestment in
higher education in the EU compared
to the US, may hamper the progress of
the former towards the ambitious
Lisbon goal set in 2000 – “to become
the most competitive and dynamic
knowledge-based economy in the
world” – because it slows down techno-
logical progress. Although the EU
should invest more in higher education,
this solution is not the panacea. Indeed,
the whole lifelong learning continuum
should be considered, as was stressed
by the European Commission in the
Communication Efficiency and equity
in European and training system45. In
particular, the EU Member States
should also invest more in pre-primary
education as an effective means to
establish the basis for further learning
and preventing school drop-out.
Secondly, the results of the chapter also
suggest that investing more in higher
education, though necessary, is unlike-
ly on its own to be sufficient for the EU
to move to the world technology fron-
tier – the adaptability of workers and
enterprises matters too. Therefore, the
promotion and dissemination of inno-
vative and adaptable forms of work
organisation, such as “discretionary
learning” are essential. 
45 Communication from the Commission (2006), “Efficiency and equity in European and training system”, (COM(2006) 481 final).
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Annex 1: A more formal description of the augmented Solow model 
and its related empirical specifications
This annex provides technical details regarding the augmented Solow model. The first section describes the building blocks
of the model. The second section discusses how the model can be made fit for empirical applications, while the third elabo-
rates on the appropriate estimation techniques. 
The model
Two equations are at the heart of the augmented Solow model: the augmented production function and the equation describ-
ing the accumulation of physical and human capital. 
The first equation describes the augmented production function as:
(A1.1) Yt = K(t)
α H(t)β (A(t)L(t))1-α-β
Where K is the stock of physical capital, L is labour46, H is the stock of human capital, and A is labour-augmenting techno-
logical progress. Labour and technology are assumed to grow exponentially at constant and exogenous rates n and g. AL
measures the number of “effective” workers. The coefficients associated with each factor of production measure the output
elasticity of the stocks of the different factors (an increase of 1% in the stock of human capital, for instance, would increase
output by β-%). The values of α and β lie between 0 and 1, and α + β < 1. 
The second equation relates physical and human capital accumulation to the level of output (which determines saving and
investment) and to capital depreciation. It assumes that the exogenous saving rate and the depreciation rate are constant and
that the fraction of income saved at each period is totally invested so that physical and human capital evolve in line with the
equation:
(A1.2) {
Where 
~
y = Y / AL, 
~
k = K / AL, and 
~
h = H / AL stand for output, physical capital, and human capital per “effective” work-
er, Sk is the share of income invested in physical capital, Sh is the share of income invested in human capital, δ is the depre-
ciation rate (which is common to physical and human capital), n is the rate of population growth and g is the rate of techno-
logical progress. Equation (A1.2) indicates that the change in the stocks of physical and human capital per effective worker
is equal to the difference between the level of investment in physical and human capital at each period and the amount of
investment necessary to keep the stocks of physical and human capital per effective worker constant.
Because of diminishing returns to capital, the augmented Solow model predicts that in the long run the economy converges
towards a steady state where human and physical capital per effective worker and hence output per effective worker remain
constant. Consequently setting 
~.
k = 0 and 
~.
h = 0 in equation (A1.2) yields the following steady state of physical capital and
human capital ratios to “effective” worker:
(A1.3) 
~
k * = (sk
1-β sh
β / n + g + δ)1/(1−α−β)
and
(A1.4) 
~
h * = (sk
α sh
1-α / n + g + δ)1/(1−α−β)
~.
k(t) = sk
~
y(t) - (g + n + δ)
~
k(t)
~.
h(t) = sh
~
y(t) - (g + n + δ)
~
h(t)
46 The economy is assumed to be at full employment.
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47 The derivation of this solution is much more complex analytically than the solution on the existence of the steady state. For further information
on this derivation, see Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) or Islam (1995).
48 This section mainly draws on Gurgand (2000). To simplify the notations and to improve comparability between the different relations, transfor-
mations affecting A(0) and g are not considered.
Substituting these values into the production function and taking logs gives the steady-state level of output per worker:
(A1.5) ln y(t) = ln A(0) + gt + α ln 
~
k * + β ln ~h *
where y=Y/L and A(0) is the initial level of technology. The reduced form of equation (A1.5) – when the steady-state levels
of physical capital and human capital are expressed according to their exogenous determinants – reads:
(A1.6) ln y(t) = ln A0 + gt + λ1 ln sk + λ2 ln sh  - λ3 ln(g + n + δ)
where λ1 = α /(1 - α - β), λ2 = β /(1 - α - β), and λ3 = (α + β)/(1 - α - β). Equation (A1.6) can be used as a starting point to test
empirically whether the augmented Solow model is able to explain international variations in per capita income if the
economies are in their steady-state. However, as this is usually not the case, equation (A1.6) is further modified to allow for
deviations from the steady-state on the basis of the principle of transition dynamics47. Around the steady state, the level of
output per worker can be written in reduced form as follows:
(A1.7) ln y(t1) = (1 - e-λτ)(λ1 ln sk + λ2 ln sh - λ3 ln(g + n + δ))
+ e-λτ ln y(t0) + (1 - e-λτ) ln A(0) + g(t1 - e-λτ t0)
where the speed of convergence is λ = (g + n + δ)(1 - α). Equation (A1.7) is a “convergence equation”, which shows that the
level of output per worker is a function of the determinants of the steady-state level of output per worker and the initial level of
output per worker.
Towards empirical application
Before a further discussion of the estimation of the augmented Solow model, three assumptions have to be made about the
technology variable, A(t) (with A(t) = A(0)egt). Indeed, both equations (A1.6) and (A1.7) contain the initial level of technol-
ogy and its growth rate which are unobservable. In order to proceed with the estimations, it is indispensable to make some
assumptions about these terms. Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) formulated simple ones.
First, the initial level of technology, A(0), is a constant which is assumed to vary randomly across countries. Because the initial
level of technology is unobservable, it is included in the disturbance term of the regressions and postulated independent of all
explanatory variables; it is defined by lnA(0) = a + ε, where a is a constant, and å is a country-specific shock. Second, it is assumed
that countries share the same common technological progress, gt. Otherwise countries would grow at different rates, thereby
excluding the possibility of convergence in per capita income. Third, technological progress is assumed to be constant over time. 
Empirical application48
One simple way to estimate the human capital parameter is to regress the structural form of the aggregate production func-
tion expressed in terms of output per worker, i.e.:
(A1.8) ln yit = α ln kit + β ln hit + α + gt + εit
This structural form is often expressed in terms of growth rate as:
(A1.9) ln yit - ln yi0 = α (ln kit - ln ki0) + β (ln hit - ln hi0) + gt + εit - εi0
Estimating equations (A1.8) and (A1.9) is not without difficulties. Indeed, both require reliable data for physical and human
capital stocks, which are often not available. Moreover, if the stocks of human and physical capital accumulated at each time
are not independent of productivity shocks contained in the error term, then standard econometric methods (i.e. Ordinary
Least Squares) will give biased and inconsistent results. However, if the use of ordinary least squares would be inappropri-
ate, other econometric methods, such as instrument variables, could still be considered if certain conditions are fulfilled.
194
Employment in Europe 2006
195
Alternatively, in order to overcome the above-mentioned difficulties, the human capital parameter is sometimes estimated
using the reduced forms of the augmented Solow model. The reduced form of the steady-state level of output per worker,
under the assumption that the economies are at their steady state, expresses the level of output per worker in terms of the
exogenous variables, namely the saving rates as:
(A1.10) ln yit = λ1 ln sik + λ2 ln sih - λ3 ln(g + n + δ) + α + gt + εit
Relaxing the very strong assumption of steady-state equilibrium and assuming that the economies are around their steady
state, the level of output per worker can be described by the “convergence equation” as:
(A1.11) ln yit = (1 - e-λτ)(λ1 ln sik + λ2 ln sih - λ3 ln(g + n + δ)) + e-λτ ln yi0 + α + gt + εit
This equation can be rewritten by taking the (steady-state) level of human capital instead of the rate of investment in human
capital as:
(A1.12) ln yit = (1 - e-λτ)(λ1’ ln sik + λ2’ ln h*i - λ3’ ln(g + n + δ)) + e-λτ ln yi0 + α + gt + εit
where λ1’ = λ3’ = α /(1 - α) and λ2’ = β /(1 - α).
Annex 2: The Benhabib-Spiegel’s variations on the Nelson-Phelps 
framework
This annex provides technical details on the Benhabib-Spiegel model (2005) and its variations on the Nelson-Phelps
approach (1966). The first section briefly presents the framework developed by Nelson-Phelps. In the second section, we
introduce the variations on the Nelson-Phelps model (1966) made by Benhabib and Spiegel in their paper published in 2005.
Based on the Nelson-Phelps approach, Benhabib and Spiegel (2005) examined two different processes of technology diffu-
sion: the confined exponential diffusion process and an alternative diffusion process known as the logistic model of technol-
ogy diffusion. 
The Nelson-Phelps framework
In their seminal paper published in 1966, Nelson and Phelps suggested that the growth of TFP or technological progress
depends positively on the gap between the level of human capital and the gap between the theoretical level of technology and
the level of technology in practice. Such a relation can be described as:
(A2.1) A(t) / A(t) = Φ(h)((T(t) - A(t)) / A(t))
where Φ is the level of human capital, A(t) is the level of technology in practice and T(t) is the theoretical level of technology.
Variations on the Nelson-Phelps framework
In 1994, Benhabib and Spiegel extended the Nelson-Phelps framework to allow the level of human capital to impact not only
on technology diffusion but also on technology creation. More precisely, they modelled the growth of TFP or technological
progress for a country i as follows:
(A2.2.) Ait / Ait = g(Hi) + c(Hi)((Amt - Ait) / Ait)
= g(Hi) + c(Hi)((Amt / Ait) - 1)
where Hi is the level of human capital in country i; g(Hi) captures its ability to create domestically new technologies;
c(Hi)((Amt-Ait)/Ait) represents its ability to absorb technologies developed by the technological leading country m; ci(.) and
gi(.) are increasing functions.
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49 The derivation of the solution of this equation is beyond the scope of this chapter. For further information on this derivation, see Benhabib and
Spiegel (1994, 2005).
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Based on this formulation, the authors showed49 that, irrespective of the initial levels of technology, the country with the high-
est level of human capital will emerge as the technology leader and will act as a “locomotive” by pushing forward the tech-
nology frontier. In the long run, the leading country and the followers will grow at the same growth rate even though they
have different levels of human capital. In such a process of technology diffusion and “catch up”, the level of technology of
the leading country cannot be surpassed by another country with a lower level of education.
In their paper published in 2005, Benhabib and Spiegel put this extended version of the original Nelson-Phelps model in the
context of disaggregated models of technology diffusion. Equation (A2.2.) is known as the “confined exponential model of tech-
nology diffusion” and that another formulation related to the “logistic model of technology diffusion” can be expressed as:
(A2.3.) Ait / Ait = g(Hi) + c(Hi)(1 - (Ait / Amt))
= g(Hi) + c(Hi)(Ait / Amt)((Amt / Ait) - 1)
The difference between equations (A2.2) and (A2.3) lies in the presence of the additional term (Ait/Amt). The presence of this
additional term in the logistic model of technology diffusion compared to the confined exponential one has noteworthy impli-
cations in terms of catching up and convergence. This additional term acts to impede the ability of “catching-up” countries
to absorb new technologies developed by the leader when the technological gap is too wide, indicating perhaps “the difficul-
ty of adopting distant technologies” (Benhabib and Spiegel, 2005). While with a confined exponential diffusion process,
technology diffusion and “catch up” ensure that the leading country and the followers will ultimately grow at the same
growth rate even though they have different levels of human capital, such convergence in growth rates is not certain in the
case of logistic diffusion process. Indeed, countries with levels of education that are too low will remain trapped in a grow-
ing technological gap unless they increase their investment in human capital. With the introduction of this alternative formu-
lation of the extended Nelson-Phelps framework, the possibility of divergence in growth rates is thus admitted.
In Benhabib and Spiegel (2005), the authors derived an empirical specification that nests these two forms of technology dif-
fusion to identify empirically the formulation that best describes the best process of technology diffusion. Specifically,
(A2.4) ∆ait = (g + (c / s)) hit - (c / s) hit (Ait / Amt)s
Where ∆ait is the growth of TFP for country i; hit is the level of human capital; and (Ait/Amt) is the ratio of the country’s TFP
to that of the leader. This specification nests the logistic (s=1) and exponential (s=-1) models. They tested this specification
for a cross-section of TFP of 84 countries over the period 1960–2005. Their results favour the logistic form of technology
diffusion over the confined exponential.
With s constrained to equal 1, the above equation can be rewritten as:
(A2.5) ∆ait = (g + c) hit - chit (Ait / Amt)
= ghit + chit (1 - (Ait / Amt))
Such a specification can be estimated in order to examine whether the level of human capital or the proportion of high-skilled
human capital in a country i has an impact on its ability to create new technologies and to absorb technologies from the coun-
try leader. The coefficient g is expected to be greater than zero so that the level of human capital or the proportion of high-
skilled human capital has a positive impact on the ability of country i to create new technologies. The coefficient c is expect-
ed to be greater than zero so that the level of human capital or the fraction of high-skilled human capital enhances its abili-
ty to absorb technologies from the leader.
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1. Introduction
1.1. The background
The freedom of movement to live and
work in other Member States has
become a symbol of European integra-
tion. Indeed, when questioned in a
recent Eurobarometer survey as to what
it means to be a “European citizen”,
freedom to move to another Member
State is generally cited as a key factor
by respondents.
There is a long history of Europeans
moving to other regions or countries in
search of a safer place, a better educa-
tion, a job or a higher income (or a
combination of these factors).
However, it is a relatively recent phe-
nomenon that people have in principle
been granted the right to work in anoth-
er EU Member State (although some
restrictions still apply, especially for
citizens from Member States which
joined the EU in May 2004).
The free movement of EU workers with-
in the-then “European Common Market”
first became possible in 1968 and was
the first of the four basic economic free-
doms of the European market to be
implemented. The other principles cover-
ing the free movement of goods, servic-
es and capital were to follow only 25
years later with the emergence of the sin-
gle European Market in 1993. 
The idea of free movement of labour
within the EU including the European
Economic Area is based on the philos-
ophy that EU citizens should be able to
enjoy throughout the entire EU the
same freedoms as they do in their home
countries1. The rationale is that freedom
of movement will contribute to the for-
mation of a stronger European identity
and deeper European integration. And
later on in this chapter, the evidence
that citizens who have lived and worked
in other European countries feel more
European is discussed. 
From an economic perspective, the free
movement of labour is seen as a way of
promoting labour market efficiency by
improving the matching of the available
labour supply to the demand from
employers. In this scenario, mobility is
driven by both the desire of workers to
improve their economic situation and
the search of companies for workers to
meet their requirement for labour2.
Greater labour force mobility, both
between jobs (job mobility) and within
and between countries (geographic
mobility) can help the European econo-
my and labour force to adapt to chang-
ing conditions more smoothly and effi-
ciently, as well as respond to change in
the competitive global economy. In a
world of increasing globalisation and
ever faster change, mobile employees
can contribute significantly to the dis-
semination and updating of knowledge,
help meet the needs of an increasingly
global world through an adaptable, flex-
ible and employable workforce and
compensate for bottlenecks of skilled
(and unskilled) labour that can act as a
break on economic activity. The mobili-
ty of workers between EU Member
States is also seen as a counterpart to
European monetary union.
However, while mobility is widely
regarded as a positive feature of the
labour market, actual mobility levels
within Europe have remained compara-
tively low (as will be demonstrated
later). National and regional disparities
in wage levels and unemployment
rates, combined with ever lower institu-
tional and administrative barriers to
mobility, would suggest that there is an
environment that encourages mobility.
However, despite this, EU citizens have
displayed a reluctance to move, with
less than 2% of all EU citizens living in
another EU Member State. This low
overall mobility tends to indicate the
absence of a genuine “mobility culture”
for workers in the EU.
Currently the enlarged EU continues to
exhibit strong labour market disparities
between regions and Member States.
European regions with skill shortages
and low unemployment often exist side
by side with regions with skill or general
labour surpluses and high unemploy-
ment. Furthermore, skill shortages in the
European labour market are expected to
grow, fuelled in part by the demographic
changes creating a smaller active popula-
tion. It suggests that the need for more
mobile workers is likely to increase.
1.2. Coverage of 
the chapter
Against this background, the main pur-
pose of this chapter is to present recent
empirical evidence on the trends in geo-
graphic labour mobility in Europe. It will
primarily focus on the economically
motivated labour mobility within and
Geographic mobility within 
the EU5Chapter
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1 Although in practice it is still restricted for citizens from new Member States – see Box 2.
2 On the theory of labour mobility, see for example Borjas, G. (2005), Chapter 9.
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between EU Member States. The wider
issue of migration from and to third
countries (outside the EU) will be con-
sidered in part, but not addressed in
detail, having been treated in previous
reports (see, for example, European
Commission (2003)) with the focus
more on the issue of migration to the EU
rather than “intra-EU mobility”. 
The chapter begins by presenting the
recent policy context on geographic
mobility in the EU. It then describes the
overall statistical evidence on numbers of
EU citizens living and working in other
Member States and the extent of current
labour mobility between European
regions and countries. This is followed by
an examination of mobile EU citizens
with respect to their socio-demographic
characteristics, their labour market-per-
formance and their motives and experi-
ences. This also includes a look at
prospects for future mobility and its cur-
rent drivers and barriers. Furthermore, this
chapter will briefly look at the phenome-
non of commuting within and between
countries as an alternative to residential
mobility. Finally, the main results are sum-
marised and policy conclusions drawn.
2. The recent policy
context
The political and economic rationale
behind the principle of the free move-
ment of people and labour is deeply
rooted in Community law. Both the
right to live and work in another
Member State, as well as the unrestrict-
ed right of EU citizens to move and
reside within the territory of the Union
have been enshrined in the EU Treaty
(Art. 39 and Art. 18).
The legal, economic and political impor-
tance of the free movement of labour has
found expression in a wide range of
European Commission (EC) initiatives
aimed at promoting and encouraging
mobility to actually take place. Most
recently these initiatives include the
Action Plan on Skills and Mobility 2002,
the Integrated Guidelines for Growth
and Employment (2005–2008), the
Action Programme in the field of
Lifelong Learning (2007–2013) and the
European Year of Workers’ Mobility
2006.
2.1. Action Plan on Skills
and Mobility 
The Action Plan for Skills and
Mobility3, adopted by the EC in
February 2002 and endorsed by the
Barcelona European Council in March
2002, was principally designed as a
contribution to achieving the Lisbon
objective of more and better jobs,
greater social cohesion and a dynamic
knowledge-based economy. It was
intended to further the principle of the
freedom of movement for workers,
underscore the importance of labour
market mobility in advancing the
Employment Strategy, and open up
European labour markets to make them
accessible for all. 
The objectives of the Action Plan were
as follows:
• Expand occupational mobility and
skills development, by ensuring that
education and training systems
become more responsive to the
labour market; that competence
development strategies for workers
are drawn up; and learning is recog-
3 European Commission (2002) and (2004).
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In this chapter, the term “geograph-
ic mobility” refers to the move of
EU residents from one region to
another within the same EU coun-
try, or from one country to another.
It is essentially synonymous to
migration, a word more commonly
used in demographic research and
with respect to migration to and
from non-EU countries. 
Geographic mobility can take sev-
eral forms. Geographic labour
mobility generally refers to a
change in residence for employ-
ment-related reasons such as mov-
ing to find and take up a new job,
being transferred, losing a job or
moving closer to work. Other forms
of geographic mobility occur due to
studying away from home, for fam-
ily or housing reasons or due to
retirement. 
Commuting is also a form of geo-
graphic mobility, albeit one that
does not include a change of resi-
dence. Geographic labour mobility
may or may not be connected to job
mobility and occupational mobility,
i.e. a change of job or professional
occupation.
Throughout the chapter, reference
is made to “old” and “new”
Member States, EU-15, EU-10,
and sometimes EU-8. The old
Member States, or EU-15 refers to
all Member States forming part of
the EU before 1 May 2004; the new
Member States or EU-10 refers to
all States that joined the EU on 1
May 2004, whereas EU-8 refers to
all EU-10 Member States except
for Malta and Cyprus. This distinc-
tion is made purely on practical and
analytical grounds. EU-25 denotes
all EU Member States.
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nised wherever acquired and qualifi-
cations are more easily transferable;
• Facilitate geographic mobility
through the removal of administra-
tive and legal barriers, the develop-
ment of language and cross-cultural
skills, the promotion of cross-border
recognition of qualifications, and an
EU-wide immigration policy;
• Improve information and transparen-
cy of job opportunities through the
provision and dissemination of infor-
mation about existing opportunities
for mobility and the related support
mechanisms in the EU. This was
mainly to be achieved through the
setting up of a one-stop mobility
information site and the improve-
ment of the EURES4 jobs vacancy
system. 
A final report on the implementation of
the Action Plan for Skills and Mobility
is due to be published shortly and will
take into account progress or shortcom-
ings towards these objectives.
2.2. Integrated Guidelines
for growth and jobs
The need for greater mobility is also
fully reflected in the Integrated
Guidelines for Growth and Jobs
(2005–2008), adopted by the European
Council in April 20055, and which form
an essential part of the re-launched
Lisbon strategy. 
With regard to ensuring a dynamic and
well-functioning Euro Area (Guideline
6), it mentions that structural policies
that foster the smooth adjustment of
prices and wages are essential to ensure
that Euro Area Member States have the
capacity to rapidly adjust to shocks and
to help avoid unwarranted inflationary
developments. Policies encouraging
occupational and geographic mobility
are among those specifically men-
tioned as being particularly important
in this respect, by contributing to the
increased responsiveness of labour
markets.
With regard to improving the matching
of labour market needs (Guideline 20),
the integrated guidelines state that in
order to allow more people to find bet-
ter employment opportunities, it is nec-
essary to strengthen the labour market
infrastructure at national and EU level,
including the use of the EURES net-
work to better anticipate and resolve
possible mismatches in the labour mar-
ket. In this context, the mobility of
workers within the EU is key and
should be guaranteed within the con-
text of the various treaties. In light of
this, Guideline 20 specifically calls for
an improvement in meeting the
demands of labour market needs
through: 
• modernising and strengthening
labour market institutions, notably
employment services, also with a
view to ensuring greater transparency
of employment and training opportu-
nities at national and European level;
• removing obstacles to the mobility
for workers across Europe within the
framework of the treaties;
• anticipating skill needs, labour mar-
ket shortages and bottlenecks;
• managing economic migration more
appropriately.
Finally, greater support for transitions
in occupational status, (including train-
ing, self-employment, business cre-
ation and geographic mobility), has
been mentioned as one of the key meas-
ures in promoting flexibility combined
with employment security and reducing
labour market segmentation (Guideline
21). This in turn will improve the
adaptability of workers and enterprises.
It states that: “geographic mobility is
needed to access job opportunities
across the EU at large”.
2.3. Mobility for education
and training purposes
Intensifying European mobility and
exchanges for education and training
purposes is an objective of the work
programme to make Europe the most
innovative and most competitive
knowledge-based economy between
now and 2010. The Action Programme
in the field of Lifelong Learning
(2007–2013) will reinforce the mobili-
ty of students and trainees in both its
Erasmus and Leonardo da Vinci pro-
grammes. The target is that by 2012
three million students will have bene-
fited from Erasmus and by 2013 there
will be 80,000 people per year taking
advantage of a Leonardo da Vinci
placement abroad.
A proposal for a Recommendation of
the European Parliament and of the
Council on transnational mobility with-
in the Community for education and
training purpose, European Quality
Charter for Mobility, has now reached
an advanced stage of agreement at both
the European Parliament and Council.
In order to ensure the overall quality of
mobility, the Charter will comprise
principles and recommendations to be
applied to all types of mobility for
learning or professional development
purposes. These include education or
training; formal or non-formal learn-
ing, such as voluntary work and proj-
ects; short or long mobility periods;
school, higher education or job-related
learning; and measures in connection
with lifelong learning.
4 European Employment Services, www.eures.europa.eu 
5 European Commission (2005).
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2.4. European Year of
Workers’ Mobility 2006
The European Commission designated
2006 as the European Year of Workers’
Mobility6. The main purpose of this ini-
tiative is to raise public awareness and
open up the debate on the real benefits
and challenges of working abroad or
changing job, including the advantages,
costs, impacts and rights of working in
another country. It has three concrete
objectives as follows:
• To inform citizens about the rights of
workers to free movement, as well as
the opportunities, costs and support
measures that exist; 
• To develop the exchange of good
practices on mobility; 
• To find out more – through studies
and surveys – about mobility flows in
Europe, the obstacles to mobility and
the motives for mobility.
In order to achieve these objectives, the
EC is organising and sponsoring
throughout 2006 and beyond a wide
range of activities, including seminars
and conferences, mobility research, and
information projects.
3. Trends in
geographic mobility
3.1. A historical overview of
intra-European migration
Europeans have a long history of
migration. The option to resettle abroad
has been regarded by many generations
of Europeans as an economically sensi-
ble and socially acceptable life choice.
As senders of people, receivers (or
both), almost all regions of Europe
have some experience of migration7.
Until the early 1970s, many Europeans
were movers. From 1945 to the early
1960s, migration within and to Europe
was marked by the displacements of
World War II, the return migration
from newly independent European
colonies and inflows of workers from
former overseas territories. In the mid-
1950s, a South-to-North migration pat-
tern emerged, starting with Italians and
soon followed by Spanish, Portuguese,
Greeks, Turks, Yugoslavs, Tunisians
and Moroccans. The relatively poorer
peripheral regions in southern Europe
(and Ireland) experienced high net out-
migration, while central metropolitan
regions in central Europe saw signifi-
cant net in-migration rates. 
Around 1973 intra–European popula-
tion movements reached a peak and
migration rates between European
regions slowed down considerably in
the succeeding years. The demand for
foreign workers fell in the wake of the
first oil price shock in 1973 and the
ensuing economic crises triggered by it.
Governments of the major destination
countries for migrants curtailed the
active recruitment of foreign workers
and attempted to encourage return
migration.
Other important factors contributing to
the slowdown of intra-European migra-
tion since the 1970s were the improv-
ing economic performance of the poor-
er countries within the EU; an increas-
ing rate of convergence of the
European regions; and the decrease in
regional income and employment gaps.
The absolute number of EU workers in
Member States other than their own
dropped by one-third between 1973 and
1984. On the other hand, from the mid-
1970s traditional migration patterns
were complicated by emerging “non-
job considerations”, most notably by
“quality of life” factors, including envi-
ronment and cost of living issues. Such
non-work related motives counter the
traditional rural-to-urban (intra-nation-
al) and South-to-North (inter-national)
directions of geographic mobility in
Western Europe. Meanwhile, cross-
national flows among urban areas
appeared to be on the rise, occasioned
by the spread of skilled international
migration, especially from the periph-
eral regions of Europe where the supply
of highly trained persons outstrips the
capacity of the local economy to absorb
it. Part of this high-skilled migration is
due to cross–border transfers of
employees of multinational companies
— sometimes advocated as a strategy
to consolidate corporate cultures and
internal labour markets.
3.2. Current trends in
European cross-border
mobility
3.2.1. Non-nationals in 
the EU population8
According to official national statistics
and Eurostat estimates, the total num-
ber of non-nationals living in the EU in
2004 was around 25 million, or just
below 5.5% of the total population. In
absolute terms, the largest numbers of
foreign citizens reside in France,
Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK.
Data for the period 2000–2004 indi-
cates that the non-national population
varied from less than 1% of the total
population in Slovakia, to 39% in
Luxembourg, but in the majority of
countries the figure was between 2%
and 8% (Table 1). However, a propor-
tion of non-nationals above 8% was
found (by decreasing order) in Latvia,
Estonia, Austria, Cyprus, Germany,
6 For more information see http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/workersmobility_2006/
7 For this section see Recchi, E. et al. (2006), p.4 f.
8 For this section see Eurostat (2006, 2).
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Belgium and Greece and below 2% in
Lithuania, Hungary and Poland.9
In all EU Member States except
Belgium, Cyprus, Ireland and
Luxembourg the majority of foreign
nationals are citizens of countries out-
side the EU-25. The number of citizens
from the 10 new Member States resid-
ing in the EU-15 is comparatively small
at around 0.2% of the total population
of the EU-15, and with the largest pro-
portion in Germany – around 0.6% of
that country’s total population. 
Between 1990 and 2004, in most
Member States the percentage of for-
eign nationals either did not change
significantly or it increased. Latvia was
the only country registering a signifi-
cant decrease (around five percentage
points from 1998 to 2004). The most
significant growth was observed in
Luxembourg, followed by Spain,
Cyprus, Greece, Ireland and Austria.
This was largely due to an increase in
population from outside the EU-25,
except for Luxembourg, where an
increase in the number of EU-15 citi-
zens was dominant. Regularisation pro-
grammes for legalizing the resident sta-
tus of irregular and undocumented
migrants had a significant effect on the
size of non-national populations in
Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain.
The nationality structures of foreign
populations in the EU Member States
vary greatly (Tables 1 and 2). As well
as geographic proximity, the composi-
tion of the non-national population,
examined against the proportion of the
five largest groups of non-nationals,
strongly reflects their history — in par-
ticular labour migration, recent politi-
cal developments and historical links.
For example, the largest non-national
groups include Turkish citizens in
Germany, Denmark and the
Netherlands; citizens of Cape Verde,
Brazil and Angola in Portugal;
Ecuadorians and Moroccans in Spain;
migrants from Albania in Greece; citi-
zens from other parts of the former
Yugoslavia in Slovenia; Czech citizens
in Slovakia; and citizens from other
former Soviet Union countries in
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. 
Germany, which in absolute numbers
hosts the largest foreign population in
the European Union, displays a rela-
tively stable ranking of its five largest
non-national populations: Turks, citi-
zens from the Western Balkan countries,
Italians, Greeks and Poles (Table 2).
Luxembourg, which has the largest
percentage of non-nationals in the EU
(and at the same time the highest pro-
portion of foreigners from other EU-15
countries), also has a stable composi-
tion of the largest groups of foreign
citizens, which remained almost
unchanged between 1991 and 2004.
The most significant change in the
composition of the recorded non-
national population occurred in
Greece, following regularisation pro-
grammes (see Table 2).
3.2.2. Non-national working age
population
Foreign working age population by
nationality
The figures presented above give an
overall impression of the composition
of citizenship by country. As the main
focus of this chapter is on the mobility
of workers in the EU, the following sec-
tions will focus on the working age
population, namely those aged between
15 and 64. For this analysis statistics
from the European Labour Force
Survey (LFS) are used as this repre-
sents the principal source of Europe-
wide harmonised statistics that allow
linkages to be established with labour-
market related variables on the (labour
market) situation of migrants, with
basic information related to their
migration movements.
Looking at the nationality breakdown
of the EU working age population, it is
obvious that the largest share of the for-
eign working age population is com-
posed of third country nationals, with
only a minority of other EU-25 citizen-
ship (see Table 3). Only Belgium,
Ireland and Luxembourg have a higher
share of EU-25 nationals than third
country nationals. 
Many Member States also show a high
share of working age citizens who were
not born in their present country of res-
idence, but hold its citizenship, mainly
through naturalisation or by being born
abroad and having migrated to their
current EU Member State at a later
date. Member States with a compara-
tively high share of non-native nation-
als are Sweden, followed by Latvia, the
Netherlands, Germany and Slovenia.
Active foreign working age population
Examination of the LFS can also identi-
fy the active working age population by
nationality (i.e. working age nationals
and foreign citizens who are either in
employment or currently unemployed,
but available and looking for work).
According to the LFS, the active work-
ing age population of the EU-15
Member States numbered 180 million
people. Of this total, approximately 
19 million have migrated to their current
Member State of residence at some
stage from another country, meaning
that they were not born in their Member
State of residence and do not hold its cit-
izenship, or are foreign born, but have
acquired citizenship of their country of
residence. (Unfortunately, this figure
does not include the numbers for Italy,
which does not publish breakdowns by
citizenship. Therefore, the number of
9 It should be noted that the figures for Latvia and Estonia included citizens of the former Soviet Union permanently resident in those countries
who have not taken the citizenship of the host country since the break-up of the Soviet Union, and also that the official figures for some Central
and Eastern European countries underestimate the stocks of foreign nationals by including permanent residents only.
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foreign workers presented here is an
underestimation.) Furthermore, out of
these 19 million about 2.7 million are
citizens from another EU-15 Member
State and about 600,000 are from one of
the 10 new Member States. In other
words, less than 20% of the foreign born
workers in the EU-15 are citizens of
another EU country.
Nevertheless, there are substantial differ-
ences across individual Member States,
both with respect to destination and
sending countries. An extreme case is
Luxembourg where due to its small size,
its proximity to other Member States and
its past attraction for labour migrants in
its steel and mining industry more than a
third of the resident active working age
population hold the nationality of anoth-
er EU-15 country, the majority of them
from Portugal, France and Italy. The
exceptional case of Luxembourg aside,
Belgium (4.3%) and Ireland (2.8%) are
the main receiving countries in relative
terms. Sweden, Germany and France
each have a share of around 2 %, Austria
1.8%. Destination countries with the
lowest shares are Portugal (0.4%),
Finland (0.3%) and Greece (0.2%) (see
Chart 1).
Chart one also shows which EU-15
countries host how many EU-10 work-
ers in relative terms. On top is Ireland
where 2.5% of the active working age
population are citizens from the new
Member States. This is almost as many
as from the old Member States. Austria
has the second highest share with 1.5%,
followed by Germany and the UK with
0.5% each. In all other countries the
share is between 0.1 and 0.3%.
Among the EU-15 Member States,
Ireland and Portugal have the highest
share of its workers resident in another
EU-15 country (see Chart 2). In 2005,
over 10% of active Irish citizens
between the age of 15 and 64 lived in
another EU-15 country, for Portugal the
share is almost 9%. Austria, Finland
and Greece are also well above the EU
average in this respect. The lowest
shares occur in Germany, France, Spain
and the UK. As for the new Member
States, Lithuania and Poland have the
highest share of its workers resident in
a EU-15 Member State (3.4% and
2.1%, respectively). For Slovakia the
share of emigrant workers resident in
the EU-15 is 2% of their active working
age population, for Hungary it is 1.2%
and for the Czech Republic 0.7% (for
the remaining EU-10 Member States
there are too few cases in the survey
samples to produce reliable results).
3.2.3. Recent cross-border
mobility of EU-15 citizens
Annual cross-border mobility
The figures presented above give an
overall impression of how many EU
citizens have taken up residence in
another EU-15 Member State at one
point in the past and who are employed
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Citizenship
Country of EU-15 EU-10 Non-EU-25 Foreign 
residence born nationals
BE 4.4 0.3 2.8 6.2
CZ (0.0) 0.3 0.4 1.2
DK 0.9 (0.2) 2.5 2.5
DE 1.9 0.6 5.4 7.9
EE : : 8.4 4.6
EL 0.2 0.4 5.3 2.1
ES 1.2 0.2 8.4 :
FR 1.8 0.1 3.6 6.3
IE 2.7 1.9 2.7 4.0
IT : : : :
CY 5.5 (0.3) 7.4 3.6
LV : : (0.4) 10.9
LT : : (0.4) 3.0
LU 32.9 (0.2) 3.2 3.5
HU (0.1) : 0.5 1.2
MT 1.1 : 1.7 2.3
NL 1.3 0.1 2.6 9.0
AT 1.7 1.4 7.1 5.9
PL : : 0.1 0.5
PT 0.4 : 2.6 4.1
SI : : (0.4) 7.7
SK : (0.1) (0.1) 0.7
FI 0.3 0.3 0.9 1.3
SE 2.0 0.3 3.1 11.5
UK 1.7 0.4 4.0 4.8
EU-10 0.1 0.1 0.5 1.5
EU-15 1.5 0.3 4.0 4.6
EU-25 1.2 0.3 3.4 4.1
Source: Eurostat, LFS, spring data.
Note: Data in brackets lack reliability due to small sample size. The symbol “:” is
used when data is either not available or extremely unreliable.
Table 3 – Share of working age foreign nationals and foreign
born nationals in the country of residence relative to total 
working age population, 2005 (in percent)
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or available to the labour market. These
stock figures therefore serve to illus-
trate the trend in past migration
between EU Member States.
However, what the overall stock figures
hide is when the move from one country
to another took place and whether any
moves took place before a person settled
into their current country of residence.
Therefore, in order to understand more
closely current geographic mobility, one
needs to examine changes of residence
from one period to another.
In principle this can be done with data
from the LFS, which records respon-
dents’ change of residence over a 12-
month period. According to the LFS
figures, annually only around 0.1% of
the active working age population of
the EU-15 have changed country of
residence from one Member State to
another every year since 2000. This
means that approximately 170,000 to
180,000 active working age persons per
year change their residence between the
EU-15 Member States.
However, these figures should be treat-
ed with caution for the following rea-
sons. Firstly, the annual mobility rate of
0.1% is an average based on only 11 of
the 15 Member States for which the
LFS provides data on year-to-year cross
border change of residence. The
absolute figure is therefore a crude
extrapolation to all EU-15 Member
States based on the average moving
rate. Secondly, the LFS tends to under-
report people who have only recently
taken up residence in another country,
due to some problems in including the
newly arrived people in the sampling
frame, as well as a high non-response
rate among migrants. According to one
study, for example, the under reporting
of annual migration by the LFS may be
around 30%10. This means that the flow
figures presented above represent an
approximation rather than a precise fig-
ure. However, even if the figures were
adjusted for any instance of under
reporting of change of residence by
30% or even double the intra-EU
migration rate, annual cross-border res-
idential mobility between the old
Member States would still appear low
in relative terms.
There are additional problems in cap-
turing the full picture of geographic
mobility in official statistics. Due to the
relatively small number of annual resi-
dential cross-border moves, it is prob-
lematic to use them for showing
detailed and statistically reliable break-
downs on the country distribution and
the socio-economic characteristics of
mobile workers. Furthermore, there are
presently no reliable and comprehen-
sive statistical sources on mobility
flows that last less than one year. There
is reason to suspect that EU citizens
may be more mobile than described by
annual flow data and stock figures from
censuses and surveys. Anecdotal evi-
dence suggests that there may be some
sizable short-term mobility in the form
of workers moving abroad for seasonal
jobs or being sent on temporary assign-
ments by their companies, but there is
so far no hard information to quantify
this short-term mobility. 
Recent mobility by destination and
sending countries
Due to the statistical limitations
described and in order to still produce a
reasonably detailed picture of recent
mobility trends in the EU, this chapter
will take a new approach at analysing
data from the LFS. Instead of looking
at the somewhat problematic year-to-
year changes of residence, the variable
“years of residence” is taken as a proxy
for the annual change of residence. 
As a result, the analysis here and in
Section 4.1 considers people who were
not born in their current Member State
of residence and who have been living
there for less than five years. The
advantage of choosing a five-year resi-
dence threshold compared to the year-
to-year residence change is that it pro-
vides more complete and reliable statis-
tical data. Applying this measure is
essentially a hybrid approach between
the stock and flow figures. It does not
include the number of international
moves that may have occurred before a
person settled in their current country
of residence, and therefore tends to
underestimate the total level of mobili-
ty occurring annually. It does, however,
allow the more detailed analysis of the
characteristics of persons who have
been geographically mobile at least
once within the past five years and thus
enables valid conclusions to be drawn
on the trends in recent mobility pat-
terns. 
According to the LFS, the number of
recently mobile EU-15 workers (i.e.
active working age EU-15 citizens res-
ident less than five years in another
EU-15 Member State) has increased
from approximately 470,000 persons in
2000 to around 610,000 in 2005. Both
in 2000 and 2005, the UK has been the
preferred destination of these mobile
EU-15 citizens in absolute terms. In
2000, about 30% of all EU-15 recently
mobile citizens lived in the UK (see
Chart 3). In 2005, this share had
declined somewhat to 27%. Around
19% of the recent movers favoured
Germany as a country of destination in
2005, followed by Spain (14%), France
(11%), and Belgium (8%). All other
EU-15 countries received a share of
less than 5% each. 
From the perspective of the sending
countries, French citizens have been the
largest group among the old Member
States to go and work in another EU-15
country in absolute terms. In 2005,
almost 14% of the recently EU-15
mobile have been from France, fol-
10 See Rendall M.S., Tomassini C., and Elliot D.J. (2003). 
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lowed by Germans (13.5%), British
(11.9%) and Italians (11.8%) (see
Chart 4)11. 
3.2.4. Mobility flows from 
the new Member States 
Although population and labour force
statistics do contain stock figures on
people from the new Member States
living in other EU countries, statistical
problems remain in capturing recent
flows of workers from the EU-10
Member States to the EU-15. The main
reason for this is that annual migration
flows from the EU-10 to the EU-15
have been too low to yield statistically
robust results from sample surveys, at
least for a detailed analysis. While
some estimates are possible for overall
flows, many breakdowns for EU-10
countries and nationals are below sta-
tistical reliability limits and cannot be
shown. 
In order to continue to obtain country
data and to assess the functioning of the
transitional arrangements (TA) for the
free movement of workers from the
eight new Member States affected by
them12 (see Box 2), the EC started a spe-
cial data collection exercise to obtain
up-to-date figures from administrative
sources on mobility flows before and
after enlargement.
The Commission analysed the labour
flows from EU-10 to EU-15 Member
States after enlargement in its “Report
on the Functioning of the Transitional
Arrangements set out in the 2003
Accession Treaty”, released in
February 200613. These statistics, which
were submitted by the EU Member
States themselves and obtained from
the Labour Force Survey (LFS),
showed that mobility flows between the
EU-10 and the EU-15 has been limited.
11 Unfortunately, no comparison by sending country with years before 2005 is possible, as Germany, the second most important receiving country,
started publishing breakdowns by citizenship only in 2005.
12 Although the TA do not apply to Cyprus and Malta, most of the analysis in this section looks at the EU-15 and the EU-10 as two groups. This is for
practical reasons and should not affect the outcome as the mobility numbers involved for Cyprus and Malta are very low.
13 European Commission (2006). 
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Furthermore, mobility flows from EU-
15 to EU-10 Member States and
between EU-10 Member States has
been generally negligible. The most
harmonised and comparable set of data
received by the EC covered 2004,
although for several countries 2003 and
2005 data are also available, for the UK
also for the first half of 200614.
Table 4 shows flows/stocks relative to
the working age population aged 15-64
(WAP) of the destination Member
State. According to this, annual flows
of EU-10 nationals represented less
than 1% of the working age population
aged 15 to 64 in all Member States
except Austria (1.2% in 2004 and 1.4%
in 2005) and Ireland (1.9% in 2004 and
3.8% in 2005). 
In addition to the finding that mobility
flows from the EU-10 to the EU-15
have been relatively limited, the
“Report on the Functioning of the
Transitional Arrangements” concluded
that workers’ mobility from the EU-8 to
EU-15 has had positive effects on the
economies of the EU-15 Member
States. Workers from the EU-8 helped
to relieve labour market shortages and
skill bottlenecks; contributed to busi-
ness creation and long-term growth
through human capital accumulation;
and contributed to the overall improve-
ment of economic and labour market
performance in Europe. Those Member
States that did not apply restrictions
(the UK, Ireland and Sweden) have
experienced high economic growth and
a rise in employment. As to the 12 EU
Member States applying transitional
arrangements, where workers managed
to obtain access legally, this has con-
tributed to a smooth integration into the
labour market. However, evidence sug-
gests that some of these countries may
also have faced undesirable side-
effects, such as higher levels of unde-
clared work and bogus self-employed
work. 
14 An updated administrative data set for mobility flows from the new to the old Member States, including figures for 2005, will be available at the
end of 2006.
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% WAP
Country of destination Type of data Reference period1 Nationality
EU-102 EU-15
BE3 Residence permit 2003 0.1 2.7
Residence permit 2004 0.2 2.7
Residence permit 2005 0.2 2.6
CZ Foreign workers stock 2003 0.9 0.1
Foreign workers stock 2004 1.0 0.1
DK Residence permit 2004 0.1 0.2
DE Foreign workers stock 2004 0.2 1.0
Work permit 2004 0.9 :
Work permit 2004 May-2005 Sep 0.9 :
EE Residence permit 2004 0.0 0.1
EL Residence permit 2004 0.1 :
ES Residence permit 2004 0.0 0.1
FR Work permit 2003 0.0 :
Work permit 2004 0.0 :
IE4 Personal Public Service Numbers 2004 May-Dec 1.9 :
Personal Public Service Numbers 2005 Jan-Nov 3.8 :
IT Application for work auth. 2004 0.1 :
Application for work auth. 2005 Jan-Sep 0.1 :
LV Residence permit 2004 May-2005 Apr 0.0 0.0
LT Residence permit 2004 0.0 0.0
HU Residence permit 2004 0.0 0.0
MT Residence permit 2004-2005 Apr 0.1 0.8
NL Work permit 2003 0.1 :
Work permit 2004 0.2 :
Work permit 2005 Jan-Jun 0.1 :
AT Average annual stock 2004 0.7 :
Average annual stock 2005 Jan-Jun 0.7 :
Work permit 2004 1.2 :
Work permit 2005 Jan-Jun 0.6 :
PL Residence permit 2004 0.0 0.0
PT Residence permit 2004 0.0 0.0
SI Work permit/ registration 2004-2005 Jun 0.1 0.0
SK Residence permit 2004 0.0 0.0
FI Residence permit 2004 0.0 0.0
SE5 Residence permit 2004 0.1 0.0
UK Applicant to WRS 2004 May-Dec 0.3 :
Applicant to WRS 2005 Jan-Dec 0.5 :
Applicant to WRS 2006 Jan-June 0.2 :
Source: Administrative data from Member States, Eurostat, LFS for working age population.
Notes: % WAP - as percentage of destination country's working age population 15-64.  ':' not applicable or data not available.
All figures refer to the number of applicants / applications / registrations / permits issued (flows), except in the case of: the Czech
Republic, where the figure refers to the stock of workers; Germany, where the first line refers to the stock of workers; and Austria,
where the first line refers to the average annual stock of employees. Figures on residence permits refer to permits issued for
employment reasons only, except for Belgium. Data for Cyprus and Luxembourg not were received by the Commission.
1) January to December, if not otherwise specified. 2) Figures for France, Italy, Austria, and the number of work permits for
Germany relate to EU-8. 3) The figures for Belgium refer to residence permits issued for all reasons. 4) The figure for Ireland refers
to PPS Numbers issued not only for employment reasons, but also for other administrative purposes, including welfare, health
and other public services. 5) The figure for Sweden for EU-10 nationals refers to 2004 May to December.
Table 4 – Resident/work permits to EU citizens as percentages of destination country's working age
population (WAP) aged 15 to 64
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The assessment of the functioning of
TA has also been the subject of sever-
al reports from different Member
States and institutions. Most of these
confirm the evidence from the
Commission’s report that the flows of
EU-8 nationals to the EU-15 have
been relatively limited since acces-
sion, and emphasise in general a pos-
itive impact of mobile workers from
the EU-10 on the economy and the
labour markets in the receiving coun-
tries15. 
3.3. Regional mobility
While cross-border residential mobility
in the EU has been relatively small,
movements between regions within
countries are much greater. Depending
on the regional breakdown analysed,
regional mobility rates in the EU-15 are
on average about ten to thirteen times
greater than annual cross-border mobil-
ity rates. Data from the LFS indicate
that the annual regional mobility rate
between the so-called NUTS 1 regions16
has been at around 1% of the total
working age population in 2005. For
NUTS 2 regions, which represent a
more detailed regional breakdown, the
mobility rate has been 1.3% in 2005.
Overall, EU-15 regional mobility has
Employment in Europe 2006
Under the Treaty of Accession of
2003, access by workers from the
EU-8 (Czech Republic, Estonia,
Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland,
Slovenia and Slovakia) to the labour
market of the EU-15 Member
States is subject to so-called transi-
tional arrangements (TA). (For
Cyprus, no restrictions apply and
with regard to Malta, there is only
the possibility of invoking a safe-
guard clause). As a result of these
provisions, the application of a part
of the Community law on free
movement of workers across the EU
may be deferred for a maximum
period of seven years. The 2003
Accession Treaty divides the transi-
tional period into three distinct
phases, according to the “2-plus 3-
plus 2” formula. Different condi-
tions apply during each of these
phases. 
For the first phase of the TA that
lasted from 1 May 2004 to 30 April
2006, in order to regulate access to
their labour markets the EU-15
Member States could apply their
national law and policy. In practical
terms, this means that a worker
from one of the new Member States
listed above is likely to need a work
permit. National measures may be
extended for a further period of
three years (1 May 2006–30 April
2009). After that, an EU-15
Member State can be authorised to
continue to apply national measures
for further two years, but only if it
experiences serious disturbances in
its labour market. The transitional
arrangements will irrevocably end
on 30 April 2011. Member States
that joined the EU on 1 May 2004
and whose nationals face restric-
tions in one of the EU-15 Member
States may impose equivalent
restrictions on workers from that
Member State. 
Workers from the Member States
that joined the EU on 1 May 2004
and who are subject to transitional
arrangements must be given priori-
ty over workers from third coun-
tries. Once the worker has obtained
access to the labour market, he/she
benefits from equal treatment. 
During the first phase of the TA
from 1 May 2004 until 30 April
2006, Sweden and Ireland decided
not to apply any restrictions on
access to their labour market by
workers from the EU-8. The UK
decided not to apply any ex-ante
restrictions on access to its labour
market but adopted a Worker's
Registration Scheme. The remain-
ing EU-15 Member States main-
tained their work permit system,
albeit with some modifications.
Three EU-8 Member States
(Poland, Slovenia and Hungary)
applied reciprocity to EU-15
Member States applying restric-
tions and none of the EU-8 Member
States applied for permission to
restrict access by workers from
other EU-8 Member States. 
The situation for the second phase,
which started on 1 May 2006, is as
follows: Ireland, Sweden and the
UK have kept their labour markets
open to citizens from the EU-8.
Finland, Greece, Italy, Portugal and
Spain have removed the restric-
tions. The UK continues its manda-
tory registration scheme. Finland is
at the moment working on a regis-
tration/monitoring scheme. Belgium,
Denmark, France, Luxembourg and
the Netherlands have announced
simplifications to their existing
national access schemes. Austria
and Germany will keep the restric-
tions until 2009. Hungary and
Poland continue to apply reciproci-
ty, while Slovenia has decided to
stop applying reciprocal measures.
Box 2 – Limited mobility for workers from the new Member States
15 See for example Boeri T. and Brücker H. (2005), Dolvik J.E. and Eldring L. (2006), Doyle N., Hughes G., and Wadensjö E. (2006), European Citizens
Action Service (ECAS) (2005) and (2006), Gilpin N., Henty M., Lemos S., Portes J. and Bullen C. (2006), Ireland’s National Training and Employment
Authority (2006), Portes J. and French S. (2005), Tamas K. and Münz R. (2006), UK Home Office (2006).
16 “NUTS” stands for the “Nomenclature of Statistical Territorial Units” and is the common classification system for dividing the European Union’s
territory in order to produce regional statistics for the Community. NUTS subdivides Member States into regions at NUTS 1 level, of which there
a are 89 in the EU25. Each of these is then subdivided into regions at NUTS level 2 (254 regions) and these in turn into regions at NUTS level 3
(1214 regions).
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been higher in 2005 than ten years ago,
although most of the increase seems to
have occurred from 1995 to the begin-
ning of this decade. Since 2000, the
EU-15 regional mobility rate seems to
have levelled off a bit17.
As for individual countries, Portugal,
the UK, Belgium, France and
Germany show the highest regional
mobility rates in 2005, both at
NUTS 2 and NUTS 1 levels (see
Tables 5 and 6). The old Member
States with the lowest internal mobili-
ty levels are Italy and Greece.
Regional mobility in the new Member
States is significantly lower than in the
old Member States18. The new Member
States for which regional mobility can
be identified from the LFS at NUTS 2
level had an average regional mobility
rate of 0.3% in 2005. The Czech
Republic had the highest rate with
0.7%, followed by Hungary with 0.3%
and Poland with 0.2%. It was lowest in
Slovakia at only 0.1%.
The great differences in regional
mobility rates between Member States
and the lower overall mobility rate
compared with the US (see Box 3),
suggest that there may be a potential for
higher geographic mobility in the EU.
4. Who are 
the movers and what
drives them
4.1. The characteristics of
EU movers
Socio-demographic characteristics
In this section the following questions
are addressed. Who is geographically
mobile? What are the typical charac-
teristics of recently mobile workers in
the EU? How do they differ from the
overall population in terms of age,
gender, education and other character-
istics?
Table 8 gives an overview of the social-
demographic composition of the recently
arrived “internationally mobile” popula-
tion in the EU-15 Member States, here
defined as active working age citizens
from other countries who have moved to
their current country of residence less
than five years ago20. It confirms a num-
ber of findings of the migration literature
and shows some interesting trends in
recent mobility flows. It also shows that
there are some distinct differences
between mobile EU-15 workers, mobile
17 Note, though, that the regional mobility rates presented here should be taken with some caution. The overall average moving rate is based on
information from only about half of the EU-15 countries, as no information is available for the others. Similar to the statistical difficulties encoun-
tered in measuring year-to-year change of residence across country borders, one can also expect coverage problems when surveying regional
change of residence, albeit to a smaller degree. Another uncertainty arises from the way regions are classified. For analytical purposes it would
be interesting to capture residential moves between labour market regions and to have information on whether a move has taken place from a
neighbouring region to another or from further away. For practical reasons, however, the regional boundaries are normally determined through
administrative borders which do not necessarily follow economic criteria. Furthermore, the source statistics do not allow identifying the distance
of a move within a country, but only the fact that a move has taken place from one region to another.
18 This finding appears somewhat in contrast to the great structural changes which their labour markets have undergone, e.g. due to privatisation
and increased unemployment.
19 See Recchi et al. (2006) for a similar analysis, which is based on the stock of EU and non-EU foreign residents in the Member States instead of
recent arrivals.
Chapter 5. Geographic mobility within the EU 
Country 1995 20001 20052
EU-15
BE 0.5 : 1.1
DE 0.7 1.3 1.1
EL 0.3 0.2 0.1
ES 0.2 0.1 0.4
FR 1.5 2.0 1.7
IT 0.3 0.3 0.1
NL 1.3 1.5 0.5
AT : : 0.2
PT : 1.6 2.1
UK 1.3 1.8 1.5
EU-15 available 0.8 1.2 1.0
EU-10
HU : 0.3 0.3
PL : : 0.2
Source: Eurostat, LFS.
1) PT, UK, HU 2001 data, NL 1998 data.
2) EL, AT 2003 data.
Table 5 – Regional mobility rates (NUTS 1 regions)
(Percent of working age population which has moved residence within the
country from one NUTS 1 region to another since the year before)
citizens from the new Member States and
mobile citizens from non-EU countries.
Age clearly is a key factor in mobility.
Younger people tend to be significantly
more willing to change their country of
residence than older people. In 2000,
half of the EU-15 active mobile were
between 25 and 34 years old, although
only little more than a quarter of the
overall working age population falls
into this age group. Younger workers
between 15 and 24 also tended to be
more mobile than the respective overall
population, whereas mobility declined
significantly after people have reached
their mid-thirties. However, the data
also indicate that the share of EU-15
mobile workers aged 35 and older has
increased significantly between 2000
and 2005, from 31% to 40%
Interestingly, both EU-10 and third
country mobile workers tend to be
younger than the EU-15 mobile. This is
especially the case for the recently EU-
10 mobile resident in the EU-15. In
2005, more than half of them were
between 25 and 34 years old and more
than a quarter were below the age of 25.
Perhaps surprisingly, the data do not
indicate any major gender differences
between other EU-15 nationals and
third country mobile workers having
recently settled in the EU-15. While it
is often assumed that men tend to be
significantly more mobile than
women, the figures show that the gen-
der composition of the EU-15 active
mobile is, in fact, similar to the gender
composition of the overall active work-
ing age population. In 2000, 60% of
the EU-15 active mobile were male
compared to 57% in the overall active
working age population, and in 2005
the composition was almost identical.
For recent arrivals from non-EU-25
countries, the gender composition has
been identical to that of the overall EU-
15 working age population in 2005.
However, the gender composition of
mobile workers from the EU-10 is sig-
nificantly different to that of the other
groups, as there was an equal split
between the sexes – 50% men and 50%
women.
As for educational attainment, there are
notable differences not only between
mobile people and the population at
large, but also among the mobile from
the EU-15, the EU-10 and third coun-
tries. In 2000, 44% of all EU-15 active
mobile were highly skilled (i.e. had
gone through tertiary education) com-
pared to only 23% of the total active
working age population, whereas
movers with medium and low skills
were significantly underrepresented. By
2005, the overall skill level of the EU-
15 mobile had increased substantially as
the share of medium-skilled movers
rose and that of low-skilled movers
dropped. Furthermore, while the share
of high-skilled workers among EU-10
mobile workers has been substantially
lower than among the EU-15 mobile,
the proportion of medium-skilled work-
ers from the EU-10 is much higher than
that of both the EU-15 mobile and the
total active working age population.
Taking further into account that only
15% of the EU-10 mobile have low skill
levels, it is fair to say that mobile work-
ers from the new Member States make a
positive contribution to improving the
skill level of the workforce in the old
Member States. As for the skill compo-
sition of mobile workers from countries
outside the EU-25, the data show that
their educational level is on average
lower than that of both the overall work-
force and mobile workers from the old
and new Member States. About a quar-
ter of the mobile workers from third
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Country 1995 20001 20052
EU-15
BE 0.9 : 2.0
DE 1.1 1.7 1.5
EL 0.4 0.2 0.1
ES 0.2 0.2 0.5
FR 1.7 2.3 :
IT 0.4 0.3 0.4
NL 1.8 2.1
AT : : 0.4
PT 1.1 1.9 2.2
FI : 1.0 1.0
SE : 1.7 :
UK 1.3 2.5 2.1
EU-15 available 1.0 1.6 1.2
EU-10
CZ : 0.6 0.7
HU : 0.4 0.3
PL : : 0.2
SK : : 0.1
EU-10 available : : 0.3
Source: Eurostat, LFS.
1) BE, PT, UK, HU 2001 data, NL 1998 data.
2) EL, AT 2003 data.
Table 6 – Regional mobility rates (NUTS 2 regions)
(Percent of working age population which has moved residence within the
country from one NUTS 2 region to another since the year before)
countries are highly skilled, 40% have
medium skills and more than a third
have low skills.
Another important factor of the mobil-
ity equation is family ties. One would
expect that a single person without
children does not have to take into
account the social and material costs
mobility may have on his or her partner
or children and is, other things being
equal, freer to make a decision to move.
It seems that this relation can be con-
firmed by the data for mobile workers
from the EU-15 and EU-10. While over
60% of the total EU-15 active working
age population is married, only around
40% of the EU-15 mobile and 47% of
the EU-10 mobile have the same status.
Furthermore, only around one-third of
the EU mobile workers have children,
compared to over 50% of the overall
active working age population. These
differences are also certainly a function
of age, as movers tend to be younger
than the average population and there-
fore less likely to be married and have
children. However, when considering
age groups single people without chil-
dren still tend to have a higher share
among movers than among the overall
population. 
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When discussing geographic mobili-
ty in Europe, it is sometimes argued
that mobility in the EU is compara-
tively low when compared to other
parts of the world, and notably the
US. This certainly appears true when
comparing cross-EU mobility to the
interstate mobility flows found in the
US. In the EU-15, only about 0.1% of
the working age population change
their country of residence in a given
year. In the US, every year about 3%
of the working age population move
to a different state (see Table 7). 
However, the validity of comparing
interstate moves in the US with
cross-border moves in the EU is
problematic on several grounds. The
United States is a federal state,
whereas the EU is not; the US is one
nation, the EU is not; free move-
ment in the US is a century-old phe-
nomenon, but only a more recent
possibility in the EU; labour legisla-
tion is different in the US compared
to the EU (where there are also dif-
ferences among Member States)
and finally language and cultural
barriers within the EU are much
greater than within the US20.
On the basis of these differences, it
therefore may be more appropriate
to compare internal mobility in the
US to geographic mobility not
between, but within the EU Member
States. Comparing interstate mobili-
ty in the US to internal mobility
between NUTS 1 regions in EU
Member States does narrow the
“mobility gap” somewhat between
Europe and the US. For example,
between 2000 and 2005, around 1%
of the working age population have
changed their residence each year
from one (NUTS 1) region to anoth-
er within the EU-15, compared to an
overall interstate mobility rate of
between 2.8 to 3.4% in the US dur-
ing the same period of time.
Around half of all the interstate
mobility actually took place within
the nine US Census Divisions which
group several states into larger ana-
lytical territorial entities roughly
comparable in size to EU Member
States. (The Census Divisions in the
US are then further grouped into
three Regions). Within Census
Divisions, therefore, some 1.5% of
the working age population move
from one state to another every year.
This is still higher than the compara-
ble EU average figure (NUTS 1) and
certainly much higher compared
with many EU Member States.  
Hence, although a large part of the
difference between the US and the
EU with respect to geographic mobil-
ity rates can obviously be explained
by the absence of national borders,
the common language and the similar
institutional framework, these com-
parisons would still suggest that there
may be a potential for higher geo-
graphic mobility in the EU.
Box 3 – Comparing geographic mobility in the EU to the US
Different
Different Census
state, Division,
Year same same Different
Census Census Census Different
Division Region Region state
1 2 3 4=1+2+3
2004 1.4 0.4 1.0 2.8
2003 1.5 0.4 1.0 3.0
2002 1.5 0.5 1.2 3.1
2001 1.6 0.5 1.0 3.1
2000 1.7 0.5 1.2 3.4
Source: US Census Bureau, Current Population Survey. 
(http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/migrate.html)
Table 7 – Geographic mobility in the United States 2000 – 2004
(in percent of working age population)
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Mobile workers by economic activity
There are also some notable differences
between mobile workers and the overall
workforce with respect to which eco-
nomic sectors they work in. Compared
to the overall employed working age
population, a high share of the mobile
EU-15 workers is employed in the hotel
and restaurant sector and real estate,
renting and business activities. For the
other activities their share is similar to
the overall working age population, but
they are underrepresented in construc-
tion. Over recent years there has also
been a clear trend for the EU-15 mobile
away from jobs in agriculture and
industry towards service jobs21.
For the non-EU-15 mobile the pattern
is somewhat different. Similar to the
EU-15 mobile, they are strongly repre-
sented in the hotel and restaurant busi-
ness. Compared to both EU-15 and
third-country mobile, a large share of
the EU-10 mobile is employed in agri-
culture, manufacturing and other indus-
tries. A notable and increasing propor-
tion of both EU-10 and non-EU mobile
works in the construction industry.
However, the case of hotels and restau-
rants and business activities aside, a
relatively small share of the EU-10
mobile works in the service industry.
This is most notable in “other service
activities” which employ almost 30%
of the EU-15 mobile and third-country
mobile, but less than 20% of the EU-10
mobile. 
Occupational structure of mobile
workers
There is clear evidence that a signifi-
cant proportion of the EU-15 mobile
tend to work in highly qualified “white-
collar” occupations. According to the
LFS, more than 55% of the EU-15
mobile worked in high-skilled non-
manual occupations in 2005, compared
to 40% of the total active working age
population (see Table 10). Low-skilled
non-manual workers occupied a similar
share among the total population and
the mobile population (26% and 24%
respectively), and “blue-collar” work-
ers were clearly underrepresented
among the EU-15 mobile population.
Compared to 2000, the trend both
towards more high-skilled non-manual
and away from blue-collar occupations
seems to have increased.
Again, these findings differ signifi-
cantly from the profile of mobile work-
ers from the EU-10 and non-EU coun-
tries. While the share of low-skilled
non-manual workers is fairly similar
across the broad nationality groups pre-
sented here, the proportion among EU-
10 and non-EU mobile workers with
high-skilled “white-collar” occupations
is by far lower than for EU-15 mobile
and the overall workforce. On the other
hand, the share of workers with skilled
“blue-collar” occupations and elemen-
tary occupations among EU-10 and
non-EU mobile increased at the same
21 Note, however, that the data presented here do not include short-term and seasonal mobility, which is a significant phenomenon in some indus-
tries, such as agriculture and construction.
2000 2005
Total EU-15 Non-EU-15 Total EU-15 EU-10 Non-EU-25
employed1 “Mobile”2 “Mobile”3 employed1 “Mobile”2 “Mobile”4 “Mobile”5
Agriculture, Fishing, and Industry (A to E) 25 21 21 22 16 21 17
of which Manufacturing (D) 20 18 16 18 14 18 12
Construction (F) 8 4 11 8 5 17 14
Wholesale and retail trade (G) 15 9 10 15 12 12 11
Hotels and restaurants (H) 4 16 12 4 12 14 14
Transport and communication (I) 6 5 4 6 6 5 4
Financial intermediation (J) 3 4 3 3 4 1 1
Real estate, renting and 9 16 11 10 17 13 9
business activities (K)
Other service activities (L to Q) 30 25 28 31 29 18 29
Source: Eurostat, LFS, spring results.
1) Total employed aged 15 to 64 
2) Employed EU-15 citizens aged 15 to 64 resident less than 5 years in another EU-15 country (except Italy).
3) Employed non-EU-15 citizens (incl. EU-10 countries) aged 15 to 64 resident less than 5 years in an EU-15 country (except Italy).
4) Employed EU-10 citizens aged 15 to 64 resident less than 5 years in an EU-15 country (except Italy).
5) Employed non-EU-25 citizens aged 15 to 64 resident less than 5 years in an EU-15 country (except Italy).
Table 9 – Economic sector structure of employed working age population in 
the EU-15 Member States, 2000 and 2005 (in percent of all economic sectors)
Economic sector
(NACE Rev. 1)
time and is much higher than among
the EU-15 mobile and the overall
employed population.
In this context, it is interesting to note
that the occupational structure of the
EU-10 mobile is in some contrast to
their educational composition. In prin-
ciple, one would expect that mobile
workers tend to work in occupations
that more or less correspond to their
educational level. For mobile workers
from EU-15 Member States and from
non-EU countries, this seems to hold
true as their occupational structure
reflects, by and large, their educational
composition. However, the proportion
of EU-10 mobile persons concentrated
in elementary occupations (30% in
2005) is much higher than one would
expect from the share of EU-10 mobile
persons with a low educational back-
ground (15%) and given the fact that
more than 60% of them have a medium
level education (see Table 8). In other
words, a relatively high number of
mobile EU-10 workers seem to move
into jobs abroad for which they are
overqualified. One reason for this could
be that many low-skilled jobs in the old
Member States are still better paid than
more qualified occupations in the new
Member States. For many qualified
mobile workers a low-skilled job may
be a temporary stepping stone to move
on to a better position in the host coun-
try or back home, after having gained
money and experience on the foreign
labour market.
Labour market performance of mobile
workers
How do mobile people fare in the
labour market? Does geographic
mobility help to improve the employ-
ment situation of an individual?
Overall, citizens from other EU coun-
tries perform relatively well in the
labour markets of their EU-15 destina-
tion countries. Table 11 shows the key
labour market indicator, the employ-
ment rate, of the total working age pop-
ulation in the old Member States com-
pared to the total stock of the foreign
resident working age population by
nationality and recently mobile per-
sons, i.e. those foreign residents who
settled in a EU-15 Member State less
than five years ago. 
According to this, EU-15 citizens resi-
dent in another EU-15 country have
shown employment rates which are
very similar to those of the overall
working age population. For the last
five years, the employment rate of EU-
15 foreign residents has been at around
67% and therefore slightly above that
of the average population (66%). For
recently mobile EU-15 citizens, i.e.
those who have been resident in their
host country for less than five years,
the picture is the same in 2005 and with
some slight variations in the years
before.
For EU-10 nationals living in a EU-15
country, employment rates were signifi-
cantly below average only five years
ago, but have increased steadily since
then. By 2005 the employment rate of
EU-10 foreigners was close to that of the
overall population, showing that EU-10
nationals contribute positively to overall
labour market performance in the old
Member States. Compared to that,
employment rates of non-EU-25 citizens
resident in the EU-15 Member States
remain considerably below average,
with only 55% of them being employed.
However, this is already significantly
higher than only five years ago.
There are significant differences
among the various destination coun-
tries, mainly with respect to employ-
ment rates of foreigners from EU-10
countries and non-EU nationals. Spain,
Austria, the UK, and most of all Ireland
are countries where EU-10 nationals
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2000 2005
Total EU-15 Non-EU-15 Total EU-15 EU-10 Non-EU-25
employed1 “Mobile”2 “Mobile”3 employed1 “Mobile”2 “Mobile”4 “Mobile”5
High-skilled non-manual 37 51 26 40 55 16 20
Low-skilled non-manual 27 26 24 26 24 28 25
Skilled manual 27 14 22 25 12 27 21
Elementary occupations 9 9 28 10 9 30 35
Source: Eurostat, LFS, spring results.
1) Total employed aged 15 to 64 
2) Employed EU-15 citizens aged 15 to 64 resident less than 5 years in another EU-15 country (except Italy)
3) Employed non-EU-15 citizens (incl. EU10 countries) aged 15 to 64 resident less than 5 years in an EU-15 country (except Italy)
4) Employed EU-10 citizens aged 15 to 64 resident less than 5 years in an EU-15 country (except Italy)
5) Employed non-EU-25 citizens aged 15 to 64 resident less than 5 years in an EU-15 country (except Italy)
Note: The distributions of active persons by occupation are based on the classification ISCO 88-COM (groups 1 to 3 for high-
skilled non-manual, 4 to 5 for low-skilled non-manual, 6 to 8 for skilled manual and 9 for elementary occupations.
Table 10 – Occupational structure of the employed working age population in 
the EU-15 Member States (in percent of all occupations)
Occupational level
227
Chapter 5. Geographic mobility within the EU 
have employment rates well above the
employment rate of the overall popula-
tion and other EU-15 nationals (see
Table 12). On the other hand, employ-
ment rates of EU-10 citizens in
Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, the
Netherlands, Finland and Sweden are
substantially below the national aver-
age. And with the exception of Greece,
EU-15 EU-10 non-EU-25 EU-15 EU-10 non-EU-25
2000 65 66 57 50 64 49 45
2001 66 67 59 53 67 53 48
2002 66 67 60 53 67 59 52
2003 66 67 58 53 65 55 52
2004 66 67 58 53 63 59 55
2005 66 67 63 55 67 62 54
Source: Eurostat, LFS, spring results.
Italy is excluded as a destination country in breakdowns by nationality, since it does not disaggregate by nationality. 
Denmark and Portugal are excluded in breakdowns for EU-10 nationals due to data unavailability. 
Estimates of data for Germany and Ireland in 2000-2004, France in 2000-2002 and Spain in 2000-2001.
Table 11 – Employment rates for resident working age population in EU-15 Member States 2000 to
2005 (in percent of working age persons)
Year
Total 
working age 
population
Foreign residents (total)
Nationality
Recently mobile 
(resident less than 5 years)
EU-15 EU-10 non-EU-25 EU-15 EU-10 non-EU-25
BE 61 60 55 35 67 52 35
DK 75 71 : 51 67 : 48
DE 65 68 51 48 67 42 35
EL 60 53 47 71 (49) (23) 64
ES 63 64 78 71 67 68 70
FR 63 67 57 44 56 : 35
IE 67 69 85 57 70 86 58
LU 64 68 (68) 56 78 : (39)
NL 73 76 (64) 41 74 : 37
AT 68 70 72 57 71 (66) 45
PT 68 65 : 73 : : 78
FI 69 67 55 45 (78) : (31)
SE 73 73 62 45 74 (63) 31
UK 71 69 75 58 68 76 55
Source: Eurostat, LFS, spring results.
Italy is excluded as a destination country in breakdowns by nationality, since it does not disaggregate by nationality. 
Denmark and Portugal are excluded in breakdowns for EU-10 nationals due to data unavailability. 
Estimates of data for Germany and Ireland in 2000-2004, France in 2000-2002 and Spain in 2000-2001.
Table 12 – Employment rates for foreign resident working age population 
in EU-15 Member States in 2005
Destination
country
Total 
working age 
population
Foreign residents (total)
Nationality
Mobile foreign 
(resident less than 5 years)
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Spain and Portugal, all EU-15 countries
show below average employment rates
for non-EU nationals. In France,
Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden
these rates are below 50%. The most
striking case is, however, Belgium
where only 35% of non-EU nationals
held a job in 2005.
As for the gender dimension, there are
no major differences between the
employment rates of men and women
from other EU Member States and
those of men and women in the total
resident working age population. In
2005, the employment rate of other
EU-15 male nationals was 75% and
that of other EU-10 male nationals
72%, compared to 73% among the total
working age population (see Table 13).
For women from both the EU-15 and
EU-10, the employment rate was 16
percentage points lower than that for
men, and for the total female working
age population 13 percentage points
lower. This is in contrast to non-EU-25
nationals, who not only have signifi-
cantly lower employment rates than
both the overall population and EU
nationals, but also a higher gender gap
(21%). However, the data also indicate
the gender employment gap has
decreased since 2000, both in the over-
all population and among foreign resi-
dents and mobile people from both
other EU countries and outside the EU.
There are also differences with respect
to age among the employment rates of
other EU nationals and non-EU nation-
als. Notably older EU-15 and EU-10 cit-
izens between the age of 55 and 64 have
a higher employment rate (47% and
49% respectively) than the overall resi-
dent working age population (46%) and
non EU-25 nationals (38%). Among
young people between the ages of 15 to
24, other EU-10 nationals show a sub-
stantially higher employment rate than
their counterparts in the overall popula-
tion and the other nationality groups. 
The data also reconfirm that education is
a key to success on the labour market.
The higher the educational level of a per-
son the higher his or her general chances
of being employed. This relationship
holds not only for the overall population
but also for internationally mobile peo-
ple. Interestingly, however, employment
rates of other low-skilled EU-15 nation-
als and recently mobile are higher than
those of the low-skilled portion of the
overall working age population. This is
also the case for recently mobile EU-10
citizens, and may be largely due to the
fact that a large number of other EU-25
citizens find low-skilled jobs in sectors
such as the construction industry and the
hotel and restaurant business.
Overall, finding a job in another coun-
try is a motivation to move for unem-
ployed and inactive people. Looking at
labour market transitions for geograph-
ically mobile workers (see Table 14),
55% of those who were unemployed in
another EU country the previous year
had found a job in the current year. This
was in contrast to 29% that stayed in
the same country.
4.2. Mobility motives and
experiences
Official statistics such as the European
LFS generally do not include data on
what motivates people to move and
whether or not mobility has been a pos-
itive experience for them. For this, ref-
Same Employed 94 3 3
Unemployed 29 64 6
Inactive 6 3 91
EU-15 Employed 76 12 11
Unemployed (55) (42) (3)
Inactive 27 (7) 66
Source: Eurostat, LFS, spring data; own calculations based on pool of data over 2000 to 2005.
Note: Data in brackets lack reliability due to small sample size. Does not include data for DE, ES, IE, NL, UK.
For 2000, the data source does not distinguish between EU-10 citizens and non-EU-25 citizens. Italy is excluded as a destination
country in breakdowns by nationality, since it does not disaggregate by nationality. Denmark and Portugal are excluded in break-
downs for EU-10 nationals due to data unavailability. Belgium is excluded in breakdown by age for mobile EU-10 due to data
unavailability.
Table 14 – Links between cross-country mobility and year-to-year job mobility, 
EU-15 Member States (in percent of the working status a year before)
Country of
residence a year
before
Working status
a year before
Current working status
Employed Unemployed Inactive
 
erence has to be made to special sur-
veys, such as the European Internal
Movers Survey22 or the Eurobarometer.
A special Eurobarometer survey on
geographic and labour market mobility
was undertaken in September 2005 and
asked people in the EU-25 Member
States about their experiences with and
views on geographic and job mobility.
The following sections summarise
some of the main results on geographic
mobility from this survey23.
General attitudes towards geographic
mobility
In general, Europeans regard geograph-
ic mobility as something positive.
According to the Eurobarometer, 57%
of respondents say that mobility across
regions or country borders is a positive
thing for European integration, 46%
think it is good for labour markets, 46%
think it is good for the individual and
40% think it is good for the economy.
Only on the question of whether or not
mobility is good for families were
views (perhaps not surprisingly) mixed,
with only 32% saying it is a good thing
and 27% feeling it is a bad thing (see
Chart 5).
Interestingly there are some differences
between citizens from the old and the
new Member States on how they view
mobility. Citizens from the old Member
States hold, on average, more positive
views on mobility than citizens from
the new Member States in all categories
except the labour market.
Reasons for moving
According to the Eurobarometer, the
single most important reason for past
movers deciding to move to another
region or country was to take up a new
job. In the EU-15 countries, 30% of all
respondents who had been geographi-
cally mobile, said that a new job or job
transfer were their reason for moving
(see Chart 6). In the EU-10 Member
States the job motive was even more
pronounced, with 36% of respondents
citing a new job as a motive for geo-
graphic mobility.
Family related reasons also rank highly
in the decision to move. In particular, a
change of partnership or of marital sta-
tus prompts many people to move, but
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22 The European Internal Movers Survey was undertaken and analysed within the PIONEUR research project, funded by the 5th Framework
Programme of the European Commission and coordinated by the University of Florence. This survey covered a sample of European citizens resident
as foreign nationals in five European Member States (France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK) and provides information on the socio-demograph-
ic profile of intra EU movers and their motivations, life patterns and mobility experiences. For more information see www.obets.ua.es/pioneur  
23 The Eurobarometer survey on geographic and labour market mobility was commissioned and financed by the European Commission and carried
out between 2 September 2005 and 6 October 2005. The survey covers residents of EU Member States aged 15 years and over (a sample of 24,642
respondents in total). All interviews were conducted face-to-face in households and in the appropriate national language. A descriptive analysis
of this data is provided in Vandenbrande et al. (2006). A more detailed and extensive analysis of the Eurobarometer mobility survey data is cur-
rently carried out by a research group under the auspices of the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions.
Their reports are due to be published in the near future.
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so does following a partner to the new
location. Another important factor for
moving (presumably to another region
and less so internationally) relates to
the aim of improving their housing sit-
uation by either finding better housing
or by becoming a home owner.
Views of people with long distance
mobility experiences
On balance, Europeans who have
already moved to another region or
country seem to regard the experience
as something positive. According to the
Eurobarometer survey, 45% of respon-
dents report no deterioration in their
circumstances after a move to another
region or country (see Chart 7). The
main positive effect reported in the sur-
vey is the improvement in housing con-
ditions (36%). 
A significant share of respondents has
also seen its employment and income
situation improve. Around 25% report a
better job situation for themselves or
their partner, 22% have seen an
increase in their household income, and
for 15% their working conditions have
changed for the better. However, per-
haps not surprisingly, social contacts
and the support of family and friends
are the two aspects of life that are most
likely to worsen after a long distance
move. However, a similar share of
respondents report that social support
and contacts have actually improved
through mobility.
4.3. Prospects for future
cross-border mobility 
The analysis above has been looking
mainly at past mobility patterns. The
Eurobarometer survey on geographic
and labour market mobility also pro-
vides some prospective information on
the future mobility of European citi-
zens. This concerns the expectations of
citizens to move within the next five
years, which indicates the underlying
potential for mobility. 
Focusing on expectations for a move to
another EU Member State within the
next five years (see Chart 8), only
around 3% of EU citizens expressed
any such expectation, although moving
intentions in the EU-10 taken as a
whole, are more pronounced than in the
EU-15 (5.4% and 2.7% respectively). 
Nevertheless, there are large variations
across Member States. Especially
among the EU-8 one can distinguish
between a group of countries with a
high mobility potential and one with a
low mobility potential. In particular
Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians and
Poles show a high propensity to move,
with over 7% of respondents declaring
that they have the intention to move to
another country within the next five
years. In contrast to this, mobility
intentions are much lower in Slovakia
(3.5%), Hungary (2.4%), Slovenia
(2.2%) and the Czech Republic (1.6%).
The highest mobility potentials among
the EU-15 exist in Denmark, followed
by Ireland, Sweden, Finland and
France. The UK also has an interna-
tional mobility potential which is
slightly above average, but with in the
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Chart 6
rest of the old Member States it is
below average. Interestingly, all of the
EU-15 high mobility countries and
even many of the EU-15 low mobility
countries show higher mobility inten-
tions than the Czech Republic,
Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia. 
Certainly not all mobility intentions will
translate into a firm intention to migrate.
It is estimated that about a third or a half
of those who express a basic intention to
move may actually do so in the future24.
This would mean that roughly between
1% to 1.5% of EU-15 citizens can be
expected to move to a different Member
State within the next five years, com-
pared to between 0.5% to 1.8% of the
population in the low mobility EU-8
countries and between 2.5% to 4.5% in
the high mobility EU-8 countries. 
Compared to 2001, mobility intentions
for the four low mobility EU-8 coun-
tries have only increased slightly and
were similar or smaller than the
increase of mobility intentions in the
EU-15 countries. However, for the
three Baltic countries and Poland,
mobility intentions increased signifi-
cantly more compared to 200125.
Given these findings, geographic
mobility between the EU-15 Member
States is likely to increase somewhat,
but it remains to be seen by how much.
As for the EU-8 countries, one can
observe two distinct groups of coun-
tries which greatly differ in their
expected mobility rates. The Czech
Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and
Slovenia, have expected mobility rates
that are below that of most old Member
States. It is therefore unlikely that
future labour flows from these coun-
tries will cause significant pressures on
the labour markets in the EU-15
Member States. Considering that geo-
24 See Krieger, H. and Fernandez, E. (2006), p.11.
25 See European Foundation (2006).
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graphic mobility is an important mech-
anism for improving labour market
efficiency, their low mobility rates may
be rather a cause of concern than a jus-
tification for the continued application
of transitional arrangements.
On the other hand, expected mobility
from the Baltic countries and Poland is
indeed significantly higher than that
from the rest of the Member States. In
principle, this should be welcome
news, as the mobile workers from these
countries and the companies employing
them are showing a relatively high
degree of flexibility and adaptability. 
It is also unlikely that this will pose
major and lasting challenges for the
labour markets of the receiving coun-
tries. Although current and expected
mobility rates for the three Baltic
countries may seem high in relative
terms, the absolute numbers behind
this are modest, given the small size of
these countries. As for Poland, the
largest of the new Member States, the
potential future outflow of workers to
the EU-15 may appear large in
absolute terms. However, this needs to
be put into the perspective of the total
size of the European labour market.
And even if mobile workers from
Poland (and elsewhere) tend to concen-
trate on a few destination countries
there are few reasons to believe that
those labour markets cannot absorb
them. Mobility flows will be spread
over time as not everybody who
declares an intention to move to anoth-
er country will do so tomorrow.
Furthermore, old Member States
which have been welcoming EU-8
workers from the beginning and which
are already experiencing considerable
inflows, namely Ireland and the UK,
have been able to integrate them into
their workforce and to the general
advantage of their economies. If at all,
the relatively high expected mobility
from the Baltic countries and Poland
may raise questions in relation to youth
and brain drain. However, this also
depends on who moves and how per-
manent emigration from these coun-
tries will be. Data from the LFS indi-
cate that a high share of recent movers
from those countries is in the youngest
age groups, has medium skill levels
short of tertiary education and tends to
move into relatively low-skilled occu-
pations. This could be a reason to
expect that a substantial proportion of
them may return to their home country
after having earned enough money and
improved their skills abroad.
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Chart 8
4.4. Drivers and barriers of
mobility
When discussing the reasons and expe-
riences of movers above, it was clear
that economic and personal reasons can
act as strong incentives to mobility.
This is also confirmed by the response
to the question of what would encour-
age somebody to move to another
country.
Here the desire for higher income and
better working conditions ranks high-
est, most notably among citizens from
the new Member States. Some 34% of
EU-10 respondents say that the
prospect of a higher income would be
an incentive to move to another coun-
try, and 31% cite better working condi-
tions as a factor (see Chart 9). In com-
parison, only 18% of EU-15 citizens
would be encouraged to move for a
higher income, and 19% for better
working conditions. It seems that for
EU-15 citizens non-economic factors
count as much as economic factors. A
better climate, the adventure of discov-
ering a new environment, learning a
new language and meeting new people
all seem to be of almost equal impor-
tance as earning a higher income or
finding a better job. 
One explanation for this distinct pattern
between the old and the new Member
States is probably the fact that the dif-
ferentials in income and employment
conditions between the EU-10 and the
EU-15 are still significantly higher
than among EU-15 Member States.
Therefore there is more incentive for
EU-10 to be more geographically
mobile than EU-15 citizens. For many
workers from the EU-15 Member
States, international income and
employment differentials alone may
not be significant enough to prompt a
move. For them it also takes “fun and
sun” factors to become mobile.
It is also interesting to note that better
access to healthcare and other public
services in the receiving countries pro-
vide only little encouragement for mobil-
ity compared to the economic incentives.
This is true for potential migrants from
both the EU-15 and the EU-10.
However, given that a majority of EU
citizens regard mobility as a good
thing, and taking into account the fact
that mobility seems to have been a pos-
itive experience for a majority of peo-
ple who have been geographically
mobile in the past, it is perplexing why
mobility rates are still at comparatively
low levels in most of the Member
States.
Part of the answer is that mobility not
only has its benefits, but also its eco-
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nomic and social costs. Despite the
existence of a whole range of different
factors which would entice someone to
move to the another country, Chart 10
also shows that almost 30% of people
do not see any factor at all which would
encourage them to be internationally
mobile. Furthermore, there is a whole
range of reasons that would discourage
people from moving. By far the biggest
obstacle to mobility is the social cost of
moving. More than 40% of respondents
say that the loss of direct contact with
family and friends would discourage
them from moving. Over a quarter say
that they would also miss the support
from family and friends, for example
with respect to caring for children or
the elderly. Concerns about having to
learn a new language only rank in third
place followed by inferior housing con-
ditions and worse income and working
conditions (see Chart 12).
Some of these concerns are also found
in the response to the question of what
difficulties someone expects to
encounter when moving to another EU
Member State. The greatest expected
difficulty is lack of language skills
(around 60% of respondents – see
Chart 11; however, as seen above, only
20% say that the lack of language skills
would actually discourage them to
move). Relatively few respondents
quote access to social protection or
social services and the recognition of
pension rights as a potential barrier,
and less than 10% believe that they
would have difficulties in having their
skills and diplomas recognised.
Obtaining a work permit also does not
seem to be a major concern to EU citi-
zens. Given the current restrictions to
the free movement of workers that
apply to the new Member States, it is,
however, not surprising that the highest
proportions of people quoting “obtain-
ing work permit” as one of the main
potential mobility barriers are in the
Czech Republic, Estonia, Poland,
Slovakia and Slovenia though the
response was consistently below 20%.
At the same time, 30% of EU citizens
expect to encounter difficulties in find-
ing a job in another country, either for
themselves or for their partner.
Overall, these data show that there are
important trade-offs between economic
and social aspects of mobility. On the
one hand, people are attracted both by
the job and income opportunities of
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geographic mobility and its potential to
improve ones quality of life through
discovering new things and a better liv-
ing environment. On the other hand,
concerns about losing one’s social net-
work, not being able to cope with a new
language or culture and the perceived
difficulty of finding a job or proper
housing abroad are the main mobility
barriers for European citizens.
Compared to this, administrative and
legal barriers are perceived as less of an
obstacle although they still play a role,
especially for citizens from the new
Member States affected by transitional
arrangements.
These findings have several implica-
tions. Most policies for improving
geographic mobility in the EU are
focusing on removing still existing
administrative and legal barriers.
Major achievements have already been
made in recent years to lower these
barriers, for example through
improved transparency, transferability
and recognition of qualifications, the
introduction of a European health
insurance card and a better coordina-
tion of Social Security Schemes (see
Box 4). These efforts should continue,
for instance through the Commission’s
proposals for improving the portabili-
ty of supplementary pension rights or
by further improving the information
and transparency of job opportunities
in Europe through the EURES net-
work (see Box 5). 
However, even if all administrative
barriers and information hurdles to
mobility were removed, the social, cul-
tural, educational and infrastructure
barriers to mobility would still remain
as the main obstacles. This is an area
where policy-makers from the EU
level all the way down to the local level
could contribute to improve matters,
for example by fostering the integra-
tion and acceptance of newcomers, by
providing for more attractive urban
environments and housing markets, by
improving language skills, by helping
young people to gain first mobility
experiences through studies or intern-
ships abroad or by raising educational
levels, especially of the low and medi-
um skilled.
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Until recently there was a piecemeal
approach to the right of free move-
ment and residence in the EU. The
fact that the citizenship of the Union
confers the right to free movement
on every citizen of the Union is
reflected by the fact that there is now
one single Community instrument
dealing with the right to move and
reside within the Union (Directive
2004/38/EC). Member States had 
to comply with this directive by 
30 April 2006.
Action has also been taken in the
area of recognition of non-formal
and formal learning. In May 2004,
the Council (Education) adopted a
set of common European principles
on the validation of non-formal and
informal learning and finalised a
European Inventory on validation,
providing a basis for mutual learn-
ing and the exchange of experi-
ences between Member States.
As regards the transparency and
transferability of qualifications, an
issue that concerns both geographic
and occupational mobility, the single
framework for transparency of quali-
fications and competences —
Europass — was adopted in
December 2004 and launched in
February 2005. Through a European
Internet portal and a network of
National Europass Centres, Europass
makes available to citizens a coordi-
nated portfolio of transparent docu-
ments. Offering tools that are mostly
used by job-seekers, it is closely
related to the EURES Job Mobility
Portal and synergy is being devel-
oped between both instruments.
One of the most visible recent
achievements has been the introduc-
tion of the European Health
Insurance Card. Regulation
631/2004 aims at facilitating the
introduction of the European Health
Insurance Card by aligning the rights
on benefits in kind of all categories
of insured persons and by simplify-
ing the procedures, and was adopted
in March 2004. The European Health
Insurance Card, which is currently
used by over 30 million citizens, has
been in place in all countries of the
European Economic Area since the
end of 2005.
The coordination of Social Security
Schemes has been improved through
the simplification and modernisation
of Regulation 1408/71 by means of
the new Regulation 883/2004. The
new Regulation contains a number of
key provisions for the promotion of
mobility and the improvement of
protection levels for migrant workers
and their families, such as the possi-
bility of extending the period during
which a job-seeker can look for work
in another Member State from three
to six months; the possibility of
exporting pre-retirement benefits,
which may result in healthcare cover-
age and entitlement to family bene-
fits; the supplementary possibility
for unemployed frontier workers to
seek a job in the Member State of
former employment by keeping their
entitlement to unemployment bene-
fits in the Member State of resi-
dence; as well as the improvement of
healthcare protection for family
members of a frontier worker by
granting them not only entitlement to
healthcare in the Member State of
residence, but also in the Member
State where they work.
The process of improving the
recognition of professional quali-
fications for regulated profes-
sions produced likewise significant
results with the adoption of the
related Directive 2005/36/EC in
September 2005. The new Directive
integrates fifteen Directives into
one single framework, while
respecting existing guarantees for
migrants. It introduces a number of
changes including greater facilita-
tion of cross-border provision of
services for regulated professions,
which is an essential element of the
Commission’s Services Strategy. It
also offers the opportunity to obtain
more automatic recognition of qual-
ifications on the basis of common
platforms, increased flexibility in
procedures and better guidance of
citizens concerning the recognition
of their professional qualifications. 
The Spring European Council of
March 2005 requested that measures
be taken as regards the recognition
of educational qualifications and
competences in non-regulated
professions through the creation of a
European Qualifications Framework
(EQF) for higher education and
vocational education and training in
this area. The instrument is designed
as a shared reference document,
which will make it possible to posi-
tion and compare different learning
outcomes and thus facilitate the
transfer and recognition of qualifica-
tions held by individual citizens. 
Concerning the portability of sup-
plementary pensions, the Com-
mission proposed on 20 October
2005 a new Directive26 aimed at
reducing the obstacles to mobility
within and between Member States
caused by the existing supplemen-
tary pension schemes provisions.
The obstacles referred in particular
to the conditions of acquisition of
pension rights, the conditions of
preservation of dormant pension
rights, as well as the transferability
of acquired rights. The proposal
complements the community acquis
in the area of supplementary pen-
sions such as Directive 98/49/EC on
the safeguarding supplementary
pension rights of employed and self-
employed persons moving within
the EU.
Box 4 – Recent actions at EU level for improving geographic mobility
26 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on improving the portability of supplementary pension rights, COM(2005) 507 final.
27 http://europa.eu.int/ploteus/portal/home.jsp 
28 http://europa.eu.int/eracareers/index_en.cfm 
29 http://ec.europa.eu/youreurope/index_en.html 
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5. Commuting
Geographic labour mobility is not con-
fined to people moving residence from
one region or country to another.
Across the EU, significant numbers of
people travel quite long distances,
sometimes across country borders,
from their homes to their places of
work, mostly every day, though occa-
sionally every week or at less frequent
intervals. In practice, this is a far more
common occurrence than people mov-
ing house to take up employment and is
an equally important aspect of mobility.
Commuting may have environmental
and other disadvantages, but also has
its benefits, both for the individual
worker as well as the labour market.
For the individual worker, commuting
may mean lower mobility costs com-
pared to moving house, as the cost of
transportation and time spent on the
commute may well be below the mate-
rial and social cost of a complete relo-
cation, especially in the presence of
modern transport systems. For employ-
ers, commuting has the advantage of
being able to tap into the labour supply
beyond local labour markets and attract
workers who otherwise would not be
willing or able to move house.
5.1. Commuting between
regions
One question is how to distinguish a
commute from the normal way to work
which most workers face every day.
Usually, a commuter is defined as
somebody who has to cross a regional
boundary to get from home to work.
Ideally, this would involve trying to
capture commutes between labour mar-
ket regions. For practical reasons, how-
ever, the regional boundary is normally
determined through administrative bor-
ders, although in reality there will be
cases in which a commute between two
neighbouring regions may actually be a
trip to work within the same regional
labour market and may also be shorter
in time or distance than a trip to work
within a region.
With this caveat in mind, examined
first are the LFS data on commuting
within Member States between NUTS
2 regions. According to this, there is
significantly more commuting going
on within the old Member States com-
pared to the new Member States. In
2005, 8% of the employed working age
population of the old Member States
(for which data are available – see
Chart 14) commuted between NUTS 2
regions. For the four new Member
States for which data are available
(namely CZ, HU, PL, SK), the regional
commuting rate was 2.6% in 2005 (see
Chart 12).
In order to ensure improved informa-
tion and more transparency of job
opportunities in Europe, the
Commission launched in September
2003 the EURES Job Mobility
Information Portal with the objec-
tive to provide Europe-wide access to
available jobs and skilled workers.
EURES links together the Public
Employment Services of the Member
States and partners such as employers
and trade union organisations. The
launch of the Portal has substantially
improved and simplified the access of
workers and employers to practical
information on questions related to
job mobility. With around 1 million
unique visitors per month, EURES
has become one of the most visited
Commission websites. By the end of
2005, further extensions of the Portal
enabled all EU citizens to have direct
access, through a common IT plat-
form, to all job vacancies published
by the Public Employment Services,
namely in the order of 1 million job
vacancies at any given time. 
EURES has also developed links with
other relevant information providers,
in particular PLOTEUS, the Portal
on Learning Opportunities through-
out the European Space27, and the
European Researcher’s Mobility
portal, also known as ERACA-
REERS28, which aims at creating a
more favourable environment for
career development opportunities for
researchers within the European
Research Area. The Portal offers free
direct advertisements of job vacancies
in the research area and posting of
CVs. In addition to the services pro-
vided through the Researchers’
Mobility Portal, researchers and their
families have, since 2004, access to a
tailored and personalised assistance
service operated through ERA-
MORE, a network of 200 mobility
centres located in 32 countries.
Another significant development on
the information side is the launch, in
February 2005, of the Your Europe
Portal29. The portal offers practical
information and opportunities to
European citizens wishing to work or
study in another EU Member State, or
to European businesses wanting to
move to or open a new branch in
another EU Member State. Over
3,000 different documents are cur-
rently stored in the Portal, covering
both general European-level and
country-related information. 
Box 5 – Improving information and transparency of job opportunities
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There are significant differences in the
commuting rates among the Member
States. Belgium, for example, has by
far the highest commuting rate, with
one in every five employees crossing a
regional border on their way to and
from work, followed by the UK, where
every sixth employee is a commuter.
Other countries with high internal com-
muting rates are the Netherlands
(12%), Austria (11%) and Germany
(10%). The lowest commuting rates are
found in Spain (1.8%) and Greece
(0.2%). Among the new Member
States, the Czech Republic and
Slovakia each have internal commuting
rates of 4.5%, and Hungary of 3.8%.
Poland, on the other hand, has the sec-
ond lowest commuting rate of all EU-
25 countries of just 1.4%.
Comparing 2005 with the situation at
the beginning of the current decade, it
seems that commuting has increased
slightly in the three new Member States
for which such a comparison is possible
(CZ, HU, SK). For the old Member
States, the data vary from country to
country. In Belgium, the UK, Germany,
Portugal, Finland and Spain, commut-
ing rates have increased slightly,
whereas the Netherlands, Austria,
France and Italy have seen pronounced
decreases.
Additional recent data on commuting is
available from the EU ad-hoc labour
market survey 200430. This survey
includes data on commuting by gender,
age group and duration, as well as dis-
tance of commute by Member State. In
particular, the data on commuting dis-
tance allows long-distance commuters
to be distinguished from short-distance
commuters, compared to the regular
LFS data. According to this survey, 9%
of the employed population in the EU-
15 Member States travel more than 
30 kilometres to work, compared to 6%
in the EU-10 (see Table 15). For short-
er distances the situation is the other
way around and more pronounced.
About 60% of the new Member States
employed population have a commute
of up to 30km compared to 39% in the
old Member States. 
The data also show that commuting is
much more prevalent among employed
men than among employed women.
Around 44% of all employed men are
commuters (including both short and
long-distance commuters), compared
to 34% of employed women. Age also
plays a role with younger people below
30 more likely to commute than older
workers.
30 See http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/indicators/business_consumer_surveys/studies_en.htm 
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5.2. Commuting between
countries
Given the close geographic proximity
between many EU Member States,
commuting is not only a phenomenon
within but also between many Member
States, albeit on a much smaller scale
than internal commuting. On average,
0.4% of the EU-25 working age popu-
lation lives in one Member State and
works in another. 
The scale of cross-border commuting
varies markedly between Member
States, as might be expected given the
different geographic positions of the
countries concerned. By far the highest
external commuting rate is found in
Slovakia, where many workers commute
to work in the neighbouring Czech
Republic and Austria. Among the EU-
15, Belgium has the highest relative
share of EU commuters (2.5%). By
comparison, countries such as Italy and
the UK have very low EU external com-
muting rates of 0.1% (see Chart 15).
A number of Member States also have
significant commuting flows with non-
EU countries. For example, Austria,
France, Germany and Italy have flows
mainly with neighbouring Switzerland,
Sweden mostly with Norway.
6. Summary and
conclusions
This chapter highlights major empirical
evidence on geographic mobility with-
in the EU in recent years. Overall, geo-
graphic mobility is a limited phenome-
non both relative to the total EU popu-
lation and compared to migration from
third countries to the EU. Currently,
less than 2% of EU working age citi-
zens live in another EU Member State.
The big majority of them are citizens of
the 15 old Member States and only a
minority is from the 10 new Member
States that joined the EU in May 2004.
Taken together, this is clearly less than
20% of the total foreign-born working
age population of the EU. 
Nevertheless, there are substantial dif-
ferences across Member States, both
with respect to destination and sending
countries. Luxembourg aside, where
due to several specific reasons well
over a third of the labour force is from
another from another EU Member
State, Ireland (5.3%), Belgium (4.6%),
Austria (3.3%), Germany (2.5%), the
UK (2.2%), Sweden (2.2%) and France
(2%) are the countries with the highest
0.0
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2.0
3.0
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5.0
6.0
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share of other EU nationals in its labour
force. In all other Member States, the
share of EU nationals among the over-
all active working age population is
below 2%. Furthermore, in a majority
of Member States, the share of workers
from the EU-10 countries is well below
that of workers from the other EU-15
Member States. Only Ireland and
Austria host a sizable share of EU-10
workers which is similar (but still
below) to that of other EU-15 workers.
In Germany and the UK, which are also
popular destination countries for EU-
10 workers, their share comes to only
0.5% of the labour force. In all other
old Member States, the proportion of
EU-10 workers is below that. 
As for countries of origin, Irish and
Portuguese citizens have in the past
been the most mobile in relative terms,
with about a tenth of active working
age citizens of these countries living in
another EU Member State. By compar-
ison, the share of Lithuanian workers
living in another EU country is 3.4% of
the Lithuanian labour force and similar
to that of Austrians and Greeks. For
Poland, the share is 2.1% and close to
the proportion of Finnish, Belgian and
Italian workers living abroad.
As for current mobility flows, available
data show that about 0.1% of the EU-15
national labour force has been changing
its place of residence from one Member
State to another each year since 2000.
Due to the problems of official statistics
of recording all newcomers and short-
term mobility lasting less than one year,
this figure is likely to be an underestima-
tion of true mobility levels. However, it is
an indication that international cross-
border mobility rates between the EU-15
countries are low. The preferred destina-
tion countries of the EU-15 mobile in
recent years have been, by order of pref-
erence, the UK, Germany, Spain and
France, and the majority of movers from
the old Member States have been coming
from France, Germany, the UK and Italy. 
Mobility rates with respect to flows of
workers from the EU-10 to the EU-15
after enlargement have been relatively
limited according to the evidence so far
and the flow from EU-15 to EU-10
Member States has been largely negli-
gible.
Regional mobility within Member
States is significantly higher than
cross-border mobility, although region-
al mobility rates between countries
vary greatly. Internal mobility is sub-
stantially lower in the new Member
States compared to the old Member
States. Due to data limitations, it is dif-
ficult to identify a clear trend over time,
but it seems that overall regional mobil-
ity rates have remained largely the
same between 2000 and 2005, with per-
haps a slight increase in the new
Member States and stable trends in the
old Member States. Overall, internal
mobility rates in the EU are lower than
in the US, although not as wide as
sometimes claimed. Nevertheless, both
the existing mobility gap with the US
as well as the relatively low cross-bor-
der mobility in the EU and the great
differences between internal mobility
rates suggest that there is a potential for
higher mobility in the EU.
In comparison with the overall work-
ing age population, but also compared
with mobile workers from non-EU
countries, internationally mobile EU-
15 citizens are significantly younger,
higher skilled, mostly single and less
likely to have children. However, their
gender composition is similar to that
of the overall labour force, with
roughly 60% male and 40% female
movers. There are indications that
their skill level has increased since
2000, and there seems to be a trend
towards higher mobility among older
workers. EU-15 mobile tend to be
overrepresented in the hotel and
restaurant sector and in business serv-
ices and well over half of them occupy
high-skill white-collar jobs.
Internationally mobile workers from
the EU-10 Member States differ from
their EU-15 counterparts in a number
of aspects. The share of young workers
is considerably higher among the EU-
10 mobile than among the EU-15 and
non-EU mobile, their gender composi-
tion is more balanced and they are
more likely to be married. Although the
share of highly educated workers is rel-
atively low among the EU-10 mobile,
the proportion of medium-skilled
movers is very high. The proportion of
EU-10 mobile people working in the
hotel and restaurant business is similar
to that of their EU-15 counterparts.
However, they are more likely to be
employed in manufacturing and the
construction industry, and significantly
less likely to concentrate in service
activities other than trade and hospital-
ity services. They are also much less
likely to be in high-skilled non-manual
positions, but have a substantially high-
er concentration in skilled blue-collar
and elementary occupations. This and
their different educational structure
suggest that EU-10 workers tend to
contribute to national economies in a
complementary way instead of general-
ly competing for similar jobs with the
national labour force.
As for labour market outcomes, the
employment rates of mobile EU-15 cit-
izens are very similar, if not higher than
those of the total working age popula-
tion. Employment rates of EU-10 citi-
zens resident in the old Member States
have increased considerably over recent
years, are close to those of the overall
population and EU-15 movers and sub-
stantially higher than for non-EU
nationals.
However, there are significant differ-
ences between countries, mainly with
respect to the labour market perform-
ance of their EU-10 and non-EU popu-
lations. Spain, Austria, the UK, and
most of all Ireland are countries where
EU-10 nationals have employment
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rates well above the employment rate of
the overall population and other EU-15
nationals. On the other hand, employ-
ment rates of EU-10 citizens in
Belgium, Germany, Greece, France, the
Netherlands, Finland and Sweden are
substantially below the national aver-
age. However, they are still consider-
ably higher than those of resident non-
EU citizens whose employment rate is
on average 55%, and in some countries
much below that.
Overall, finding a job in another country
is a motivation to move for unemployed
and inactive people. Geographically
mobile workers who were unemployed
in another EU country the previous year
are significantly more likely to have
found a job than an unemployed who has
not changed residence.
Europeans in general and those who
already know it from their own experi-
ence, largely regard geographic mobili-
ty as something positive. While eco-
nomic factors such as the prospect of
better income and employment condi-
tions are the most important mobility
incentive for citizens from the new
Member States, citizens from the old
Member States seem to regard
“lifestyle” factors such as better wea-
ther, the adventure of discovering a new
environment, learning a new language
or meeting new people as important as
economic factors.
Nevertheless, the willingness to actual-
ly move remains limited, especially
when it comes to change of residence
to another Member State. Admin-
istrative barriers to mobility are still
considered an obstacle, albeit on a
minor scale compared to other factors
and difficulties, such as language, the
concern of losing social ties to friends
and family, and coping with a different
culture or finding a job or housing in
another country or region.
Commuting between regions, but also
between Member States, is a common
and in many countries increasing form
of geographic mobility which can be an
alternative to residential mobility.
Despite its potential environmental and
other consequences, it can be an attrac-
tive alternative to changing residence
and enhances the local supply of
labour. However, the potential of com-
muting depends on geographic proxim-
ity and the availability and expansion
of modern transport infrastructures.
In general, further research is needed on
how much geographic mobility
European labour markets need, or rather
how mobility can be optimised, taking
into account both social and economic
aspects31. Geographic mobility can be
an enriching experience for the individ-
ual worker in economic terms and with
respect to quality of life and contributes
to improving labour market efficiency. 
In spite of this, overall geographic
mobility in the EU has remained rela-
tively low until now. Survey data on the
intention of European citizens to move
to another country in the next five years
suggest that cross-border mobility
between the EU-15 Member States may
increase somewhat in the near future,
but it remains to be seen by how much. 
As for the EU-8 countries, one can
observe two distinct groups of coun-
tries which greatly differ in their
expected mobility rates. The Czech
Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and
Slovenia, have expected mobility rates
which are below that of most old
Member States. It is therefore unlikely
that future labour flows from these
countries will cause significant pres-
sures on the labour markets in the EU-
15 Member States. Considering that
geographic mobility is an important
mechanism for improving labour mar-
ket efficiency, their low mobility rates
may be rather a cause of concern than a
justification for the continued applica-
tion of transitional arrangements.
On the other hand, expected mobility
from the three Baltic countries and
Poland is indeed significantly higher
than that from the rest of the Member
States. In principle, this should be wel-
come news, as the mobile workers from
these countries and the companies
employing them are demonstrating a
high degree of flexibility and adaptabil-
ity. It also seems unlikely that this will
pose major and lasting challenges for
the labour markets of the receiving
countries, given the large size of the
total European labour market and the
positive experiences of the countries
such as Ireland and the UK who
already host a considerable number of
workers from these countries. 
If at all, the relatively high expected
mobility from the Baltic countries and
Poland may raise questions in relation to
youth and brain drain. However, this
depends on who moves and how perma-
nent emigration from these countries
will be. Only two and a half years after
enlargement it seems too early to draw
firm conclusions on this. The fact that a
high share of movers from those coun-
tries is in the youngest age group, has
medium skill levels short of tertiary edu-
cation and tends to move into relatively
low-skilled occupations could be a rea-
son to expect that many of them may
return to their home country with the
money and experiences earned abroad.
Looking at the longer term, geographi-
cal mobility between the EU Member
States is likely to be affected by aging
populations. According to recent popu-
lation projections the EU population
will age substantially over the next
decades and the younger age popula-
tion is set to shrink considerably32. As
the number of young entrants in the
31 DG Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities is supporting research on this through studies launched in the framework of the European
Year of Workers' Mobility 2006.
32 See Eurostat (2006, 1).
labour market is projected to fall and as
young people are the most likely to be
mobile, demographics will act as
another brake on geographic mobility. 
Given the relatively low mobility levels
in Europe and demographic develop-
ments, it will require a combined set of
measures to foster geographic mobility.
Major achievements have already been
made in recent years to lower adminis-
trative and legal barriers to mobility,
for example through improved trans-
parency, transferability and recognition
of qualifications, the introduction of a
European health insurance card and a
better co-ordination of Social Security
Schemes. These efforts should contin-
ue, for example through the Com-
mission’s proposals for improving the
portability of supplementary pension
rights or by further improving the infor-
mation and transparency of job oppor-
tunities in Europe through the EURES
network. Furthermore, the restrictions
on the free movement of workers from
new Member States should be lifted as
soon as possible.
However, the removal of administrative,
legal and information barriers to mobil-
ity will not be enough. It will help
European citizens to better exercise their
right of free movement and facilitate
individual moving decisions. Yet, the
social, cultural, educational and infra-
structure barriers to mobility would still
remain as the main obstacles. This is an
area where policy makers from the EU
level all the way down to the local level
could contribute to improve matters, for
example by fostering the integration and
acceptance of newcomers, by providing
for more attractive urban environments
and housing markets, by improving lan-
guage skills, by helping young people to
gain first mobility experiences through
studies or internships abroad or by rais-
ing educational levels, especially for the
low and medium skilled.
Geographic mobility represents an
important element in the strategy to
cope with the current and future labour
market challenges in the enlarged EU.
However, in order to provide an effi-
cient policy response to these chal-
lenges, policies on geographic mobility
need to be coupled with actions in the
field of other employment policies (for
example by attracting and retaining
more people in employment or by com-
bining in an adequate way labour mar-
ket flexibility with employment securi-
ty), education and regional and struc-
tural policy. And if it is accepted that
there are positive effects of geographic
mobility between and within Member
States, it is hard to ignore the great
potential of migration to the EU. It is
not only sensible but also necessary to
continue efforts to develop a uniform
and responsible policy on immigration
from third countries.
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